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Abstract
Recent research carried out under the 'third wave of science studies' has produced 
robust categories of expertise, and has developed normative ideas about how it 
should be used during controversies over technological decision-making. Though 
separate in the literature, third wave ideas about contributory expertise appear to 
be compatible with the recent 'turn to ontology'. Both sets of ideas focus on what 
it is that practices are able to produce, and consider the results of those practices 
to be real. It is argued here that contributory expertise can usefully be treated 
as an 'object' under the ontological framework, thus placing additional analytical 
focus on the practices that are used to enact it.
To explore this idea, documentary analysis and qualitative interviews have been 
used to produce a description of cryptology research and the crypto wars in the 
United Kingdom from 1970 to 2000. The cryptology research carried out at four 
research sites will be described. It is argued that, given divergence amongst the 
institutional research practices used at each site, the contributory cryptology ex­
pertises enacted during this period were 'multiple', and can be identified as such 
using sociological discrimination. A description of how these expertises were then 
used during the crypto wars - a subsequent controversy over the regulation and use 
of cryptography in the 1990s - is also provided. It is argued that, as a consequence 
of this multiplicity, expertises were used during the crypto wars in different ways 
and for different purposes. In particular, the consequences of basing political deci­
sions on expertise enacted in secret are described. It is argued that acknowledging 
multiplicity amongst contributory expertise could be used to improve the applica­
tion of 'elective modernism', and to refine its core tenets through the application 
of a 'Minimum Transfer Requirement' and the identification of the 'problem of 
exp ert discrimination '.
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Introduction
1.1 C ontroversies and E xp ertise
This thesis is about controversies over technological decision-making. A contro­
versy over technological decision-making is a protracted disagreement over what 
the right political decision might be on an issue that intersects with science and 
technology. It therefore refers to controversies over, say, the use of nuclear power, 
the production of genetically modihed food, the right response to climate change, 
or the use of vivisection to further scientific knowledge. Controversies over techno­
logical decision-making are important because, given the prominent role of science 
and technology in Western societies, their outcomes partly determine the nature 
of the society that we live in. The outcomes of controversies over technological 
decision-making have the potential to improve or worsen the lives of many within 
society. In extreme cases, arriving at a particular decision can determine whether 
human lives are saved or lost (e.g. Weinel 2010).
Studies of controversies over technological decision-making have been a core com­
ponent of the interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) since 
the 1970s (e.g. Nelkin 1971, 1979, 1984, 19936, Wynne 1982, 1992, Epstein 1996, 
Mulkay 1997, Jasanoff 2005). It is perhaps surprising, then, that although work 
within STS has been successful in delivering rich, detailed, case study descriptions, 
some scholars have expressed a reluctance to use these as a platform for developing 
normative ideas about how actors ought to behave, and what processes should be 
used, if the 'best' outcome is to be achieved (e.g. Jasanoff 2003, Lynch & Cole 
2005). Those that have identified a need for a more 'engaged' approach have
1
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oAen called for various forms of increased democratic public participation in con­
troversies over technological decision-making (e.g. Irwin 1995, Burningham 1998, 
Wilsdon &: Willis 2004). However, in the last ten to fifteen years, a body of work 
under the heading of the 'third wave of science studies' (hereafter 'third wave') has 
emerged that offers an alternative approach (Collins & Evans 2002, 2007, Collins 
et al. 2010, Collins 2014a). As Harry Collins and Robert Evans have explained:
W hat we want to do is consider how to make good decisions in the 
right way. But our particular concern is to find a rationale which is 
not inconsistent with the last three decades of work in science studies.
Our initial claim is that though many others working within the science 
studies tradition have studied the problem, and contributed valuably 
to the debate about technical decision-making^, they have not solved 
it in a way that is completely intellectually satisfying (Collins & Evans 
2002, p.236).
The third wave is rooted in the study of expertise. Put simply, expertise is consid­
ered important because it is a powerful tool that can be used to inform decisions, 
justify preferences, and frame questions. According to Collins and Evans (2002), 
the study of the relationship between controversies over technological decision­
making and expertise can be divided into three 'waves'. They have argued that 
sociological analysts working within a particular wave have tended to hold a cer­
tain view of the relationship between scientific and technological expertise and 
controversies over technological decision-making. They argued that, during the 
first wave of science studies, which preceded the 1960s, good scientific credentials 
were largely seen as synonymous with expertise. Scientific credentials were there­
fore used as criteria for demarcating the expert from the non-expert, occasionally 
even on non-scientific or non-technical matters. Though nowadays considered out­
dated by STS scholars, echoes of this view can be found in contemporary popular
^Earlier third wave work refers to 'technical decision-making' rather than 'technological 
decision-making'. However, 'technological decision-making' is now used as standard after clari­
fication from Weinel (2010).
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discourse.^ One consequence of this view is that, during controversies over techno­
logical decision-making, given that only credentialed scientists can be thought of 
as experts, they are the only ones imbued with authority to influence technological 
decisions. Taken to its extreme, this constitutes a form of technocracy (Collins 
et al. 2010).
As STS matured, and in line with a broader rejection of technocratic ideals (see 
Ezrahi 1990), the belief that authority should reside solely in credentialed scientific 
and technological expertise during controversies over technological decision-making 
has been shown to be both untenable and undesirable. Sociological analysts work­
ing under the second wave of science studies, which started in the 1960s and 
continues to the present day, have shown that credentialed scientific expertise, 
when applied by itself to many controversial issues in society, is not necessarily 
robust or hexible enough to satisfactorily resolve them. In some cases, it is argued, 
scientific expertise needs to be complemented with other types of knowledge about 
the problem being tackled (e.g. Irwin 1995, Epstein 1996). However, some working 
under wave two have gone further in their critique of the wave one understand­
ing. Here, the very use of scientific expertise in controversies over technological 
decision-making is challenged because it is seen to impose an undemocratic sci­
entific and technological framing that is in conflict with wider moral or political 
priorities (Wynne 2003). Taken to its extreme, this rejection of technocracy can 
result in an endorsement of 'technological populism', given that it threatens to 
erode any distinction between experts and non-experts (Collins et al. 2010).
In response, those working under the third wave consider both the technocracy 
characteristic of wave one, and the technological populism characteristic of wave 
two, to be unsatisfactory. Therefore, they have attempted to chart a path between 
the two. They have done this through a reconceptualization of expertise (Collins 
& Evans 2007). In short, the third wave sees expertise as a product of sustained 
social experience of a particular domain, rather than resulting solely from possess­
ing formal credentials, studying primary sources, or being an active citizen. Thus,
^This is visible, for example, in debates over whether there should be more UK Members of 
Parliament (MPs) with scientific expertise. Those that have argued in favour of this have done 
so not because of the benefits to be gained hom the expertise that scientists might have in their 
own specific held, but rather because of the belief that their training has provided them with 
the expertise to generally make more rational, evidence-based decisions (e.g. Henderson 2011). 
However, others have argued that there is no strong evidence to suggest that MPs with scientihc 
expertise vote any differently from those that don't (Goodwin 2014).
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expertise is primarily rooted in the tacit knowledge that is acquired through so­
cial experience, rather than the explicit knowledge that can be accrued without 
it (Collins 2010). Consequently, those who can be said to possess expertise rele­
vant to technological decision-making may include those who don't possess formal 
scientific credentials but do have practical experience of contributing towards a 
relevant scientific or non-scientific domain, whilst also allowing for the possibility 
of excluding those that do possess good scientific credentials if they lack the rel­
evant experience. The third wave, through its periodic table of expertise, states 
that those who have contributory expertise - acquired through the accumulation of 
the tacit knowledge that comes from experience of contributing to a held, or inter­
actional expertise - acquired through the accumulation of tacit knowledge based 
on experience of being immersed in the language of that held, can be said to pos­
sess specialist expertise. This is contrasted with forms of non-specialist expertise, 
which is typically based on knowledge of a domain that can be made explicit, and 
thus can be acquired without being engaged in certain social practices (Collins & 
Evans 2007).
This way of conceptualizing expertise has been used as a platform for ideas about 
how it should be used during controversies over technological decision-making. 
This aspect of the third wave has been called 'elective modernism' (Collins et al. 
2010). Elective modernism, which remains a work in progress, attempts to de- 
hne a system that avoids both technocracy and technological populism. It does 
this by embodying the insights from the second and third waves in normative 
rules about how controversies over technological decision-making should be man­
aged. Elective modernist prescriptions are designed to allow for controversies over 
technological decision-making to be informed by the relevant specialist expertise, 
whilst preventing that expertise from dominating democratic processes. There is 
thus "a preference for democracies which actively promote discussion and debate 
of technical matters yet which reject populism of all kinds while still rejecting 
technocracy", and a belief that "scientihc values [are] among those which should 
be at the heart of a good society" (Collins et al. 2010, p. 185).
Third wave ideas have not escaped criticism (Wynne 2003, Rip 2003, Jasanoff 
2003, Fischer 2011, Forsyth 2011, Epstein 2011). However, critical engagement 
has often been disappointing because most critiques have not addressed third wave 
concepts directly. Rather, they have focussed on the premise on which the third 
wave is based. It is typically argued that the descriptive work of the second wave
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should continue, and the normative work of the third wave should be postponed or 
even abandoned. Those that defend the third wave have (reluctantly) pointed out 
that these criticisms resemble those typically found in cases of Kuhnian paradigm 
incommensurability, in that:
(1) The two sides tend to use disparate sets of exemplary cases to illus­
trate their points. (2) There is a failure to get sufficiently far 'inside' 
the new perspective to know how to give it a fair or even charitable 
reading before starting on the critique. (3) There is a tendency to re­
state the core beliefs of the 'old paradigm' as if they were criticisms in 
themselves. (4) The old paradigm is said to be able to cope with all the 
things that the new view claims to solve so long as one accepts a few 
small anomalies and inconsistencies (Collins et al. 2011, pp.340-341).
The style and nature of the debate over the third wave therefore belies the fact 
that the third and second waves occupy much common ground, and that the 
third wave attempts to use insights from the second wave to inform its normative 
arguments. In making this point, one observer has drawn attention to the small 
pool of case studies used as a basis for understanding expertise during controversies 
over technological decision-making, and has argued that more are needed:
I am struck on reading the exchanges about the Third Wave by the 
abstraction of the debate, yet at the same time by the powerful influ­
ence of a relatively small number of studies of actual decision-making 
processes... That empirical investigations have done so much to illumi­
nate relations between knowledge and policy/pohtical processes sug­
gests that we should far more often 'go and see', especially in the highly 
dynamic circumstances of technological innovation and change (Owens 
2011, p.331).
It is with this in mind that I introduce a new case study of a controversy over tech­
nological decision-making to the third wave debate. In this thesis, I will present a 
case study of cryptology research and the crypto wars in the United Kingdom from 
1970 to 2000. The purpose of this case study is to both contribute towards the 
third wave debate, and to improve our sociological understanding of cryptology 
and the crypto wars.
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1.2 C ryp to logy  and th e  C ryp to  W ars
Cryptology and the crypto wars are not topics that most people are familiar with, 
so it is useful to introduce the basics. Cryptology is concerned with the writing 
and breaking of codes and ciphers. 'Cryptography' refers to "the science and art 
of designing ciphers", 'cryptanalysis' to "the science and art of breaking them ", 
and 'cryptology' to "the study of both" (Anderson 2008, p. 130).
Cryptology can therefore be used, in its most straightforward implementation, to 
communicate in secret through the sending and receiving of encrypted messages. 
Cryptography can be used to encrypt the content of emails such that only the 
intended recipient is able to read them. This makes cryptographic technologies 
important to those concerned that individual privacy is being eroded by the in­
creasing prevalence of electronic communication, and the ease with which such 
communications can be intercepted. Additionally, developments in modern cryp­
tology are significant because, as well as providing the means to encrypt (and 
decrypt) simple messages, they can also be embedded into electronic technologies 
to provide: data confidentiality - restrictions on who or what can access data; 
data integrity - assurances about the accuracy and consistency of data; and au­
thentication - a means of confirming whether someone or something is who or 
what they claim to be.^ Modern cryptology is therefore used to underpin the se­
curity of many electronic systems, including Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), 
computer passwords, and home security systems. Additionally, cryptology, in the 
form of the Secure Socket Layer and the Transport Socket Layer protocols - which 
are built into most web browsers - are used to secure the transmission of financial 
information between a customer and a vendor during online transactions (Piper & 
Murphy 2002, pp. 130-132). Cryptographic technologies are therefore essential for 
the prevention of fraud, and other criminal activity, in a world increasingly reliant 
on electronic communication networks.
However, by the same logic, cryptographic technologies can also be used by crim­
inals, terrorists, businesses, and other actors, to hide their communications and 
conceal their activity, thus making it harder for law enforcement bodies and intel­
ligence organizations to detect any wrongdoing. This created a tension between 
the apparent benefits of widespread access to cryptography, conceived of in terms
^'Modern' cryptography is used here to refer to developments in the held from the 1970s 
onwards, particularly those associated with Public-Key Cryptography.
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of individual privacy and fraud prevention, and the apparent risks associated with 
widespread access to cryptography, conceived of in terms of the problems it cre­
ated for effective law enforcement. When this tension arose, governments in many 
countries around the world decided that they needed a policy to resolve it. The 
'crypto wars' - the name most commonly used to refer to the political debates 
over these issues - emerged out of disagreements over the various governmental 
attempts to regulate the access to and use of cryptographic technologies during 
the 1990s.
1.2.1 W hy C ryptology and the C rypto Wars?
Before saying anything further about cryptology and the crypto wars, I will explain 
why I have chosen to use it as a case study to speak about the third wave. There 
are four main reasons. The hrst of these has already been alluded to. It has been 
observed that the third wave debate, and indeed the wider debate about expertise 
and controversies over technological decision-making, would benefit from being 
able to draw upon a larger pool of case studies (Owens 2011). Furthermore, given 
that many of the existing case studies are based on controversies that intersect 
with the natural sciences, the debate would benefit from the introduction of case 
studies from the mathematical sciences, such as computing and cryptology.
Secondly, cryptographic technologies, though rarely discussed, are undoubtedly 
important to modern Western societies. Lawrence Lessig has argued that crypto­
graphic technologies constitute "the most important technological breakthrough 
in the last one thousand years", and that "no other technological discovery - from 
nuclear weapons (I hope) to the Internet - will have a more significant impact on 
social and political life" (Lessig 1999, pp.35-36). Though Lessig may be guilty of 
exaggerating the importance of cryptography, as electronic communication net­
works become ever more prevalent, its significance cannot continue to be ignored.
This links to a third reason. Although this case study will focus on events that 
occurred in the 1990s, the issues at the heart of the crypto wars are very much 
alive. Questions over the appropriate level of access to, and appropriate use of 
cryptology, continue to be raised. Issues surrounding cryptology were central to 
one of the biggest news stories in second decade of the twenty-first century - 
the leaking of secret intelligence information by former National Security Agency 
(NSA) employee Edward Snowden. Although this thesis will not discuss these
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events, and it will be some time before the dust has settled and they can be 
analysed by the academic community, it has been widely reported in the press that, 
since 2000, intelligence organizations have secretly attempted to build flaws into 
commercially available cryptographic technologies as part of a coordinated effort 
to read encrypted information (Perlroth et al. 2013). Now that this information 
has been made public, it is clear that the issue of whether it is appropriate for 
intelligence organizations to carry out this kind of cryptology work without public 
scrutiny is one that needs addressing.
Finally, as will become clear from the overview of cryptology and the crypto wars 
that will follow, this was a controversy that featured a broad array of expertise. 
This expertise was produced in a variety of different contexts and for a variety of 
different purposes. It was produced within academia, the civil service, industry, 
and intelligence organizations. But more importantly, cryptology expertise has in 
the past been singled-out as unusual compared to that produced by other scientific 
disciplines. The reason for this is that it is closely bound up with secrecy. Two 
lengthy quotes from eminent cryptologists - both of whom will be discussed in 
later chapters - will help illustrate this. In the hrst, Ross Anderson argued that:
The practice of cryptology differs from, say, that of aeronautical en­
gineering in a rather striking way: there is almost no public feedback 
about how cryptographic systems fail. When an aircraft crashes, it 
is front page news. Teams of investigators rush to the scene, and the 
subsequent enquiries are conducted by experts from organisations with 
a wide range of interests - the carrier, the insurer, the manufacturer, 
the airline pilots' union, and the local aviation authority. Their hnd- 
ings are examined by journalists and politicians, discussed in pilots' 
messes, and passed on by flying instructors. In short, the flying com­
munity has a strong and institutionalised learning mechanism. This 
is perhaps the main reason why, despite the inherent hazards of flying 
in large aircraft, which are maintained and piloted by fallible human 
beings, at hundreds of miles an hour through congested airspace, in 
bad weather and at night, the risk of being killed on an air journey is 
only about one in a million. In the crypto community, on the other 
hand, there is no such learning mechanism. The history of the subject
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shows the same mistakes being made over and over again; in partic­
ular, poor management of codebooks and cipher machine procedures 
enabled many communication networks to be broken (Anderson 1994).
In the second, James H. Ellis reflected that:
Cryptography is a most unusual science. Most professional scientists 
aim to be the first to publish their work, because it is through dissem­
ination that the work realises its value. In contrast, the fullest value 
of cryptography is realised by minimising the information available to 
potential adversaries. Thus professional cryptographers normally work 
in closed communities to provide sufficient professional interaction to 
ensure quality while maintaining secrecy from outsiders. Revelation of 
these secrets is normally only sanctioned in the interests of historical 
accuracy after it has been demonstrated clearly that no further benefit 
can be obtained from continued secrecy (Ellis 1987).
Although Robert K. Merton (1973) identified 'communalism' as one of the norms 
that underpins science, subsequent work within the second wave of science studies 
has shown that scientific research can also be guided by secrecy (Mirtoff 1974, 
Rappert 2009, Balmer 2012). Secrecy can be used to protect research findings 
in order to establish priority, to maintain a commercial advantage, or to prevent 
other nations from knowing about defence capabilities. However, judging by the 
above quotations, it is clear that the role of secrecy in cryptology research - at 
least in the minds of cryptologists - appears to be much more central than in other 
fields. Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) has argued that such 'extreme' cases are particularly 
useful in case-study research because they activate a greater number of actors and 
processes. For example, Diane Vaughan's (1996) study of the 1986 Challenger 
space shuttle explosion, though focussed on a very rare event, provided insights 
into the culture of large organizations like NASA, the role of small technologies in 
large projects, the unfolding of public inquiries, and the public role played by high- 
profile scientists. Given that secrecy is intertwined with cryptology to a greater 
degree than in most other fields, a study of cryptology may be valuable because it 
can be used to highlight processes that may be present to a lesser degree in other 
science and technology case studies.
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Plaintext: H E L L 0 W 0 R L D
Key: +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3
Ciphertext: K H 0 0 R Z R U 0 6
FIGURE 1.1: An Example of a Simple Substitution Cipher
1.2.2 The H istory of C ryptology
Before discussing modern cryptology and the crypto wars in more detail, it will 
be useful to say a little more about the history of the field and, in the process, 
introduce some of the basic technical concepts. The history of cryptology, from 
its invention in ancient times, to its use during the Second World War, has been 
well described (e.g. Kahn 1997, 1991, Singh 1999, Sebag-Montehore 2001). In his 
definitive 1,200 page history of cryptology, David Kahn (1997) comprehensively 
described the development and use of cryptology during this long period. Up 
until the twentieth century, cryptography was primarily used to encipher messages 
so that individuals could communicate with each other in secret. In one of his 
numerous historical examples, Kahn described the famous Caesar cipher - named 
after the cryptographic techniques used by Julius Caesar to communicate with 
his centurions. The Caesar cipher is an example of what's known as a 'simple 
substitution cipher'. Here, aa in most other examples, it is assumed that someone 
wants to send a message to someone else.'  ^ But, they do not want anyone but 
the intended recipient to be able to read it. If an intercepter sees the message 
before it reaches the recipient, it should be unintelligible to them. To create a 
simple substitution cipher, the ciphertext (the encrypted message) is produced 
by substituting each letter in the plaintext (the unencrypted message) with the 
letter, say, three places along in the alphabet. In this example, any 'A' would be 
substituted with a 'D', and any 'D ' would be substituted with a 'C  (any 'X', 'Y' 
or 'Z' would be replaced with an 'A ', 'B' or 'C , as the end of the alphabet joins 
back to the beginning).
In Figure 1.1, we can see that, using a simple substitution cipher, the message 
'HELLO WORLD' would be encrypted to 'KHOOR ZROUC. The process used 
to convert the plaintext into the ciphertext, in this case a shift of three places
'^Most explanations of basic ideas in cryptology use Alice' and 'Bob' to refer to the parties 
wishing to communicate. I don't hnd this naming convention particularly helpful, as the names 
used are non-descriptive. Therefore, I will typically use 'sender', 'recipient' and 'intercepter' 
instead.
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Plaintext: a E L L 0 W 0 R L D
Key; C R y P T 0 G R A M+3 +17 +25 +16 +19 +15 +7 +17 +1 +13
Ciphertext: K V K B I L V I M Q
FiG lTRE 1. 2: An Example of a Vigcnere Cipher
forward in the alphabet, is known as the 'key'. The ciphertext can be converted 
back into plaintext using a process that is the inverse of the process used to 
encrypt it, in this case, a shift of three places backwards in the alphabet. Due to 
the symmetry of the encryption and decryption processes, the Caesar Cipher is an 
example of what's known as 'symmetric' cryptography.
This is a very simple example. More elaborate methods of enciphering messages 
were developed between Caesar's lifetime and the twentieth century. A notable 
example is the Vigenere Cipher - where a message is enciphered based on the 
position of letters in a keyword in order to further distance the ciphertext from 
the plaintext (see Figure 1.2). The Caesar cipher is an example of what's known 
as a 'monoalphabetic' cipher, whereas the Vigenere Cipher is an example of what's 
known as a 'polyalphabetic' cipher. The famous Enigma Machine - a cryptographic 
device used to send messages by the German armed forces during the Second World 
War - though incredibly complex, was essentially based on a polyalphabetic cipher.
1.2.3 P ublic-K ey Cryptography
Modern cryptology can be said to begin with the development of public-key cryp­
tography. In the past, symmetric ciphers had a clear but limited use in certain 
contexts, such as military and intelligence work, and the private correspondence 
of interested individuals.^ The advent of networked computer systems in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, together with rapid developments in computer hardware, 
prompted a rethink of what cryptology could be used for. This process began 
when Horst Feistel, a researcher at IBM, proposed a system whereby messages 
could be represented by a sequence of binary digits, which could in turn be en­
ciphered at a speed and complexity that would have been impossible to achieve 
manually. Feistel's algorithm, which he called Lucifer, was identified as a way
^Many prominent historical figures, such as Benjamin Franklin and Lewis Carroll, have dis­
played an interest in using cryptography to communicate in secret (see Kahn 1997).
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of securing potentially sensitive hnancial information transmitted by the newly 
introduced network of ATMs. Aware of the increasing demand for secure systems 
of this type, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) in the US selected Lucifer 
as the algorithm to underpin their new Data Encryption Standard (DES) in 1975 
(Blanchette 2012, pp.34-35).
Importantly, no matter how complicated the encipherment process, for symmetric 
ciphers, the ciphertext can always be converted back into plaintext if the key is 
known. Whilst statistical cryptanalysis techniques can also be used to determine 
the key used given certain conditions, in practice, for symmetric ciphers to be 
useful, the recipient must know the key in order to be able to read the message. 
This creates what's known as the key distribution problem - namely, how does the 
sender make the recipient aware of the key without also making the interceptor 
aware of it at the same time? Until the 1970s, the insolubility of this problem was 
believed to be one of the fundamental tenets of cryptology.
Then, in the mid 1970s, cryptology changed radically with the development of 
'asymmetric' or 'public-key' cryptography. Although developed independently in a 
number of contexts, public-key cryptography is usually associated with the work of 
two American computer scientists - Whitheld Dilhe and Martin Heilman. In 1976, 
they published a paper - with the bold title of 'New Directions in Cryptography' 
- that proposed techniques for solving the key distribution problem, and in the 
process, expanded the potential uses of cryptography (Dillie &: Heilman 1976). 
Difhe and Heilman's system was based on both the sender and the recipient having 
their own key, and it being split in two - with one part made publicly accessible, 
and the other part kept private. Thus, when the sender wished to send a message 
to the recipient, they could encrypt it using the recipient's public key. Due to a 
one-way mathematical relationship between the public and private keys, only the 
intended recipient would have the correct private key to successfully decrypt the 
message. Under this system, private keys do not have to be exchanged prior to 
the communication. Furthermore, the internal logical of the system also allowed 
Dihie and Heilman to conceive of cryptography being used to provide integrity 
and authentication, as well as confidentiality.
Although Difhe and Heilman's proposed system lacked the one-way mathematical 
function required to make it work, a solution was provided two years later by Ron 
Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman (Rivest et al. 1978). Rivest, Shamir 
and Adleman proposed a system - now known as RSA based on the initials of
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the authors' surnames - built around the intractability of finding the prime fac­
tors of large numbers. Multiplying prime numbers requires little computational 
effort, even if the numbers are very large. However, reversing the process, starting 
with the product only, requires so much computational effort that for very large 
numbers, it is practically (though not theoretically) impossible. Though it is un­
necessary to state here the exact mathematical processes required for RSA key 
generation, it is sufhcient to appreciate that if two large random prime numbers 
are multiplied, it is possible to reveal partial information about the result, in the 
form of a public key, whilst retaining, in the form of a private key, the unique 
information required to quickly reverse the process. Thus, when integrated with 
Diffie and Heilman's system, the RSA algorithm enabled the sender to encrypt 
using the recipients public key, whilst allowing the recipient (and the recipient 
only) to decrypt it using their private key.
As has already been mentioned, developments in public-key cryptography, and 
the advent of large-scale computer networks (see Abbate 1999), raised questions 
over what the appropriate level of access to cryptographic technologies should 
be. By the 1990s, it was clear that whilst these technologies could be used to 
uphold individual privacy, and could be key to ensuring trust in electronic com­
merce, they could also be used to conceal criminal activity. When this tension 
arose, governments around the world decided that a policy on cryptography was 
needed. Policies typically attempted to determine whether the potential benefits 
of widespread public access to cryptographic technologies outweighed potential 
disadvantages. Debates ensued over whether governmental policies had balanced 
these concerns correctly, and whether their policy solutions were technologically 
or politically feasible. These debates took place throughout the 1990s, at a time 
when the Internet was starting to be used by the general public. Although the 
crypto wars are usually thought of as particular set of debates that occurred during 
this period, it is clear that debates over the central issues have continued through 
to the present day, and it is likely that they will continue.
1.2.4 The Literature on the C rypto Wars
The history of cryptology up to and including the Second World War has been 
well described, and is a thriving albeit niche academic discipline.^ However, the
^This history of cryptology has its own dedicated journal - Cryptologia. The articles in this 
journal tend to focus on pre-Second World War cryptology, and are often highly technical. This
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current body of non-technical literature, on both cryptology research after 1945 
and the crypto wars, is small. Neither cryptology research nor the crypto wars are 
discussed in any of the major surveys of the history of computing (Ceruzzi 2003, 
Campbell-Kelly et al. 2013), the history of software (Campbell-Kelly 2003), or the 
history of the relationship between computers and industry (Ensmenger 2010). 
This reflects a broader absence in the historical literature of studies of technologies 
associated with computer security. This situation is largely mirrored in the STS 
literature. W ith the notable exception of Jean François Blanchette's o/
Froo/ (2012) - which will be discussed later on in this chapter - 1 am not aware of 
any published sociological studies of the science of cryptology, or cryptography as 
a technology.^ Interestingly, despite this, some cryptology insiders appear to think 
of the crypto wars literature as satisfactorily complete. For example, reflecting in 
2011, the noted cryptographer M att Blaze claimed that "the history of the 1990's 
'crypto wars' has been well-chronicled" (Blaze 2011, p.238). Statements such as 
this, in conjunction with the current state of the literature, highlight a disparity 
between what insiders know about the crypto wars, and what outsiders are aware 
of or are able to learn.
Though crypto wars debates took place within many national contexts, in the 
non-technical literature on cryptology and the crypto wars that does exist, most 
have placed their focus on events that occurred in the United States. Though, in 
general, studies have not opted for an explicit national framing, most appear to 
have focussed their attention on the US by default because it was home to key 
technological developments, its government was the first to attempt to confront 
the challenges that cryptology posed, and because their policy solutions relied 
upon, in the opinions of some, rather draconian measures.
In the three best known works on the crypto wars in the US, Steven Levy (2001), 
Simon Singh (1999), and Whithed Difhe and Susan Landau (2007) all argued that, 
as electronic communication became ever more ubiquitous in the second half of 
the twentieth century, the development of cryptography technologies offered a way 
for privacy to be upheld in light of the increasing prevalence of surveillance. In
partly stems from a belief that a technical understanding of the history of cryptology can be used 
to inform modern cryptology research, given that the secrecy that has surrounded the discipline 
may have inhibited the circulation of some key concepts.
^This absence can be demonstrated by searching for "crypto wars" using Google Scholar. 
In October 2013, this search returned under one hundred academic journal articles, books, and 
conference papers. Furthermore, most of the sources that were returned refer only to the crypto 
wars in passing, or as a way to contextualize a piece of current scientific research. Only a handful 
are primarily concerned with discussing the events themselves.
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Cfi/pto, Levy, a journalist for the technology magazine lUzred, described a David vs. 
Goliath story in which cryptology scientists and enthusiasts (which Levy refered 
to as "code rebels") were successful in defeating the US government's attempts to 
'control' cryptography. Here, engaging in cryptology research is synonymous with 
resisting surveillance, and is bound up with cyber-libertarianism. In setting the 
tone for his book. Levy argued:
Doesn't the advent of computer communications means that everyone 
should have access to the sophisticated tools that allow the exchange 
of words with lawyers and lovers, coworkers and customers, physicians 
and priests with the same confidence granted to face-to-face conver­
sations behind closed doors? This book tells the story of the people 
who asked those questions and created a revolution in the field that is 
destined to last all our lives. It is the story of those who did their best 
to make these questions go away. The former were nobodies: computer 
hackers, academics and policy wonks. The latter were the most pow­
erful people in the world: spies, generals and presidents. Guess who 
won (Levy 2001, p.2).
This sentiment is partially mirrored in Singh's Code BooA; (1999). Essentially 
an introduction to the science and history of cryptology, Singh, echoing Levy's 
tone, enthusiastically walks the reader through the basic concepts and techniques 
before describing a similar story. In on tAe Lme (2007), Difhe and Landau
also described the crypto wars in terms of the US government's reliance on wiretap­
ping techniques for the purposes of law enforcement - techniques that widespread 
access to cryptography technologies threatened to render obsolete.^
It has been noted that these arguments are often built upon assumptions about 
the potential for government abuses of surveillance rather than actual cases, and
^In addition to these three main works, there are a handful of other less well-known descrip­
tions. Olivia Bosch (2005), in examining the related issue of cryptography export, sought to 
understand the role of industry in the eventual changes to US export policy. She concluded that 
the eventual ending of US attempts to regulate cryptography export could be best understood 
in terms of technological (rather than political) factors, such as its declining role in information 
security policy and its infrequent use for purposes of confidentiality. Also worthy of a mention 
is Bruce Schneier and David Banisar's T/ie Fupers (1997). This book is an
edited collection primary source documents related to the crypto wars in the US. Rather than 
being a neutral collection of material, the documents chosen for inclusion come primarily from 
US government sources, and appear to have been collected in an attempt to highlight political 
machinations.
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that there is perhaps a sense of "misplaced Big Brotherism" that stems from the 
authors' belief in the importance of individual privacy (Staples 1998). Blanchette 
has noted that cryptology insiders are keen to invoke such descriptions, not only 
because it casts them as the heroes, but also because they tend to fit with a narra­
tive that allows them to "portray the evolution of the held as that of maturation 
from a craft to a bona-hde mathematical science, spurred by the embrace of math­
ematical formalism in the second half of the twentieth century" - a story that, as 
will be described later in this chapter, Blanchette challenges (Blanchette 2012, 
pp.17-39).
Though less well-known, the best description of the crypto wars in the US that 
presently exists has been provided by Gus Hosein (2003). Hosein, in touching 
on ideas from STS, used a case study of the crypto wars to argue that regulatory 
discourse could be best understood through consideration of both the technological 
and the social actor. In describing the crypto wars in the US, Hosein divided the 
government's responses to the development of public-key cryptography into three 
chronological stages: intervening in the algorithms; managing access to keys; and 
controlling the form and nature of the keys (Hosein 2003, p. 137). Prom 1979 to 
1993, shortly after the development of public-key cryptography, the US government 
attempted to regulate cryptography by 'intervening in the algorithms'. The NSA 
argued that strong encryption was fundamentally harmful to national security, 
and used this to ju s ti^  attempts to prohibit the publication of developments in 
cryptology through the screening of research and the acquisition of patents. In 
the case of cryptology research carried out within US universities, this strategy 
was partially successful. Despite this approach, in 1991, towards the end of this 
phase, an amateur programmer named Philip Zimmermann uploaded a piece of 
software called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) to the Internet. PGP, which is still 
widely-used, is a computer program that can be used to encrypt electronic emails 
using public-key cryptography. Zimmermann had developed PGP at home in his 
spare time. He was not a scientist, nor was he working at a university or a research 
environment. Therefore, as well as being one of the hrst usable implementations 
of public-key cryptography, the development of PGP, and the manner in which it 
was produced, signalled the extent to which cryptography had become publicly 
available. At the time, exporting cryptography technologies from the US still 
required a licence from the government, as it was seen as having potential military 
uses. On this basis, attempts were made to prosecute Zimmermann for 'exporting'
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cryptography software using the Internet, but the case was dropped after three 
years.
In 1993, with attempts to intervene in the development of cryptology partially 
unsuccessful. Bill Clinton's newly-elected Democrat administration attempted to 
introduce the Clipper Chip, and in doing so, initiated a phase of the crypto wars 
marked by attempts to 'manage access to keys'. The now-notorious Clipper Chip 
was based on the principle of key escrow. Escrow is a legal term that refers to the 
practice of handing over information or goods to a third party, so that other au­
thorised parties may also gain access to them. Clipper was therefore an electronic 
chip designed by the NSA to be implemented in a number of devices, such as tele­
phones and modems. It provided strong encryption, but also provided a what's 
known as a backdoor - essentially a built-in security Haw - which the US govern­
ment would be able to exploit in order decrypt communications if they wished. 
The Clipper proposal was controversial and unpopular. It was heavily criticised by 
organizations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and provoked a strong 
negative response from many cryptologists. W hat's more, in August 1994, Matt 
Blaze (1994) published a paper detailing a serious vulnerability in the scheme 
tha t could be used to disable the key escrow function. However, the most serious 
problem that the Clipper Chip faced was that industry expressed little interest in 
adopting devices that housed it, and a convincing case could not be made for them 
to incur the extra costs of doing so. The Clipper Chip proposals were dropped.
Following the failure to promote the adoption of the Clipper Chip, the US gov­
ernment instead set about 'controlling the form and nature of the keys'. Though 
attempts to integrate Clipper in hardware form were abandoned, the US govern­
ment attempted to introduce key escrow in software form. These proposals were 
equally unpopular with the cryptology community. Eventually, in an attempt 
to drum up worldwide support for key escrow, the US government lobbied the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and raised 
the issue at the 1996 G7 summit in Paris. Despite receiving support hrom some 
members of the G7, the problems over industry adoption remained. During the 
protracted debates over Clipper, many industries had adopted standards of their 
own. The software Clipper proposals were also dropped. This marked the end 
of the debates on this particular issue in the US. Whilst the US government had 
failed to establish a key escrow-based standard, they had partially succeeded in
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stalling the development of open cryptology research, particularly during the early 
years.
The literature on the crypto wars, then, is dominated by descriptions of events 
that occurred in the US - events that took place within a particular social and 
political context. However, parallel crypto wars debates occurred in a number of 
other countries around the world. Bert-Jaap Koops' (2013) Crypto Law Survey 
project provides an overview of the legal and political developments related to 
cryptography in just under one hundred countries. Of course, it is true that these 
national debates did not take place in isolation from one another. They overlapped 
chronologically, in terms of the broad issues discussed, and occasionally featured 
the same actors. W hat's more, activity relevant to the debates was often mobilized 
using the Internet, and ideas about the independence of this activity from that of 
nation states - exemplified by John Perry Barlow's DecZamfmn independence 
o/ Cp6erspace (1996) - had wider currency than they do now. However, as Jack 
Goldsmith and Tim Wu (2006) have argued, although there has in the past been 
a tendency to view the Internet, and the debates surrounding it, as relating to 
a borderless global community that dehes attempts at control from nations, the 
importance of governmental coercion at a national level has often been seriously 
underestimated. Thus, arriving at an understanding of other national crypto wars 
debates, and, indeed, a more general understanding of the crypto wars across the 
world, based solely on what's known about the crypto wars in the US, is likely to 
be a flawed strategy.
Though it is known that they took place, only a handful of national debates out­
side of the US have received any reflective academic attention (e.g. Koops 1998, 
Parviainen 2000). As well as providing the best description of the crypto wars in 
the US, Hosein (2003) has also provided the only attem pt that I am aware of to 
describe events in the UK. Using (what I would call) a comparative ethnography 
of the crypto wars in the US and the UK, Hosein argued tha t policy discourses 
and the dynamics of regulatory change are best understood by considering both 
social and technological actors. To support this claim, Hosein devoted a chapter 
of his doctoral thesis to providing a description of the political and regulatory 
developments related to cryptography in the UK. Hosein essentially described the 
attempts by successive UK governments to gain access to the public's encryption 
keys for the purposes of law enforcement during the 1990s. He broke this pro­
cess down into two phases. In the first, John Major's Conservative government
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attempted to gain access to keys by attempting to link a key escrow scheme to the 
benefits of electronic commerce. In the second, after the first initiative had failed, 
Tony Blair's Labour government successfully passed legislation that allowed direct 
lawful government access to encryption keys. During the first phase, the Conser­
vative government proposed the establishment of Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) - 
state-licensed organizations that would provide encryption services to the public. 
It was hoped that the mandatory government-run licensing scheme would improve 
public trust in electronic commerce, as it would allow people to feel confident 
about performing financial transactions over the Internet. However, TTPs would 
also be required by law to keep keys in escrow, and would be further required 
to make them available on demand to law enforcement and intelligence bodies. 
Hosein then moved on to describe how, following Labour's election victory in May 
1997, law enforcement priorities were 'de-coupled' from electronic commerce. The 
proposals for a mandatory TTP licensing scheme were replaced with proposals for 
a voluntary one. When these proposals also proved unpopular, the government 
changed tack, and instead pursued a policy based on new powers that allowed 
law enforcement bodies to demand keys from citizens. This initiative was success­
ful, and resulted in the controversial Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(RIPA).
Though Hosein's description covers many of the important political developments 
tha t took place during the UK crypto wars, it is incomplete. In particular, the 
crypto wars are isolated from society, and perhaps more importantly, from cryp­
tology expertise. The political processes, particularly the arguments used in par­
liament - which are quoted extensively - are disconnected from the relevant cryp­
tology research - which is not described at all. This isn't, by itself, a criticism of 
Hosein's approach. After all, Hosein was not concerned with understanding the 
relationship between expertise and technological decision-making, but with reg­
ulatory discourse. This understandably placed an emphasis on the political and 
rhetorical activity associated with the crypto wars. However, this framing served 
to isolate the crypto wars from the expertise that underpinned the political argu­
ments being made. As it was not relevant to his research, Hosein did not consider 
how and why the expertise that underpinned the political arguments had been 
produced, and instead focussed on providing detailed descriptions of the rhetoric 
used. In short, for Hosein, cryptology expertise arrived ready-made.
If anything unites the literature on the crypto wars, whether focussed on events
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in the US or the UK, it is this lack of a proper description of how the relevant 
cryptology expertise was produced. The implication from the sources that fo­
cussed on events in the US is that cryptology expertise emerged primarily out of 
an academic cyber-libertarian movement. Under this view, cryptology research 
was undertaken because electronic communication threatened individual privacy. 
Recently, Blanchette (2012) has partly challenged this view. Though Blanchette 
specifically stated tha t he did not wish to return to the crypto wars debates of the 
1990s, he does provide some valuable insights on the nature of cryptology research. 
In attempting to understand why digital signatures - a particular technology based 
on cryptography - have failed to gain wider acceptance, Blanchette made three 
overlapping arguments about the complex nature of cryptology research. Firstly, 
he argued that the characterization of cryptography and digital signatures by re­
searchers as immaterial has made their translation into hardware and software 
artifacts problematic. Secondly, that attempts to mathematize certain areas of 
cryptography, with the aim of providing provable security, have marginalized ar­
eas of research that, although resistant to mathematization, have the potential to 
deliver a greater social impact. Thirdly, that the way in which cryptographers 
have modeled digital signatures has served to obscure the trade-offs inherent in 
producing technologies that are to function in the real world. Though not directly 
relevant to my research, through these arguments, Blanchette at least highlights 
that it is possible to gain an understanding of the nature of cryptography re­
search, and that the associated practices and assumptions are more complex than 
the impression thus far given in the crypto wars literature.
1.3 R esearch  Q u estion s and A nsw ers
Keeping what's been said thus far about the third wave and the crypto wars in 
mind, this thesis is structured around formulating and answering the following 
three sequential research questions. The questions aim to probe both the creation 
of cryptology expertise and its relationship to the crypto wars, and to use this as 
a platform to examine some of the concepts that underpin the third wave.
1. How was contributory cryptology expertise produced during the technical 
phase of the crypto wars in the United Kingdom?
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My answer to this question will be provided in the form of four descriptions of 
the cryptology research that was carried out at four separate UK sites. I will 
describe the nature of the research carried out at: the Data Security Group at 
the National Physical Laboratory; the Information Security Group at Royal Hol­
loway, University of London; the Security Group at the University of Cambridge; 
and the Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG) at the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Each individual description highlights 
the different practices used to produce expertise in cryptology from 1970 - when 
cryptology research began outside of a military or intelligence context, to the mid- 
1990s - when the political debates over cryptology policy began. I will describe how 
the Data Security Group at the National Physical Laboratory, following reforms 
tha t commercialized government research establishments, came to produce cryp­
tology expertise geared towards the development of standards and accreditation 
schemes. The Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, following changes 
to the structure of the University of London and an emphasis on industrial col­
laboration, produced expertise in the mathematics of cryptology for technological 
solutions. The Security Group at the University of Cambridge, in line with a tra­
ditional departmental emphasis on systems research, developed expertise on how 
cryptography technologies function as part of real-world security systems. Finally, 
CESG at the Government Communications Headquarters, though responsible for 
providing cryptology expertise to public bodies, thanks to their organizational 
links to GCHQ and their intelligence priorities, produced cryptology expertise de­
signed to be secret. W hat emerges hrom these descriptions is an overview of, in a 
short period of time, just how diverse contributory expertise in cryptology became 
prior to the crypto wars.
2. Can the ontological framework and the third wave be used in conjunction to 
develop a re-conceptualization of the production of this contributory exper­
tise as 'multiple'?
My answer to this question is a qualified 'yes'. Although the concept of interac­
tional expertise has received much attention from those working under the third 
wave, contributory expertise has been thought of as unproblematic. However, 
given that the third wave recognises that contributory expertise is rooted in col­
lective practices, it follows that a variation in the practices used to produce con­
tributory expertise within a particular discipline has the potential to produce a
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variety of different expertises. To probe this possibility, I draw upon recent work 
within STS on the 'ontological framework'. Although largely separate from the 
third wave in the literature, the ontological framework, like the third wave, em­
phasises the productive power of collective practices, and holds that the results of 
these practices are real. One particular strand of the ontological framework has 
stressed that divergent practices will 'enact' multiplicity. Though this multiplicity 
is partially discernable in the descriptions that make up the answer to the first 
research question, I argue that it can be demonstrated more clearly through a 
formalised process of sociological discrimination - a particular type of expertise as 
defined by previous work under the third wave. However, whilst ontological multi­
plicity can be identified in this fundamental sense, it must also be recognised that 
some of the more detailed concepts from the ontological framework do not align 
well with ideas from the third wave. It is for this reason that I have described my 
answer as a qualified 'yes'. In particular, concepts from the ontological framework 
tha t aim to understand how divergence amongst enactments is resolved, do not 
map well onto political attempts to deal with and interpret contributory expertise 
during the crypto wars. Furthermore, given that there appears to be unresolved 
philosophical contradictions inherent in adopting extreme forms of some ontolog­
ical ideas, it is sensible to postpone further alignment with the third wave.
3. W hat were the consequences of this multiplicity of contributory expertises 
during the political phase of the crypto wars?
In response to this question, I argue that once recognised, multiplicity of con­
tributory expertise should be taken seriously by the third wave if the aim is to 
"make the best decisions in the right way" during controversies over technological 
decision-making. This is because, during the crypto wars, the multiplicity amongst 
contributory expertise, was, to a certain extent, translated across to the political 
decisions that were eventually made. Each enactment of contributory cryptology 
expertise was used for different and often distinct purposes. The contributory 
expertise enacted at the National Physical Laboratory was not drawn upon. The 
expertise enacted at Royal Holloway was used to provide a technology to underpin 
the government's controversial proposals. The expertise enacted at the University 
of Cambridge, though initially ignored, was used to construct an opposition to 
these proposals. Finally, the expertise enacted at CESG, given its secret nature, 
both contributed to the formation of the proposals, and added an extra layer of
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uncertainty to pohtical decisions. Importantly, I argue that the nature of each 
enactment, and its eventual use, were linked. Therefore, from a positive point of 
view, acknowledging multiplicity offers a tool for political decision-makers to map 
out sources of available expertise, and given the diverse array of propositional ques­
tions that characterize controversies over technological decision-making, to make 
more informed choices when seeking out expertise. From a negative point of view, 
acknowledging multiplicity also highlights some of the problems with elective mod­
ernist principles. These problems are rooted in the fact that some enactments of 
contributory expertise, if used, can distort political decisions during a controversy. 
Therefore, the choices made about what expertises are used to inform decisions 
become important. In the case of the crypto wars, the use of the secret expertise 
enacted by CESG meant that it was difficult for other experts to assess its quality, 
and that more generally, it was difficult for observers to determine CESG's role 
in the formation of the proposals. Given that debates over technical issues were 
partially ruled out, speculative arguments over the quality of GESG's expertise, 
and the motivations behind it, came to be more important. In parallel, the initial 
exclusion of the expertise enacted at the University of Cambridge prompted them 
to take steps to have their expertise reflected in political decisions. This 'scientist 
activism', though it may have exerted a positive influence on political decisions, 
resulted from the decision to exclude certain expertise during the formation of 
the government's proposals, and threatened to undermine an essential third wave 
distinction between the formative intentions of science and politics.
1.4 C hapter G uide
How these arguments were arrived at will be described over the course of nine 
further chapters. In chapter 2, I survey the literature related to the two main 
theoretical touchstones of this thesis: the third wave understanding of expertise 
during controversies over technological decision-making; and the ontological frame­
work. I will use this chapter as a way of laying the theoretical ground for what 
will follow, and to explain in more detail how my three research questions were 
arrived at. I will show that case studies of controversies, though in the past used 
to better understand the creation of scientific facts and technological artefacts, 
are now often used to understand the relationship between expertise and techno­
logical decision-making. The third wave has attempted to partially move beyond
Chapter 1. introdt/ctmn 24
describing controversies over technological decision-making, to formulating nor­
mative prescriptions relating to how they should function. The third wave has 
produced a robust classification scheme for different types of expertise, and has 
attempted to extend the implications of this scheme to technological-decision mak­
ing. However, some of the principles that underpin elective modernism are still 
being developed, and would benefit from refinement. In particular, prescriptions 
relating to the proper relationship between controversies and contributory exper­
tise are in need of attention. One way for researchers to try  and get an intellectual 
foothold on this particular issue is by drawing on the ontological framework. I 
will therefore describe how the ontological framework has been developed within 
STS. I will show that the ontological framework has stressed the importance of 
multiplicity - the idea that divergent research practices will enact a multiplicity 
of objects. I argue that, though the full philosophical implications of adopting 
the ontological framework are best avoided for the moment, it can still be used to 
probe the production of contributory expertise, and therefore prompts considera­
tion of the implications of multiple contributory expertises for prescriptions on the 
relationship between science and politics during a controversies over technological 
decision-making.
In chapter 3, I will describe the methods used to answer my research questions. 
Given tha t there is often little reflection on the methods used in STS research, I 
will situate my methodological choices within the broader literature on research 
in the social sciences. I will describe the processes used to gather data on the 
production of cryptology expertise, and on how this expertise was used during 
the political debates tha t made up the crypto wars. Put simply, I collected the 
data for this study using a combination of documentary analysis and retrospective 
semi-structured interviewing. I argue that the historical nature of the research 
methods used prompts concerns over what documents and interviews are able to 
reveal about the past. Given that the historical nature of these methods departs 
from the ethnographic methods often used when investigating research practices, 
I will argue that this necessitates a shift in focus from observable, micro-social 
processes located at the level of the laboratory, to unobservable, macro-social 
processes, located at an institutional level.
In terms of data collection and analysis, my study can be divided into three stages 
(see Table 1.1). Documentary analysis and retrospective semi-structured inter­
views were used to collect data relating to the production of cryptology expertise
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S ta g e D a t a  C o l le c t io n A n a ly s is R e s e a r c h  A c t iv i t y
F irst
D ocu m entary  analysis; 
R etrosp ective  
sem i-stru ctured  
in terview ing
T h em atic
C ollection  o f d a ta  relatin g  to  the  
prod uction  o f con trib utory  
crypto logy  exp ertise  at various 
sites w ith in  th e UK betw een  
1970 and 2000
Second
D ocu m entary  analysis; 
R etrosp ective  
sem i-stru ctured  
in terv iew in g
T h em atic
C ollection  of d a ta  relatin g  to  the  
d evelopm en t o f UK leg isla tion  
related  to  cryp to logy  b etw een  
1970 and 2000
T hird None
C oncept 
and theory  
developm ent
A ttem p ts to  understand  how  
exp ertise  from  research sites  was 
transferred to , and used  
during, p o litica l processes
TABLE 1.1: Research Design
at various research sites. Then, similar documentary analysis and semi-structured 
interviewing techniques were used to examine how that expertise was used dur­
ing the political debates. A third and hnal stage of theoretical and conceptual 
development was also undertaken in order to dehne and then carry out a pro­
cess of sociological discrimination that can be used to demonstrate multiplicity, 
to probe how expertise was transferred from research sites to the political arena, 
and to consider what the ideal form of this process might look like in light of the 
existence of multiplicity.
In chapters 4 through 7, I will describe in detail what emerged from the data 
tha t was collected for the purposes of the hrst stage of held work (see Table 1.1). 
More specihcally, each chapter will describe the nature of the cryptology expertise 
produced at one of the four aforementioned cryptology research sites: the Data Se­
curity Group at the National Physical Laboratory; the Information Security Group 
at Royal Holloway; University of London; the Security Group at the University 
of Cambridge; and CESG at the Government Communications Headquarters. In 
each case, an historical description will be provided of the institutional context 
within which cryptology research was initiated, and how this context shaped the 
nature of that research thereafter. The nature of the cryptology research carried 
out at each site will be described from its initiation to the start of the crypto wars 
in the mid-1990s. Taken together, these chapters form the basis of my answer to 
the hrst research question.
In chapter 8, I describe the data that was collected for the purposes of the second 
stage of heldwork (see Table 1.1). As such, I describe the political phase of the
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crypto wars. In contrast to previous descriptions, I describe the politics of the 
crypto wars in terms of its relationship to cryptology expertise. I divide the crypto 
wars into two overlapping parliamentary bills. I describe the relationship between 
cryptology expertise and the Department of Trade and Industry proposals for a 
nation-wide cryptology network of Trusted Third Parties - organizations licensed 
to provide cryptology services to the public, but also required by law to provide the 
means to decrypt the communications they handled to law enforcement bodies. I 
also describe the relationship between cryptology expertise and proposals to license 
the export of cryptography from the UK by intangible means. Together, these 
debates highlight how the government used the available cryptology expertise, the 
consequences that this had for the nature of the crypto wars debates, and how 
this shaped the eventual policy decisions.
In the hrst half of chapter 9, I will bring the content of the preceding chapters to­
gether to demonstrate the multiplicity of contributory expertises that were enacted 
at the four research sites. To do this, I will describe and then carry out a process of 
sociological discrimination. Moving from the specihc descriptions of expertises de­
scribed in chapters 4 through 7 ,1 will categorise the activity of each research group 
in terms of the more general categories of: the production of certihed knowledge; 
education and training activities; public research and the innovation process; the 
participation in public or collective goods and hnalities; and public debates about 
science and technology. This provides a method of operationalizing sociological 
discrimination that clearly demonstrates that contributory cryptology expertise 
was multiple. This, together with the descriptions from chapters 4 through 7, will 
form the basis of my answer to the second research question. In the second half 
of this chapter, I will describe how this multiplicity of contributory expertises, 
was, to a certain extent, translated across to political decisions. I will show how 
each enactment of contributory expertise was used for different and often distinct 
purposes, and that these uses were linked to the practices used to enact it. To 
add an extra layer of detail, I also describe a method of differentiating between 
how expertise, once enacted, can be transferred to those responsible for making 
political decisions. In the case of the crypto wars, expertise was either: not trans­
ferred; commissioned; delivered; or transferred invisibly. This, together with the 
description provided in chapter 8, is used to arrive at an appreciation of some of 
the consequences of multiplicity of contributory expertise during the crypto wars. 
This forms the basis of my answer to the third research question. In light of these 
consequences, I close this chapter with some suggestions for how the third wave
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may be modified in order to accommodate them. I suggest what I have called 
the Minimum Transfer Requirement - a method of determining whether it can be 
claimed that political decisions have given adequate consideration to the avail­
able contributory expertise. I also identify the problem of expert discrimination 
- a recognition of the fact that it may not always be possible to publicly assess 
the quality of the expertise used to underpin decisions during controversies over 
technological decision-making.
In chapter 10, the concluding chapter, I will reflect upon the answers given to 
the three research questions. I will use this as a basis for identifying limitations, 
and for making suggestions for further work. From this, it will be clear that the 
limitations identified, in both my answers and the third wave more generally, could 
be addressed through carrying out more empirical case studies viewed through the 
lens of the third wave.
Chapter 2
Literature R eview
2.1 In trod u ction
In this chapter, I will review the literature relevant to the themes outlined in 
chapter 1. I have divided this chapter into two sections. The hrst section provides 
a review of the literature related to expertise and controversies over technological 
decision-making. The second section provides a review of the literature related to 
the ontological framework. I will close the chapter with a conclusion that brings 
together the ideas from each section, and charts a path for the rest of the thesis 
through the construction of three research questions.
2.2 E xp ertise  and C ontroversies over T echnolog­
ical D ecision -M ak in g
In this section, I will examine how the study of controversies has been used within 
STS to understand: the construction of scientific facts; the construction of techno­
logical artefacts; and technological decision-making. In particular, I will describe 
how recent studies of controversies over technological decision-making have fo­
cused on their relationship with expertise. Studies have often shown how certain 
types of expertise can be marginalised during policy-making processes. This has 
led, in some cases, to calls for increased democratic participation in controversies 
of this type. More recently, others have argued that this prompts concerns over
28
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how far participation should be widened, given that some possess more relevant 
expertise than others. I argue that, although the issue of widening participation 
outside of the expert scientific community is important, we should also examine 
in more detail the nature of the participation of the expert scientific community. 
More specifically, I argue that we should embark upon a more careful consid­
eration of how contributory expertise is used in controversies over technological 
decision-making.
2.2.1 W hat is a Controversy?
Controversies are the visible result of disagreements between actors. STS is con­
cerned with those disagreements that feature science and technology. Built into 
the fabric of a controversy is the idea that something becomes controversial when 
one group (or an individual) disagrees with the 'actions o f  or the 'claims made 
by' another. Studies of controversies have therefore sought to identih^ divergent 
groups, sides, stakeholders, or individuals. This idea is so fundamental to the 
study of controversies within STS that it is difficult to conceive of one that does 
not conform to this basic rule. In approaching controversies from a philosophical 
point of view, H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr and Arthur Caplan observed that:
Scientific disputes resist closure or resolution when the stakeholders in 
the debate belong to: 1) Different scientific communities with different 
appreciations of the evidence at stake . . .  or 2) Competing social groups 
with different views of social control (Engelhardt &: Caplan 1987, p. 11).
The idea that competing social groups may hold different views about social con­
trol is, to a certain extent, unsurprising. However, the idea that different scientists 
can have different appreciations of the evidence at stake challenges the realist ac­
count of scientific knowledge production. This challenge has its roots in Thomas 
Kuhn's (1962) study of scientific revolutions. Kuhn rejected the idea that scientific 
knowledge develops through continuous accumulation, and attempted to replace 
it with the idea that scientific knowledge develops through revolutions. According 
to Kuhn, during periods of revolution, different groups of scientists come to oper­
ate under incommensurate conceptual frameworks, resulting in interpretations of 
evidence that share little common ground. Kuhn located these incommensurate
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frameworks within, amongst other things, social context, thus opening the door 
to a sociological interpretation of the creation of scientific knowledge.
When describing controversies from the point of view of STS, a common hrst step is 
to identify the groups involved. For example, in the opening sentence of Dorothy 
Nelkin and James M. Jasper's study of an animal rights controversy, divergent 
groups are used to frame the study:
In the spring of 1976 a coalition  of an im al p ro te c tio n  organiza- 
tions mobilized a protest against research on cats at the A m erican  
M useum  o f N a tu ra l H is to ry  in New York City [emphasis mine] 
(Nelkin & Jasper 1993, p.26).
Here, as in many other case studies, the controversy is immediately presented as 
a disagreement between groups. However, care must be taken when presenting 
controversies in this way. As Sheila Jasanoff (1996) pointed out, a controversy 
will often consist of more than just two sides, and as a result, presenting a debate 
as two-sided can result in an over-simplihcation. Also, as Bruno Latour (2005, 
pp.27-43) has argued, when examining controversies sociologically, the analyst 
should avoid imposing rigid groupings upon the actors under study. Instead, it 
should be recognised that over the course of a controversy, groups can be formed 
and dismantled, and their membership can change. Latour advised that, rather 
than adopting ideas about fixed groupings, the analyst should "follow the actors" 
and begin by studying "the traces left behind by their activity of forming and 
dismantling groups" (Latour 2005, p.29).
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2.2.2 Controversies and the Sociology of Scientific Knowl- 
edge
The literature on scientific and technological controversies within STS can be 
broadly divided into three strands: controversies over the results of scientific ex­
periments; controversies over the development of technological artefacts; and con­
troversies over technological decision-making.^ Scientific and technological contro­
versies were hrst studied in order to generate theories about how scientihc knowl­
edge is produced (e.g. Bloor 1976, Collins 1985). As such, they became central to 
a subheld of STS known as the Sociology of Scientihc Knowledge (SSK). Following 
Kuhn's (1962) study of the structure of scientihc revolutions, the intuitive idea of 
scientihc knowledge as cumulative was called into question. Nonetheless, science 
was also thought of as consistently able to establish facts. This created a dilemma 
for those wishing to understand how scientihc knowledge is created. Harry Collins 
was among the hrst to express this problem, when he wrote:
To speak hguratively, it is as though epistemologists are concerned 
with the characteristics of ships (knowledge) in bottles (validity) while 
living in a world where all ships are already in bottles with the glue 
dried and the strings cut. A ship within a bottle is a natural object in 
this world, and because there is no way to reverse the process, it is not 
easy to accept that the ship was ever just a bundle of sticks (Collins 
1975, p.205).
Collins believed that the study of controversies over scientihc knowledge offered 
a partial solution to this problem, given that they described the processes that 
occurred during the creation of facts. As Collins went on to explain:
^Though often clearly noticeable, the separation between these strands is sometimes implicit 
rather than explicit. This is because, when considering complex case studies, it is almost in­
evitable that when a case study is framed broadly, it will overlap into more than one of the above 
categories. For example, although Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch's (1993) study of attempts to 
achieve cold fusion primarily detailed a controversy over the results of scientific experiments, the 
way that that these experiments were viewed by policymakers began to influence future research 
funding strategies. In this example, claims of success led directly to $5 million being devoted 
to cold fusion research by the Utah State Legislature. Furthermore, had the experiments ulti­
mately been deemed successful, debates over the appropriate use of cold fusion in society would 
undoubtedly have followed. Therefore, although attempts have been made to produce more 
specific controversy typologies (e.g. Giere 1987, Nelkin 1993a), they often offer little analytical 
purchase due to significant category overlap. Furthermore, forcing a controversy into a particular 
category may unnecessarily exclude theoretical perspectives and explanatory factors.
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My contention is that because of the institutionalization of the pro­
duction of scientihc truth, it is possible to make a partial escape from 
the cultural determinism of current knowledge, in studies of science. It 
is actually possible to locate this process in scientihc laboratories, in 
letters, conferences and conversations. It is possible then to perform 
a kind of automatic phenomenological bracketing for ideas and facts, 
by looking at them while they are being formed, before they have be­
come 'set' as part of anyone's natural (scientihc) world (Collins 1975, 
pp.205-206).
On this understanding, controversy 'closure' is the culmination of the processes 
used to produce scientihc facts. Collins argued that the results of experiments 
alone are not always suhicient to establish facts. In particular, Collins asked, if the 
purpose of an experiment is to establish the existence of a particular phenomenon, 
how can one be sure what the right result for that experiment should be, and 
how can one be sure that the experiment has been performed correctly? Collins 
coined the term "experimenters' regress" to refer to the cycle that can result from 
believing that a good experimental result will emerge from properly functioning 
experimental apparatus, whilst simultaneously believing that it is possible to tell 
when the experiment is functioning properly because it has delivered a good result. 
Collins argued that the experimenters' regress can eventually be (and often is) bro­
ken, and controversies over experimental results can be settled, through recourse 
to social factors, such as the status, credibility, and persuasiveness of an experi­
menter (Collins 1992). A number of studies of the creation of scientific knowledge 
have been since been conducted (e.g. Latour & Woolgar 1979, Knorr Cetina 1981, 
Lynch 1985, Latour 1987), not least Collins' own 35-year project examining the 
search for gravitational waves (Collins 2004).
2.2.3 C ontroversies and the Sociology of Technology
Controversies have also been used as a way to understand the development of tech­
nological artefacts. In the late 1980s, following the successful use of controversies 
to illuminate the creation of scientihc knowledge, many technologies came to be 
seen as the result of controversies over the most appropriate solution to a par­
ticular problem, rather than as a result of 'technological determinism' - the view
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that technology emerges independent of societal influence, but shapes the devel­
opment of society thereafter.^ In the absence of an independent and context-free 
measure of appropriateness, technological developments came to be seen, in part, 
as the result of certain groups making more effective use of rhetoric, or furthering 
their interests in some other way. Taking as their example the development of 
the bicycle, Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker (1989) argued that the convergence 
towards pneumatic tyres and equal sized wheels could be understood in terms of 
the competing interests of certain groups, given the 'interpretive flexibility' of the 
meanings and purposes of cycling.
Interpretive flexibility, an idea that was developed under a branch of SSK in or­
der to understand disagreement over the meaning of the results of scientific ex­
periments, came to be the central idea in a separate strand of STS that aimed 
to explore the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT). A number of stud­
ies of the development of technological artefacts have been conducted using the 
SCOT approach, including Donald MacKenzie's (1990) study of nuclear missiles 
and Boelie Elzen's (1986) study of ultracentrifuges. However, the notion of inter­
pretive flexibility raised further questions. For example, despite the interpretive 
flexibility inherent in many systems, controversial elements (such as the air-hlled 
tyre) appeared to have been 'bypassed', given that the same technologies were 
used by groups with varying interpretations of cycling. This phenomenon was 
accounted for using the concept of 'boundary objects'. Using an historical study 
of Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Biology, Susan Leigh Star and James Griese- 
mer (1989) showed how the creation of boundary objects, in conjunction with a 
process of methods standardization, allowed groups within the museum with di­
vergent viewpoints and agendas - such as collectors, trappers, and administrators 
- to co-operate in such a way that the museum remained functional in line with 
each group's definition. Star and Griesemer defined boundary objects as "objects 
which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the 
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity 
across sites" (Star &: Griesemer 1989, p.393). Furthermore:
^The question of whether technology drives society has a long history. As David Edgerton 
(1993) has pointed out, some scholars had rejected technological determinism outright before 
the development of an identifiable held focussed on the sociology of technology (e.g. Noble 1977, 
1984). 'Soft' forms of technological determinism can be found in the work of Langdon Winner 
(1977, 1980) and Thomas P. Hughes (1994). Furthermore, 'hard' technological determinism can 
still be detected in recent writings on technology outside of STS (e.g. Kelly 2011).
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[Boundary objects] have different meanings in different social worlds 
but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make 
them recognizable, a means of translation. The creation and manage­
ment of boundary objects is a key process in developing and maintain­
ing coherence across intersecting social worlds (Star & Griesemer 1989, 
p.393).
In reviewing the literature on the subject, Joan Fujimura (1992) found that the 
boundary objects concept has since been widely used throughout STS. For exam­
ple, Kathryn Henderson (1991) has shown how sketches and technical drawings 
acted as boundary objects that allowed scientists and engineers involved in dif­
ferent stages of the innovation process to work together on the development of 
turbine engines, and Jenny Marie (2008) has shown how certain breeds of rab­
bit and poultry acted as boundary objects that connected fanciers, and scientists 
requiring animals for genetic research.
2.2.4 W ays o f U nderstanding Controversies
Whether using controversies to understand the creation of scientific facts, or the 
development of technological artefacts, STS scholars have used social factors to 
account for the way they unfolded. Numerous strategies have been developed 
for understanding the creation of scientific knowledge and technological artefacts, 
including: the Strong Programme; the Empirical Program of Relativism (EPOR); 
discourse analysis; and Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Although not all of these 
approaches are compatible with one another, most are based on the idea that the 
study of controversies can reveal something about the role of social factors in the 
processes used to create scientific knowledge and technological artefacts.
Studies guided by the Strong Programme and EPOR have tended to emphasise 
the role played by 'interests'. The basic idea is that disagreements over scientific 
knowledge, or the development of a technology, can be understood in terms of the 
different social interests of the actors involved. Interests may be classed as exter­
nal or internal to science and technology, but the explanatory framework remains 
broadly the same. The Strong Programme, which was originally stated by David 
Bloor (1976), aimed to uphold four tenets in the course of offering sociological 
explanations: causation; impartiality; symmetry; and refiexivity. The causation
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tenet stressed the study of the conditions that bring about knowledge. The impar­
tiality tenet stressed that studies would be impartial with respected to the truth 
or falsity of the creation. The symmetry tenet stressed that the same kinds of ex­
planation would be applied to true and false claims. The rehexivity tenet stressed 
that tenets would also apply to the claims made under the Strong Programme 
itself. Studies carried out using the Strong Programme have tended to emphasise 
the role of external interests, in that they have looked to the macro-social or the 
historical interests of the actors involved to explain narrower debates within sci­
ence. For example, Steven Shapings (1975) study of the early nineteenth century 
debates that occurred in the held of phrenology located scientihc disagreements 
within the wider social debates taking place in Edinburgh at the time, rather than 
in the incommensurability of the various intellectual positions. Shapin argued 
that, given that the Edinburgh Phrenological Society drew its members from the 
lower and middle classes, and that the Royal Society of Edinburgh drew its mem­
bers from the upper classes, disagreements over the science could be understood 
in terms of a class struggle.
EPOR has tended to emphasise the role of more localized, internal interests. 
EPOR, which was most clearly stated by Collins (19816), consists of three sequen­
tial stages: demonstrating the interpretive flexibility of experimental data; show­
ing, despite this, the mechanisms by which closure is reached; and finally, linking 
these mechanisms to wider social and political structures. Though broadly similar 
to the Strong Programme, satisfactorily completing the third stage of EPOR has 
sometimes proved difficult, and descriptions produced using EPOR have not typi­
cally drawn on macro-social or historical factors in order to explain disagreement, 
but have instead located the disagreement within the social aspects of the scien­
tific community. Studies have shown how the participants in a controversy may 
disagree because they are using, for example, different conceptual frameworks, 
or different methods of knowledge production. For example, Andrew Pickering's 
(1981) study of a controversy over the observation of a magnetic monopole - a 
hypothetical elementary particle - showed that interpretive flexibility was dealt 
with through recourse to an uncontroversial prior theoretical consensus, rather 
than through the results of experiments alone.
A number of studies of scientific and technological controversies have been based 
on an examination of 'rhetoric'. In line with the so-called 'linguistic turn', scholars
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have primarily analysed controversies as discourses or texts. On this understand­
ing, the study of changes in rhetoric can not only be used to mark out different 
stages of a controversy, but the style of the contrasting arguments of divergent 
groups can be seen as actually constituting, shaping, and closing the controversy. 
Whilst some EPOR explanations have accounted for controversy closure in this 
way (Collins 1981 a), rhetoric was typically the main focus of studies conducted 
using discourse analysis and some early studies based on ANT.
The study of rhetoric began with the Ancient Greeks, and contemporary ideas 
about rhetoric are the intellectual descendants of these concepts (Conley 1990). 
Following on from Kufm (1962), historians, sociologists, and philosophers of sci­
ence and technology have been able to examine the content of argument and form 
a link between rhetoric and controversy. On this understanding, whilst it may be 
tempting to conceive of scientific argument as antithetical to rhetorical argument, 
scientific argument is ultimately designed to persuade, and as a result, the choices 
made by the proponent of a scientific or technical argument can be analysed. For 
example, Charles Bazerman (1988) has shown how Isaac Newton took a collection 
of experiments and observations and recast them as one single experiment when 
attempting to communicate his ideas in his Aew and Co/onrs. Baz­
erman argued that, in recasting multiple experiments as one experiment, Newton 
used a rhetorical device in an attem pt to convince his readers of his argument. G. 
Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay's (1984) study of discourses within biochem­
istry showed, amongst other things, that scientists are able to draw on both an 
'empiricist repertoire' - when ju s ti^ n g  the formal experimental procedures as­
sociated with their own work - and a 'contingent repertoire' - when describing 
the social or psychological factors that explain why other scientists disagree with 
them. Similarly, in their famous historical study of the debates between Robert 
Boyle and Thomas Hobbes, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer (1985) showed that 
the rhetorical strategies employed by both individuals mirrored their respective 
views on the scientific method and the impact this had on the idea of certainty.
Before delving any further into how rhetoric has been used to understand contro­
versies, it is useful to examine what it means for something to be considered uncon­
troversial. In carrying out an anthropological study of the Salk Institute, Bruno 
Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979) defined a completely uncontroversial statement 
as a 'fact'. They argued that a fact is a piece of information that has shed both 
its modalities and the history of its creation. Given that science aims to produce
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facts, they argued, rhetoric is used to remove both the modalities and history from 
arguments, so that the acceptance of a statement is universal. These ideas were 
developed further in Latour's 5'czence m Actmn (1987). Underpinning this work, 
and many other studies of controversies, is the idea that in order to understand 
how scientific knowledge is produced, it must be examined whilst facts are in the 
process of being created, instead of when they arrive fully-formed - a state Latour 
referred to as 'black boxed'. Latour attempted to trace the development of a set of 
controversies by studying the pubhshed claims and counterclaims of scientists. In 
one of his examples, Latour took a debate on the structure of hormones between 
two Nobel Prize-winning endocrinologists - Roger Guillemin and Andrew Schally. 
Latour showed how both Guillemin and Schally attempted to add authority to 
their claims, and simultaneously subtract authority from their opponent's claims, 
by drawing on the status of the investigator and the context of the citation.
The Latourian approach to understanding controversies through rhetoric, and the 
work on ANT that this fed into, has not been universally praised or accepted (e.g. 
Amsterdamska 1990). One objection that the focus on rhetoric raises is that it 
appears to downplay the importance of the tangible or the material - whether in 
the form of objects or evidence. Furthermore, if a controversy is conceived of in 
terms of discourses, texts, claims and counter-claims, this may distort our under­
standing of other important factors. The emphasis on closure that's  noticeable in 
the literature on controversies may be linked to the fact that many studies of con­
troversies have taken rhetoric as the focus. If rhetoric is used as the lens through 
which controversies are examined, aside from potentially marking out the start 
of a controversy, it is dilhcult to see how it would be possible to use the study 
of claims and counter-claims to analyse events prior to the disagreement. This 
serves to isolate the controversy from the uncontroversial scientific research that 
preceded it, and goes some way to prohibiting the study of how something can 
become controversial in the first place.
It is also questionable whether the analysis of rhetoric can capture how actors 
use certain aspects of non-communication, such as secrecy, silences, and absences, 
strategically (or otherwise) during controversies. Such features have clear relevance 
for the study of controversies. However, they also carry with them equally clear 
barriers to their descriptive representation. This may explain why they have rarely 
been studied in the past. However, as Brian Rappert (2010) has argued, there is 
now an emerging belief that such barriers are not necessarily insurmountable.
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but may instead require novel approaches to research. Brian Balmer (2012) has 
used a number of case studies of research into biological and chemical weapons 
to highlight how secrecy can alter the dynamics of knowledge production, and 
thus the way scientists communicate. Balmer has shown that science produced 
in secret can exclude scientists from their traditional reward system, and can 
insulate scientists from the moral objections to their work, resulting in a lack of 
rhetorical engagement. Even when claims and counter-claims relating to secret 
science are exchanged, and it is therefore possible to analyse the rhetoric used, 
acknowledging the role of secrecy should surely be central to their interpretation. 
For instance, Balmer argued that one way in which outcomes of secret science can 
be observed is when secrets are revealed, either intentionally - though publication 
or press release, or unintentionally - through leaks. From the point of view of those 
carrying out secret research, when secrets are revealed intentionally, the process 
can be carefully managed, and decisions about what to release and how to release 
it are paramount. When secrets are revealed unintentionally, they can initiate a 
process of information management that aims to deal with the new circumstances. 
Furthermore, secrecy can also actively construct uncertainty, gossip and rumour 
that can then be used either positively or negatively by actors on all sides of the 
secrecy divide.
Latour's early work on the use of rhetoric during scientihc controversies fed into 
the development of ANT. ANT - which is principally associated with Latour, 
Michel Gallon and John Law - was developed during the 1980s, and came to dom­
inate STS throughout the 1990s and beyond. Though Latour's work on the use of 
rhetoric in controversies shares similar goals with the Strong Programme, EPOR 
and discourse analysis, ANT departs from them in that it aims to describe a much 
broader set of relationships. ANT can be described as a material-semiotic method, 
because it aims to describe how material objects and concepts can come together 
to form networks. Nodes within ANT are referred to as actors, and the actor 
label can be applied to almost anything. Furthermore, things that we may more 
readily think of as networked, can themselves be actors within broader networks. 
Importantly, actors, whether human or non-human, are granted agency during the 
network building process. Where ANT has been used to understand controversies, 
success and failure has been accounted for in terms of how well actors were able 
to build and maintain networks. For example, in Michel Gallon's (1986) study of 
the controversy over the decline of scallops in France, the survival of scallop stocks 
at St Brieuc Bay was accounted for through the success of actors - including the
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scallops themselves - in building a stable network. Conversely, in Latour's (1996) 
study of the Aramis project - an attem pt to implement a rapid transit system in 
Paris - it was argued that the project's failure was due to the crumbling of the 
network of which it was a part. In contrast with previous approaches described, 
using controversies to understand the creation of scientific knowledge and techno­
logical artefacts is not the central purpose of ANT. ANT aims to describe a much 
broader set of social phenomena. Because of this, though it is possible to say much 
more about the concepts associated with ANT and the work it has spawned, it 
does not make sense to describe ANT in any further detail during a discussion of 
controversies.
2.2.5 Controversies over Technological D ecision-M aking
In parallel to work aiming to understand the development of scientific knowledge 
and technological artefacts, STS scholars have also studied controversies over tech­
nological decision-making. Controversies over technological decision-making have 
been studied because they are interesting and important in their own right, but 
also because they can reveal something about prevailing attitudes towards science 
and technology. Building upon an earlier definition from Collins and Evans (2002), 
Martin Weinel (2010) described controversies over technological decision-making 
as "those points where science and technology intersect with the political domain 
because the issues are of visible relevance to the public". As Weinel (2010, pp.l9- 
20) pointed out, numerous attempts have been made by others to define similar 
scenarios. For example. Brooks (1964) defined 'science for policy' as "matters that 
are basically political or administrative but are significantly dependent upon tech­
nical factors", and Brian Wynne (2007) has referred to 'public decision-making 
that involves science'. These are essentially nothing more than different ways of 
referring to the same phenomena. Given that this thesis will place an emphasis 
on third wave ideas, I have adopted their use of 'controversies over technological 
decision-making'.
Dorothy Nelkin (1993a) has provided a brief history of studies of controversies 
over technological decision-making in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Nelkin argued that, in the years that followed the Second World War, science 
and technology was seen as the engine for a sustained period of economic growth.
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However, this period of growth also spawned an increased awareness of risk. Nelkin 
described how:
Technological improvements were threatening neighbourhoods and caus­
ing environmental problems; drugs to stimulate the growth of beef cat­
tle were causing cancer; efficient industrial processes were threatening 
worker health (Nelkin 1993a, p.x).
By the late 1970s, both scientists and non-scientists were seriously examining the 
possibility that certain kinds of scientific research should not be done at all (e.g. 
Morison 1978). This resulted in the perception that science had entered a period 
of crisis. Reflecting upon this in 1990, Yaron Ezrahi described the recent 'attacks' 
on science and scientific research as a major conceptual shift that marked "its vis­
ible decline as a force in the rhetoric of liberal democratic politics" (Ezrahi 1990, 
p. 13). This observation chimed with Ulrich Beck's (1992) claim that contemporary 
Western societies during this period came to be thought of as 'risk societies'. As 
such. Beck argued that the central problem facing risk societies was not the pro­
duction of social 'goods' - such as wealth and employment, but the minimization 
of the effect of risks - which Beck called social 'bads'.
As with debates over the results of scientific experiments and technological arte­
facts, the examination of interests and rhetoric has been a key part of understand­
ing controversies over technological decision-making. To take just one example, 
Michael Mulkay's (1997) study of the embryo research debate in the UK focused on 
how the rhetorical strategies of scientists, politicians, and others, shaped the de­
bate over the extent to which embryo experimentation should be allowed. Mulkay 
devoted much of his case study to the examination of parliamentary debates, and 
as such, showed that the focus on claims and counter-claims of actors can form 
the basis of a study of this type.
There is probably a link between the research into the social factors that influence 
the creation of scientific knowledge and the broader trends that Nelkin, Ezrahi 
and Beck identified. For some, the belief that scientific and technological con­
troversies are amenable to social factors prompted a rethink of the notion that 
authority lies solely in scientific and technological expertise during controversies 
over technological decision-making. Brian Wynne's (1992, 1996) study of Cum­
brian sheep farming following the fallout from the Chernobyl disaster described
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how scientific expertise came into conflict with non-scientihc expertise of the local 
farmers. In attempting to predict the risks that might result from the fallout, sci­
entists adopted a one-size-hts-all approach based on laboratory evidence that told 
them that the threat posed by the fallout would clear up relatively quickly. This 
was at odds with the farmer's own knowledge of the geographical features of the 
land that told them that the threat was likely to linger. This conflict undermined 
confidence in the ability of the scientists and policymakers to deal with the prob­
lem, and suggested a role for other forms of non-accredited expertise in scientific 
and technological decision making. Other studies have emphasised that, during 
controversies over technological decision-making, non-scientihc or non-accredited 
experts can make a positive contribution. For example, Steven Epstein (1995) 
has described how AIDS victims were able to contribute to the design of clinical 
trials, and Alan Irwin (1995) has shown how farmers were able to contribute to 
an assessment of the risk of certain pesticides. Together, these studies suggested 
that knowledge produced in the laboratory is not necessarily sufficient to meet the 
challenges of controversies over technological decision-making, and that locating 
expertise in scientihc credentials can exclude people with relevant expertise, to the 
detriment of eventual outcome.
This can be thought of as a 'conservative critique' of the use of credentialed sci­
entihc expertise during controversies over technological decision-making (Evans & 
Collins 2008). The conservative critique, together with the sociological interpre­
tation of the construction of scientihc knowledge and technological artefacts, has 
been used as a platform for a more radical critique. Here, case studies showing 
that the successful use of rhetoric or the promotion of interests is all that separates 
true scientihc facts from false claims, together with a broader commitment to in­
terpreting the two symmetrically, serves to strip scientihc evidence of epistemic 
authority. Under this view, prioritising scientihc expertise over the economic, 
political, and moral preferences of the public can no longer be justihed. Further­
more, it is argued that the inclusion of scientihc expertise results in the framing of 
the controversy as something that primarily hinges on scientihc and technological 
questions, at the expense of other factors (Wynne 2003). For example:
Those opposed to further developments in genetic testing and screen­
ing may question their economic, political, and moral consequences 
by stressing the way in which they reinforce existing inequalities (e.g., 
allowing the afhuent or powerful to enhance their children's genetic
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inheritance); create new forms of discrimination (e.g., a return of eu­
genics via the "deselection" of embryos seen as likely to have a disease 
or disability); and/or presume the desirability of increased industri­
alization, commodification, and control (e.g., by implying that it is 
proper to choose or design humans) (Evans & Collins 2008, p.612).
The implementation of deliberative or participatory processes - where the opinions 
of stakeholders and the wider public are solicited - have been advocated as ways of 
counterbalancing overly scientihc or technological hramings (Irwin 1995, Burning- 
ham 1998, Wilsdon & Willis 2004). Whilst the implementation of such processes 
may improve the acceptance of decisions, it has also helped promote the notion 
of 'lay expertise' - the expertise acquired by virtue of being a citizen, and the 
expertise required to arrive at economic, political, and moral outcome preferences. 
This has served to give credence to the idea that, during controversies over tech­
nological decision-making, there should be no boundaries to participation because 
no special weight should be given to those with scientihc or technological exper­
tise, because lay expertise is all that's  required to ensure that public preferences 
are considered. On this understanding, during a controversy over technological 
decision-making, "the proper participants are in principle every democratic citi­
zen" (Wynne 2003, p.411). This dissolution of the boundaries between experts 
and citizens during controversies over technological decision-making chimes with 
other descriptive studies of how scientihc and technological expertise is attributed. 
Sheila Jasanoff (2005) used a study of the controversies over biotechnology in the 
UK, Germany, the US, and the EU to show how different countries use different 
mechanisms and modes of reasoning to make decisions about what constitutes 
expertise. These mechanisms, Jasanoff argued, form part of 'civic epistemologies' 
that are deeply embedded in the institutions that manage, shape and hrame polit­
ical issues. Given that many of these institutions are made up of people without 
scientihc and technological expertise, citizens and lay people become active par­
ticipants in the construction of expertise, thus undermining the basis for a clear 
demarcation between the two.
2.2.6 The Third W ave o f Science Studies
In response to these arguments, Harry Collins, Robert Evans, and others, have 
established a Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) research program. In a
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much-discussed article, Collins and Evans (2002) argued that given work on the 
'problem of legitimacy' had shown that a case could be made for consulting those 
outside of the scientihc and technical elite during controversies, in light of recent 
attempts to increase democratic participation in controversies over technological 
decision-making, the most pressing problem was now the 'problem of extension'. 
Collins and Evans asked:
Should the political legitimacy of technical decisions in the public do­
main be maximized by referring them to the widest democratic pro­
cesses, or should such decisions be based on the best expert advice?
The hrst choice risks technological paralysis: the second invites popu­
lar opposition (Collins & Evans 2002, pp.235-236).
Collins and Evans (2002) believed that the way to solve the problem of extension 
was to recognise a preference for "those who know what they're talking about". 
To realise this, they claimed that it was necessary to reconceptualize the notion 
of what it means to be considered an expert. They argued that developing new 
categories of expertise, and then taking a normative position on the extent to which 
they should be drawn upon should constitute a third wave of science studies.
Collins and Evans (2002) argued that STS could be divided into three 'waves'.^ 
During what they called the hrst wave of science studies, which occurred during the 
1950s and 1960s, scholarly work served to reinforce the successes of science. During 
controversies over technological decision-making, it was acceptable for scientists to 
profess on matters outside of their held, and it was virtually unthinkable for those 
outside of the scientihc and political communities to inhuence decision-making 
processes. During what they called the second wave of science studies, scholarly 
work typically established and maintained that science was socially constructed, 
extra-scientihc factors were often drawn upon to close controversies, and following 
on from the work of Wynne, Jasanoff, and others, the lines between experts and 
non-experts were blurred. This, as has been described, led some to conclude that 
experts should have no more inhuence on controversies over technological decision­
making than non-experts. Therefore, with respect to the problem of legitimacy 
and the problem of extension:
^Collins and Evans used the term 'waves' to refer to the dominant ways of thinking within a 
particular period, rather than to specify clear boundaries beyond which certain ways of thinking 
could not be found. As such, Wave One attitudes, though dominant in the 1950s and 1960s, 
did not disappear with the advent of Wave Two, and can still observed today within certain 
discourses (e.g. Henderson 2011).
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The First Wave of Science Studies had no Problem of Extension, and 
was unaware of the Problem of Legitimacy. The Second Wave of Sci­
ence Studies was good for solving the Problem of Legitimacy that it 
inherited from Wave One, but replaced it with the Problem of Ex­
tension . . .  We propose that the Third Wave of Science Studies should 
accept the Second Wave's solution to the Problem of Legitimacy, but 
still draw a boundary around the body of 'technically-qualified-by- 
experience' contributors to technical decision-making (Collins &: Evans 
2002, p.238).
To complement this idea, and to prepare the ground for future normative claims, 
Collins and Evans initially defined four types of expertise: no expertise; interac­
tional expertise; referred expertise; and contributory expertise (Collins & Evans 
2002, p.254). Rather than being based on qualifications or accreditation, these 
types were based on experience. Taking the example of a sociological fieldworker 
aiming to study scientific knowledge production, no expertise was defined as the 
degree of expertise with which the fieldworker sets out, and is therefore insufficient 
for both sociological analysis and making a scientihc contribution to the held un­
der study. Interactional expertise was dehned as the level of expertise sufhcient to 
perform a sociological analysis of the held, and to interact interestingly with those 
performing the scientihc activity. Referred expertise was dehned as expertise from 
an adjacent held that could be applied to the held under study. Finally, contrib­
utory expertise was dehned as having the level of expertise necessary to make a 
direct contribution to the scientihc held (Collins &: Evans 2002, pp.254-259).
In the initial critical response to these initial claims, Wynne (2003) argued that 
Collins and Evans (2002) had misunderstood the problem of legitimacy, in that 
they based it on the belief that people with authentic but unrecognized expertise 
were denied access to deliberations. Wynne claimed that, in fact, the real prob­
lem was that meaning was imposed on the public in the form of decision-based, 
prepositional questions, such as "is nuclear power safe?" or "is British beef safe?". 
Jasanoff (2003) argued that Collins and Evans (2002) provided a misleading char­
acterization of the science studies literature, displayed misconceptions about the 
foundations of expertise in the public domain, and misunderstood the purposes of 
public participation in contemporary democratic societies. Pertaining to all three 
criticisms, Jasanoff argued that:
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Expertise is not merely something that is in the heads and hands of 
skilled persons, constituted through their deep familiarity with the 
problem in question, but rather that it is something acquired, and 
deployed, within particular historical, political, and cultural contexts. 
Expertise relevant to public decisions, I have further shown, responds 
to specific institutional imperatives that vary within and between na­
tion states. Accordingly, who counts as an expert (and what counts 
as expertise) in UK environmental or public health controversies may 
not necessarily be who (or what) would count for the same purpose in 
Germany or India or the USA (Jasanoff 2003, p.393).
Jasanoff, along with Arie Rip (2003), questioned the appropriateness of categories 
of expertise, given that the central question is often "what counts as relevant 
knowledge?", rather than "who possess the scientific knowledge?". Furthermore, 
they argued, even if contributory expertise can be clearly identified as such, we 
may still wonder about the circumstances under which this came about:
If we regard the very formation of expert 'core-sets' as a political phe­
nomenon, then attention inevitably has to focus on the processes by 
which such sets are created, maintained, patrolled, and protected. In 
many areas of public policy, we may not be interested in re-examining 
the foundations of settled expertise in this way, but when controversy 
erupts, it becomes important to ask what sustains the authority of a 
particular group of experts and their expertise (Jasanoff 2003, p.395).
In general, then, the criticisms levelled at the third wave suggested - in the minds 
of the critics at least - that it had failed to sufficiently incorporate ideas from 
the second wave, and could therefore be interpreted as a backwards step towards 
first wave ideas. In response to Wynne's criticism, Collins and Evans (2003) 
replied that, although the overly scientific or technological framing of controversies 
over technological decision-making should be avoided, this should not lead to the 
outright exclusion of all scientific or technological questions, and that propositional 
questions of the type Wynne described require expert debate. In response to 
Jasanoff and Rip, Collins and Evans (2003) located the root of their disagreement 
in a failure to appreciate the difference between descriptive aims of the second 
wave and the prescriptive aims of the third. Therefore, although Collins and
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Evans agreed that the current processes involved in expert attribution do serve to 
blur the lines between expert and non-expert, this alone should not prevent the 
third wave from attempting to prescribe a system where this is not the case.
2.2.7 The Periodic Table o f E xpertise
The differences between the descriptive aims of the second wave, and the normative 
aims of the third wave, served to leave them somewhat separate in the literature 
that followed. Work continues on both in parallel. Therefore, the remainder of this 
section will focus on how the third wave has been developed. Since the publication 
of their original third wave paper, Collins, Evans and others have rehned their 
categories of expertise and developed complementary concepts. Collins and Evans' 
third wave ideas were updated and extended with their periodic table of expertise. 
The periodic table of expertise is now used as the starting point for studies of 
expertise in the third wave, and remains its most important set of concepts and 
categories.
Before describing the 'elements' of the table, it is important to recognise that it 
is built upon the concept of 'tacit knowledge'. A term made famous by Michael 
Polanyi in his Persona/ Know/edpe (1958), tacit knowledge refers to that which we 
know how to do, but not how to explain how to do. For example, we may possess 
the tacit knowledge required to ride a bicycle, but we may not be able to express 
this knowledge logically or explicitly. Polanyi, who'd trained as a chemist, argued 
that the philosophical descriptions of laboratory science that were available at 
the time were too reliant on explicit knowledge, and therefore neglected the tacit 
knowledge often required to make experiments work. Since Polanyi popularized 
the term, different disciplines have developed their own understanding of tacit 
knowledge, and in some cases, have rehned and updated his ideas. Drawing on 
work from artihcial intelligence and automation, Collins (2010) has made a useful 
distinction between three types of tacit knowledge: 'relational' tacit knowledge; 
'somatic-limit' tacit knowledge; and 'collective' tacit knowledge. Relational tacit 
knowledge, which may be thought of as the 'weakest' form of tacit knowledge, 
simply refers to knowledge that could be made explicit, but has not, due to the 
contingencies of society. However, somatic-limit and collective tacit knowledge 
refer to knowledge that is thought of as tacit due the nature of the knowledge
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itself. As Collins explained in an earlier article (written before the development 
of the idea of relational tacit knowledge):
Why is such a large component of human knowledge known tacitly?
Two different reasons are not distinguished in the literature. The first 
reason is to do with the limited capacities and particular nature of 
the human brain and body; this gives us what I'll call 'somatic-limit 
tacit knowledge'. The second reason is to do with the relationship 
between individual humans and society; this gives us 'collective tacit 
knowledge'. The two kinds of tacit knowledge are rarely distinguished, 
because they are experienced and acquired by humans in the same 
way: through immersion in society and guided practice. Neverthe­
less, they have not only entirely different causes, but entirely different 
consequences (Collins 2007a, p.258).
This can be illustrated using the bicycle-riding example. Although it may appear 
tha t no formal rules can exist for bicycle balancing, this can be seen as the result 
of the limitations of human beings, rather than the nature of the knowledge itself. 
As such, it is somatic-limit tacit knowledge. If we were to imagine trying to 
balance a bicycle on the moon (or any other environment with low gravity), or if 
the speed of human reactions and comprehension were drastically increased, it is 
conceivable that the rider could follow a set of logical step-by-step instructions to 
balance the bicycle. After all, scientists have already built robots that can balance 
bicycles in controlled environments. However, balancing a bicycle is not the same 
as riding a bicycle. Bicycle riding, particularly in urban environments, requires 
collective tacit knowledge. It is collective tacit knowledge that allows for, say, an 
appreciation of the social conventions that govern trahie, thus allowing the rider 
to negotiate safe passage. Collective tacit knowledge recognises that changing the 
context will change the nature of the activity. Riding a bicycle in London is not 
the same as riding a bicycle in Amsterdam. Crucially:
Collective tacit knowledge is not a m atter of the accident of the hu­
man constitution, but a matter of the knowledge itself. This knowledge 
has to  be known tacitly, because it is located in human collectivities 
and, therefore, can never be the property of any one individual. The 
simplest way to see this is to note that changes in the content of the
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knowledge belonging to communities is beyond the control of the in­
dividuals within the communities. For example, the content of the 
ever-changing argot that children speak, to the irritation of their par­
ents, is not under the control of any child or parent; it evolves at the 
collective level and no one knows the rules of its evolution (Collins 
2007a, p.260).
As such, if collective tacit knowledge is seen as being located within the society 
that produced it, and varies accordingly, it is of particular relevance to sociologists.
The periodic table of expertises (see Figure 2.1) is built upon these ideas about 
tacit knowledge. The first row of the table - ubiquitous expertises - refers to the 
expertise, such as natural language speaking, that “every member of society must 
possess in order to  live in it” . As a result, if one possess ubiquitous expertises, one 
also has a huge body of tacit knowledge. The second row of the table - disposi­
tions - refers to expertises such as “linguistic fluency or analytical flair” . The third 
row - specialist expertises - deals with different types of knowledge. It is divided 
into ubiquitous tacit knowledge and specialist tacit knowledge. Expertise that 
is based on ubiquitous tacit knowledge includes: beer mat knowledge - isolated 
facts that serve little purpose outside of general knowledge quizzes; popular under­
standing of science - knowledge obtained from popular books and journalism that 
typically eschew discussions of doubt and uncertainty; and primary source knowl­
edge - knowledge garnered from journal articles and other first-hand documents
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that provide a shallow description of how an activity operates, and say very little 
about the context in which it was created. Expertise that is based on specialist 
tacit knowledge includes interactional expertise and contributory expertise, the 
definitions of which were largely carried over from Collins and Evans' (2002) orig­
inal third wave article. The fourth row - meta-expertises - is concerned with the 
expertise required to assess the expertise of others, and is divided into transmuted 
expertises and non-transmuted expertises. Transmuted expertise refers to the abil­
ity of those who don't possess a particular specialist expertise, but do have the 
expertise required to judge between those that do. Given that these judgements 
are based on things like demeanour, consistency, and trustworthiness, they use 
social distinctions to produce technical distinctions. Non-transmuted expertises 
refers to the judgements made based on a level of expertise related to the expertise 
being judged. As such, it includes the expertise of, say, art critics, as they may not 
create art themselves, but use their expertise to pass judgement, and managers of 
scientific projects, who can use their management skills on a range other projects 
if required. The fifth row - meta-criteria - refers to the criteria that outsiders use 
to judge between experts if they have no expertise themselves. As such, it includes 
judgements based on information about the expert's qualifications or track record 
(Collins &: Evans 2007).
2.2.8 Specialist E xpertise
When analysing controversies over technological decision-making, consideration 
of the expertise contained in all five rows of the periodic table may be required. 
However, the types of expertise under the heading of specialist tacit knowledge are 
those that have received the most scholarly attention. Contributory expertise was 
defined as “what you need to do an activity with competence'', and interactional 
expertise was defined as “the ability to master the language of a specialist domain 
in the absence of practical competence'' (Collins &: Evans 2007, p. 14). Much of 
Collins and Evans' (2007) was devoted to a discussion of interactional expertise, 
as has been much subsequent work within the third wave (see Collins 20076). This 
is because it was thought to be the least well-understood type. It also specifically 
relates to the problem of extension, given that it widens the boundary between 
experts and non-experts during a controversy. In particular, it licenses the STS 
scholar to participate in a controversy related to a scientific field that they do not
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have any practical experience of contributing towards. In this sense, the idea of 
interactional expertise is crucial for linking the second wave to the third wave.
Collins and Evans (2007) placed language at the centre of their understanding of 
interactional expertise. They wrote that:
Typically, sociologists who want to study areas of scientific knowledge 
that are new to them have to try to grasp something of the science 
itself. The sociologist begins with no specialist expertise - which is 
a level insufficient to do sociological analysis of scientific knowledge.
The sociologist is likely to move rapidly through public understanding 
and primary source knowledge, which are also inadequate to allow for 
competent social analysis of scientific knowledge. W ith luck, however, 
interactional expertise, which does allow for social analysis of scientific 
knowledge, will eventually be attained . . .  The transition to interac­
tional expertise is accomplished, crucially, by engaging in conversation 
with experts. Interactional expertise is slowly gained with more and 
more discussion of the science (or other technical skill) (Collins &: Evans 
2007, pp.32-33).
Furthermore:
Where interactional expertise is being acquired, there will be a pro­
gression from “interview” to “discussion” to “conversation” as more 
and more of the science is understood. There is no sudden “ah hah” 
moment that marks the switch to mastery of interactional expertise, 
but its steady acquisition can nevertheless be recognized (Collins &
Evans 2007, p.33).
Experiments have been carried out tha t confirm the existence of interactional 
expertise. Here, an imitation game similar to the famous Turing Test was used to 
show that a judge could not distinguish between colour blind and colour sighted 
individuals because the colour blind are Constantly immersed in the language of 
colour. In contrast, those without perfect pitch cannot pretend to have perfect 
pitch because they are not typically immersed in language that refers to it (Collins 
et al. 2006).
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In contrast, less has been said about the nature of contributory expertise within 
the context of the third wave. Collins and Evans (2007) placed practices at the 
heart of their description of contributory expertise. They, in part, understood 
contributory expertise in terms of Stuart and Hubert Dreyfus' (1986) hve-stage 
model of skill acquisition. Under this model, as an individual learns more about 
an activity, they pass through live stages: novice; advanced beginner; compe­
tence; proficiency; and expertise. As an individual progresses towards expertise, 
increased practical understanding results in a reduced reliance on formal rules, 
thus more of their actions are based on context and instinct. This understanding 
of contributory expertise also relates to the problem of extension, given that it can 
be used to attribute specialist expertise to those without scientific qualifications 
or accreditation. Instead, what's required is practical experience of contributing 
towards a particular domain. Therefore, under the third wave, in Wynne's (1996) 
aforementioned case study, the Cumbrian sheep farmers would be considered ex­
perts because of their considerable experience of sheep farming in that particular 
locale (Collins & Evans 2002).
2.2.9 E lective M odernism
More recently, Collins, Weinel, and Evans (2010) have outlined what the third 
wave categories of specialist expertise imply for controversies over technological 
decision-making. They have labelled this 'elective modernism'. Elective mod­
ernism consists of normative principles that are designed to, if used during a 
controversy over technological decision-making, avoid the tendency towards 'tech­
nological populism' they argued could be seen during the second wave, whilst 
also avoiding the 'technocracy' of the first wave that the second wave had shown 
to be both untenable and undesirable. To be clear, technocracy was used here 
to refer to the complete exclusion of non-credentialed scientific and technological 
experts from a controversy, and technological populism to the complete opening 
up of a controversy to anyone, and with no special preference given to scientific 
expertise. The purpose of elective modernism, then, was to outline a system that 
realised a ''preference for democracies which actively promote discussion and de­
bate of technical matters yet which reject popuhsm of all kinds while still rejecting 
technocracy'' (Collins et al. 2010, p. 185).
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In order to do this, Collins, Weinel and Evans (2010) returned to an earlier dis­
tinction between what they called the 'technical phase' and the 'political phase' 
of a controversy. Put simply, the technical phase is the period during which the 
science is done, and the political phase is period during which the politics is done. 
Collins and Evans (2002) originally argued that the two phases were different from 
one another in terms of: the type of questions they addressed; the actors involved; 
the role of politics; and the type of values involved. Thus, it was argued that it 
is possible to distinguish between the technical phase and the political phase of a 
controversy using Ludwig W ittgenstein's (1953) 'family resemblance' concept:
Science is a distinct 'form-of-life' distinguished by the key 'formative 
intentions' of the actors. Philosophical demarcation criteria might have 
failed but sociological demarcation criteria such as the difference be­
tween the values of science and the values of politics can still be ro­
bustly applied so long as they are meant to mark out activities that 
have a family resemblance. Family resemblances stand up even though 
not every single activity carried out under the description of science 
matches all the characteristics of the family... It is possible to distin­
guish between the unavoidable 'intrinsic' politics of science and the 'ex­
trinsic' politics that are an explicit part of the political process... Given 
[the above] it is possible to maintain the distinction between the 'tech­
nical phase' of a technological decision in the public domain and the 
'political phase'. The technical phase is informed by the formative in­
tentions associated with the scientific form-of-life, whereas the political 
phase is concerned with the formative intentions associated with the 
politics of the wider society (Collins et al. 2010, pp. 187-188).^
Collins, Weinel, and Evans (2010) argued that in order to achieve elective mod­
ernism's goal of avoiding technocracy, the political phase should always have pri­
ority over the technical phase. In other words, the outcome of a controversy over 
technological decision-making does not necessarily have to reflect the work of the 
technical phase. However, the political phase must at least consider as much of the
"^Although the technical phase and the political phase can be demarcated in this way, it does 
not imply that those with specialist expertise necessarily operate within a technical phase based 
on the formative intentions of science. For example, although the sheep farmers in Wynne's 
(1996) case study can be said to possess contributory expertise, and can be said to be operating 
within a technical phase, this technical phase was based on formative intentions that are different 
from those of both science and politics.
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work of the technical phase as possible. Furthermore, the political phase should 
make no attem pt to subvert or misrepresent the findings of the technical phase. 
As such, although the speed of politics is faster than the speed of scientific consen­
sus formation, technological populism can be avoided by valuing the judgement 
of experts. In linking back to the second wave, Collins, Weinel, and Evans (2010) 
reiterated that, although it had been shown that experts cannot deliver completely 
neutral findings, and that there is no clear fact-value distinction, experts should 
at least try to insulate their work from the cultural or political environment.
Collins, Weinel, and Evans (2010) illustrated this using the example of the Brent 
Spar oil platform - a controversy over the Shell Oil Company's decision to dispose 
of the platform by sinking it into the North Sea. This decision was opposed 
by environmental groups - including Greenpeace - who argued that sinking the 
platform would pollute the sea, and would set a precedent for the future disposal 
of hazardous material. Ultimately, Shell responded to these arguments, and the 
platform was disposed of on land. Collins, Weinel, and Evans (2010) argued that, 
in this situation, it was possible to make two types of argument: the utilitarian; 
and the quasi-religious/populist:
The argument that the Brent Spar was primarily a symbol of a will­
ingness to pollute, or mix the clean with the dirty, also has these two 
possible interpretations. First, there is the 'utilitarian symbolic argu­
ment' which states that sinking the Brent Spar would be the 'thin end 
of the wedge' - that is, it would set a precedent that would license 
many more similar actions. Thus sinking one rig would ju s ti^  sinking 
any number of rigs and, perhaps, other items of industrial waste and 
this would cause long term pollution damage whether or not the Brent 
Spar was a potential pollutant on its own. This kind of argument 
was made by some of the actors involved in the Brent Spar debate. 
Second, there is the quasi-religious/populist symbolic argument which 
runs along the lines that the North Sea should not be mixed with un­
natural things like oil rigs. This sentiment, though it is not always 
thought of as quasi-religious, is nonetheless what characterizes argu­
ments for the preservation of the 'natural' environment in this absolute 
sense (Collins et al. 2010, p. 190).
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Under elective modernism, qnasi-religious/popnlist arguments can play no part in 
the technical phase, and cannot be advanced by experts in the political phase. 
However, non-experts may advance them during the political phase, and if these 
arguments are successful over utilitarian arguments during the political phase, 
the elective modernist would have to accept this outcome as legitimate in order 
to avoid technocracy. In order to avoid technological populism, decisions made 
during the political phase should be done so with as much of the information from 
the technical phase as possible:
Political decisions should not be made without considering as much 
as possible of the technical knowledge which bears upon the decision.
The democratic process, in leading up to the decision about whether oil 
rigs should be dumped, should make visible all that needs to be known 
about the effects of dumping and that the question of what needs to 
be known should be given as wide an answer as possible (Collins et al.
2010, p.191).
Elective modernism therefore places a focus on the relationship between the techni­
cal phase and the political phase. In order for relevant expertise from the technical 
phase to have the best chance of being transferred to the political phase, Collins, 
Weinel, and Evans (2010) highlighted the importance of having institutions in 
place that can allow for the political phase to be framed as imaginatively as pos­
sible. Though this would help ensure that no relevant expertise is ignored, it does 
not say anything about the nature of the transfer process, and what this might 
look like in its ideal form.
Robert Evans and Alexandra Plows (2007) have used a study of controversies over 
medical genomics to expand upon definitions of the technical and political phases, 
and to describe the relationships that can exist between them. In short, these 
relationships are circular. The activity of the technical phase shapes the activity of 
the political phase, and vice versa (see Figure 2.2). The political phase frames the 
questions that it becomes appropriate for the technical phase to address, and the 
technical phase informs the political phase of what's known and what's possible. 
However, Evans and Plows (2007) did not describe what an idealised form of the 
transfer between phases might look like.
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Technical phase: Deals with 
questions of fact, uses expert 
knowledge and skill, Includes 
scientists and other experts.
Output: Frames questions, 
priorities and standards against  ^
which experts should be held to 
account.
Output: Provides resources for 
wider debate. Including guidance
on what is/is not known, 
contested or possible.
Political phase: Deals with 
questions of preference, uses 
meta-expertise to discriminate 
Includes non expert citizens.
FIGURE 2.2: The R elationship Between the Technical and Political Phases
(Evans &: Plows 2007)
Martin Weinel (2010) has referred to the issues surrounding the appropriate rela­
tionship between the technical and the political phase as the 'problem of integra­
tion'. According the Weinel, the problem of integration:
Arises as a direct consequence of the [third wave] model's ability to 
solve the problem of extension. Implicit in demarcating between ex­
perts and non-experts is the construction of a niche or 'phase', as it 
has been called by Collins and Evans (2002), in which technical experts 
can make policy-relevant technical judgements. Separating such a spe­
cific 'technical phase' from a larger 'political phase' makes it logically 
necessary to establish rules according to which the technical advice 
formulated by experts feeds into or informs the political phase (Weinel
2010, p.8).
Weinel (2010) offered a partial solution to the problem of integration with the 
development of what he called the 'Minimal Default Position' (MDP). MDP is 
a rule that specifies a minimum requirement of the relationship between the two 
phases - namely, that ''if experts provide a consensual answer to a propositional
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question with a sufhcient degree of certainty, this answer should, as a minimum 
requirement, have a constraining effect on the decision-making in the political 
phase” (Weinel 2010, pp.71-72). Importantly, the constraining effect of the tech­
nical phase is limited to the public justihcations that can be used to legitimise 
choices in the political phase. As Weinel illustrated:
For example, imagine that experts (in the wide sense of SEE, which 
might include farm workers) are fairly certain that a particular pes­
ticide is safe for users as well as for consumers of agricultural prod­
ucts. According to the MDP, this expert assessment itself must not 
necessarily impact on the policy-choices of decision-makers. It might 
be decided that farmers can legitimately use the substance, but it is 
also feasible that legislation is approved, which forbids the use of the 
substance. Whatever policy-choice is elected, policy-makers must not 
misrepresent the expert assessment. If policy-makers legislate against 
the use of the pesticide, they must not ju s ti^  their policy-choice by 
claiming that experts are uncertain about the issue of safety or that 
experts have even judged that the substance is too unsafe. Instead, 
they can ju s ti^  such a decision by stating that despite the fact that 
experts have found the pesticide to be safe, they have decided not to 
allow the use of the substance because they aspire to establish a purely 
organic agriculture (Weinel 2010, pp.72-73).
Weinel (2010) later used the MDP rule to demonstrate how the former South 
African president Thabo Mbeki had misused the expertise from the technical phase 
of a controversy over AIDS vaccination.^
To sum up, the principles that underpin elective modernism can be expressed in 
the following tenets:
1. Recognize but do not endorse religious or populist reasons in the making of 
technological decisions in the public domain.
2. Frame technological issues imaginatively so as to bring as many proposi­
tional questions and answers to the table as might bear on the technological 
decision.
^As will be described in the next section, Weinel (2010) also argued that although the MDP 
wag useful for improving the style of debate, it needed to be combined with a consideration of 
meta-expertise in order to arrive at an outcome consistent with the goals of elective modernism.
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3. Never suppress or distort the opinions of experts even if they must always 
be treated as subservient to politics but, on the contrary, make sure that 
all relevant answers to all relevant propositional questions are as visible as 
possible.
4. A good society will be informed by, among other things, scientific values for 
these are democratic values.
5. A good society will facilitate maximum scope for discussion of political m at­
ters and maximum exposure of technical matters.
6. Always aspire to keep the technical and the political phase separate even 
where they are combined in institutions or individuals (Collins et al. 2010, 
p.195).
2.2.10 M et a-Expertise
The development of elective modernism has prompted further consideration of the 
meta-expertise row of the periodic table. As part of the same study of AIDS 
vaccination in South Africa, Weinel (2010) defined two further categories of meta­
expertise that could be used to better understand how expertise can be judged 
during controversies over technological decision-making. The judgement of exper­
tise is an important element of the relationship between the technical and political 
phases, given that those in the political phase may be required to make a deci­
sion based on apparently conflicting expertise, or based on expertise of varying 
quality. Weinel therefore developed the additional meta-expertise categories of 
Domain-Specific Discrimination and Sociological Discrimination.
Domain-Specific Discrimination (DSD) refers to the non-technical expertise used 
by technical experts to arrive at judgements about other experts within their held. 
In contrast to transmuted meta-expertises, such as ubiquitous discrimination and 
local discrimination - where an assessment of the expertise of an individual is ar­
rived at through consideration of social attributes to which everyone has access, 
or through consideration of social attributes accessible by virtue of a closer social 
proximity - DSD assesses expertise through social factors intrinsic to the partic­
ular held of science, such as experimental skill, reputation, background, and so 
on. As such, it links back to the factors identihed under EPOR that are often
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used by scientists to break the experimenters regress and close controversies over 
experimental results (Collins & Weinel 2011).
Sociological Discrimination refers to the ability of those with expertise in the so­
ciology of science to be able to arrive at a similar judgement about a particular 
aspect of a controversy. Weinel (2010) argued that those with expertise in the 
sociology of science would be better equipped than those relying on ubiquitous 
discrimination to judge, for example, whether a controversy was actually present 
within a particular scientific field. Weinel argued that those equipped with so­
ciological discrimination would be able to distinguish between authentic and in­
authentic scientific controversies through an assessment of four criteria: explicit 
argument - whether a disagreement within the discipline is visible; expertise of 
claim maker - whether those making claims that challenges a consensus possess 
the relevant technical expertise; constitutive work - whether the claims that chal­
lenge a consensus were based on scientific work; and conceptual continuity with 
science - whether the claim that challenges a consensus has any intention of being 
a part of science (Weinel 2010, pp. 170-171).
2.2.11 Criticism s o f E lective M odernism
Critical responses to the elective modernism position have argued variously that: 
it rests on an untenable fact-value distinction; the technical and political phases 
cannot be disentangled from one another; and there's little evidence that techno­
logical populism is a problem in need of addressing (Fischer 2011, Forsyth 2011, 
Epstein 2011). Such criticisms are reminiscent of those levelled at the original 
invocation of the third wave, in that they imply that ideas from the second wave 
have not been sufficiently incorporated into the third. It is important to stress 
again that, throughout the third wave debate, critics and proponents have, to a 
certain extent, been arguing at crossed purposes. Proponents of the third wave, 
in attempting to address the problem of extension, have embarked upon a nor­
mative exercise, whereas their critics, in reiterating the arguments of the second 
wave, continue to be engaged in a descriptive exercise. Collins, Weinel, and Evans 
(2011), in noticing this tendency, have commented that there may bo a certain 
degree of paradigm incommensurability between the two approaches. However, 
the similarities between wave two and wave three should not be forgotten, and
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nor should the importance of wave two ideas in underpinning the third wave con­
cepts. Therefore, much of the critical engagement with elective modernism has 
been disappointing due to a lack of direct engagement with its principles.
Consequently, there is plenty of scope for rehning third wave ideas. Those that 
have done this have tended to focus on how the relationship between the technical 
and political phases should function (Evans & Plows 2007, Weinel 2010). Under 
elective modernism, it is stated that specialist expertise produced during the tech­
nical phase should inform the political phase of a controversy. However, it is worth 
reiterating that, in practice, this does not always happen. In their recent study 
of the controversy over the impact of insecticides on honeybee colonies, Sainath 
Suryanarayanan and Daniel Lee Kleinman (2013) demonstrated that the claims of 
scientists achieved 'epistemic dominance' over the claims of beekeepers. Echoing 
Jasanoff (2003), they argued that the third wave framework ''[does] not consider 
the factors that legitimize certain claims about methods, data, and truth while 
delegitimizing others, factors that thus define certain actors as experts and oth­
ers as nonexperts”. They concluded their case study by arguing that ''beekeeper 
knowledge is constructed via practices that take an informal epistemic form, which 
makes them conducive to the highly dynamic, local, variable, and complex aspects 
of their operations” , and more generally that:
Understanding why certain knowledge claims are recognized and oth­
ers are not demands an analysis that takes seriously the historical and 
structural bases for the influence of different actors' claims in techno- 
scientihc controversies. Comprehending context and history is crucial 
to explaining epistemological dominance (Suryanarayanan & Kleinman 
2013, p.233).
On this understanding, the history of how contributory expertise was created 
during the technical phase appears to partly inform its chances of influencing the 
political. To a certain extent, the periodic table of expertise already acknowledges 
that this is a possibility. It locates expertise in collective tacit knowledge, and 
defines collective tacit knowledge as dependent on social context. Although there 
may be differences between accepted and marginalised contributory expertise, this 
is not necessarily the only outcome of context dependency. It seems likely that 
different types of contributory expertise can be produced in different contexts, and 
that the way in which this expertise is used during the political phase is significant.
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For elective modernism to be workable, understanding and acknowledging how 
contributory expertise can vary therefore becomes important if the best decisions 
are to be made about the processes used to transfer expertise from the technical 
phase to the political phase.
2.2.12 Sum m ary
Studies of controversies have been central to the sociological understanding of the 
creation of scientific facts, the creation of technological artefacts, and technological 
decision-making. These studies have often focussed on the rhetoric used during 
controversies. However, if controversies are thought of in this way, certain features 
- such as materiality, secrecy and silences - may be overlooked. Recent studies of 
controversies have focussed on expertise. Whereas some have advocated increased 
public participation and a role for lay  expertise', Collins, Evans, and others - 
through their invocation of the third wave, and in particular, their statement of 
elective modernism - have attempted to consider expertise and its political con­
sequences in normative terms. They have distinguished between expertise based 
on specialist tacit knowledge from that based on ubiquitous tacit knowledge, and 
transmuted meta-expertise from non-transmuted meta-expertise. They have also 
outlined a system that could go some way to solving the problem of extension, 
whilst avoiding both technological populism and technocracy. Some have criti­
cised the proponents of the third wave for overlooking aspects of the work from 
the second wave, and in doing so, taking a backwards step towards the first wave. 
However, much of this disagreement can be resolved through the acknowledgement 
that second and third wave work both have different goals. Work from the second 
wave is primarily descriptive, whereas work from the third wave is primarily pre­
scriptive. That being said, links between the two waves must remain strong if the 
third wave is to develop, given that its normative ideas are informed by descriptive 
case studies.
Since the original paper, the third wave has done much to integrate work Rom the 
second wave - particularly through work on interactional expertise. However, con­
sideration of contributory expertise has been, to some extent, put to one side. This 
is perhaps because few people working under the third wave would disagree that 
contributory expertise generated during the technical phase should inform the po­
litical phase. However, work has shown that some types of contributory expertise
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are nonetheless excluded from the political phase. This should prompt a more de­
tailed examination of how contributory expertise can be produced, acquired and 
maintained - particularly given that proponents of the third wave acknowledge 
that the nature of contributory expertise is dependent on the practices used to 
produce it. Furthermore, it should also prompt an examination of how different 
types of contributory expertise are transferred from the technical phase to the 
political phase, and once there, how they are used. Doing so may also require a 
deeper understanding of how expertise is assessed. Once this has been achieved, it 
may even be possible to suggest mechanisms that make better use of contributory 
expertise under elective modernism. One way that we may be able to explore the 
differences in the nature of contributory expertise further is through a review of 
the STS literature related to practices, in particular, the more recent work on the 
concept of multiplicity that has emerged from the so-called ontological turn. This 
will be the subject of the next section.
2.3 T he O ntologica l Fram ew ork
As was described in the previous section, recent attempts to study controver­
sies over technological decision-making within STS have focused on expertise, and 
in the case of contributory expertise, the practices that are used to produce it. 
Though the study of practices within STS has a long tradition, much recent work 
in this area has been carried out within an ontological framework. After briefly 
defining the ontological Ramework through a contrast with the epistemological 
framework, I will describe how, through a process of criticism and refinement, a 
strand of the ontological framework has come to foreground 'multiplicity'. I will 
then turn my attention to how ideas about multiplicity have been applied and 
adapted. I will describe how: case studies drawing upon multiplicity have ex­
panded beyond medicine into other areas; multiplicity has been refined to develop 
the 'different worlds' argument; acknowledging multiplicity has foregrounded po­
litical concerns; and how multiplicity has already been used to understand aspects 
of controversies over technological decision-making. I will argue that, following 
some of the concerns that have been expressed about whether the epistemologi­
cal and ontological frameworks are truly distinct Rom one another, together with 
concerns over the philosophical implications of adopting its strict form, the best
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approach is to adopt 'ontography' - the use of the vocabulary of the ontologi­
cal framework to build empirical descriptions (Lynch 2013). When thought of 
in this way, the ontological framework complements the study of expertise under 
the third wave, and there exists the possibility that the two can be used together 
to enhance our understanding of controversies over technological decision-making 
and contributory expertise.
2.3.1 T he Epistem ological Framework
In order to introduce the ontological framework, it is necessary to take a step back 
from the study of controversies, and to consider ways of understanding 'difference'. 
John Law and Vicky Singleton (2005) identified two broad theoretical frameworks 
for understanding difference within STS: the ontological; and the epistemologi­
cal. The epistemological Ramework takes its name Rom the branch of philosophy 
known as epistemology. Epistemology, which is derived Rom the Greek word for 
knowledge, is concerned with theories of knowledge production (Blackburn 2005, 
p. 118). In simple terms, work done under the epistemological framework is based 
around the idea that difference can be accounted for through the recognition that 
actors view the world from different perspectives (Law &: Singleton 2005). As can 
be seen in the examples Rom the previous section, this way of accounting for dif­
ference hag proved to be a fruitful way of understanding controversies. Research 
under the epistemological framework hag informed a number of key concepts and 
research programs within STS, including SSK and SCOT. For example, the SCOT 
notion of interpretive flexibility hinges on the idea that groups can have different 
perspectives on how a particular technological artefact should be.
Though work under the epistemological Ramework continues, it is oRen claimed 
that there has been an 'ontological turn ' within STS. Some have even argued that:
The turn to ontology in STS is part of a much wider intellectual and 
political movement. In Western thinking this can be traced back at 
least as far as Nietzsche, and it now expresses itself both in post­
structuralism, and in a range of empirical disciplines, including cultural 
studies, human geography, parts of feminism, anthropology and post­
colonialism (Law & Lien 2013, pp.363-364).
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Whether or not this bold claim is true, work done under the ontological framework 
has certain identifiable characteristics. The ontological framework takes its name 
from 'ontology', which in turn is derived from the Creek word for 'being'. In the 
classic philosophical sense, ontology - a term coined in the seventeenth century - is 
a "branch of metaphysics that concerns itself with what exists" (Blackburn 2005, 
p.261). The ontological turn is usually used to refer to a series of insights that 
have emerged primarily from anthropological theory during the last two decades 
(Henare et al. 2007). How anthropologists have understood the purpose and nature 
of the ontological Ramework has varied, and given that their focus is oRen on the 
challenges associated with understanding the non-Western world, some interpre­
tations have little direct relevance to STS (e.g. Course 2010). As a result. I'll focus 
on how STS has used the ontological Ramework. As will become clear, within STS, 
the ontological framework has been concerned with the practices that are used to 
produce objects - where 'object' is used to refer to anything that can be said to 
exist, rather than something that necessarily occupies three-dimensional Euclidian 
space. Crucially, whereas the epistemological framework accounts for difference 
through the existence of divergent perspectives on a single reality, the ontological 
framework accounts for difference through the belief that divergent practices pro­
duce multiple objects, and in some of the more radical interpretations, multiple 
realities.
2.3.2 O ntological F lu idity
If we are to trace the development of the ontological framework within STS, as 
this section will attem pt to do, the most sensible place to start is with some 
of the most prominent ways that STS has dealt with objects in the past. The 
ontological Ramework is often referred to as a post-ANT framework (van Heur 
et al. 2013), so it is worth considering how ANT understands objects. One of 
the initial aims of ANT was to understand how complex systems are able to 
maintain long-distance control (Law 1992). This led to the concept of 'immutable 
mobiles'. Using an example from the Copernican revolution, Latour (1987) defined 
immutable mobiles as objects tha t are able to 'move around', whilst 'holding their 
shape'. Latour argued that the Copernican revolution was only able to take place 
because astronomers from all over Europe began to record their observations using 
the same pre-printed charts. This allowed facts to move around, remain universal, 
and form part of a stable network. The strength of the immutable mobiles concept
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lay in that it was able to describe how abstract objects - such as facts about 
the solar system - behaved, as well as tangible objects. Take the example of 
a Portuguese imperial ship. The ship must be able to move around, retain its 
shape (else it will sink), and form part of a network (the empire) (Law 1986). By 
regarding both abstract and tangible entities as objects, complex systems could 
be understood using the same framework.
There were, however, anxieties relating to immutable mobiles and the ANT ap­
proach. One such concern was the 'rigidity' that the immutable mobiles concept 
appeared to require. Responding to the criticism that ANT overemphasises the 
immutability of objects, Marianne de Laet and Annemarie Mol (2000) used an 
examination of the Zimbabwe Bush Pump to show how objects exhibit, and can 
be designed to exhibit, fluidity. Building upon an earlier argument about the flu­
idity of anaemia (Mol &: Law 1994), they argued that the pump can be thought 
of as 'fluid' because it has the ability to change its shape yet remain functional. 
In short, it is a 'mutable mobile'. For example, when the pump breaks, villagers 
are able to mend it using materials that were not part of the original design. Ad­
ditionally, the pump can also be thought of as fluid in terms of what it is able to 
provide. The pump provides water, but it also provides 'health' if the water is 
uncontaminated. The huidity of the pump is also linked to its boundaries. The 
pump supports a community at a local level, but at a wider level it supports a 
nation, as it is produced entirely within Zimbabwe's borders. To reiterate once 
more, though this may appear to echo SCOT and interpretive flexibility, de Laet 
and Mol emphasised that "the fluidity of the pump's working order is not a m atter 
of interpretation" because "it is built into the technology itself" (de Laet & Mol 
2000, p.225). The pump, they argued, was deliberately designed to be fluid, and 
later redesigns aimed to increase its fluidity.
Whilst recognising fluidity furthers our understanding of the nature of objects, it 
leaves some important questions unanswered. For example, there are questions 
that relate to the 'problem of difference' - namely, how can the simultaneous 
differences in objects be accounted for? In particular, sticking with the bush 
pump example, how can we account for the fact that it provides clean water at a 
local level, but also political stability in the form of a reliable water network at 
another (de Laet & Mol 2000, p.235)? The answer to this question came to form 
the basis of ontological 'multiplicity'.
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2.3.3 O ntological M ultip licity
Ideas about ontological multiplicity can be found in the work of Annemarie Mol. 
Partial elements of this concept can be found both in Mol's early work on anaemia 
(Mol & Berg 1994) and in related studies of atherosclerosis - a disease where 
deposits of fat cause the walls of arteries to thicken (Mol & Elsman 1996, Mol 
1998). In the definitive work on the subject, T/ze Bod?/ Mol (2002)
provided a study of atherosclerosis treatment in a Dutch hospital. Mol used this 
study to argue that objects - including diseases - are constructed through practices. 
Importantly, Mol also argued that different groups will construct multiple versions 
of the 'same' object if different practices are used, thus causing reality to multiply. 
Clearly departing from the epistemological framework. Mol argued that:
It is possible to refrain from understanding objects as central points 
of focus of different people's perspectives. It is possible instead to 
understand them as things manipulated in practises. If we do this 
- instead of bracketing the practises in which objects are handled we 
foreground them - this has far-reaching effects. Reality multiplies (Mol 
2002, pp.4-5).
Mol (2002) chose to use the term 'enact' to refer to the different processes that 
bring objects into existence. For example, the patient suffering from atheroscle­
rosis may enact the disease in terms of decreased mobility, whereas a healthcare 
professional may enact the disease in terms of cells observed under a microscope. 
This is not meant to imply that all health care professionals will enact atheroscle­
rosis in the same way. Different health care practices will also enact different 
versions of atherosclerosis. To illustrate this. Mol contrasted the atherosclerosis 
enacted in the clinic with the atherosclerosis enacted in the pathology laboratory. 
Thus, different instances of atherosclerosis were assigned a locality.
The recognition that different atherosclerosis objects are constructed through dif­
ferent practices in diherent locations is not meant to imply that they are kept 
completely separate at all times. Clearly, patients often need to embark on a 
single course of treatment. This can be achieved through a process of 'coordina­
tion'. Mol (2002) identified two methods by which coordination may be achieved. 
Firstly, a hierarchy of evidence may be constructed. This can then be used to ex­
plain away contradictory test results. For example, if a patient complains of pain
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consistent with atherosclerosis, but this is not corroborated with test results, the 
next course of action will often be based on the fact that test results carry more 
weight. Alternatively, information about different enactments of atherosclerosis 
can be calibrated where the above incommensurability is negotiable. A process of 
translation can occur if common measures are established among different practices 
and techniques. Mol described how coordination was achieved when medical pro­
fessionals were faced with conflicting results from two different practices: duplex 
(a non-invasive ultrasound technique); and angiography. In the end, angiography 
won out because one translation technique judged it to be the 'gold standard' (Mol 
&: Elsman 1996, Mol 2002).
2.3.4 D eveloping the O ntological Framework
T/ze provided a starting point for thinking about multiplicity within
STS. The work that has followed has developed these ideas. In particular: case 
studies have expanded beyond descriptions of health and medicine; multiplicity has 
been refined through the 'different worlds' argument; acknowledging multiplicity 
has foregrounded political concerns; and multiplicity has been used to understand 
aspects of scientific and technological controversies.
The first area I have identified is concerned with the scope of multiplicity case 
studies. In particular, it refers to the extent to which multiplicity has been ap­
plied across the STS landscape. As Steve Woolgar and Javier Lezaun (2013) have 
observed, of the case studies that have directly drawn on Mol's ideas about prac­
tices and multiplicity, the majority have been based on case studies of biology or 
medicine. In addition to Mol's (2002) study of atherosclerosis, there have been 
ontological case studies of hypoglycaemia (Mol & Law 2004), alcoholic liver disease 
(Law &: Singleton 2005), biological reproduction (Thompson 2007), phantomatic 
organisms (Schrader 2010), and foot and mouth disease (Law &: Mol 2011). This is 
despite the fact that "in principle, there seems to be no limit to the kinds of entity 
that might be treated as susceptible to enactment. Objects, persons, things, facts, 
theories, instruments and so on can all be enacted" (Woolgar &: Lezaun 2013, 
p.325). It is therefore encouraging that ideas about multiplicity have also been 
tentatively applied to objects outside of biology and medicine - such as software. 
In a study of the Connexions network - a free educational content delivery system
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at Rice University - Christopher Kelty (2008, p.270) briefly argued that multiplic­
ity could be used to understand the finality of open source projects, as well as 
how multiple enactments of various groups are coordinated towards delivering a 
finished product. It would appear, then, that the scope of multiplicity is expand­
ing, and that in the future, it will be applied to a wider and more ambitious range 
of objects.
The second area that I have identified refers to the depth of the multiplicity con­
cept. In particular, it refers to how concepts associated with multiplicity have 
been expanded upon. One of the most significant of these additions is the 'dif^ 
ferent worlds' argument. In a study of the 2001 foot and mouth disease epidemic 
in the UK, Law and Mol (2011) argued, as with the study of atherosclerosis, that 
divergent practices resulted in the enacting of different foot and mouth disease 
objects. For example, at the clinical level, foot and mouth disease was enacted 
through the identification of deviances within small groups of animals, whereas the 
laboratory enacted foot and mouth disease by seeking to identi^  a particular virus 
using a microscope. A third enactment of foot and mouth disease came from epi­
demiology speciahsts who enacted it by attempting to trace the infection through 
the entire UK livestock population. Again, as with the study of atherosclerosis, the 
issue of how each of these enactments interacted to form a single foot and mouth 
object centred around the idea that there exists a process by which a dominant 
object is selected - in this case, the laboratory version.
Law and Mol (2011) argued that the diRerences between each enactment of foot 
and mouth disease were rooted in the fact that they had each been enacted in 
'different worlds'. The final part of their study aimed to define more precisely the 
areas in which this praxiographic divergence occurred. Four factors were identified: 
the materials used to enact the object; the qualities of the enacted object; the 
staging of time when the object was enacted; and the spatial relations of where 
the object was enacted. Taking materials as an example, they argued tha t it was 
clear that the clinic, the laboratory, and the epidemiology department, all used 
different materials to enact foot and mouth disease. At the clinical level, foot and 
mouth disease was enacted through the examination of animal bodies. At the 
laboratory level, foot and mouth disease was enacted using biological samples and 
laboratory equipment. At the epidemiological level, foot and mouth disease was 
enacted using livestock transport records. Thus, in identifying these areas. Law 
and Mol provided a means of differentiating between enactments in other contexts.
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The third area that I have identified relates to politics. It has been argued that 
the ontological framework, through multiplicity, should prompt the foregrounding 
of political concerns. Whereas the epistemological framework prompts a certain 
detachment, because difference can be accounted for in terms of perspectives, the 
ontological framework confronts difference and treats it as real. Given that, under 
this view, reality is actively enacted through practices, the ontological framework 
prompts more direct questions about what kind of world we want to create. This 
has been attended to in the literature through discussions of 'experimental political 
ontology' and 'ontonorms'. Law and Mol (2011) concluded their aforementioned 
study of foot and mouth disease with a brief discussion of 'ontological politics'. 
They stated that:
This is not a politics that works to establish goals, leaving questions
of means for subsequent implementation by experts and technicians.
Instead, in an ontological politics technical questions are at stake from
the beginning (Law & Mol 2011, p. 14).
In other words. Law and Mol argued tha t policy decisions should not be seen as sep­
arate Rom ontology, and that there is a role for the ontological framework to play 
in their governance. Similarly, Noortje Marres (2013) attempted to understand 
what a commitment to the ontological Ramework should imply for investigations 
into politics. According to Marres, "political ontology can here be taken to refer to 
the set of definitions that stipulate the features of specihcally political entities (the 
state, power, citizenship, interest, democracy and so on)" (Marres 2013, p.422). 
Marres defined three types of investigation into political ontology: theoretical; 
empirical; and experimental. Theoretical ontology is simply concerned with what 
exists. Here, "ontology involves the stipulation of a general set of entities and 
relations on the level of theory or discourse, as a general blueprint of the world" 
(Marres 2013, p.422). This view is inadequate for understanding political entities, 
because it does not concern itself with how things come to exist. However, "em­
pirical ontology differs from theoretical ontology by proposing that the question of 
'what the world is made up o f  cannot be answered wholly in theory but is partly 
settled in practices that must be studied empirically" (Marres 2013, p.422). As 
a result, much work within STS has been based on empirical investigations into 
how the world has been made following interventions Rom science and technology. 
Experimental ontology - which Marres advocates above the others - goes one step
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further. As well as investigating how things come into being through practices, 
"[experimental ontology] directs attention to efforts to purposefully design politics 
and morality into material objects, devices and settings" (Marres 2013, p.423). In 
short. Marres advocates experimental ontology because "it proposes to examine 
how politics and democracy are accomplished through the deployment of devices, 
objects and settings, rather than accounting for politics and democracy in an epis- 
temic register, that is, in terms of the deployment of discourses and ideas only" 
(Marres 2013, p.422).
Mol (2013) advocated a step further still. Although Mol did not precisely define 
the term 'ontonorms', she used it to refer to the behavioural norms that can often 
be found embedded in practices and the objects they enact. In a study of advice 
given to patients in consultations with dieticians. Mol found norms embedded in 
the practices that are tha t ultimately used to enact patients' bodies. Mol argued 
that, the purpose of analysis should therefore not be to merely highlight that this 
is so, but to "[analyse] the norms embedded in practices while interfering in them 
through adding a novel, oblique analysis" (Mol 2013, p.481). Unfortunately, Mol 
did not elaborate sufficiently on what a 'novel, oblique analysis' might actually 
look like. The concept of ontonorms therefore awaits further development.
The fourth area that I have identified is concerned with cohesion. Cohesion refers 
to the extent to which multiplicity may be used to shed light upon other themes 
within STS. It is evident from the literature that there may be the potential for a 
link to be formed with the study of controversies. As we have already seen, there 
is a link between the ontological framework and politics, and some have even ar­
gued that intervening in politics should be the aim of ontological investigations. 
Scientific and technological controversies could provide an ideal entry point for 
this, given their centrality in previous studies of the relationship between science, 
technology and politics. As has already been discussed, ideas relating to multi­
plicity have already been applied to the 2001 foot and mouth disease epidemic 
in the UK (Law &: Mol 2011). The debates over how the epidemic was governed 
have certainly allowed this episode to be thought of as a controversy (e.g. Don­
aldson et al. 2002, Woods 2004). Another example of a link between multiplicity 
and a controversy over technical decision-making can be found in Michelle Mur­
phy's (2006) study of 'sick building syndrome'. Sick building syndrome refers to 
the symptoms that office workers claimed to suffer due to low-level chemical ex­
posures from the buildings in which they worked. However, at the time of the
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controversy, it remained unclear - particularly to scientists - whether the buildings 
were the actual cause. This lack of a consensus sparked a controversy. Murphy 
argued that versions of sick building syndrome:
. . .  were brought into existence in multiple, often conflicting circum­
stances - the result of not just specific environments, but also new ar­
rangements of technologies and practices through which laypeople, sci­
entists, and corporate experts apprehended the health effects of build­
ings on bodies (Murphy 2006, p.8)
On this understanding, sick building syndrome became 'real' to certain groups, 
whilst remaining illusive to others. This is an interesting alternative take on 
what it might mean for something to be thought of as controversial. Rather than 
seeing a controversy as a result of different perspectives on a single reality, as 
the epistemological framework might do, ontological multiplicity offers a way of 
understanding a controversy as a disagreement over what exists.
2.3.5 C riticism s of the O ntological Framework
Though the ontological Ramework has provided the basis for a number of stud­
ies within STS, some have expressed reservations about its adoption. These have 
included: doubts over claims about the existence of an ontological turn; concerns 
over the supposed differences between the epistemological framework and the onto­
logical Ramework within STS; and most seriously, the commitments that adopting 
a strict form of philosophical ontology would entail.
Some have questioned whether STS has truly turned from the epistemological 
Ramework to the ontological framework. This, of course, is not an easy thing to 
determine one way or the other. Bibliometric analysis Rom 2013 revealed that 
although there has been a recent increase in the use of ontological vocabulary, it 
remains unclear whether the discipline has fully turned to the ontological Rame­
work (van Heur et al. 2013). Others have questioned the basis for the demarcation 
between the epistemological and the ontological within STS. Woolgar and Lezaun 
(2013) argue that a distinction between the epistemological and the ontological 
would be simplistic, given the diverse nature of previous STS research:
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The history of STS complicates any simplistic distinction (or transi­
tion) between ontology and epistemology. Contrary to those who see in 
'constructivism' a programme focused on the investigation of ideational 
and discursive forms, the held has long advanced an analytical pro­
gramme that foregrounds the instrumental, performative and material 
dimensions implied in the making of facts and artefacts. 'Representa­
tion' has rarely been treated in STS as the sort of 'epistemological' or 
meta-physical construct that some proponents of the ontological turn 
seem to want to turn against. When one considers the long tradi­
tion of research into the materialization of technoscientihc entities, the 
attention to embodied practices and practices of embodiment or the 
classic accounts of the co-production of epistemological and political 
order, it is clear that the held's interrogation of knowledge-making can 
hardly be described as a study of conceptual or cognitive 'perspectives' 
(Woolgar &: Lezaun 2013, p.322).
In this vein, Malcolm Ashmore (2005) has advocated a both/and approach to case 
studies, and as such, recognises the possibility that the epistemological framework 
and the ontological Ramework can be used in conjunction.
The most serious criticism that the ontological framework has faced concerns its 
associated philosophical 'baggage' - in particular, a commitment to the existence 
of multiple 'realities'. Anthropologists working outside of STS have been vocal 
in expressing concerns over whether those using the ontological framework oscil­
late between the study of what exists and the view that the "'radical alterity' 
of certain societies . . .  consists not in them having different 'socially constructed' 
viewpoints on the same (natural) world, but in them hving in actually different 
worlds" (Laidlaw 2012). Similarly, Paolo Heywood (2010) has argued that ad­
vocates of the ontological Ramework "use the word 'ontology' precisely because 
of the connotations of 'reality' and 'being' it brings with it; yet they neglect to 
acknowledge that insisting on the 'reality' of multiple worlds commits you to a 
meta-ontology in which such worlds exist: what Quine would call "a 'bloated uni­
verse" '. These arguments are difhcult to ignore, and on this basis, it seems sensible 
to take a step back Rom the commitment to the existence of multiple realities that 
is frequently mentioned in Mol's work.
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Michael Lynch (2013), in perceiving the same tension between a philosophical 
commitment to ontology and the empirical study of practices, has recommended 
an approach he referred to as 'ontography' - namely, "historical and ethnographic 
investigations of particular world-making and world-sustaining practices that do 
not begin by assuming a general picture of the world". Lynch argued that the value 
of many of the studies that have been conducted under the ontological framework 
does not rest on the use of the framework itself, but in the rich empirical descrip­
tions that they provide. Concerned that a philosophical commitment to ontology 
inevitably results in conclusions about 'multiple objects existing in multiple real­
ities', and whilst also recognising that there are analytical benefits of using the 
ontological vocabulary, ontography "is a descriptive alternative to its grand the­
oretical counterpart" (Lynch 2013, p.458). Similarly, for Woolgar and Lezaun 
(2013), the ontological framework, or the increased use of ontological vocabulary, 
does allow for work within STS to focus on multiplicity:
The interest in ontology within STS points to the fact that, at least 
in some quarters, the analytical repertoire of the held is seen as in- 
sufhciently attuned to the multiplicity and degrees of alterity of the 
worlds that science and technology bring into being. In this sense, the 
turn to ontology would be a way of drawing out the full implications of 
many other turns: the materialist, performative, instrumental or ex­
perimental sensibilities developed by the held over the last two decades 
(Woolgar &: Lezaun 2013, p.323).
Based on the above concerns, it is clear that the ontological framework should not 
be seen as completely distinct from the epistemological. Equally, the ontological 
framework should not be seen as a hybrid of the epistemological framework and 
the responses to those who have criticised it. Indeed, scholars who have adopted 
the ontological framework often acknowledge that their chosen case study could 
be understood using the epistemological framework, but that they have chosen 
the ontological framework in order to garner fresh insights (e.g. Law & Singleton 
2005). Therefore, despite the reservations described above, there is undoubtedly 
a sense that the use of the ontological framework - in particular the ontological 
vocabulary in the form of ontography - can be a productive way to learn more 
about science, technology and society.
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2.3.6 Sum m ary
Previous studies within STS have shown that it is possible to account for difference 
adequately through consideration of divergent perspectives. Nonetheless, it is also 
possible to account for difference by shifting the focus onto the practices used to 
enact objects. Although it appears that prior commitments to the full philosoph­
ical implications of this view are best avoided, the vocabulary established under 
the ontological framework can be sufficient to reconfigure the analyst's view so as 
to provide alternative empirical descriptions. Since the publication of
case studies have started to expanded beyond medicine into other areas; 
multiplicity has been refined through the 'different worlds argument'; acknowledg­
ing multiplicity has foregrounded of political concerns; and multiplicity has been 
tentatively used to understand controversies. W ith this in mind, the ontological 
framework appears well suited to examining the enacting of contributory expertise 
during controversies over technological decision-making.
2.4 C onclusion
In this chapter I have described how scientific and technological controversies have 
been understood within STS. Many studies have focussed on the role of interests 
and rhetoric. However, this focus has made it difficult to appreciate certain facets 
of controversies - such as secrecy, absence and silence - as well as downplaying 
the analytical significance of the material. More recently, studies of controver­
sies, particularly studies of controversies over technological decision-making, have 
focussed on expertise. Studies have shown that scientific and technological exper­
tise, when applied in isolation, is not always robust enough to produce satisfactory 
outcomes. Therefore, a case has been made for adopting a more democratic and 
inclusive approach to technological decision-making. In response, concerns have 
been expressed that this could result in a complete dissolution of the bound­
aries between expert and non-expert, with no special preference given to specialist 
knowledge. The third wave aims to chart a path between technocracy and tech­
nological populism through a reconceptualization of expertise. In assembling the 
periodic table of expertise, particular emphasis has been placed on understanding 
the nature of interactional expertise. Less attention has been devoted to exploring 
contributory expertise. However, given that contributory expertise is rooted in
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collective practices dependent on social context, it is reasonable to ask whether, 
as a category, it is able to meaningfully capture the essence of the various scien­
tific and technological contributions that can emerge from the technical phase of a 
controversy. One way in which it is possible to probe this is through the use of the 
ontological framework. In the second half of this chapter, I have shown how work 
using the ontological framework has emphasised how divergence amongst research 
practices can result in multiplicity. Although usually separate in the literature, 
ideas about contributory expertise and multiplicity share key tenets. In partic­
ular, both contributory expertise and multiple enactments are seen as real, and 
both are rooted in collective practices. On this basis, I aim to investigate the rela­
tionship between the two. I will investigate whether ideas about multiplicity can 
be used in a meaningful way to improve our understanding of how contributory 
expertise is produced. In particular, I will ask whether contributory expertise can 
be seen as an object under the ontological framework. If this is possible, then we 
might expect it to reveal a multiplicity of contributory expertises. If we suppose 
that contributory expertise can be studied using the ontological framework, and 
that the practices used to enact it are divergent, then it follows that the resulting 
contributory expertises will be multiple. This prompts - in the first instance - an 
investigation into the practices that are used to produce contributory expertise, in 
order to see whether they do differ from one another in a meaningful way. How­
ever, although recognising the possible existence of multiplicity is an important 
first step, in order for this recognition to be worthwhile, it has to be possible 
to convincingly delineate and characterize different enactments within the tech­
nical phase, and then understand their use during the political phase. This, at 
least in part, requires the ability to judge the expertise of others. Therefore the 
meta-expertises row of the periodic table of expertise may be able to guide this 
process.
If the contributory expertises produced during the technical phase of a controversy 
are multiple - and can be identified as such - then we may also ask what conse­
quences this might have for the political phase. For example, it becomes reasonable 
to suppose that different types of contributory expertise produced during the tech­
nical phase will be available to policymakers during the political phase. However, 
contributory expertise on, say, the design and construction of a technology may 
be significantly different from the contributory expertise related to understanding 
systems within which tha t same technology will function. On top of this, contrib­
utory expertise produced in an environment dominated by certain institutional
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imperatives - such as secrecy - may alter the nature of collective practices used, 
thus altering the nature of the contributory expertise. If contributory expertise is 
reconceptualized as multiple - and thus it is acknowledged that enactments can be 
of a different nature - the way in which each enactment is used during the political 
phase becomes significant. It becomes possible for it to be said that a particular 
enactment of contributory expertise was favoured, and another was ignored. Ad­
ditionally, it becomes possible to investigate the consequences of these decisions. 
If these consequences are significant for the political phase of a controversy, then 
this should be reflected in the principles that make up elective modernism. For ex­
ample, elective modernism states that the political phase should consider as much 
of the work from the technical phase as possible. However, the impact of favouring 
or ignoring a particular enactment of contributory expertise has not yet been con­
sidered. Similarly, elective modernism stipulates that the work of experts should 
not be distorted during the political phase. However, the use of, for example, 
expertise that has been enacted under conditions of secrecy may be problematic 
because the processes normally used to judge expertise under the third wave may 
not be available. This has the potential to blur the lines between the legitimate 
questioning of the quality of expertise, and speculation that might otherwise be 
viewed as an attempt to subvert expert findings.
Responses to these concerns will be sought through an examination of cryptology 
research and the crypto wars in the UK from 1970 to 2000. In the introductory 
chapter, I showed how the current literature on the crypto wars, though arguably 
one of the most important controversies of recent years, is poorly aligned with ideas 
from STS. In particular, the way in which the crypto wars have been framed has 
served to efface cryptology research. Though the politics of the crypto wars have 
been well described, the practices used to create the relevant cryptology expertise 
have been overlooked. Using the terms from the third wave, the rhetoric of the 
political phase has been described, but the work of the technical phase, and the 
relationship between the two, have not. This has created the false impression that 
contributory cryptology expertise arrived at the political phase of the crypto wars 
ready-made. Given that the crypto wars was a controversy heavily influenced 
by experts, and given the importance of secrecy in cryptology research, a re­
examination of the crypto wars provides an ideal opportunity for the development 
of ideas related to multiple contributory expertises, the transfer of expertise form 
the technical to the political phase, and finally, to better understand an important 
episode in the recent history of electronic communication.
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On this basis, the following three research can be formulated:
1. How was contributory cryptology expertise produced during the technical 
phase of the crypto wars in the United Kingdom?
2. Can the ontological framework and the third wave be used in conjunction to 
develop a re-conceptualization of the production of this contributory exper­
tise as 'multiple'?
3. W hat were the consequences of this multiplicity of contributory expertises 
during the political phase of the crypto wars?
The next chapter will be devoted to a consideration of the best way to provide 
answers to these questions.
Chapter 3
M ethodology
3.1 In trod u ction
In this chapter I will describe the methods used to answer the research questions 
posed in the concluding section of the previous chapter. In contrast to many 
studies within STS, I will begin by providing a description of the background 
assumptions that have underpinned the more specific methodological choices. I 
will describe the reasoning behind my decisions to use case study and historical 
approaches, with respect to the area that my research aims to investigate - namely, 
the relationship between cryptology, expertise, and controversies over technological 
decision-making. W ith this in mind, I will then provide a detailed description of 
the specihc documentary analysis and semi-structured interview methods used, 
and attem pt to justij^ their combined use.
3.2 M eth od o log ica l B ackground
My approaches and methods - and what I see as their hierarchical relationship to 
one another - can be expressed in a simplified howchart (see Figure 3.1). As Figure 
3.1 illustrates, following on from the formulation of my research questions, I de­
cided to use a qualitative approach, and to adopt a social constructivist worldview. 
I also decided that my chosen case study would be examined using historical re­
search methods, and that most of my data would come from documentary analysis 
and semi-structured interviewing.
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Qualitative Research
Social Constructivism
Case Study
Historical M ethods
Documentary Analysis & 
Semi-structured Interviewing
FIGURE 3.1: M ethodology Flowchart
Much STS research does not give a detailed description of the methods used to 
reach its conclusions. Many studies within STS do not discuss research methods at 
all. Steven Yearley has argued that this is linked to a general lack of reflection on 
STS' inherent assumptions (Yearley 2005, p. 107). However, STS is not completely 
blind to methodological ideas. Though many do not engage with methodological 
ideas found in other areas of social research, pointers to the style of investigation 
used can be found in theoretical approaches. For example, the Strong Programme 
emphasised rehexivity on the part of the researcher, and provided a basic outline 
for research into SSK (Bloor 1976). However, it has often been left unclear how 
the goals of the Strong Programme can be achieved in terms of the methods 
of investigation used, and how they relate to other ideas from social research 
more broadly. As a result, it would appear beneficial to link some of the latent 
methodological ideas within STS to some of the well-developed concepts found in 
social research. Thus, the first part of this chapter will be devoted to justifying 
my decision to use case study and historical methods. The second half will be 
devoted to providing some specific details regarding my data collection and analysis 
techniques.
3.2.1 Case Study
In common with much research in STS, this study could broadly be described as 
qualitative and social constructivist. Alan Bryman has described the qualitative
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approach as one that "predominantly emphasises an inductive approach to the 
relationship between theory and research, in which the emphasis is placed on the 
generation of theories", "has rejected the practices and norms of the natural sci­
entific model and of positivism in particular in preference for an emphasis on the 
ways in which individuals interpret their social world", and "embodies a view of 
social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individual's creation" 
(Bryman 2008, p.22). Jan Golinski has observed that most of the major theoret­
ical and practical approaches designed for STS - such as the Strong Programme 
and EPOR - are essentially social constructivist in nature, given that social con­
structivism "draws attention to the central notion that scientific knowledge is a 
human creation, made with available cultural and material resources, rather than 
simply the revelation of a natural order that is pre-given and independent of hu­
man action" (Golinski 2005, p.6). When the aims and objectives of this research - 
as discussed in chapters 1 and 2 - are considered alongside these descriptions, the 
use of a qualitative approach and a social constructivist worldview were clearly 
appropriate.
John W. Creswell (2007) has identified five approaches to qualitative research: nar­
rative; phenomenological; grounded theory; ethnographic; and case study. How­
ever, in practice, many research projects will incorporate elements from more than 
one of the above approaches. My research was no exception. Given that one of the 
aims was to describe and interpret the practices of cryptology scientists through 
the "shared and learned patterns of values, behaviours, beliefs and language of a 
culture sharing group" (Creswell 2007, p.68), it certainly shared some of the basic 
characteristics of ethnographic research. However, there are some important ways 
in which my research departed from it. The main reason is that I was aiming to de­
scribe and interpret events from the past. As a result, I was unable to collect data 
through participant observation - often considered the most illuminating method 
in ethnographic research. Studying the past also prevented me from taking part 
in some of the activities considered integral to good ethnographic research within 
STS - such as attending scientific conferences and observing laboratory work (Hess 
2001). On top of this, there are also some more general ways in which research 
thought of as ethnographic within STS differs from much contemporary anthropo­
logical ethnography. David J. Hess (2001) has noted that STS ethnographies are 
typically: focussed on a world of which the researcher is a part; require a more sym­
biotic relationship between researcher and participant; and are often undertaken 
in order to subvert an existing 'standard' historical or sociological description.
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On this basis, my research can be more accurately thought of as a case study. For 
Creswell, case study research "involves the study of an issue explored through one 
or more cases within a bounded system" over time, through the use of multiple 
sources of information (Creswell 2007, p.67). Case study research may examine an 
issue using one or more case studies, and within those, one or more research sites. 
The key methodological issue related to the case study approach concerns how 
the case itself is selected, and following on from that, how that case is bounded. 
Robert E. Stake (1995) has argued that a case study requires a certain degree of 
specificity or 'boundedness' in order to be useful. However, a precise method for 
measuring boundedness does not exist. As such, the choice of case study, and the 
way in which tha t case is bounded, appears to be in no small part subject to the 
researcher's judgement. Therefore, the case study researcher has a responsibility to 
justify their choices and be aware of how decisions may impact upon the research.
When considering the case study approach, there may also be concerns about 
the apparent trade off between depth and generalizability. Whilst case studies 
can oEer a richer, more in-depth description of a scenario, this can be seen to be 
at the expense of descriptions that can be applied to other scenarios. However, 
as Bryman has pointed out, case study researchers rarely delude themselves into 
thinking that they are producing results with a high degree of external validity 
(Bryman 2008, p.55). Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) has gone further in defending the case 
study rationale. Flyvbjerg rejected the ideas that: general theoretical knowledge is 
more valuable than case study knowledge; one cannot generalize from a case study; 
case studies are useful for generating hypotheses but not for testing them; case 
studies have a tendency towards the confirmation of the researchers pre-conceived 
biases; and that it is dihicult to develop theoretical positions Rom specific case 
studies. Flyvbjerg argued that the search for predictive theories and 'universals' 
in the social sciences is in vain, and in this sense case study knowledge can be 
more valuable. Furthermore, he argued that the idea that advances in the sciences 
are made on the basis of generalizability is oRen unfounded, and that case study 
research can be used as a way of falsifying a theory. He also argued atypical or 
extreme cases can often reveal more about a particular situation because of their 
ability to activate more social mechanisms. Finally, Flyvbjerg acknowledged that 
verification bias is a serious issue, but argued that it's a feature of all types of 
research, even in the so-called hard sciences.
There is a clear precedent for the use of case study research within STS. Although
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some STS research is thought of as ethnographic, much is based on case stud­
ies. Indeed, the prevalence of the case study approach in STS has occasionally 
generated exasperation from those working in the held (Beaulieu et al. 2007). 
Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly an approach that is able to produce valuable in­
sights. Although concerns about generalizability may be largely unfounded, the 
case study researcher must provide a justihcation of their choice of case study and 
the way in which that case study was bounded.
P h a s e C o n c e p t u a lB o u n d i n g
G e o g r a p h i c a l
B o u n d i n g
T e m p o r a l
B o u n d i n g
Technical
P o l i t i c a l
R estr ic ted  to  
co llectiv e
cryp to logy  research
R estr ic ted  to  
a ttem p ts  by  
th e  governm ent to  
leg is la te  on  
m atters re la ted  to  
cryp to logy
R estr ic ted  to  
research carried out 
at a s ite  w ith in  th e  
U n i t e d  
K ingdom
R estr ic ted  to  
a tte m p ts  by th e  
U n ited  K ingdom
g o v e r n m e n t  t o  
leg is la te
R estr ic ted  to  
research carried  
out b etw een  1970 
and 2000
R e s t r i c t e d  t o  
a ttem p ts  to  leg is la te  
b etw een  1970
a n d  2 000
TABLE 3.1: Caae Study Bounding
Though there is general agreement that case studies should be bounded, there is 
no clear consensus on exactly how this should be done. Therefore, I decided to 
bound my case study using three of my own criteria: what my chosen theoretical 
concepts permitted consideration of; the geographical location where events could 
take place; and the period of time during which these events could have happened 
(see Table 3.1). The conceptual bounding of my case study was determined by 
existing third wave concepts. Although many of the types of expertise from the 
periodic table influenced the crypto wars, I limited my study to the role of contrib­
utory expertise. Furthermore, given that the technical phase is currently defined 
as being informed by the scientific form of life (Collins et al. 2010), I restricted 
my study of practices from the technical phase to those sites that actually carried 
out collective cryptology research, rather than, say, sites that carried out relevant 
research into law or politics. In terms of this geographical bounding. Goldsmith 
and Wu's (2006) injunction regarding an awareness of how national context can 
shape debates relating to the Internet chimed with what was known about how 
the political phase varied with national context (see Koops 2013). As such, it 
appeared reasonable to restrict my case study to developments that occurred in
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the UK, whilst maintaining an awareness of possible contributions from outside. 
In terms of temporal bounding, the relatively short period of time between the ad­
vent of an open cryptology research program in the 1970s and the eventual passing 
of legislation around 2000 presented the opportunity to study the development of 
UK-based cryptology research in its entirety.
Given that the aim was to investigate the emergence of multiple contributory 
expertise, it appeared necessary to carry out a 'multi-sited' case study. However, 
prior to carrying out the research, a decision still needed to be made about what 
sites to include. Importantly, prior to carrying out the research, I tried not to 
let my prior knowledge of the crypto wars dictate my choice of research sites too 
heavily. This was because, given that my literature review had identified that 
secrecy, silences, and absences might be important, I needed to give these factors 
the opportunity to emerge, and working backwards from the overt politics of the 
crypto wars may have effaced them. But perhaps most importantly, I decided 
that it would be a mistake to use this information to set unmovable boundaries 
around my case study, given that information gathered during the research may 
have prompted a rethink of the reasoning used to bound it. As such, I tried to 
remain open to the possibility that the boundaries may need to evolve with the 
data.
3.2.2 H istorical M ethods
After deciding to use the case study approach, and after deciding how to bound 
it, the next step was to think about the best way to probe the case. Given that 
I had bounded my case study to examine events from the past, it was clear that 
I would be carrying out a form of historical research. This is not unusual in STS 
or the social sciences more generally, particularly if the case study approach is 
used. However, this does prompt methodological concerns. A traditional view 
of history and sociology suggests that they attem pt to explain things in different 
ways. According to the terms introduced by the German philosopher Wilhelm 
Windelband (1848-1915), history can be thought of as 'idiographic' - because it 
seeks to describe singular, particular cases, whereas sociology can be thought of as 
'nomolhetic' - because it seeks to generalize phenomena using theory. However, by 
the final quarter of the twentieth century, the idiographic-nomothetic distinction 
had largely fallen out of favour, and the subtle similarities between sociology and
Chapter 3. 83
history came to be appreciated. Some even argued that history and sociology 
were essentially the same. Philip Abrams - in advocating 'historical sociology' - 
argued that "sociological explanation is necessarily historical" and tha t "historical 
sociology is thus not some special kind of sociology; rather, it is the essence of 
the discipline" (Abrams 1982, p.2). For Abrams, "historical sociology is not a 
matter of providing historical background, nor is it a m atter of imposing grand 
explanations such as evolution onto the social. It is the attem pt to study the social 
as something that is constructed in time" (Abrams 1982, p.2). Though this defines 
historical sociology rather broadly, many other definitions see historical sociology 
as primarily concerned with the development and emergence of modernity - and 
other large-scale phenomena such as capitalism and the state - over long periods 
of time (Delanty &: Isin 2003, Lachmann 2013). In the case of my research, I did 
not believe that the historical sociology label was appropriate. Although I argue 
that understanding the relationship between scientific research and controversies 
over technological decision-making is important, under the third wave, this is 
not typically linked to grand sociological themes and does not draw on historical 
evidence from a period of time fundamentally different to the present.
Others have argued that, although history and sociology share certain similarities, 
they differ in terms of the available data gathering methods. According to John
H. Goldthorpe (1991), historians are concerned with finding evidence from among 
a stock of relics, whereas sociologists, whilst also able to draw upon relics, have 
the option of generating their own evidence in the present using ethnographic 
methods. Therefore:
Because sociologists have the possibility of producing their own evi­
dence - over and above that of exploiting relics - they are in a position 
of advantage that should not be disregarded or lightly thrown away. In 
other words, sociologists should not readily and unthinkingly turn to 
history: they should do so, rather, only with good reasons and in full 
awareness of the limitations they will thereby face (Goldthorpe 1991, 
p.214).
Goldthorpe used this as a platform to caution against the "perverse recourse to his­
tory" when attempting to describe phenomena that can be studied in the present, 
and to launch a broader critique of historical sociology. On this basis, there does 
appear to be a case for being aware of the limitations of using historical methods
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such as documentary analysis, as opposed to certain ethnographic methods such 
as participant observation, to produce sociological insights. It also implies that for 
the examination of cryptology research practices and cryptology expertise, using 
historical methods may not be as effective as using sociological methods.
It should be noted that many have been critical of Goldthorpe's claims, argu­
ing variously that he either oversimplified the distinction between historical and 
sociological methods, or the nature of modern attempts at historical sociology 
(Bryant 1994, Mann 1994, Hart 1994, Mouzelis 1994). More specifically, though 
ethnographic methods have been used in the past to study laboratory activity, 
they have tended to study the processes involved in experimental work. Here, 
it is thought, ethnographic methods are appropriate because there are lots of 
observable, tactile, micro-social practices for the sociologist to record, whereaa 
historical methods are inappropriate because these same practices are often ab­
sent from written records or considered unimportant by those who had carried 
them out. However, as Lisa Garforth (2012) has pointed out, it is not clear that 
non-experimental laboratory activity is as readily observable. For example, much 
scientific work requires thinking time, and much cryptology research requires time 
spent sat at a computer. As a result, when attempting to study this type of 
cryptology research practice, and similar research practices used in other mathe­
matical sciences, ethnographic methods and historical methods may prove equally 
unrevealing. However, this is not necessarily true of unobservable, institutional, 
macro-social practices - such as departmental management, seeking funding, com­
municating with external partners, and so on - that may be equally important in 
understanding the knowledge-making process. Although largely unobservable in 
the laboratory, these practices leave traces in documents and memories that can 
be accessed using documentary analysis and interviews.
Crucially, I decided that the appropriate response was to recognise that, if histori­
cal methods are to be used, they are likely to reveal and emphasise different types 
of practices, and that this will shape any conclusions that may be drawn. Finally, 
it is worth noting that for any study that aims to empirically investigate the rela­
tionship between a technical phase and a political phase, the historical approach 
may be the only available option. This is because it is questionable whether it 
would be feasible to ju s ti^  the study of the technical phase in the present us­
ing ethnographic methods, with the aim of understanding how the expertise that 
resulted was used during a political phase that may or may not occur in the future.
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3.3 D a ta  G athering
Following on from my discussion of the methodological assumptions that underpin 
my research, I will now discuss some of the more practical considerations associated 
with my data gathering techniques. An overview of my research plan will be 
given, followed by a description of the documentary analysis and semi-structured 
interviewing techniques used.
3.3.1 R esearch D esign
In this subsection. 111 provide an overview of my fieldwork and analysis design. 
As Robert K. Yin pointed out, "unlike other research methods, a comprehensive 
catalog of research designs for case studies has yet to be developed" (Yin 2009, 
p.25). This creates a degree of freedom for researchers when designing their case 
studies. My fieldwork and analysis can be divided into three stages (see Table 3.1).
S ta g e P h a se M e th o d s A n a ly s is R esearchA c t iv ity
F irs t Technical
Documentary
analysis;
Retrospective
semi-structured
interviewing
Thematic
Collection of data relating 
to the production of 
contributory cryptology 
expertise at various sites 
within the UK between 
1970 and 2000
Second P o li t ica l
Documentary
analysis;
Retrospective
semi-structured
interviewing
Thematic
Collection of data relating 
to the development of UK 
legislation related to 
cryptology between 
1970 and 2000
Third Transfer None
Concept 
and theory 
development
Attem pts to understand how 
expertise from research sites 
was transferred to, and used 
during, political processes
TABLE 3.2: Updated Research Design
As I mentioned in the previous section, I decided to carry out a multi-sited case 
study in order to allow for multiple contributory expertises to emerge from the 
technical phase. Although I knew that I was only interested in sites where scientific 
research into cryptology was undertaken, I still had to formulate a list of potential 
sites and then decide upon which of them to study. After I had done this, I 
reasoned, locating the relevant sources of data would be relatively straightforward.
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However, as was explained in the introductory chapter, I also knew that this would 
be complicated by the fact that an historical account of cryptology research in the 
UK did not exist. Therefore, in choosing research sites, it would not be possible 
to make use of a form of probability sampling. Therefore, I decided to carry out 
some preliminary historical research in order to identify potential sites. Once I 
had identified a handful of sites, I decided to proceed with the fieldwork, and from 
then on, use a mixture of purposive and snowball sampling to acquire information 
about any additional research sites. When examining documents, I made sure to 
check for any information relating to cryptology research undertaken at other sites, 
and when interviewing, included questions that probed for information relating to 
the work of others. This ultimately led to the identification of the following five 
research sites, all of which produced cryptology expertise during the technical 
phase:
1. Data Security Group, National Physical Laboratory
2. Information Security Group, Royal Holloway College, University of London
3. Mathematics Division, Racal Electronics pic
4. Security Group, University of Cambridge
5. CESG, Government Communications Headquarters
At quite an early stage in the fieldwork, I felt that I was approaching a saturation 
point in terms of cryptology research sites, so I decided to focus on these five.
For the first stage of my fieldwork and analysis (see Table 3.2)^, the broad aim was 
to gather and analyse data relating to the technical phase of the crypto wars. This 
resulted in the gathering and analysing of data on the research practices used to 
produce contributory cryptology expertise at various sites in the UK between 1970 
and 2000. For each site, this involved locating and examining documents that shed 
light on the research practices used. Then, after the documentary analysis stage 
was complete, potential interviewees were identified and approached. Interviews 
were then used to 'triangulate' information contained in the documents, and to 
gather data on research practices typically not available hrom documentary sources. 
The data from the documents and the interviews was then analysed in order to
^This table is the same as Table 1.1, but with an added 'Phase' column following the discussion 
of technical and political phases in the literature review.
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identify themes. For the second stage, the broad aim was to gather data relating 
to the political phase of the crypto wars. This resulted in the gathering and 
analysing of data on the development of UK legislation related to cryptography 
between 1970 and 2000. Here, the same pattern of documentary analysis and 
semi-structured interviewing was used. Official documents produced during the 
parliamentary process were used as a starting point. This would then lead to other 
documents, and would allow for the creation of a list of potential interviewees. 
Again, the data from the documentary analysis and the semi-structured interviews 
was analysed in order to identify themes. For the third stage, the broad aim was 
to develop concepts related to the 'transfer'. Here, I use the term 'transfer' to 
refer to the processes used to transfer expertise hrom the technical phase to the 
political phase.^ This resulted in an examination of how contributory cryptology 
expertise was transferred and then used during the legislative process.
3.3.2 D ocum entary A nalysis
Turning now to the specific data collection methods used, the first two stages 
of fieldwork both involved some form of documentary analysis. For Bryman, an 
analysable document is something that: can be read (including visual material); 
has not been produced specifically for the purpose of social research; has been 
preserved; and is relevant to the concerns of the researcher (Bryman 2008, p.515). 
As a result, this rather broad definition includes paper-based documents, electronic 
documents, photographs, and websites.
Documentary analysis has much in common with historical enquiry. Therefore, 
many of the arguments made during discussions about the nature of history are 
relevant. These discussions are usually thought of - at least initially - in terms 
of the Carr-Elton debate. E. H. Carr's published in 1961,
argued against a then-dominant empirical view. Carr argued that "the belief 
in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the 
interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy", and thus espoused a form 
of historical relativism (Carr 1961, p .12). In response, G. R. Elton's T/ie
(1967) defended the view that emerged from the work of the nineteenth 
century German historian Leopold von Ranke - namely, that it is possible to arrive
^'Transfer' cannot yet be thought of as a phase under elective modernism. It has been placed 
in the 'Phase' column of Table 3.2 to preserve symmetry.
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at objective truth about the past through the careful study of primary source 
documents.
Though some discussions of the nature of history are still thought of in terms of 
the Carr-Elton debate, it has been largely supplanted by the postmodern critique 
of history. Although it isn't possible to discuss the postmodern critique in detail, 
it is useful to observe, as Richard J. Evans (1999) has done, that the critique can 
take 'radical' and 'moderate' forms. In its moderate form, the postmodern critique 
of history encourages historians to take problems of interpretation seriously, and 
to take a rehcxivc approach to looking at the cultures and belief systems they find 
themselves in. The radical form attempts to completely undermine any attempt 
to understand the past by arguing along the lines that "language cannot relate 
to anything but itself" (Evans 1999, p.3). As Evans argued, "once postmodernist 
hyperrelativism's principles are applied to itself, many of its arguments begin to 
collapse under the weight of their own contradictions", and are thus difhcult to take 
seriously, despite their supposed implications for history and sociology as modes of 
enquiry (Evans 1999, p. 190). However, ideas emanating from the moderate view 
seem to offer a more nuanced way to understand documents, as well as chiming 
with the reflexivity tenet of the Strong Programme (Bloor 1976).
Taking a more nuanced view of what documents can tell us requires an assess­
ment of their qualities. John Scott (1990) has developed four criteria for aiding 
researchers with this process, namely: authenticity; credibility; representativeness; 
and meaning. Authenticity requires an assessment of "whether [the document] is 
actually what it purports to be" (Scott 1990, p. 19). Clearly, in extreme cases, if 
a document deliberately purports to be something that it is not, this has obvious 
implications for the interpretation of its content. Authenticity also requires an as­
sessment of whether a document is an original or a copy, and thus an assessment 
of likely errors in the copying process. Credibility requires an assessment of how 
distorted the contents of a document is likely to be. Of course, all documents are 
distorted in the sense that they provide information selected by the author. Thus, 
"the question of credibility concerns the extent to which an observer is sincere in 
the choice of a point of view and in the attem pt to record an accurate account 
from that chosen standpoint" (Scott 1990, p.22). Assessing representativeness "in­
volves a judgement as to whether the documents consulted are representative of 
the totality of relevant documents" (Scott 1990, p.24). Though good research can 
be conducted without the totality of relevant documents, an honest appraisal of
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what is missing can help with the formulation of more realistic analyses. Finally, 
meaning requires an assessment of whether the document is readable, and if it is, 
how it can be interpreted.
All four of the above criteria are linked. Of the four, meaning appears to have 
the largest bearing on the aforementioned concerns related to the moderate post­
modern critique. There are many different approaches to the interpretation of 
documents. Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (2009) advocated a check­
list approach. They encouraged researchers to consider things like: the context in 
which the document was produced; the key concepts it draws upon; the metaphors 
and binary distinctions that are used; and the way in which the document ad­
dresses the audience. These are undoubtedly important considerations. However, 
it is also important to consider the nature of the object of study when decid­
ing on an interpretive framework. Given that I used documents to investigate 
research practices, Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey's (2011) ideas on 'docu­
mentary realities' were particularly relevant. Atkinson and Coffey analysed UK 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) documents to show that "documents are not 
neutral, transparent reflections of organisational and occupational life" but that 
"they actively construct the very organisations they purport to describe". As such, 
documents should be interpreted in terms of what the author wanted to convey 
to their audience and what the document was produced in order to accomplish, 
rather than as naturally occurring analogues of reality.
On this understanding, the documents produced by an organization should be seen 
as an integral part of certain working practices, rather than a description of them. 
Therefore, in terms of my research, documentary analysis was not carried out in 
the hope of finding a set of documents that described in detail how scientists went 
about their research into cryptology. Rather, documents were seen as something 
produced during the course of research activity, and as an integral part of the 
practices used to produce cryptology expertise. Therefore, in terms of analysis, 
documents were used to make inferences about the nature of the practices of which 
they were a part. These inferences could then be checked during interviews with 
those that had actually been involved in their production.
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3.3.3 P racticalities of D ocum entary A nalysis
I will now describe some of the more practical steps taken during my research with 
respect to documentary analysis. Most of the documents that I examined were 
sourced from archives.^ A small number were sourced from the Internet, which, it 
could be argued, shares certain similarities with traditional archives. In both cases, 
it is important to appreciate that archives are essentially incomplete, and thus the 
material contained in them paints an imperfect picture of their sources. Michael 
R. Hill (1993) used the term 'archival sedimentation' to refer to the processes by 
which material finds its way into archives. The eventual content of an archive 
can be determined by: actors at the primary stage - when the material is held 
by those who created it; the secondary stage - when material is transferred to the 
archive; and the tertiary stage - when the material is stored at the archives. All 
three contain the potential for material to be lost through accidental or deliberate 
removal. Therefore, Hill advises, it is important to be aware that archives can 
both challenge and deceive.
Though most of the processes I used to examine archival material could be de­
scribe as standard practice, I did make use of two rarely-used techniques in social 
research. The first of these was the use of Freedom of Information (Fol) Requests. 
In the UK, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 allows any person to request, in 
writing, details about whether a UK public body holds information on a particu­
lar topic. If the public body possesses that information, then the individual who 
made the original request can make a further request to be granted access to that 
information. Though the potential uses of Fol requests are clear, they are rarely 
used for social research (Brown 2009). Researchers may use Fol requests to access 
information held by public bodies that is not published or archived. However, Fol 
requests can also be used to access archival material protected by the so-called 
thirty-year rule - a principle set out in the Public Records Act 1958 that prevents 
access to records created by public bodies until thirty years after their creation. 
Given that my research was concerned, in part, with events between 1970 and 
2000, there existed the potential to use Fol requests to access otherwise withheld 
information. I submitted a total of 22 successful Fol requests.'^ Once accepted, 
the requested information could usually be viewed at archives in the normal way.
full list of the archival sources used can be found in Appendix B. 
'^Archivai sources accessed using Fol requests are marked in Appendix B.
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I also made use of an Internet Archive tool known as the Wayback Machine.^ The 
Wayback Machine provides access to an online digital archive of the World Wide 
Web. It allows a user to view digitally archived copies of web pages from as far 
back as 1996. This was particularly useful for my research, as it allowed me to view 
past versions of web pages created by my chosen research sites. It also allowed 
me to view the complete web archive for the UK Cryptography Policy Discussion 
Croup (ukcrypto) mailing list, which, as will be described in Chapter 8, was a 
hub of communicative and organizational activity during the political phase of the 
crypto wars. The web page which hosts the ukcrypto archive only contains the 
most recent three years worth of conversations, but the Wayback Machine was 
used to access the most recent three years worth of conversations from any given 
date, thus effectively allowing for complete access.
S t a g e  D o c u m e n t s  A n a l y s e d
F ir s t
S e c o n d
R e se a r c h  p a p e r s , c o m m it te e  m in u te s , p e r so n a l d o c u m e n ts ,  
p u b lis h e d  h is to r ie s , c o n fe r e n c e  re c o r d s , n e w s le t te r s ,
in te rn a l  pu b l ic a t io n s ,  p r o d u c t  ca ta logues ,  p ro d u c t  m anua ls ,  
s a le s  m a te r ia l, p r o s p e c tu s e s ,  a r c h iv e d  w e b s ite s .
C r e e n  p a p e r s . W h ite  p a p e r s , H a n sa r d , c o n s u lta t io n  d o c u m e n ts ,  
c o n s u lta t io n  r e s p o n s e s . S e le c t  C o m m it te e  m e e t in g  r eco rd s . 
S e le c t  C o m m it te e  r e p o r ts , p r e ss  r e le a se s , r e sea rch  p a p e r s ,  
m a ilin g  lis t  p o s t s ,  a r c h iv e d  w e b s ite s ,  c o n fe r e n c e  reco rd s .
T h ir d  N o n e .
TABLE 3.3: Types of Document Analysed
In broad terms, documents were analysed using qualitative content analysis, in 
that the analysis consisted of the "searching-out of underlying themes" (Bryman 
2008, p.529). Once the documents for each research site had been collected for the 
first stage, they were analysed in order to bring out the themes specific to each. 
This was done through a process similar to the coding of interview transcripts, 
and as such, had much in common with David L. Altheide's (2004) version of 
'Ethnographic Content Analysis'. Documents were analysed iteratively in order to 
identify themes that could then be used to formulate a description of the practices 
used to enact expertise. A similar process was used for the second stage. However, 
in this instance, documents were initially analysed in order to produce a timeline
^The Wayback Machine tool can bo accessed at: http://web.archive.org
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of events. This timeline was then coded in order to identify the individual debates 
that made up the political phase.
3.3.4 Sem i-Structured Interview ing
In order to complement the documentary analysis undertaken in the hrst two 
stages, I also carried out a series of semi-structured interviews with relevant actors. 
Interviews were, where possible, carried out after the relevant documents had been 
analysed. Therefore, the interviews acted a source of new data, as well as a way 
of validating the data gleaned from documents.
There are various different types of interview used in social research. These types 
are often thought of as lying on a spectrum, with structured interviewing - where 
the interviewer is expected to stick rigidly to an interview guide, at one end, and 
unstructured interviewing - where the interviewer will form questions based upon 
an interview guide that carries only a list of general topics to be covered, at the 
other. Semi-structured interviewing sits somewhere in-between the two. Here:
The interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form 
of an interview schedule but is able to vary the sequence of questions.
The questions are Requently somewhat more general in their frame of 
reference from that typically found in a structured interview schedule.
Also, the interviewer usually has some latitude to ask further questions 
in response to what are seen as significant replies (Bryman 2008, p. 196).
According to Bryman (2008, p.437), semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
differ from structured interviews - which have much in common with surveys - in 
that: they place less emphasis on the measurement of reliability and validity; they 
are more amenable to the generation of theory; there is a greater interest in the 
interviewee's point of view; rambling or going off on tangents is encouraged as it 
suggests what is important to the interviewee; greater use is made of prompting 
and probing; and interviewees can be interviewed more than once. As such, semi­
structured interviewing aligned well with the aims of my research, given that I 
hoped that the interviewees would steer my questions towards themes and pieces 
of information they felt were significant.
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There are numerous types of semi-structured interview. Given that my aim was 
to use the interviews to learn about events hrom the past, they could be most 
accurately described as 'retrospective interviews' - a term coined by Andrew Pet­
tigrew (1985) to refer to interviews he conducted at Imperial Chemical Industries 
(ICI) on their past use of organizational development expertise. Here, as with 
oral history interviews, the chief methodological issue concerns the impact that 
memory might have on the quality of the data. The interviewee may have com­
pletely forgotten certain details, or perhaps more importantly, the way in which 
they perceive and understand events hrom the past may have changed during the 
intervening period. Linda Shopes (2011) has argued that, following the so-called 
'linguistic turn ' in the second half of the twentieth century, whereas previously 
there had been a tendency to take the content of interviews about the past at face 
value, broader intellectual trends prompted a re-examination of what they can tell 
us. Michael Frisch (1998) argued that, instead of viewing interviews as a way to 
get closer to the past by bypassing prior historical interpretation, they should be 
used to examine what happens to personal experience on the way to it becoming 
memory, and on the way to it becoming history. As Shopes elaborated:
Meaning is conveyed through language, which is in turn shaped by 
memory, myth, and ideology and through non-verbal expression and 
gesture, which give both immediacy and emotional depth to the ex­
change and further command the listeners' attention. Interviews thus 
offer clues into narrators' subjectivities - the intersubjectivity - between 
narrator and interviewer. Understood in this way, interviews are not 
documents in the traditional sense, to be mined for facts, but texts, 
to be interpreted for ways narrators understand - and want others to 
understand - their lives, their place in history, the way history works 
(Shopes 2011, p.458).
Therefore, with respect to my research, interviews were used as a way of revealing 
how actors understood the nature and purpose of their cryptology research, how 
it related to the research of others, and how it related to the crypto wars.
One way in which researchers using semi-structured interviewing have attempted 
to achieve this interpretation has been through efforts to establish a rapport with 
their interviewees. Methodological reflection on research that has drawn on inter­
views with scientists and other professionals has highlighted two key issues that
Chapter 3. 94
may be linked to a lack of rapport: the tendency for interviewee responses to take 
on the character of official lines; and the tendency for interviewee responses to 
be delivered in a neutral, teacher-like way. For example, during her interviews 
with civil servants, Karen Duke realised tha t "there was indeed an 'official line"' 
and that her job was "both to recognise it and probe beyond it" (Duke 2002, 
p.42). In this particular example, Duke's interviewees were insistent that they 
were responsible for 'implementing' rather than 'making' policy. Similarly, in his 
study of macroeconomists, Neil Stephens noticed that, on occasion, the interview 
"would adopt the pattern of a lecturer/student relationship where the interviewee 
would frequently lean towards teaching the technical issues of macroeconomics as 
opposed to placing values upon them ", and that there existed "the potential for 
the teaching voice to depersonalize the account", forcing the researcher to "resit- 
uate the conversation onto the personal position of the interviewee in the debate, 
rather than recounting the consensual 'perceived wisdom" ' (Stephens 2007, p.208). 
Responses like these clearly have the potential to create problems during an inter­
view, particularly when the interviewer is asking about an inherently controversial 
topic. Therefore, I decided that my interviews should more closely resemble an 
informal encounter in order to avoid the characteristics of a doctoral supervision 
or a formal data gathering exercise.
There is also the issue of the appropriate level of scientific knowledge demonstrated 
by the interviewer when communicating with the interviewee. In common with 
many scientific fields, cryptology and computing are laden with terms and con­
cepts that require specific knowledge and training to unpack. To a certain extent, 
this is also true of the legislative and policymaking processes surrounding contro­
versies over technological decision-making. The methodological salience of the use 
of scientific knowledge is proportional to the extent to which the joint construc­
tion of meaning between interviewer and interviewee is prioritised. Nonetheless, 
outside of recent work on interactional expertise, this is an issue that has been 
infrequently discussed in relation to interviews with scientists. In an exception. 
Grit Laudel and Jochen Glaser (2007) drew on ideas from laboratory ethnogra­
phies in order to formulate their own methodological position. They considered 
examples of the naive observer, such as Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's
Tz/e (1979) - where the attempt was made to shed any prior knowledge of 
the science in question and of laboratory practices. They also considered exam­
ples of the informed observer, such as Harry Collins' (1998) study of the search 
for gravitational waves - where a conscious attem pt is made to achieve a level of
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comprehension and understanding deemed acceptable for sociological study. Fi­
nally, they considered examples of the native observer, such as Andrew Pickering's 
(1984) study of particle physics - where a former professional scientist attempts to 
examine their own held from a sociological perspective. Insofar as these positions 
apply to interviewing, the idea of the informed interviewer is perhaps the most 
preferable, as it strikes a balance between, on the one hand, the impracticability 
(and perhaps impossibility) of consciously aiming to shed prior assumptions, and 
on the other, the problems of 'going native'. It also allows for the possibility of 
developing a rapport with the interviewee, given that "informed questions signal 
the interviewees that you have done your homework, made an effort, and have not 
just come to pick their brain", and that "you have gone as far as you can go with 
the available material and now you need some help" (Rubin & Rubin 1995, p. 195).
In terms of the implications of these arguments for my research, the problems 
associated with memory appear to be the most salient. As with documentary 
analysis, they serve to caution against seeing interview data as a mirror of the past, 
thus placing importance on triangulation with data from other sources. When 
conducting interviews, I attempted to maintain an awareness of the potential for 
my interviewees to make factual mistakes, but also that, in some cases, the way 
in which they looked back on their careers and the crypto wars would be shaped 
by what had happened in the intervening period. In terms of rapport, given my 
own undergraduate and employment background in computing science, and the 
fact that I conducted my documentary analysis before carrying out my interviews, 
I attempted to adopt a position that was close to the informed observer or the 
interactional expert. This, it was hoped, would go some way to improving rapport, 
and would thus reduce the likelihood of being fed ofhcial lines or being taught 
basic cryptology. My concern with improving and maintaining a rapport with my 
interviewees also extended to my practical approach to interviews. Broadly, as 
will be described in the next subsection, I decided that my approach would be 
informal and flexible, given tha t I did not want to do anything that might alienate 
my interviewees, and because being overly formal might increase the likelihood of 
being fed ofhcial lines or being treated as a student receiving supervision.
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3.3.5 P racticalities o f Sem i-Structured Interview ing
One of the most important sets of decisions that had to be made during the 
course of the fieldwork centred on whom to interview. At the most basic level, 
the population was specified by the conceptual, geographical, and temporal case 
studying bounding, as defined earlier in this chapter (see Table 3.1). To recap, 
this meant that I wanted to interview individuals who had: carried out collective 
cryptology research; carried out this research in the UK; and had carried out this 
research between 1970 and 2000. However, in practice, I also knew that there 
were a number of reasons why it would be impossible to interview some of the 
individuals within this population. For example, given the historical nature of 
the case study, some of those who had carried out collective cryptology research 
in the first half of my specified period - particularly those who had held senior 
positions - had died. Similarly, given the amount of time that had passed between 
the start of the period under study and the present, it would have been unrealistic 
to expect to be able to identi^  every individual within the population. As a 
result, from the outset, I suspected that the number of individuals within this 
population was small, and that the number that could realistically be sampled 
from this population was even smaller.
Due to the lack of literature on the history of cryptology research in the UK during 
this period, before the fieldwork proper began, there existed no obvious source of a 
list of individuals within the specified population. However, preliminary research 
had revealed the names of some of the most prominent individuals and institu­
tions. This was used as a starting point for documentary analysis. As part of 
this analysis, documents were used to identi^  the names of individuals who were 
part of the specified population. In some cases, the available documents included 
detailed administrative material - such as organizational charts - that contained 
complete employee information for a particular period. In other cases - where this 
material was not available - the names of individuals were gathered in a piecemeal 
fashion from a variety of documents that happened to mention employee informa­
tion. Furthermore, during the interviews, interviewees were asked for information 
about others working in the held at the time. As such, the sampling method used 
shared many of the characteristics of snowballing.
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Although it is very difhcult to provide exact hgures, based on information con­
tained within the available documents, I estimated that the total population (in­
cluding those who had died or were unidentihable) numbered around 40 individ­
uals. Of these, I was able to identify 24 individuals. Once a list of potential 
interviewees had been produced, the next step was to obtain their respective con­
tact details. Given that many of individuals had been identihed from documents 
originating from as far back as the 1970s, this required considerable work, and was 
often unsuccessful. Typically, up-to-date contact information was sought through 
the use of Internet search engines, social networking websites, telephone direc­
tories, the electoral roll, institutional gatekeepers, and professional and personal 
contacts. I was able to hnd the contact details of 14 individuals. As this number 
was relatively low, I deemed it reasonable to attem pt to interview every individual 
on this list. This resulted in a total of 10 interviews (see Table 3.4).^
I n t e r v ie w e e I n s t i t u t io n Y e a r s M o d e F ie ld w o r k  S ta g e
1 N a tion a l P h ysica l Laboratory 1987-1997 Face-to-face F irst
2 N ation a l P h y sica l L aboratory 1978-2000 Skype video F i r s t
3 N ation a l P h ysica l L aboratory 1970-1992 E m a il F i r s t
4 R o y a l H o llo w a y 1984-2000 T elephone F irst and Second
5 R o y a l H o llo w a y 1989-2000 E m a il First and Second
6 R a c a l 1981-1987 T elephone F irst
7 Reical 1987-2000 T elephone First
8 Cam bridge 1992-2000 T elephone F irst and Second
9 Various (inc. F IP R ) 1998-2000 F ace-to-face S e c o n d
10 V a r io u s  ( in c . F I P R ) 1998-2000 T elephone Second
TABLE 3.4: Interviewee Demographics
Once contact information had been found, either a letter or an email requesting 
an interview was sent. The initial contact also contained details about the nature 
of the research.^ Importantly, in the initial letter, potential interviewees were 
offered a choice of interview mode. It was made clear that if participants agreed 
to be interviewed, they would have a choice of a: face-to-face; telephone; Skype 
video; or email interview. Given that many potential interviewees had spent their 
lives working as computer scientists, offering a choice of Skype video and email 
was considered appropriate and unproblematic. Although offering a choice of 
mode goes against a convention in social research that tends to favour face-to-face 
interviewing, I felt that it was important to be as flexible as possible given the small
^Thc information contained in the 'Years' column within Table 3.4 is limited by the case 
study's temporal bounding. Therefore, the dates given do not indicate how long each interviewee 
worked for a particular institution, but rather the years spent working on cryptology between 
1970 and 2000.
copy of the material sent to potential interviewees can be found in Appendix A.
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number of potential interviewees, and because being too insistent on a particular 
mode might have adversely affected rapport. Though it is difficult to know for 
sure whether this strategy paid off, it is perhaps telling that the majority of those 
contacted agreed to be interviewed, and that most of the participants elected to 
conduct their interview over the telephone, with smaller numbers agreeing to meet 
face-to-face, communicate over Skype video, or via email.
There exists a generally held view that, though telephone interviews are typi­
cally cheaper and more convenient than face-to-face interviews, face-to-face should 
be seen as the 'gold standard'. However, some recent comparative studies have 
claimed that there is little difference between telephone and face-to-face data 
(Irvine 2011, Stephens 2007, Cachia & Millward 2011). Amanda Holt (2010) has 
even argued that, in some cases, telephone interviews may be preferable because 
they can: remove misleading ethnographic data; force the interviewee to articulate 
everything verbally; and remove the basis for a power imbalance between inter­
viewer and interviewee. The last of these points was particularly relevant, given 
that I wanted to avoid interviews that resembled a teacher-student encounter.
Although the majority of interviews were conducted over the telephone, a small 
number were carried out using Skype video. Skype is a piece of downloadable 
computer software that allows the user to conduct video calls with other users. 
Skype is an emerging research tool tha t combines some of the facets of face-to- 
face and telephone interviews (Hanna 2012). For my Skype interviews, visual 
information was observed but was not recorded. As with my face-to-face inter­
views, Skype interviews provided an additional layer of data in the form of body 
language and other visual information. However, it should be noted that Skype 
video interviews typically provide less visual information than face-to-face due to 
the constraints imposed by the fixed viewing window (itself determined by the 
interviewees computer setup) and the frequent stuttering and pixelated video feed 
caused by insufficient bandwidth.
Whereas telephone, face-to-face and Skype video interviews were conducted 'syn­
chronously', email interviews were conducted 'asynchronously'. Email interview­
ing is increasingly being recognised as a legitimate interview mode in the social 
sciences (Meho 2006, Burns 2010), and it's use was considered appropriate in this 
case given the nature of the interviewees. When an email interview was agreed 
upon, an initial list of questions was sent to the interviewee, and then the intervie­
wee replied with their responses. In one instance, a participant offered to answer
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some initial questions by email, but agreed to a telephone interview if they felt 
that lengthier responses were required. Email interviews were easy to arrange, 
free from problems of computer literacy due to the nature of the participants, bet­
ter suited to busier participants as they were able to reply at their convenience, 
and on the whole, appeared to be a good source of precise information. In terms 
of drawbacks, though interviewees responded to every question that was asked 
rather than cherrypicking preferred questions, email interviews made prompting 
and probing much more difficult, and the collection of visual data impossible.
All interviews - apart from those conducted over email - were recorded using a 
Dictaphone. After the interviews had been completed, they were transcribed ahead 
of the analysis. In the case of the face-to-face, telephone and Skype recordings, this 
was done 'manually', by listening to the recording and typing up what was said. 
In the case of the email interviews, no transcribing was necessary, as they already 
existed in written form. Analysing the interview data had to be done in such a 
way that it complemented the documentary data. Basic historical information, 
such as names and dates, was obtained by reading through the transcripts, and 
where possible, checking against other sources due to the potential for error caused 
by memory.
As with the documentary analysis, for the interview data, salient information was 
identihed using thematic analysis. As Bryman pointed out, although attempts 
have been made to develop specihc thematic analysis techniques, it is not an 
approach tha t "has an identihable heritage or one that has been outlined in terms 
of a distinctive cluster of techniques" (Bryman 2008, p.554). Therefore, thematic 
analysis is used here to refer to the process of reading through interview transcripts 
iteratively to identify dominant trends and ideas. In this way, the analysis process 
was similar to coding. However, it should be noted that coding is often a much 
more formal process best suited to multiple interviews on a hxed topic. Data 
from face-to-face, telephone and Skype video interviews wag largely treated in the 
same way. However, the email interviews were fundamentally different from the 
other modes used because they oEered written data instead of spoken data. As 
a result, a higher degree of reliability was attached to any short pieces of factual 
information, such as names and dates, because the interviewee had been afforded 
the time to check any information of which they may have been uncertain.
Chapter 3. 100
3.3.6 A  N ote  on Ethics
As with all forms of social research, ethical considerations were important in de­
ciding upon a methodological approach. All interviews were carried ont after re­
ceiving informed consent from the interviewee. In the social sciences it is generally 
considered good ethical practice to anonymize or de-identi^ interview transcripts 
before quoting from them, so as to ensure confidentiality. However, this can cre­
ate a tension in work that has a historical dimension, as it seems to undermine 
its central purpose of providing detailed information about individuals from the 
past. In line with Harry Collins' (20146) code of practice for interviews, I have 
decided to anonymize any quotations used. As Collins argued, though insiders 
may be able to guess the source of a quote, this rarely matters because they are 
by definition already aware of the interviewee's position in a debate. Though I 
made no promises about confidentiality in the consent form issued to all intervie­
wees, I decided later that, given the aims of the research, there was little to be 
gained from potentially embarrassing or otherwise harming those that had been 
willing to contribute. Where quotes are not anonymized, they have been taken 
from referenced documents. Given tha t all documents analysed were, in theory 
at least, publicly available, it did not seem necessary to anonymize or de-identij^ 
these quotes, as the content was already a m atter of public record. Furthermore, 
given that many of the documents used are available online, it would be straight­
forward for someone who wished to know the source of a quote to find it using a 
search engine.
3.4 C onclusion
Much published STS research does not provide the reader with a detailed descrip­
tion of the processes used to reach its stated conclusions. As a result, many of 
the basic assumptions that underpin STS research are left unquestioned, leading 
some to draw attention to a lack of reflexivity. Therefore, I sought to ground 
my methods in established concepts from the social sciences, and have provided 
justifications of the use of the case study and historical approaches, with respect 
to the aims of my research.
It was decided early on that qualitative research and social constructivism would 
be well suited to the investigation of the nature of cryptology research practices.
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the nature of the expertise they produced, and how that expertise was used during 
the crypto wars. Though case studies have traditionally been viewed as consisting 
of a trade-off between depth and generalizability, this view is often based on ide­
alized conceptions of contrasting methods, and somewhat dated ideas about the 
potential for social research to provide universal theories. Of more importance 
is the way in which a case study is bounded. Because 'boundedness' is difhcult 
to measure, it is the responsibility of the researcher to provide a justihcation of 
the decisions they made when isolating their study. I have argued that, given 
the salience of national context and what's currently known about the emergence 
of open cryptology research, restricting the technical phase of the case study to 
developments in UK cryptology research hrom 1970 and 2000, and to the politi­
cal phase to the hrst series of debates in the crypto wars, was both sensible and 
feasible.
Given the temporal bounding of the case, historical methods - such as documentary 
analysis and retrospective semi-structured interviewing - were required to gather 
data. Despite some criticism of the use of historical methods to inform sociolog­
ical conclusions, it should be acknowledged that history and sociology do share 
some of the same goals and methods, and have been successfully blended by STS 
researchers in the past. More importantly, though ethnographic methods such as 
participant observation can be an excellent way of examining certain observable, 
micro-social laboratory practices - such as those associated with experimental work 
- documentary analysis and retrospective semi-structured interviewing appear to 
be better suited to capturing unobservable macro-social institutional and orga­
nizational practices. Given tha t these practices may also have had an important 
role in the production of expertise during the technical phase, and historical meth­
ods seem suited to their examination, it was decided that they would be used to 
underpin the answers to the research questions.
Turning to the arguments related to the data gathering strategies, recent thinking 
has led to a more sophisticated appreciation of what documents are able to reveal 
about the past. Given tha t documents reveal and sustain documentary realities, 
documents pertaining to cryptology research sites and controversies were not anal­
ysed in the hope that they would offer a clean description of the past. Rather, 
they were analysed as part of the expertise producing practices that were of in­
terest. Therefore, the thematic analysis of documents allowed for inferences to be 
made about the nature of the wider processes of which they were a part. Data
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from documents was complemented with data from a series of retrospective semi­
structured interviews. The primary advantage of using retrospective interviews in 
conjunction with documentary analysis was that they allowed me to both reveal 
new information about the past, and to confirm or refute my prior interpretations. 
However, it should be acknowledged that the experiences of the interviewee in the 
intervening period can shape the way in which they subsequently make sense of 
the past. As a result, as with documents, retrospective interviews were not seen as 
texts able to provide precise descriptions of past practices. Interviews were instead 
analysed thematically to gain an insight into how interviewees made sense of their 
past contributions to cryptology and how they related them to the crypto wars.
In terms of the practical steps taken during the research, the range of analysable 
documents was extended through the use of Freedom of Information requests and 
the Wayback Machine. In order maximize the amount of data available during 
the retrospective interview process, I decided to adopt a flexible and informal 
approach. This was deemed important because of the small number of potential 
interviewees, and because it was believed that this would help establish a rapport. 
Generating a good rapport with interviewees also offered a way of potentially 
minimizing the number of responses that resembled official lines, as well as the 
number of interviews based around a teacher-student dynamic.
The successes and failures of this methodological approach will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 10. The next four chapters will be devoted to the descrip­
tions of cryptology research practices that these methods were able to produce.
Chapter 4 
Cryptology Research at the  
National Physical Laboratory
4.1 In trod u ction
The next four chapters will describe what resulted from the hrst stage of my 
research design, as outlined in the previous chapter (see Table 3.2). The purpose 
of this stage was to examine the technical phase of the crypto wars. After carrying 
out some preliminary investigations into the history of cryptology research in the 
UK between 1970 and 2000, it became clear that this was not something that could 
be found in existing historical or sociological accounts of the period. I would have 
to assemble the history myself. After carrying out some preliminary historical 
research, it became clear that collective cryptology research was only carried out 
at a handful of research sites from the 1970s onwards. Though it wasn't unheard of 
for individuals - usually within computing or mathematics departments - to carry 
out their own independent research into cryptology, cryptology research groups 
were rare.^
Between 1970 and 2000, cryptology research groups could be found within the fol­
lowing hve institutions: the National Physical Laboratory; the University of Lon­
don (in particular at Royal Holloway college); Racal Electronics pic; the University
^The emphasis on group or collective practices is important because of the distinction made 
between somatic limit tacit knowledge and collective tacit knowledge, and the fact that the latter 
underpins specialist expertise within the periodic table. It is only through collective activity that 
distinct specialist expertise can emerge.
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of Cambridge; and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).^ The 
next four chapters will describe how cryptology research developed at each of these 
institutions.^
In this chapter, I will examine the cryptology research carried out by the Data Se­
curity Group at the National Physical Laboratory (NPL). I will begin by providing 
a brief history of the laboratory, from its founding at the beginning of the 1900s 
to the start of its research into cryptology in the late 1970s. I will then provide 
more detailed information about the computing work that the laboratory under­
took, paying particular attention to pioneering contributions from Donald Davies. 
I will then examine the social and political context in which cryptology work was 
carried out, focussing attention on the influence of 'New Public Management', 
and the attempts to implement a customer-contractor principle. I will show that, 
although the aim of the government's 1971 Rothschild report was to essentially 
commercialize the work of Government Research Establishments, within the Data 
Security Group at NPL, it resulted in a move away from basic cryptology research, 
and towards work designed to produce standards and to provide consulting ser­
vices for industries that relied on secure electronic transactions. In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, as the 'marketization' of NPL intensified, the work of the Data 
Security Group moved away from the production and development of standards, 
and towards the testing of technologies for their conformance to standards, and 
the accreditation of testing facilities.
4.2 H istorica l O verview  o f N P L
The National Physical Laboratory - based in Teddington on the outskirts of south­
west London - is the UK's measurement standards laboratory. NPL is a Govern­
ment Research Establishment (GRE) - a government-owned institution that carries 
out scientific research on behalf of the state. From its official opening in 1902 (it 
was founded in 1900), to the present day, NPL has received the majority of its 
funding from government sources. Therefore, historians have argued that ideas
^This is not an exhaustive list. There is evidence to suggest that collective cryptology research 
was carried out at (at least) one other site. This particular limitation will be discussed in more 
depth in the chapter 10.
^The reasons why hve research sites will be describe across four chapters will become clear 
later on. Put simply, the cryptology research carried out at Racal will be described in the chapter 
on cryptology research at Royal Holloway because of the way in which their work overlapped, 
and the strong links between the two groups.
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about the kind of state-funded research, if any, GREs should perform have ulti­
mately shaped the course of its development. Consequently, the history of NPL 
can be understood within the context of changing political attitudes to the funding 
of science and technology, and its relationship to industry (Pyatt 1983, Magnello 
2000).
NPL was formally opened by the Prince of Wales (later King George V) in March 
1902. In his address, the Prince stated that:
In the National Physical Laboratory we have the first instance of the 
State taking part in scientific research. The object of the scheme is,
I understand, to bring scientific knowledge to bear practically upon 
our everyday industrial and commercial life, to break down the barrier 
between theory and practice, to effect a union between science and 
commerce (Pyatt 1983, p.32).
Though today this might sound relatively innocuous, the idea that industry could 
benefit from a program of state-funded scientific research was a somewhat in­
congruous, controversial and potentially problematic idea given the laissez-faire 
approach that was the hallmark of Victorian economic policy (Moseley 1978).
When the laboratory first became operational, there were just two divisions: En­
gineering; and Physics. The Engineering Division was primarily concerned with 
testing new technologies, whereas the Physics Division carried out research into 
electrotechnics, metrology, optics, and chemistry (Pyatt 1983, p.43). In the years 
leading up to the First World War, typical early work included a study of the effect 
of wind on bridges and roofs, the standardization of shafts and holes in industrial 
machinery, and the stress testing of iron and steel specimens (Pyatt 1983, pp.40- 
45). As the war unfolded, it became apparent that NPL could be used to perform 
research that was geared towards the war effort. In an attem pt to develop the 
UK's scientific capabilities, the government created the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (DSIR) in 1914, and control of NPL was passed to it in 
1918 (Edgerton 2006, p. 116). At around this time, science funding was increased 
dramatically, largely catalysed by the severing of trade links with Germany. Re­
search into areas such as the calibration of gauges for the manufacture of fuses 
and shells was increased (Pyatt 1983, p.65), as was research into aeronautics and 
aerodynamics (Magnello 2000, p.61).
Chapter 4. ResearcA ^Ae Aa^maa/ f  Apgzca/ Ta6ara(orp 106
Following the First World War, the UK had, in general, acquired a much more 
scientific outlook. The attitudes of those opposed to the funding of scientific re­
search by the state had softened. In line with a general trend towards rearmament 
(Edgerton 2011, pp.28-46), NPL maintained much of its military-themed research 
throughout the interwar period. Although this was part of a general trend, it was 
particularly prevalent at NPL because many senior staff maintained strong links 
with the armed forces. W ith the outbreak Second World War, NPL was once 
again able to substitute its remaining non-military research with research that 
was directed towards the war effort. By 1941 - in line with many other GREs 
(Edgerton 2011, pp.233-271) - all divisions within NPL were once again working 
on military projects. Perhaps the most well known contribution that NPL made 
during the Second World War came when it provided the testing ground for an 
early prototype of the famous bouncing bomb - later immortalised in the him TAe 
Dam Rasters (Pyatt 1983, p. 138).
Following the Second World War, with the immediate priority of armed conhict 
largely absent, questions about the appropriateness of state-funded scientihc re­
search came back to the fore. When control of NPL passed hrom DSIR to the 
newly created Ministry of Technology (MinTech) in 1965, the emphasis again re­
turned to testing, calibration and metrology. During this period, research at the 
NPL was mostly funded through a block grant system. A hxed amount of govern­
ment money would be given to the laboratory, and decisions about how to spend 
it would be made internally by the laboratory's senior management. This system 
was therefore aligned with what Michael Polanyi (1962) referred to as the 'republic 
of science', in that scientists at NPL - in common with scientists working in many 
other contexts - were able to pursue their own interests whilst still working as part 
of a collaborative network.
4.2.1 Early C om puting R esearch
It was in the post-war environment that computing research at NPL began. It 
started with the establishment of the Mathematics Division in 1945, and soon 
after, the appointment of J. R. Womersley as Superintendent (Yates 1997, p .11). 
Although originally called the Mathematics Division, and later the Autonomies 
Division, its role was to examine computational methods and to investigate the 
possibility of providing computing services to government. The establishment of
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the division was hardly surprising given that the testing and calibration work NPL 
undertook necessitated accurate and fast numerical calculations, and management 
were keenly aware of the vital role that the wartime computing service had played, 
given their links with the armed services.
Before work on cryptology and data security began at NPL, two major computing 
projects were completed. These projects resulted in two technological artefacts 
well known in the history of computing: the Pilot ACE; and packet switching. 
Although these were by no means the only computing technologies produced at 
NPL, they are the ones that have thus far been given the most historical attention, 
and are also indicative of the nature of the work that the division undertook under 
the block grant system. They are also noteworthy because of their pioneering 
nature. This was undoubtedly a confident period for the laboratory. The prevailing 
political attitudes, together with the post-war economic boom - both reflected in 
the block grant system - meant that the laboratory felt it could proceed with 
this kind of innovative, ground-breaking research (Yates 1997, p.200). One of the 
hrst projects that the new division undertook was to design and build their own 
programmable computer - the ACE (Automatic Computing Engine). The project 
- which was initially led by Alan Turing - foundered slightly in the early stages, 
leading to both Turing's departure and the scaling down of the project (Davies 
1990, 1993). Nonetheless, the Pilot ACE (as it came to be known) ran its hrst 
automated calculation in 1950 and was completed in 1951, making it one of only 
three programmable computers in the UK at the time (Campbell-Kelly 1981).
The second major project resulted in the development of packet switching. When 
Donald Davies became superintendent of the Division of Computer Science in 1966, 
he initiated a new programme of computer network research. As Donald Davies 
is a key individual in the history of computing research at NPL - especially, as we 
shall see, related to cryptology - it is worth pausing to provide some biographical 
details. Donald W atts Davies was born in the Rhonnda Valley, Wales in 1924. 
He entered Imperial College London to study Physics at the age of 19. After 
graduating with a hrst in 1943, he spent the remainder of the Second World War 
working on tube alloys at Birmingham University."^ After the war, he returned 
to Imperial College and took another hrst in mathematics, winning the Lubbock 
Memorial Prize in the process. Davies joined NPL in 1947 and worked on the ACE
^Though seemingly implausible at first glance, Davies' birth and graduation dates were con­
firmed during personal correspondence with Martin Campbell-Kelly.
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project with Turing, and later on data communications and packet switching. He 
was head of the computing divisions within the NPL from 1966 to 1979, when 
he stepped down to head a small data security research group. Davies retired 
in 1984 aged 60. A year earlier he was awarded a CBE, followed by the von 
Neumann medal in 1986, before being elected as a fellow of the Royal Society in 
1987 (Campbell-Kelly 2008). Though Davies' contributions to the Pilot ACE and 
packet switching are now well known, his work on cryptology and data security in 
the hnal third of his career has been neglected by historians.
One of the new areas of investigation that Davies pioneered was data communica­
tions. After an earlier visit to the US in 1965, Davies had experienced first-hand 
the issues that those working on early computer networks were facing - in par­
ticular, the inherent conflict between time-sharing and real-time communication 
(Campbell-Kelly 1988). In June 1966, Davies produced a report that proposed 
a solution to these problems and included it in an unofficial proposal for a UK 
national data communications network. Shortly afterwards, Davies learned of 
an almost identical proposal produced by the American computer scientist Paul 
Baran of the RAND corporation. It was this proposal that described the technol­
ogy that would underpin the proposed ARPANET, which would eventually come 
to be known as the Internet (Abbate 1999). In contrast, the nationwide network 
that Davies proposed was never built. It did, however, come to be implemented 
on a much smaller scale at NPL, and as such, became one of the first local area 
networks (LANs) in the country (Yates 1997, pp. 131-135). In coming to grips with 
the nature of networked communications, Davies was among the first to glimpse 
the potential security issues that networked computers raised.
4.2.2 N ew  Public M anagem ent
In order to understand the nature of the data security and cryptology research that 
was undertaken at NPL, we first need to understand something about the broader 
attitudes to the funding of GREs in the preceding period. The way in which NPL 
was governed began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These changes 
can be understood within the wider context of what is referred to as 'New Public 
Management' (Hood 1991). New Public Management is a term that has been used 
to refer to the noticeable changes in public administration that occurred in the UK
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and other developed countries in the second half of the twentieth century. New 
Public Management refers loosely to:
A commitment to downsizing the state, cost-cutting, marketization 
and competition, the devolution of executive functions to quasi-autonomous 
agencies and a commitment to customer-contractor and other quasi­
commercial policy-making and management principles (Boden et al.
1998).
These commitments, it is claimed, had two broad consequences for the public 
sector. Firstly, the public sector became less distinct from the private sector in 
terms of personnel, methods and reward structures. Secondly, the discretionary 
powers of management were replaced with general rules of procedure (Dunleavy &: 
Hood 1994). These consequences can be observed in the recent histories of various 
GREs (Boden et al. 2004). The changes can be seen as the result of various 
high-level government policies that attempted to modify the ways in which GREs 
operated.
The hrst such policy was detailed in the 1971 Government white paper on research 
and development, known as the Rothschild Report (1971). The ideas that the 
report espoused were to impact upon the activities of NPL. Broadly, the report 
promoted the view that it was unacceptable for state-funded research to overlap 
with industrial research and development. It attempted to eliminate this overlap 
by abandoning the block grant funding system and replacing it with the 'customer- 
contractor' principle.
After winning the 1970 general election, the Conservative party - under the lead­
ership of Edward Heath - set about reviewing the functions of government depart­
ments (Gummett 1980, Wilkie 1991). MinTech had been established by Harold 
Wilson's Labour government in 1964, and although its success is a m atter for de­
bate, the Conservative election manifesto of 1970 pledged to reform it. A review 
process was undertaken by the government, and this ultimately led to a report 
by Victor Rothschild, 3rd Baron Rothschild, head of the newly created Central 
Policy Review StaE - now often thought of as the original think tank (see Black- 
stone & Plowden 1988). The report stated that each government department with 
a significant link to science and technology should appoint a Chief Scientist to 
advise them on matters of science policy. The Chief Scientist would be supported
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by Requirements Boards who would assist the relevant government department - 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the case of NPL - by providing 
the technical knowledge required to make far-sighted policy decisions. The most 
crucial part of the report stated that "applied R&D, that is R&D with a practical 
application as its objective, must be done on a customer-contractor basis. The 
Customer says what he wants; the contractor does it (if he can); and the customer 
pays" (Rothschild 1971). This recommendation became instantly controversial 
because it not only applied to work done in GREs - such as the work of NPL 
- but also to the rest of the work done under the research council system. The 
report further recommended that 25% of the work funded by the research councils 
should be on applied R&D, and should consequently be subject to the customer- 
contractor principle. That government ministers, with the Requirements Boards 
acting as a proxy, would effectively be commissioning R&D was seen by many as a 
direct attack on the autonomy of science, and a violation of the Haldane Principle 
(Wilkie 1991).^
Although this perceived 'attack' on the autonomy of the research councils triggered 
much of the outcry, the imposition of the customer-contractor principle does not 
seem to have been welcomed by the senior staff at NPL either.^ The internal 
response to the report Rom the Superintendents at NPL was almost universally 
defensive and critical. In summarising the view of NPL for the benefit of the 
director, one senior employee wrote:
This report can be criticised on many counts. It is dogmatic on ar­
guable points. It ignores large areas of government science. It is 
devoted to means rather than ends. It is based on a fundamental 
misconception regarding the different categories of scientific research. 
Despite its trenchant style it is vague and self-contradictory in many 
places and ignores the financial problems that would be thrown up by 
the adoption of its proposals (National Physical Laboratory 1971).
^The Haldane Principle, as it is commonly understood, refers to the idea that decisions 
about what to spend research funds on should be determined by scientists and not by politicians 
(Gummett 1980, p.25). However, as Gummet and others have noted, the original Haldane Report 
did not refer directly to a Haldane Principle. It acquired this name at a later date. As a result, 
its meaning has changed over time and has often been shaped by debates over science funding 
(Edgerton 2009).
^This came in the form of numerous articles in Antwns and Aew 45 published letters,
four editorials in T/ie Tzmes, and a lengthy debate in the House of Lords featuring contributions 
from many distinguished scientists (Gummett 1980, p. 198).
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More specifically, one of the recurring criticisms was that the report failed to 
grasp the nuanced and diffuse way in which the production of standards can be 
beneficial, and how the customer-contractor principle would be unable to account 
for the broad customer-base that standards serve. As another senior figure at NPL 
stated, "the bulk of the work of the NPL is in the held of standards. It is therefore 
a m atter of concern that the report should make no reference to it, nor provide a 
category of work into which it hts" (National Physical Laboratory 1971).
It has been argued that - despite the trenchant style of the Rothschild Report, and 
the negative reaction that it received - "signihcant changes were not achieved, and 
for the most part laboratories continued as close adjuncts of their departments, 
with funds howing in a way which was not closely monitored, and with the lab­
oratory dehning much of the work to be done" (Boden et al. 1998, pp.271-272). 
Although the block grant system was replaced, staff at NPL were able to come to 
agreements with the DTI about what work should be contracted to them. As one 
former NPL scientist explained to me:
R esp o n d en t: The customer is not a very informed customer. They 
weren't back then, and they're not now. They don't really understand 
the work that's  done. But let's face it, NPL is working at the forefront 
in physics, maths and computing. Well, it was then. Not any more.
So, basically, you would have to be working in the field in order to 
understand it. So, yes, it was driven by a Requirements Board, but we 
used to tell them . . .  we used to write their requirements for them.
The report does, however, appear to have prompted a more general change within 
the Division of Computer Science. In his annual report to the review committee, 
itself set up to help NPL deal with the Requirements Board system, the director 
of the NPL - J. V. Dunworth - stressed that the primary role of the laboratory 
was the production of standards (National Physical Laboratory 1973). However, 
in the same report, Dunworth also acknowledged that the Division of Computer 
Science (and also the Maritime Division) had, in the past, been concerned with 
research of a more pioneering and academic nature, and did not currently perform 
any standards work at all. hYom 1973 onwards, judging from the pressure from 
the Requirements Boards tha t appears in the minutes of various high-level com­
mittees, the nature of the computing work at NPL began to change. Innovative 
research into computing hardware and data communications was scaled down, and
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standards work was initiated. Despite the fact that the Rothschild Report had 
not covered the production of standards, the Requirements Boards were happy for 
this work to continue. Indeed, the annual overviews of divisional work seem to 
indicate a general trend across NPL to consolidate its standards and consulting 
role. A separate Standards Committee was established and there were (ultimately 
failed) attempts to turn NPL into the British Bureau of Standards (Department 
of Trade and Industry 1976).
The work of the Division of Computer Science was eventually brought into line 
with the rest of the laboratory and this general trend. In 1974, Dr (later Sir) leuan 
Maddock, the Chief Scientist at the DTI, drew attention to the small number of 
receipts for contractor work related to computing (National Physical Laboratory 
1974). This became a consistent refrain through to 1980, and was regularly raised 
at Review Committee meetings by the Chief Scientist of the day. Although ofhcial 
correspondence between NPL and the DTI was largely courteous and professional, 
it is clear from the available documents that the Chief Scientist saw the com­
puting divisions as anomalous and potentially problematic. That the laboratory 
was struggling to satisj^ the Requirements Boards in terms of computing-related 
contractor work no doubt further influenced the turn to standards and consulting 
work.
4.3 T he D a ta  Security  G roup
By 1978, work on protocol and security standards was seen as part of the future of 
the computing work of NPL (National Physical Laboratory 1978u,6). It was also 
in 1978 that Davies, who was, according to David Yates (1997, p. 123), dissatisfied 
by the increased level of administrative work that the Requirements Board system 
generated, stepped down as Superintendent of the Division of Numerical Analysis 
and Computer Science to head a newly formed Data Security Croup. By 1980, 
the group had begun research on cryptology and data security standards.
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4.3.1 C ryptology Standards
Though Donald Davies was appointed head of the Data Security Croup in 1978, 
his interest in data security was much older. In a 1986 interview with the histo­
rian of computing Martin Campbell-Kelly, Davies claimed to have had the "usual 
childhood interest in cryptography" (Campbell-Kelly 1986). His hrst serious cryp­
tology work came in 1963, when Midland Bank asked him to test a proprietary 
cipher designed for use in early ATMs. Davies commented that the ciphers the 
bank produced were very basic, and that he was able to break them almost im­
mediately. Davies first began working on cryptology standards in 1972, when the 
NBS were soliciting proposals for what was to become the DES. Davies submitted 
a basic proposal. This, along with all others, was rejected by the NBS. When the 
time came for the second round, Davies chose not to submit an improved version, 
and, as was mentioned in the introductory chapter, the NBS eventually selected 
Feistel's proposal. In addition to these early forays into cryptology, Davies' notes 
- now held at the Imperial College London Archives - suggest that he was keenly 
aware of the developments that had taken place in the US. Shortly after the de­
velopment of Public-Key Cryptography, Davies employed a mathematician in the 
Data Security Croup to attempt to 'break' the RSA algorithm. Furthermore, 
Davies and his team at NPL chaired one of the first public seminars in the UK on 
the protection of data by cryptography in September 1977. The National Com­
puting Centre (NCC) sponsored the seminar, and it was attended by around 100 
delegates. The majority of these delegates came from industry, and included rep­
resentatives from Barclays Bank, Ceneral Motors and IBM (National Computing 
Centre 1977).
From these beginnings, the Data Security Croup used research into cryptology to 
build a body of expertise in the held. As this expertise matured, it was increas­
ingly focussed on the use of cryptography to secure hnancial transactions. During 
the 1980s, the group produced a textbook on data security and electronic funds 
transfer and a series of annotated bibliographies, as well as more practical research 
into key management and DES (e.g. Bell & Olding 1978, Price 1979, 1980, Davies 
& Price 1980a,6, Price 1982, 1983, Davies &: Price 1984). Furthermore, members 
of the group acted as chairmen for various national and international data security 
standards committees.
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One of the hrst projects that the Data Security Croup undertook was the devel­
opment of the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA). The MAA was designed 
to be a digital signature standard. Work began on the MAA in 1981, and details 
of the MAA were published in 1983 (Davies &: Clayden 1983). The MAA became 
part of ISO Banking Standard 8731-2 in 1987. The MAA - an example of Mes­
sage Authentication Code - is a standard for providing a message with a digital 
signature. This allows the recipient of an electronic message to be sure that the 
sender of the message is who they claim to be, and can also be used by a single 
user to determine if their hies have been altered (Schneier 1996, p.455). Davies 
and Clayden described the workings of the algorithm as follows:
An 'authenticator' is a number which is sent with a message so that 
a check can be made by the receiver of the message that it has not 
been altered since it left the sender. For authenticators in general the 
sender and receiver share the knowledge of a key K which is otherwise 
secret. If M is the message, the authenticator is a function of K and 
M. It is calculated by the sender and again by the receiver. If the 
receiver's calculated value equals the authenticator value received with 
the message, the message is assumed to be correct. When a well- 
designed authenticator is used, giving a 32 bit result, the probability 
that a message alteration will not be detected is 2"^ ,^ which is small 
enough for most purposes (Davies &: Clayden 1983).
In other words, if the authenticator number that the recipient receives is a function 
of the key known to both parties, then it can be confidently assumed that the 
sender is who they claim to be, and that there have been no changes to the 
message since it was sent.
The hrst document to detail the MAA was produced in 1983 (Davies &: Clayden 
1983). This document does not contain any reference to the potential for the 
MAA to be used in the held of banking. Nor does it make reference to any 
other potential practical application. Only in subsequent documents is banking 
directly referred to. In 1988, a revised document detailing the MAA was published 
(Davies & Clayden 1988). This document referred to "hnancial messages" rather 
than just "messages", and also stated that "the algorithm attracted the attention 
of the Committee of the London Clearing Banks and then Technical Committee 68 
(Banking) of the International Standards Organisation, which adopted it as one
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of the approved algorithms for message authentication" (Davies &: Clayden 1988, 
p .l). Although believed to be in wide use through to the mid 1990s, the MAA 
was then suspected to contain security vulnerabilities due to its age and relative 
simplicity (Schneier 1996, p.457). These doubts over the security of the MAA were 
later confirmed when, in 1997, a team of cryptographers demonstrated a series of 
potential attacks tha t could compromise the algorithm (Preneel et al. 1997).
In addition to work on standards like the MAA, the Data Security Group also 
provided consultancy services. An example of this kind of service was the Tokens 
and Transactions Control Consortium (TTCC). The consortium was concerned 
with machine-readable cards and their uses. The TTCC was established in 1982, 
and was disbanded in 1988 and replaced with the Advanced Tokens Technology 
Club. The TTCC was essentially a club made up of firms that were willing to pay 
a subscription fee in return for being kept up-to-date on current developments and 
advised about the future of the held. At hrst, the TTCC acted as an information 
hub for subscribing hrms. They would be provided with expertise after explaining 
their needs and requirements. This did eventually lead to some experimental 
work and product development, including the development of the prototype NPL 
Intelligent Token - a piece of technology similar to a 'smart card' system that could 
be used to verify the identity of the token holder. Although similar to a smart 
card, the NPL Intelligent Token used public-key cryptography to authenticate the 
user using digital signatures.
The MAA and the TTCC were typical of the early cryptology research of the 
Data Security Group, and indeed much of the other work of the laboratory, in 
that expertise was built through the production of commercially useful standards, 
technologies, and advice. However, there were further considerations specific to 
cryptology that led the Data Security Group down this particular path. As one 
former member of the Data Security Group described to me in an interview:
Respondent: [The Data Security Group] was definitely set up to be 
working in the commercial environment. Donald Davies and Wynn 
Price had to negotiate with GCHQ at Cheltenham. They had deals.
It was not military security at all. That's why it was interesting. It was 
definitely set up to do commercial security, across networks in a com­
mercial environment, i.e. business and stuff. He wasn't interested in
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the military side at all. In fact, there would have been severe problems 
if they had been.
As this quote illustrates, the niche that the Data Security Group came to occupy 
was fashioned by the commercial priorities expressed in the Rothschilde Report, 
but also the space left vacant by GCHQ's control of military cryptology. As the 
same interviewee explained further:
R esp o n d en t: [Donald Davies and Wynne Price] certainly moved at a 
different level in terms of having to be very careful in terms of GCHQ 
all the time. That was the greatest fear, that GCHQ would tell us to 
stop doing work. Obviously, they can't directly do it but they could 
make life very difficult for NPL to continue to do the work.
Ensuring that the research of the Data Security Group did not encroach on 
GCHQ's work, then, appears to have been a pressing concern, and one that also 
shaped the direction of the group's research.
4.3.2 Later Governance of N PL
From the mid-1980s onwards, the political context within which the work of the 
Data Security Group was undertaken changed further. Margaret Thatcher's Gon- 
servative Government came to power in 1979. Under the Thatcher Government, 
the speed and intensity with which New Public Management initiatives were pur­
sued was increased. At the same time, the public sector was downsized and public 
expenditure on science and technology was reduced. The Requirements Boards 
system was eventually dissolved in 1988. In the same year, the Prime Minister's 
Efficiency Unit published a report entitled 'Improving Management in Govern­
ment: The Next Steps'. This report launched what came to be known as the Next 
Steps Initiative. The initiative aimed to deliver more efficient and cost effective 
public services through the breaking up of the single Whitehall unit into what it 
called 'executive agencies'. This initiative was pursued enthusiastically within the 
DTI, meaning that a number of GREs, including NPL, were seen as strong can­
didates for agency status (Boden et al. 1998, p.272). NPL subsequently became 
an agency of the DTI in 1990. This belief in 'agenciffcation' chimed with a more
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general feeling about what kind of work GREs should be pursuing. In 1988, the 
Chief Scientific Advisor for the Cabinet Office, Sir John Eairclough, argued that:
Spending on R&D should be directed to work which was far from the 
development of a marketable product or process. 'Near market' R&D 
was to be left to industry, with government expenditure confined to 
areas where the market would fail to operate to produce maximum 
benefits to the economy as a whole (Boden et al. 1998, p.272).
As a result, as far as GREs were concerned, scientific work that benehtted the 
economy, and was simultaneously unlikely to emerge directly from industry, was 
to be favoured over the production of marketable technologies.
A further series of reports were published in the early 1990s that aimed to deal 
directly with the role of government laboratories (Boden et al. 2001). The first 
of these was the 'Review of Allocation and Use of Government Expenditure on 
Science and Technology' (known as the Levene-Stewart Review after the Prime 
Minister's Advisor on Efficiency - Sir Peter Levene, and the Chief Scientific Advisor 
- Sir William Stewart). The review argued that, despite previous efforts, in general, 
the relationships that existed between GREs and their parent departments did not 
much resemble those that existed in the private sector. The review proposed that, 
in the case of government laboratories, procurement should be separated from 
ownership, and that full privatization should be seriously considered. Further 
reviews and government exercises followed. Ultimately, direct privatization of 
government laboratories was favoured over a more gradual introduction of policies 
to encourage market-liberalization. The end result was that by 1996, a number of 
government laboratories, including the National Engineering Laboratory and the 
Laboratory of the Government Chemist, were fully privatized.
Instead of being fully privatized, the NPL became a Government-Owned Con­
tractor Operated (GoCo) agency. Under the GoGo arrangement, the government 
retained ownership of NPL, but contracted a private company to operate it. This 
contract was won by Serco pic in 1995. Serco established NPL Ltd as a subsidiary 
for the purposes of managing NPL. GoGo status undoubtedly entails complex 
arrangements, but in simple terms:
The contract between the outsourcing firm and the government spec­
ifies the work that the government will buy from the business and
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arrangements for sharing efhciency gains. This quite substantial or­
ganisational reform (in terms of the shape, nature and character of the 
organisation) is eRectively only a privatisation of the management of 
the business (Boden et al. 2006, p. 135).
As such, GoCo was the weakest form of privatisation used during this process 
of GRE reform. In the case of NPL, some have deemed the reforms successful, 
given that researchers have claimed that signihcant savings have been achieved and 
more commercial practices have been implemented, without adversely affecting the 
quality of the scientihc work produced (Whelan 2000, Wallard 2001).^
The reform of GREs also resulted in broad changes to working practices. Boden 
et al. found an increased emphasis on the customer-contractor principal in this 
period. Control over the research to be carried out was transferred to the customer, 
which in the case of NPL, was the DTI:
In the agencies and privatized laboratories alike, the introduction of 
customer-contractor relationships has almost ubiquitously been de­
scribed to us as the reform which has had the biggest single change 
on work and organization. For privatized hrms the impact of the in­
troduction of customer-contractor relationships, which preceded any 
change in ownership, was greater than the change experienced on pri­
vatization itself. For many laboratories funding used to come either 
as a vote directly to the establishment or from the Whitehall parent 
but following a specihcation largely drawn up by the laboratory itself.
For agencies and privatized laboratories alike funds now rest with the 
Whitehall customer, who may well now specify the work (or contract 
a third party to do so) and may use market testing mechanisms too 
(Boden et al. 1998, p.286).
In general this served to bring a sharper focus to the work of government labo­
ratories, and in the process, phased out "hobby projects" and "Friday afternoon 
experiments" (Boden et al. 1998, p.286). More specifically, "the 'business' ap­
proach to the delivery of science and technology from the government research
^It should be noted that this view is far from universally shared. It was clear from the 
interviews I carried out that some - at least within the Data Security Group - viewed these 
reforms very negatively indeed.
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laboratories has involved a shift towards greater emphasis on technology transfer 
activities, and away from the basic functions which universities are now able to 
pursue and capitalise upon" (Boden et al. 2001, p.95). As a result, differences be­
tween the research of GREs and universities, in general, became more pronounced.
4.3.3 Testing and A ccreditation
The consequences of these changes are visible in the research of the Data Security 
Group. Between 1988 and 1990 - the period between the dissolution of the Re­
quirements Boards system and the switch to agency status - the research of the 
Data Security Group continued along the same lines as before. Between 1990 and 
1995, the research of the group came to be dominated by testing activities. Start­
ing in April 1990, the Data Security Group embarked on a two-year programme of 
work under the heading of 'Standards and Conformance Testing in Data Security' 
(Data Security Group 1993). By this point, all of NPL's research was being com­
missioned on a customer-contractor basis. In the case of this research programme, 
the customer was the Information Technology Division (ITD) of the DTI. The 
two-year programme was divided into hve sections:
1. Supporting standards in data security;
2. Research and development in conformance testing methods;
3. Technology transfer;
4. Support for the DTI's CCSC, managed by NPL since April 1990;^
5. Technical support for DTI's ITD (Data Security Group 19916, p .l).
Most of the work carried out under this programme was devoted to research and 
design in conformance testing methods. The group developed a series of tech­
niques under the heading of 'Strict Conformance Testing'. The purpose of Strict 
Conformance Testing was to determine how well a particular piece of technology 
conformed to a particular standard. Strict Conformance Testing was dehned as 
"The testing and analysis of an implementation of an IT security standard to 
ensure that:"
^'CCSC stands for Commercial Computer Security Centre. This body will be described later 
on in this section.
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1. It implements the mandatory requirements of the standard in a correct man­
ner;
2. It implements only those optional requirements of the standard stated as 
being supported in the conformance statement, and they are implemented 
in a correct manner, and;
3. It contains no functionality which would either be prejudicial to the correct 
operation of the implementation, or would cause a possible breach of security 
(Data Security Group 19916, p.l).
The Data Security Group also investigated the use of formal methods for testing 
standards. Formal methods use quasi-mathematical language to logically define 
processes within software for the purpose of clearly speci%dng what it is supposed 
to do. The group used the MAA as a basis for assessing which formal methods 
would be of most use for the testing of security standards. In this case, the Vienna 
Development Method was judged the most useful (Data Security Group 1991a).
Also in April 1990, the Commercial Computer Security Centre (CCSC) was moved 
to NPL. The CCSC was established by the DTI in 1987, and was based at the 
Royal Signals and Radar Establishment at Malvern. The purpose of the CCSC was 
to act as a technical focus for industry on IT security issues and to stimulate the 
development of approaches to IT security evaluation (Data Security Group 19916, 
p.3). Whilst based at Malvern, the CCSC produced the so-called Green Books - 
a seven-volume collection of criteria and codes of practice concerning the security 
evaluation of technologies. When the CGSG moved to the Data Security Group, 
the focus was shifted to harmonising these criteria with those developed separately 
in other countries. This effort contributed to the formation of the Information 
Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) - a set of criteria that were 
used in several European countries, including France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK. The GGSG played a key role in the formation of ITSEC: "Amongst 
other things, the CCSC contributed the 'claims language', a system of structured 
natural language statements used to express the claimed security functionality of a 
product or system unambiguously" (Data Security Group 19916, p.3). The CCSC 
also worked on the Information Technology Security Evaluation Manual (ITSEM). 
ITSEM, which was published in September 1993, specifies the methodology to be 
used when carrying out ITSEC evaluations.
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In May 1991, the UK Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certifica­
tion Scheme was established. Set up jointly by the DTI and CESG, the purpose 
of "the Scheme" was to put in place a mechanism for carrying out evaluations of 
technologies in line with the ITSEC. This led to the creation of a UK Certifica­
tion Body based at GCHQ in Cheltenham. The Certification Body - a group of 
around 20 representatives from CESG and the DTI including a small number of 
Data Security Group employees - managed the running of the Scheme. Actual 
evaluations of technologies were carried out by Commercial Licensed Evaluation 
Facilities (CLEFs), which were in turn accredited by the National Measurement 
Accreditation Service (NAMAS). Those working within the Data Security Group 
were fully trained NAMAS assessors, whose job it was to take part in the ac­
creditation process for laboratories that wished to become CLEFs (Data Security 
Group 19916, p.4). The task of the CCSC was deemed complete in 1993, and was 
closed down. After the establishment of the ITSEC, it was decided that a fur­
ther harmonisation effort should be undertaken to align the European and North 
American criteria. This led to the Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation ('CG' or 'Common Criteria').
When NPL came to be managed by Serco, research practices within the Data 
Security Group were focused on producing cryptology expertise relevant to testing 
and accreditation. However, faced with increased financial pressure, Serco began 
to look for ways to cut overhead costs. Computing research within NPL was 
scaled back, and research groups were reorganized. The Data Security Group 
was formally closed, and cryptology research expertise was transferred to a new 
'Techniques for High Integrity Section'. However, data security and cryptology 
research, along with other many forms of computing research, were gradually 
phased out. As one interviewee explained to me:
Respondent: Serco didn't understand the work we did, and didn't 
see the value of it, and didn't think it should be inside NPL. They 
knew that the DTI were cutting their funding and making it harder, 
so I think they wanted to focus on the core work of NPL.
On this understanding, increased efforts to commercialize the work of NPL can 
be seen as responsible for the shrinking of their cryptology expertise just as the 
political phase of the crypto wars was getting underway.
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4 .4  C onclusion
From the 1970s to the start of the crypto wars in the mid-1990s, the research of 
NPL was increasingly commercialized. This resulted in the replacement of the 
block-grant system of funding with a system based on the customer-contractor 
principle. The increasingly strict adoption of the customer-contractor principle 
shaped the research practices of the Data Security Group. Although the Data 
Security Group initially carried out basic cryptology standards research, such as 
the development of the MAA, as the pressure to commercialize intensified, the 
group increasingly acted as industrial consultants. By the 1990s, it was seen as 
inappropriate for the group to be developing near-market products, and so instead 
focussed on work that filled then gaps left by industry. Under a contract from the 
DTI, the group developed techniques for testing cryptology standards produced by 
others, and provided the expertise required to estabhsh national and international 
testing and accreditation frameworks. By the mid-1990s, the practices of the 
Data Security Group had produced a body of contributory expertise related to the 
testing of cryptology standards and technologies, that operated within a highly 
bureaucratized network of small groups and initiatives. It could even be argued 
that the emphasis on New Public Management served to prohibit the acquisition of 
contributory expertise related to other aspects of cryptology, and that eventually, 
it led to a shrinking of the cryptology expertise produced at NPL.
Chapter 5 
Cryptology Research at Royal 
Holloway
5.1 In trod u ction
Royal Holloway College, University of London, has been an important site for 
cryptology research in the UK from the mid-1980s to the present. This chapter 
will describe how research into cryptology at Royal Holloway emerged ont of the 
reorganization of the University of London in the mid 1980s, but also out of col­
laborations with Racal Electronics pic and other industrial partners. I will begin 
by examining the circumstances that led to the changes to the organization of the 
University of London in the 1960s. I will then describe the parallel emergence of 
Racal and their shift to producing electronic communications devices that utilized 
cryptography. Then, I will describe how Royal Holloway and Racal came to col­
laborate with one another. Finally, I argue that the expertise produced by the 
Information Security Group at Royal Holloway emerged, in part, from practices 
that were designed for mathematical research, and in part from practices that were 
designed for industrial collaboration.
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5.2 H istorica l O verview  o f th e  U n iv ersity  o f Lon­
don
Before describing the cryptology research carried out at Royal Holloway College, it 
is necessary to situate the college within the context of the University of London. 
Royal Holloway has been a constituent college of the University of London since 
1900. The University of London - which was founded in 1836 - operates under 
a federal system. Today, it consists of 18 colleges - of which Royal Holloway is 
one - 10 research institutes, and a number of other centralized bodies. However, 
these brief details mask a complexity and uniqueness that "arises from its size, its 
federal structure, its metropolitan role, and above all, the course of its historical 
development" (Harte 1986, p. 10). The structure of the University of London, and 
the relationships between its various constituent bodies, is complex. As a result, 
the description that follows will provide only a very brief overview of the issues 
relevant to the development of cryptology research at Royal Holloway.
The University of London was originally founded in 1836 to provide a federal 
structure that linked University College London and King's College London - two 
new universities that were established in 1826 and 1829 respectively. More educa­
tional institutions based in London and the surrounding area were subsequently 
incorporated into the University at various points. The relationship between the 
institutions that make up the University and the University's central organization 
has varied throughout its history. As F. M. L. Thompson has explained, although 
for much of the University's early history it did little more than co-ordinate ex­
aminations across the colleges, it still exerted a certain influence:
Since from 1836 to 1900 the University was purely an examining and 
degree-awarding body the main initiatives in mapping out new branches 
of knowledge necessarily happened in the separate teaching colleges. 
Nevertheless, the University controlled the examination system, and 
the examination syllabus was an important instrument for translating 
new knowledge into formal qualifications, and these in turn exerted 
a strong influence on the ways in which the colleges arranged their 
teaching (Thompson 1990, pp.x-xi).
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Unsurprisingly, this relationship has caused disagreements between the colleges 
and the University over what should be researched and taught. Thompson has 
argued that the responses to this tension have gone through three phases:
1. 1836-1900: The University, in the shape of a Covernment-nominated senate, 
prescribed through its examination syllabuses the content of the college's 
degrees;
2. 1900-1966: A single University-wide degree for each subject that was man­
aged by Boards of Studies, themselves made up of teachers from the various 
colleges;
3. 1966-: Centralised University control of degrees has been largely abandoned, 
with teachers within colleges designed their own degrees.
In the above scheme, the most relevant period for this study is the one that began 
in 1966 and continues to the present day. As a result, the periods 1836-1900 and 
1900-1966 will not be discussed further.
The start of the third phase in the above scheme was, in part, a result of the 
broader changes to the UK university system that occurred in the 1960s, following 
the Robbins Report (1963). In 1963, Lord Robbins published his report of the 
Committee on Higher Education. The Robbins Report recommended the imme­
diate expansion of the university system, and more specifically, that "courses of 
higher education should be available for all those who are qualified by ability and 
attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so" (Robbins 1963, p.8). Robbins' 
conclusions were largely accepted and implemented by Harold Wilson's Labour 
government.
The Robbins Report had direct implications for the University of London. Al­
though the report recognized that the University's federal structure could offer 
advantages, it also argued that the system created problems and inconveniences. 
This led to a process of critical examination, and eventually, reform (Harte 1986, 
p.262). In 1970, an inquiry chaired by Lord Murray of Newhaven was launched 
into the organization of the University of London. The Murray Committee's re­
port was in favour of continuing with the federal system, but also asked whether 
it would be advantageous if the colleges were to merge into half-a-dozen larger
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institutions that could then evolve into separate universities (Murray 1972). Al­
though the conclusions of the Murray Report were initially rejected, they set the 
tone for the subsequent debates about the future of the University. Faced with in­
creased hnancial pressures - felt by many other universities in the 1970s and 1980s 
- the decision was eventually taken to merge some of the University's constituent 
colleges.
Though the federal system remains in place, today, the colleges of the University 
of London are so distinct that most are considered to be separate universities in 
their own right. For example, the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), an ofhcial 
government assessment of the quality of research produced by university depart­
ments, separately assesses and ranks each college. Furthermore, those working 
and studying at each college rarely consider themselves to be a part of a single 
'University of London'. As Thompson described:
It is only on grand ceremonial occasions, the graduations days and the 
conferments of honorary degrees, that the University is made visibly 
aware of its own existence; and the number actively participating in 
these rituals cannot be more than a tiny fraction of the whole body 
of teachers and students. For most of them their world of learning is 
bounded by their individual College or Institute, and the University 
remains a remote, unknown, nebulous and vaguely threatening entity, 
little more than the source of red tape, mountains of largely incom­
prehensible paper, and unpleasant financial decrees (Thompson 1990, 
p.ix).
As such, it makes little sense to study the practices that influenced cryptology 
research at the university level, given the absence of practices that are shared 
across colleges. Instead, the focus will be placed on individual colleges, and the 
departments within them, as they were more intimately involved in shaping the 
research.
5.3 H istorica l O verview  o f R acal
In order to understand the nature of cryptology research practices at Royal Hol­
loway, their relationship with the UK electronics company Racal must also be
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examined. This subsection will provide a brief historical introduction to Racal, 
paying particular attention to their work on data communications and communi­
cations security. Racal Electronics Ltd was established by Raymond Brown and 
George Calder Cunningham in 1950. The name 'Racak came from the 'Ra' and 
'Cak in each of the founders' names. Brown and Cunningham - who had both 
previously worked for the British electronics hrm Plessey - initially created Racal 
with the aim of manufacturing and selling high-frequency communications equip­
ment. In 1966, Raymond Brown left Racal to become Head of Defence Sales at 
the Ministry of Defence, and Ernest Harrison - who had joined the company as an 
accountant - was appointed as chairman (Wilson 1980). Harrison became synony­
mous with Racal, and remained as chairman until the company was sold to French 
electronics and defence contractor Thompson-CSF (which changed its name to the 
Thales Group shortly afterwards) in 2000. Under Harrison, Racal became some­
thing of a success story. At one point it was the third largest electronics hrm in the 
UK. At its peak, it operated in 110 countries, and employed over 30,000 people.
For much of its history, Racal operated under a franchise model. By 1990, the 
Racal Group was made up of around 150 autonomous companies - such as Racal- 
Engineering and Racal-Telecom - that each specialised in designing and building 
certain types of product. However, the vast majority of these companies did not 
carry out their own cryptology research, and as a result, will not be discussed 
further. Though not a name that many are now familiar with, Racal is perhaps 
best remembered for spawning the Vodafone telecommunications company, which 
at the time of writing, is the second largest mobile telecommunications company in 
the world. Despite Racaks size and signihcance in the second half of the twentieth 
century, there does not presently exist an historical description of its activities.
5.3.1 Early Years
Racal started out by manufacturing military radio equipment. In the immedi­
ate years following its creation, the company struggled to win orders, and would 
manufacture almost anything in order to remain operational (Jansen 1990). Racal 
achieved a breakthrough in the mid-1950s when it received a contract from the 
Royal Navy to build a variant of the American Collins Model 51-J Radio Receiver. 
The result was the Racal RA17 - a highly successful piece of technology that
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set Racal on the path to becoming a major supplier of military communications 
equipment.
By the late 1960s, Racal had begun to enter the data communications industry. 
In 1969, Racal formed a partnership with the Milgo Electronic Corporation - an 
American hrm that had recently developed a series of high-speed modems. This 
partnership created a new company - Racal-Milgo - and helped Racal establish 
itself in the US. At this time, data communications was a burgeoning held, and 
as a result, it was the fastest growing area for Racal throughout the 1970s (Wil­
son 1980). In 1973, Racal established an Advanced Development Division. The 
purpose of the division - which was initially led by Keith Thrower - was to investi­
gate and probe new areas of research in order to aid product development within 
other divisions. The Advanced Development Division was in communication with 
almost all of the companies within the Racal Croup, but much of its early work 
was in the held of communications security (Racal 1975).
5.3.2 D evelopm ent o f C om m unications Security P roducts
It was through the research of the Advanced Development Division that research 
into communications security at Racal began. Early research was deemed success­
ful, and Racal-Datacom was formed in April 1974 to continue it (Racal 1975). As 
the Raca/ Rezzzew - the internal journal for the Racal Croup - explained:
Racal-Datacom set up its activity in temporary premises in Salisbury 
with a small nucleus of Racal personnel transferred from various com­
panies with the group . . .  In November 1974 new premises, including 
laboratory, production area and ohices were completed and quickly in 
operation. First deliveries of production units were made in December 
1974 and a new product has been introduced every two months from 
that date (Racal 1975).
The products that Racal-Datacom produced were originally marketed under the 
Racal-Mobical brand, as it had been in use since 1966. By 1975, products were 
being released under the Racal-Datacom name instead. By 1977, Racal-Datacom - 
which would later change its name to Racal-Comsec (referring to the communica­
tions security features that they provided) - had developed a number of products.
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These products were designed to offer either secure speech communication, or, 
secure text communication. The products were typically aimed at militaries and 
police forces, rather than civilians. The product range included the MA 4014B 
- a device that used a technique known as time division scrambling. The MA 
4014B processed speech into discrete time segments that were then rapidly shuf­
fled in a pseudo-random manner at over 140 times a minute. Over 600,000 code 
keys were selectable, each of which would be programmed by up to 64,000 codes 
by means of front panel switches (Racal 1977). Racal also sold devices that of­
fered secure text communication. The MA 4210 was a small device, slightly larger 
than a pocket calculator, that could convert plaintext messages into cryptograms, 
and vice versa, using a keyboard and a dot matrix display. It used two inter­
connected pseudo-random binary generators to produce a complex non-linear key 
stream of 170,000,000,000 characters (Racal 1977). Importantly, although Racal 
typically claimed as part of their promotional material that these early products 
were able to withstand "sophisticated computer-backed cryptanalysis", the secu­
rity that they offered did not have any strong mathematical underpinnings. They 
realised that this would have to change if they were to continue to make similar 
claims and develop their products further.
5.3.3 E nlisting C ryptology E xpertise
In 1978, Racal-Comsec decided to take a more mathematical approach to designing 
their communications security products. However, they decided that they did 
not at that time possess the required mathematical expertise. They decided to 
address this deficiency by drawing on the expertise held within the University of 
London. Racal-Comsec's search for cryptology expertise occurred at a time when 
it was starting to become available outside of military and intelligence gathering 
organizations. As has already been described in chapter 1, in the US Whitfield 
Difhe and Martin Heilman (1976) had already published their paper outlining 
the principles of public-key cryptography. This was followed by Rivest, Shamir 
and Adleman's (1978) paper that outlined how public-key cryptography could be 
achieved in practice. In the UK, research into cryptography at NPL had just 
formally begun with the establishment of Donald Davies' Data Security Group. 
Furthermore, a small number of individuals - such as John Gordon at Hatfield 
Polytechnic, and R. F. Ghurchhouse at Cardiff University - had also begun to 
carry out some early cryptology research. Racal-Comsec, however, decided to
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approach Fred Piper - a mathematician based at Westheld College, University of 
London.
As Fred Piper is an important hgure in the history of UK cryptology research, 
it is worth pausing to consider his career. Fred Piper received an undergraduate 
degree in mathematics Rom Imperial College London in 1962. This was followed 
by a PhD in mathematics from the same college in 1964. Piper then worked briefly 
as a lecturer at Royal Holloway College before transferring to Westfield College in 
1969. There, he was promoted to Reader in 1971, and Professor in 1975. Piper is 
now informally considered the 'father' of the UK's cryptology research community. 
This is perhaps reflected in the fact that, together with Royal Holloway colleague 
Sean Murphy, Piper wrote the cryptography edition of the popular A R/zazf 
7zz/radzzc/zazz series (Piper & Murphy 2002).
When Racal-Comsec approached Piper, he had not yet carried out any cryptology 
research. Piper had specialized in combinatorics - a branch of mathematics that 
deals with finite structures such as graphs and sets. Though Piper had not carried 
out research into cryptology when approached by Racal-Comsec, he was well placed 
to understand the mathematics associated with the techniques that they were 
hoping to use. When Racal-Comsec approached Piper, their devices were based 
on the use of stream ciphers - an example of symmetric cryptography where each 
plaintext digit is encrypted based on a digit within a random stream of numbers. 
Racal-Comsec were using physical testing to test the efficacy of their random 
number generators, which was ultimately unsuited to the task. Placing the random 
number generators on a mathematical basis offered a cleaner way of understanding 
the strength of the security that their products were able to provide.
Racal-Comsec wanted to employ their own mathematician. Piper suggested Henry 
Beker - an ex-PhD student of his who was then working in the Mathematics De­
partment at Swansea University. Beker was appointed by Racal-Comsec to be 
their first Head of Mathematics. The four individuals that held this post aRer 
Beker also completed PhDs that were supervised by Piper, such was the strength 
of the relationship between him and Racal-Comsec. Beker and Piper worked to­
gether on cryptology for the next few years. The results of some this work were 
described in Czp/zer R s^/ezzzs (Beker & Piper 1982) and Reczzz^ e R^eec/z Cazzzzzzzz- 
zzzca/zazzs (Beker & Piper 1985). As is acknowledged in the books' prefaces, the 
research that they described was driven by Racal-Comsec's need for mathematics 
to underpin the cryptography used in their products.
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5.4 H istorica l O verview  o f R oyal H ollow ay
After being introduced to cryptology through Racal-Comsec, Piper would go on 
to be instrumental in establishing a programme of cryptology research at Royal 
Holloway. In order to understand how this came about, attention must be briefly 
re-focussed on the University of London. The University of London underwent 
a period of major re-organization during the 1980s. This re-organization process 
played a major role in the establishment of cryptology expertise at Royal Holloway. 
This section describes how this came about.
Royal Holloway College was established in 1879 by Thomas Holloway. Holloway 
was a Victorian entrepreneur who had amassed a fortune from selling patented 
medicine. After considering the best way to spend his wealth, Holloway decided 
to establish a women-only college. The result was Royal Holloway College, based 
in Egham, Surrey. Royal Holloway became a constituent college of the Univer­
sity of London in 1900. The college remained women-only until 1945, when male 
postgraduate students were accepted. Following the Robbins Report, male un­
dergraduate students were accepted in order to meet the demands of expansion. 
This was the most significant change in a series of developments designed to move 
the College away from the Victorian traditions that had previously sustained it 
(Bingham 1987).
As with many other small universities and colleges, though Royal Holloway made 
progress towards expansion in the ten years that followed the Robins Report, the 
inflation of the early 1970s left the college in dire financial straits. This made 
further expansion difficult. It prompted the college to consider ways to generate 
more money. For the departments within the Faculty of Science, this resulted 
in attempts to form working relationships with industry. In 1978, the Dean of 
Science recommended:
1. That academic departments should be actively encouraged to organise train­
ing courses and to seek liaison with industry where appropriate;
2. That commercially viable rates should be charged for any training courses 
or services provided by departments;
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3. That the larger part of any surplus (i.e. after covering overheads) accruing 
from such commercial ventures (say 80%) should be credited to the Depart­
ments concerned, to provide an independent revenue to assist their teaching 
and research budgets. The remainder should be credited to the college tu­
ition account (Royal Holloway 1978).
By the late 1970s - following the recommendations of the Murray Report - it was 
becoming clear that the Royal Holloway would have to seriously consider merging 
with another college of the University of London. If mergers were to take place, it 
was clear that Royal Holloway wanted to use them as an opportunity to increase 
the amount of scientific research based at their current site. It was clear from 
the documents contained in their archives tha t it was believed that increasing the 
amount of scientific research performed by the college would improve its financial 
situation. In 1981, with college mergers looking increasingly likely, the Principal 
of Royal Holloway - Lionel Butler - wrote to the Vice-Chancellor of the University 
of London - Randolph Quirk - to make the case for a 'science consortium' based 
at Royal Holloway, which would absorb the scientific research currently being 
undertaken at Bedford College and Westheld College (Butler 1981). The following 
year, it was agreed that Bedford College would merge with Royal Holloway College 
to become Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, and would be based at the 
existing Royal Holloway site in Surrey. This merger took place at the same time 
as a number of other mergers within the University. The most signihcant of these 
came when Westheld College merged with Queen Mary College, to be based at 
the existing Queen Mary site in East London.
The college mergers of the 1980s also had direct consequences for teaching and 
research. In order to maximize the resources at the University's disposal, it was 
decided that certain colleges should focus on particular helds. Rather than it being 
spread across all colleges, attempts were made to shift scientihc research to hve 
colleges: University College; Imperial College (which formally separated from the 
University of London in 2007); King's College; Queen Mary; and Royal Holloway 
(Harte 1986, p.284).
Although the science consortium described by Butler did not materialize exactly 
as he had envisioned, some scientihc work was transferred there. Academics based 
at other colleges of the University were asked to transfer to Royal Holloway - 
particularly those working on scientihc and mathematical research. Despite the
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merger, the financial situation faced by the college in the 1980s was still described 
by the Principal as being "extremely serious" (Royal Holloway 1986a). In the mid 
to late 1980s, the college, particularly within the Faculty of Science, continued 
to search for new ways to obtain grants from industry (Royal Holloway 1986 c). 
Additionally, the college also planned to recruit more overseas students, expand 
the academic profile to include more vocational subjects, provide short courses 
and consultancy to industry, and to embark on a zero-based budgeting exercise. 
It was in this context that the cryptology research at Royal Holloway began.
5.5 T he In form ation  S ecu rity  G roup
Fred Piper was asked by the University of London to move back to Royal Holloway 
College from Westfield College in order to lead research into discrete mathematics 
and combinatorics. He ofhcially transferred in August 1984. At the same time, 
Donald Davies - who had previously established a cryptology research program at 
NPL - joined Royal Holloway's department of Computer Science and Statistics as 
a visiting professor (Royal Holloway 1984). Upon arriving at Royal Holloway, the 
head of the mathematics department there - M. R. C. McDowell - asked Piper to 
focus on building expertise in cryptology. McDowell had read Beker and Piper's 
first book on cipher systems, and saw cryptology as an expanding held, and a 
potentially useful niche for Royal Holloway to occupy.
5.5.1 Form ation
The hrst steps towards an Information Security Group at Royal Holloway began 
in November 1986, when a proposal for an academic initiative in 'D ata Security' 
was submitted to the Academic Board (Royal Holloway 19866). The documents 
that accompanied the proposal are worth examining in detail, as they offer a good 
indication of how the initiative was pitched to the university. They stated that:
The security of stored and transmitted data, and the prevention of 
unauthorized access to software and other facilities, is the subject of 
massive international endeavour. The held is rich in technological and
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mathematical challenge, and is growing rapidly as an academic spe­
cialism, strongly linked with industrial advancement in information 
technology (Royal Holloway 198G6).
It was believed that a gap in the market had been identified related to data 
security:
British industry has a growing need for recruitment of graduates in 
data communications and computer systems, with specialist skills in 
data security. Despite the fact that all the major financial institutions 
and a number of large corporations now have a senior person responsi­
ble for data and computer security, the British Universities do not yet 
include an adequate centre of excellence satisfying the requirement for 
data security specialists (Royal Holloway 19866).
Cryptology research was to be central to work done under the heading of data 
security. Specific objectives of research would be to develop and implement:
1. New, improved key management schemes;
2. Encryption algorithms;
3. Message authentication codes;
4. Public key systems (Royal Holloway 19866).
The importance of collaborating with industry for the the purposes of wealth 
generation were also emphasised:
The proposed academic initiative would lead to practical implementa­
tions. It is expected that the results would be industrially valuable as 
well as being academically excellent. It is important that this could be 
a wealth-generating area of university/industry collaboration (Royal 
Holloway 19866).
It was also stressed that Royal Holloway was "already collaborating with industry, 
specifically Racal, Hewlett-Packard, ICL and Ferranti, in data security" (Royal 
Holloway 19866). Specific details were also given of proposed project with Racal:
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Racal approached [Royal Holloway and Bedford New College] with a 
request to  use the college's computing facilities as a testbed/showpiece 
for their network security protocols and equipments. If, as seems likely, 
this goes ahead, this would constitute further recognition of existing 
expertise in data security at RHBNC. This collaborative venture would 
be strongly consistent with an academic initiative proposal to develop 
a centre of excellence in data security (Royal Holloway 19866).
The academic initiative proposal was approved, and around T40,000 was allocated 
annually to cover the cost of equipment, and the appointment of a Reader and a 
Research Associate. This can perhaps be considered the start of the Information 
Security Group at Royal Holloway. However, it should be noted that the group 
had a very informal structure through until the early-1990s.
5.5.2 Early C ryptology R esearch and Industrial C ollabo­
ration
Industrial partnerships were central to the early research of the group. When 
asked to summarize the work of the Information Security Group, one interviewee 
stated that:
R esp o n d en t: [Industrial collaboration was] absolutely crucial. Couldn't 
be over emphasised enough. Basically, everything I did in cryptography 
and information security was centred around industry collaboration.
Elaborating further:
R esp o n d en t: I set up a consultancy company because if we were 
really going to understand information security and even cryptogra­
phy, we had to understand how it was used and why. The last thing 
industry wanted was academics telling industry what they thought in­
dustry should be doing. So, everything was focused around industrial 
collaboration. That's how I got into cryptography in the hrst place 
. . .  We started by writing to all of the local people saying 'Took, we 
do combinatorial mathematics, if there anything that we can do that's
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useful for you?". That's how cryptography and coding theory came 
and jumped up and became something that industry wanted.
The early research of the group was three-fold. It revolved around: block de­
sign; theoretical coding; and cryptology. Much of this work was funded by the 
Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) (known since 1994 as the En­
gineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)). From 1988 onwards, 
the group undertook a series of SERC-funded cryptology projects, on topics such 
as 'Encryption Algorithms' (CR/E64640/01), 'Stream Ciphers' (CR/H23719/01) 
and 'Digital Signatures and Hash Functions' (CR/K51259/01) (Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council 2013). Some SERC-funded projects were 
undertaken in collaboration with industry, such as UK DTI/EPSRC research 
project entitled 'Security Studies for Third Generation Telecommunications Sys­
tems' (CR/J17173/01). This T160,000 project was carried out in conjunction with 
Vodafone (which had recently emerged from the Racal group) and CEC Plessey 
Telecommunications (CPT).
Of the early work on cryptology, one of the most notable developments was Sean 
Murphy's work on differential cryptanalysis. Murphy - who'd joined Royal Hol­
loway in 1988 shortly after completing a PhD in mathematics at the University of 
Bath - carried out postdoctoral research on the analysis of block ciphers. This led 
to work on differential cryptanalysis. As was explained to me in an interview:
Respondent: Differential cryptanalysis is based on encrypting a pair 
of plaintexts with a specified difference, so is classified as a chosen- 
plaintext attack. In some circumstances, analysis of the corresponding 
pair of ciphertexts can give some small information about the key.
The technique of differential cryptanalysis is essentially concerned with 
analyzing many such pairs of ciphertexts to determine the key. When 
I started working at Royal Holloway as a postdoctoral researcher, I 
started by looking at FEAL, a block cipher published by the Japanese 
company NTT. This led to the development of the ideas of differential 
cryptanalysis and the 1990 paper analyzing FEAL, though others were 
working with similar ideas at this time.
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Though now a familiar concept, Murphy's analysis of the FEAL block cipher came 
to be recognised as one of the founding contributions to the practice of differential 
cryptanalysis in the open literature (Coppersmith 1994).
In 1990, Chris Mitchell - another former PhD student of Piper's and former Head 
of Mathematics at Racal-Comsec - joined the Information Security Croup after 
leaving a post at Hewlett-Packard. The Information Security Croup have subse­
quently claimed that this move was significant because it led to the formation of 
an annual Hewlett-Packard-funded colloquium on information security. As well as 
cementing the relationship between Hewlett-Packard and the Information Security 
Croup, it marked a change in the nature of the work of the group from mathemat­
ical cryptology to more general computer and information security (Information 
Security Croup 2008).
5.5.3 Teaching
In 1991, the Information Security Croup submitted a proposal for the introduction 
of an MSc course in Information Security (Royal Holloway 1991). The course 
would cover cryptology, but also computer security, network security, and security 
management. In 1987, a number of companies had approached the Information 
Security Croup about establishing an MSc in cryptology. However, the group 
decided that this would be too narrow, so instead they delayed the introduction 
of a new course in order to recruit those required to oTer a course that covered 
a wider range of fields. The MSc in Information Security that resulted was a 
vocational course that aimed to produce information security professionals capable 
of managing the security requirements of large organizations. In its first year in 
1992, the MSc had a total of ten students. At the height of the dotcom era in 
2000, student numbers peaked at around 250. Though the early collaborations 
with industry had prompted the group to build mathematical expertise, industry 
collaboration now increasingly meant training students to be able to go out and 
provide the information security expertise that many other non-technical industries 
required.
Though the demand for cryptography expertise had grown, the Information Se­
curity Croup still collaborated with companies within the specialist cryptology 
industry. Following the launch of the MSc programme, one of the group's main 
partners was Zergo. Zergo was founded by Henry Beker - Racal-Comsec's first
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Head of Mathematics - and became a leading provider of cryptology solutions 
during the 1990s. In order to be able to adequately train their staff, Zergo relied 
on the expertise of the Information Security Croup:
[Zergo] introduced a structured Information Security training programme 
on which members of the ISC lectured. This led in 1994 to the Intro­
duction of the Postgraduate Diploma in Information Security, based 
on courses offered by Zergo and an MSc level dissertation supervised 
by Royal Holloway academics (Information Security Croup 2008).
The training tha t the Information Security Croup provided also led to them being 
awarded a Queen's Anniversary Prize for Higher and Further Education in 1998. 
The group were commended because they had:
. . .  pioneered high-level education in information security and advises 
both government and industry in one of the most sensitive developing 
areas of business. The group plays a vital role in training those who 
work in the held of information security, across industry and commerce 
as well as in vital security elements of the nation. The courses were 
the hrst of their kind in the world and are now seen by many as the 
benchmark qualihcation (Royal Anniversary Trust 2013).
Today, the MSc in Information Security is still in operation, and continues to train 
information security professionals for work in industry. It is recognised as one of 
the leading postgraduate courses in the held.
5.6 C onclusion
The Information Security Croup at Royal Holloway emerged from a combination 
of the reorganization of the University of London, and a series of industrial part­
nerships. Following the Robbins Report, constituent colleges of the University of 
London merged in order to meet the demands for expansion in an unfavourable 
economic climate. Royal Holloway successfully aimed to fashion itself as a home 
for scientihc research, and was able to capitalize on a niche in the shape of cryptol­
ogy. In line with what the college expected from departments within the Faculty
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of Science, the Information Security Croup capitalized on industrial partnerships 
with companies like Racal. This shaped the research of the group, and led it 
towards research that would complement the requirements of industry.
The early research of the Information Security Croup was abstract and mathe­
matical, because at that time, industry required the mathematical underpinnings 
for the technologies it was producing. By the early 1990s, through taking steps to­
wards offering postgraduate teaching, the work of the group had expanded beyond 
cryptology into the broader realm of information security. This brought the group 
even closer to the needs of a wider range of industries, as they required solutions 
to specific problems and trained personnel to provide them. Although it would be 
misleading to argue that the group exclusively engaged in work that followed the 
contours of the requirements industrial cryptology, the group certainly enacted a 
body of contributory expertise of this nature - one that, as will become clear in 
the next chapter, was not necessarily mirrored in other academic contexts.
Chapter 6 
Cryptology Research at the  
University of Cambridge
6.1 In trod u ction
In this chapter I will consider the cryptology research of the Security Group within 
the Computing Laboratory at the University of Cambridge. I will begin by briefly 
describing the work related to computing that was undertaken before the labora­
tory was founded in the mid-1930s. I will then describe how, following the Second 
World War, research practices at the laboratory were shaped by the headships of 
Maurice Wilkes and Roger Needham. Under Wilkes, the laboratory was primarily 
concerned with large-scale, long-term projects, that typically resulted in the con­
struction of large computing systems. This continued under Needham, but thanks 
to increases in funding, the laboratory was able to expand in terms of the number 
of staff it employed, the space it occupied, and the number of research themes 
it pursued. Security became a key research theme for the laboratory during the 
1980s. This led to the formation of an informal Security Croup tha t became par­
ticularly concerned with cryptology in the early 1990s. I argue that the focus on 
systems, and in particular the adoption of interdisciplinary methods, allowed the 
Security Croup to develop expertise on how such systems behaved when put to 
use in the real world.
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6.2 H istorica l O verview  o f th e  C am bridge C om ­
puter L aboratory
The University of Cambridge was founded in 1209. It is the third oldest university 
in the world. Today, it is generally regarded as one of the world's best and most 
prestigious universities. Furthermore, with an endowment of nearly five billion 
pounds, it is also one of the wealthiest. Similar to the University of London, 
the University of Cambridge has a federal structure. It is today comprised of 31 
autonomous colleges, and just over 100 departments. One such department is the 
famous Cambridge Computer Laboratory.
6.2.1 The R oots o f C om puting Research
The Cambridge Computer Laboratory was established in the 1930s. Before the lab­
oratory was established, individuals associated with the University of Cambridge 
made some of the most important early advances in the history of computing. 
Computing at the University of Cambridge can perhaps be thought of as start­
ing with Charles Babbage (1791-1871). Babbage studied mathematics at Trinity 
College, Cambridge (and later Peterhouse College, Cambridge) as an undergrad­
uate from 1810 to 1814, before nominally returning to Cambridge as the Lucasian 
Professor of Mathematics from 1828 to 1839 (Hyman 1982). Babbage is now best 
remembered for his proposals for the construction of two early 'computers' - the 
Difference Engine and the Analytical Engine - as well as for his work on economics 
and manufacturing (Schaffer 1994). Babbage also performed some notable work 
on cryptology. According to one biographer, Babbage was "the outstanding cryp- 
tologist of his age", and was "wholly without rival" (Hyman 1982, p.227). David 
Kahn has described how, though he never published his work on cryptology, Bab­
bage was the hrst to employ mathematical formulas and notations, and was able 
to solve both polyalphabetic ciphers and to manage autokeys (Kahn 1997, p.204). 
Babbage became interested in ciphers as a schoolboy, and maintained this interest 
throughout his life. Though he remarked in his autobiography that "diciphering is 
one of the most fascinating of arts, I fear I have wasted upon it more time than it 
deserves", Ole Immanuel Franksen (1993) has argued that Babbage had intended 
to write a book entitled The Philosophy of Deciphering in 1853. But, like many 
of Babbage's projects, this book was never completed.
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's work was eventually followed around one hundred years later by the the­
oretical contributions of Alan Turing (1912-1954). Turing studied mathematics at 
King's College, Cambridge between 1931 and 1934, before being elected as a fellow 
of the same college in 1935. In 1936, whilst still at Cambridge, Turing introduced 
the concept of 'universal machines' in his now famous paper 'On Computable 
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem'. This would later 
become the abstract model on which modern computers are based. Turing also 
carried out important work related to cryptology. He famously worked on break­
ing Cerman ciphers at the Covernment Code and Cypher School (CC&CS) at 
Bletchley Park during the Second World War. During his time at Bletchley Park, 
Turing also designed an electromagnetic machine known as the Turing-Welchman 
bombe - designed to assist with the deciphering of messages encrypted using the 
Cerman Enigma machine (Hodges 1983).
Though the work of Charles Babbage is sometimes considered to be the hrst com­
puting work to be carried out at the University of Cambridge, there does not 
appear to be a link between Babbage and what would eventually become the 
Cambridge Computer Laboratory. Similarly, though he did come into contact 
with those involved, Turing was not formally connected to the work that would 
ultimately lead to the creation of the laboratory. Furthermore, there exists no 
evidence to suggest tha t Turing undertook any serious cryptology work whilst 
at Cambridge. As a result, though any examination of Cambridge computing 
would, in a sense, be incomplete without consideration of the work of Babbage 
and Turing, it would be difhcult to argue that their work exerted any noticeable 
inhuence on the working practices associated with the laboratory or its later work 
on cryptology.
6.2.2 Form ation
The Cambridge Mathematical Laboratory was ofhcially created in 1937. Accord­
ing to Mary Croarken (1992), the 1930s had seen an increase in the amount of 
computations required for theoretical and applied scientific research. In order 
to meet this demand, a model differential analyser - based on a similar device 
constructed at the University of Manchester - was built at Cambridge. The dif­
ferential analyser came to the attention of Maurice Wilkes - then a researcher 
with the Cavendish Laboratory Radio Group. Wilkes made use of the machine
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for his own computations, and eventually became responsible for the machine's 
maintenance and for providing guidance to other researchers. The enthusiasm 
for the differential analyser led to formal approval for the creation of a separate 
mathematical laboratory. A 1936 General Board Report on the Establishment of 
a Computer Laboratory stated that the intention, firstly, was "to provide a com­
puting service for general use", and secondly, "to be a centre for the development 
of computational techniques in the University" (Sparck Jones 1999). The work of 
the new Mathematical Laboratory would be guided by these two aims up until the 
late 1960s.
The hrst director of the laboratory was John Lennard-Jones, who was then also 
the Plummer Professor of Theoretical Chemistry. Shortly after the laboratory was 
established, the Second World War broke out, and its activities were temporarily 
suspended. Following the end of the war in 1945, Maurice Wilkes took over as 
director of the laboratory. He would hold this position until his retirement in 
1980. Wilkes was born in Dudley, Staffordshire, in 1913. He read the Mathemat­
ical Tripos at St John's College, Cambridge from 1931-1934, before completing a 
PhD in the propagation of radio waves at the Cavendish Laboratory. During the 
Second World War, Wilkes served as a radio operator and contributed towards 
the development of radar. After the war, Wilkes devoted most of his attention to 
computing research. As head of the Computer Laboratory, he oversaw a number 
of pioneering computing projects, most notably, the construction of one of the hrst 
stored program computers - the Electronic Delay Storage Automatic Calculator 
(EDSAC). Wilkes was elected as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1956, and was a 
founder member and hrst president of the British Computer Society. He was the 
second recipient of the Turing Award in 1967, and was knighted in 2000. He died 
in 2010 aged 97.
In his autobiography, Wilkes (1985) outlined his approach to university research 
projects. He believed that projects should be pursued either for the purpose of 
training graduate students, or to satisfy the intellectual interests of a faculty mem­
ber. Above all, Wilkes believed that university projects should fall into the main­
stream of computer science, and thus contribute towards the held as a whole. In 
practice, this meant that projects should typically be long-term - requiring around 
ten years to reach maturity - at which point, the impetus could be passed to indus­
try. Wilkes claimed that the decision to commit to a particular project involves 
an assessment of what the future will be like, and in particular, "the technological.
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economic, and sociological forces that will mould it" (Wilkes 1985, p.222-223). For 
Wilkes, computers were technologies that had to be useful, and they had to be able 
to function in the real world. Wilkes and his approach dominated the laboratory 
during his headship, as can be seen in the projects that were undertaken during 
this period (Ahmed 2013). As will become clear, the practices that the members 
of laboratory used under Wilkes allowed them to develop considerable expertise 
in how to build, maintain and operate usable computer systems.
6.2.3 Early C om puter D evelopm ent
The hrst major project that the laboratory undertook following the end of the 
Second World War was the construction of the EDSAC. In line with the aims 
laid out in the aforementioned 1936 report, Wilkes decided that the immediate 
objective for the laboratory after the war was to establish a usable and reliable 
computing service in a short timescale. As historians of computing have noted, the 
objective "was not to build the best possible machine" (Lavington 1980, pp.31-32). 
In contrast to the approaches used in most of the other early computer projects, 
Wilkes "decided that he was interested in having a computer, rather than in 
trying to advance computer engineering technology" (Campbell-Kelly & Aspray 
2004, p.90). After learning about the EDVAC project first-hand during a trip 
to America, Wilkes and his small team began construction of a similar machine. 
Though there were short-lived attempts at collaboration with the new computing 
division at NFL, differing views on how to approach the task meant tha t the two 
laboratories would go it alone. EDSAC ran its first program in 1949 and provided 
a usable computing service until 1958. As such, the EDSAC can be thought of 
as the first stored-program computer. Consequently, Wilkes' team was amongst 
the first to experience some of the now-familiar issues associated with computer 
programming (Campbell-Kelly 1992). As he explained in his memoirs:
By June 1949 people had begun to realize that it was not so easy to get 
a program right as had at one time appeared. I well remember when 
this realization came on me with full force. The EDSAC was on the 
top floor of the building and the tape-punching and editing equipment 
one floor below on a gallery that ran round the room in which the 
differential analyser was installed. I was trying to get working my first 
non-trivial program, which was one for the numerical integration of
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Airy's diEerential equation. It was on one of my journeys between 
the EDSAC room and the punching equipment that 'hesitating at the 
angles of stairs' the realization came over me with full force that a 
good part of the remainder of my life was going to be spent in finding 
errors in my own programs (Wilkes 1985, p. 145).
Once the EDSAC was functioning, a number of researchers from a variety of 
scientific disciplines used it to perform calculations. As Joyce Wheeler has noted, 
"the EDSAC was always regarded as a tool for the solution of problems, rather 
than just an engineering achievement" (Wheeler 1992, p.27). One of the first uses 
of EDSAC was to find large prime numbers, but it was also used as a tool by various 
university departments in fields such as astronomy, genetics, crystallography and 
economics.
W ith the EDSAC operational, the 1950s saw much discussion within the laboratory 
about future research. The stored-program concept on which EDSAC was based 
was thought of as successful, so it was eventually decided that a more powerful 
version of EDSAC was the next logical step. The successor to EDSAC - EDSAC 
2 - became operational in 1958, and remained in use until 1965 (Wilkes 1992). 
EDSAC 2 was followed by a machine named Titan. Titan was the name of a time­
sharing computer built in collaboration with the British computer manufacturer 
Ferranti. The advent of the time-sharing model is significant because it marks 
the point at which concerns about what we now think of as 'computer security' 
become relevant. Prior to time-sharing, computers did not maintain persistent files 
linked to a particular user, so in a sense, there was nothing to protect. However, 
under the time-sharing model, there was a need to prevent users hrom being able 
to access hies that belonged to others. Those working at the laboratory became 
aware of this issue whilst using Titan. As such, it is notable in the context of 
computer security as the hrst computer to incorporate a one-way mathematical 
function to protect password hies (Needham 1992).
6.3 C om pu ter S ecu rity  and C ryp to logy  R esearch
Towards the end of the 1960s, the laboratory began to change direction. With 
the rise of companies like IBM, it no longer seemed feasible for the main focus to 
be the development of new computers. The aims expressed in the 1936 General
Chapter 6. ResearcA af ^Ae [/n%'uers2^  ^ 0/  Cam^ncf^e 146
Board report - concerned as they were with building new computers to provide a 
computing service to the rest of the University - were now out of date. As a result, 
Wilkes submitted a report to the General Board in 1969 that argued that the focus 
of the laboratory should shift from the construction of new computers, and that the 
user service should be separated from the laboratory in the form of a University 
Computer Service. The General Board approved these recommendations, and 
the laboratory set about research into other aspects of computing (Ahmed 2013, 
pp.80-83).
In common with many other computer laboratories at this time - in particular 
NPL - the Cambridge Computer Laboratory developed an interest in data com­
munications. In 1974, Wilkes had the opportunity to view a digital communication 
ring built by the Swiss firm Easier AC. This inspired the construction of the Cam­
bridge Ring - an early electronic communications network that shared computer 
peripherals. The expertise gained during the development of the Cambridge Ring, 
together the expertise in security gained during the development of Titan, would 
create a platform on which to build expertise on networks and data security.
Research into computer security at the laboratory began in the late 1970s, gath­
ered pace during the 1980s, and by the 1990s, was one of the main avenues of 
research (Sparck Jones 1999). Cryptology was a key part of the laboratory's com­
puter security research. Research into computer security and cryptology at the 
laboratory began with the work of Roger Needham. Needham was appointed head 
of the laboratory when Wilkes retired in 1980. Needham completed an undergrad­
uate degree in Mathematics and Philosophy at Cambridge in 1956, and a PhD on 
information retrieval and automatic classification in 1961 (Rashid 2004). He was 
elected as a fellow the Royal Society in 1985. Needham decided to leave academia 
in 1995, before being involved in the establishment of the UK's Microsoft Research 
Laboratory. He remained at Microsoft until his death from cancer in 2003. Need­
ham was a classic systems computer scientist. He played a key role in many of 
the aforementioned Cambridge projects, including Titan, the CAP (standing for 
'capability-based') computer, and the Cambridge Ring. Alongside his research, 
Needham also maintained a public service career. Needham was a member of 
a number of government committees, including the Science Research Council's 
Computer Science Committee, the University Grants Committee, and the Alvey 
Committee. Needham was also a member of the Wass Committee - a group charged 
with the reform of the structure of the University of Cambridge in the 1980s. The
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Committee proposed the creation of the new position of Pro-Vice-Chancellor to 
assist the Vice-Chancellor. Needham was chosen as the hrst to occupy this post. 
Throughout his career Needham maintained ties with industry. He consulted for 
hrms such as Xerox and Hitatchi. Whereas Wilkes preferred to carry out projects 
that existed entirely within the laboratory itself, Needham looked to outside in- 
huences.^ Needham always upheld a positive view of the computer industry. In 
one interview he claimed tha t "if there wasn't an industry concerned with making 
and using computers the subject wouldn't exist. It's not like physics - physics was 
made by God, but computer science was made by man. It's there because the 
industry's there" (Rashid 2004, p.6).
During the hrst decade of Needham's headship, he presided over an expanding 
laboratory. It expanded in terms of the number of staff it employed, the space it 
occupied, and the number of research themes it pursued. Much of this was down 
to generous hnancial support. Needham took over as head of the laboratory at a 
time when certain aspects of computing research were well funded. In particular, 
the Alvey Programme - a UK government sponsored research programme that 
ran from 1983 to 1987 - provided hnancial support for a number of high-prohle 
computing research projects (Ahmed 2013, pp. 104-105). One of the hrst projects 
that the laboratory undertook under Needham's headship was the development of 
UNIVERSE (UNIV-Expanded Ring and Satellite Experiment). UNIVERSE was 
a system designed to connect separate local area networks using satellites. The 
project was jointly funded by the Science Research Council, the DTI, and a small 
group of commercial partners. As such, it was one of the hrst projects that the 
laboratory undertook that received external input, and was therefore typical of 
Needham's collaborative approach to research (Ahmed 2013, p. 105-106).
6.3.1 Early C ryptology and C om puter Security R esearch
Needham was also concerned with computer security during the 1980s and 1990s. 
As a result, research into computer security became a research theme at the lab­
oratory during this period. Needham's interest in security emerged from his ear­
lier work on networks, time-sharing, and capability-based computing. Needham's
^The most notable exception to this general rule came when J. Lyons and Co., a British 
catering company, assisted with the EDSAC project in order to aid the development of their 
own computer. This resulted in the LEO (Lyons Electronic Ofhce) Computer, now considered 
the first computer to be used for commercial or business purposes.
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two most well known contributions to computer security - and indeed cryptology 
- were the co-development of the Needham-Schroeder protocol and BAN logic. 
The Needham-Schroeder Protocol - developed jointly with Xerox PARC-based 
researcher Michael Schroeder in 1978 - defined a method for using encryption to 
provide a decentralized authentication system on an insecure network (Needham &: 
Schroeder 1978). Needham-Schroeder would eventually evolve into the widely-used 
Kerberos protocol, which is now a key part of Microsoft, Windows security (Ander­
son &: Bond 2004). Needham's second key contribution was the co-development 
of BAN logic. BAN logic - also known as Burrow-Abadi-Needham logic - was hrst 
described in 1990 (Burrows et al. 1990). BAN logic is essentially a set of rules 
for logically dehning trust in communication systems. It was designed with the 
aim of clari^ing assumptions about who or what in a system is trustworthy. As a 
result, it became possible to dehne more clearly the protection that certain proto­
cols offered, particularly as it highlighted the distinction between trustworthy and 
untrustworthy insiders.
The Needham-Schroeder protocol and BAN logic are milestones in the develop­
ment of security and cryptology at the laboratory. As well as being interesting 
technical achievements, they are notable because of the way they demonstrate 
how Needham conceptualized security. A consideration of real-world security sys­
tems, and the role that cryptology played in them, allowed Needham and others 
to develop an understanding of cryptology as a component in a system.
6.3.2 The Security Group
The expansion of the laboratory that Needham oversaw during the 1980s fed 
through to the research carried out during the decade that followed. Building 
on Needham's research in this area, the laboratory established a Security Group 
during the 1990s. The group started as an informal collection of computer scien­
tists with an interest in computer security, cryptology, and distributed systems. 
Though the research group was open to anyone with an interest in security - 
whether based at the laboratory or not - the group had Cambridge researchers at 
its core. It was an emphasis on tackling real-world problems that came to define 
their work throughout the 1990s.
During the 1990s, the key figure in terms of cryptology and security at the labora­
tory - along with Roger Needham - was Ross Anderson. Anderson's work spanned
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multiple Helds. He published interdisciplinary work on the economics and psychol­
ogy of information security, peer-to-peer and social network systems, reliability of 
security systems, cryptology protocols and algorithms, information hiding, and 
privacy and freedom issues (Anderson 2012). He has also written an influential 
textbook on security engineering, the second edition of which was published in 
2008 (Anderson 2008). Anderson studied Mathematics and Philosophy at Trin­
ity College, Cambridge, graduating in 1979. His first job was in avionics, before 
working in security in the 1980s when he acted as a consultant for companies that 
designed cryptography equipment for banks. Anderson returned to Cambridge in 
1992, where he undertook a PhD under the supervision of Roger Needham. He 
remained at the laboratory after the completion of his doctoral research. He was 
elected as a fellow of the Royal Society in 2009.
During the early 1990s, the Security Group carried out research into cryptographic 
protocols, cryptographic algorithms, formal methods and steganography. In 1994, 
Needham also co-developed - along with Cambridge colleague David Wheeler - the 
Tiny Encryption Algorithm. The algorithm - which was designed to be both small 
and secure - can be expressed in as little as nine lines of code. It was designed 
to be small enough to be used in almost any situation, whilst still delivering 
an acceptable level of security (Wheeler &: Needham 1994). Later, the group 
developed a number of cryptographic protocols and cryptographic primitives (low- 
level cryptographic algorithms). For example, Anderson co-developed the Tiger 
hash function and the BEAR and LION block ciphers in 1996, and the Chameleon 
stream cipher in 1997 (Anderson &: Biham 1996 a, 6, Anderson & Manifavas 1997).
The group also collaborated with industry. As the group were keen to emphasise, 
"much of our best research has been inspired by tackling real problems, and our 
funding comes from a wide range of sources; we collaborate with commerce and 
industry both in the UK and overseas" (Computer Security Croup 1998 a). An 
example of the group's work of this kind is the NetCard project, the goal of which 
was to "design protocols to support emerging services in high speed networks". 
Funding for the project was provided by the DTI and the EPSRC, and was carried 
out in collaboration with Energis Communications Ltd and General Information 
Systems Ltd (Computer Security Croup 19986).
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6.3.3 C ryptology and Security System s
In addition to these research themes, the group also began to study the reliability 
of security systems, electronic commerce, and medical information security. This 
work is best exemplified in one of Anderson's (1994) most influential early papers 
on why cryptosystems fail. The use of interdisciplinary research methods is what 
clearly differentiates this from other cryptology work. The conclusions of this 
research were based on a survey of known retail banking fraud cases. Through 
using this method, Anderson was able to show that "the threat model commonly 
used by cryptosystem designers was wrong" and that "most frauds were not caused 
by cryptanalysis or other technical attacks, but by implementation errors and 
management failures" (Anderson 1994, p.32). The survey highlighted that many 
instances of bank fraud took place with some kind of insider knowledge or access. 
For example:
In a recent case, a housewife hrom Hastings, England, had money stolen 
from her account by a bank clerk who issued an extra card for it. The 
bank's systems not only failed to prevent this, but also had the feature 
that whenever a cardholder got a statement from an ATM, the items 
on it would not subsequently appear on the full statements sent to the 
account address (Anderson 1994, p.33).
In another example from a bank in Scotland, "a maintenance engineer fitted an 
ATM with a handheld computer, which recorded customers' PINs and account 
numbers. He then made up counterfeit cards and looted their accounts" (Anderson 
1994, p.33). Anderson observed that high-tech attacks - such as those that directly 
attempted to break a cryptographic algorithm - were very rare, and even those that 
did exist tended to exploit the difficulties associated with integrating cryptology 
into a security system. Thus, it was concluded that:
Designers of cryptographic systems have suffered from a lack of infor­
mation about how their products fail in practice, as opposed to how 
they might fail in theory. This lack of feedback has led to a false threat 
model being accepted. Designers focussed on what could possibly go 
wrong, rather than on what was likely to; and many of their products 
are so complex and tricky to use that they are rarely used properly 
(Anderson 1994, p.39).
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This paradigmatic insight formed the basis for much of the work of the labora­
tory in the years that followed. In 1995, Anderson and Needham (1995) coined 
the phrase "programming Satan's computer" to refer to the problems associated 
with securing a system under the control of an adversary. Civen tha t "the great 
majority of actual security failures resulted from the opportunistic exploitation of 
various design and management blunders" and that "one can always check that a 
protocol does not commit the old familiar sins, but every so often someone comes 
up with a new and pernicious twist" it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to 
prove a cryptographic protocol 'correct'. Consequently, Anderson and Needham 
proposed what they called an 'explicitness principle' - the idea that:
Robust security is about explicitness. A cryptographic protocol should 
make any necessary naming, typing and freshness information explicit 
in its messages; designers must also be explicit about their starting 
assumptions and goals, as well as any algorithmic properties which 
could be used in an attack (Anderson &: Needham 1995, p.439)
Again, the way in which the laboratory researched real-world uses of cryptography 
was clearly evident. It could also be argued that this work carries with it explicit 
policy implications. Anderson set his survey of retail bank fraud against the 
backdrop of the UK's legal framework, and contrasted it with the situation in 
other countries:
In some countries (including the USA), the banks have to carry the 
risks associated with new technology. Following a legal precedent, in 
which a bank customer's word that she had not made a withdrawal 
was found to outweigh the banks' experts' word that she must have 
done, the US Federal Reserve passed regulations which require banks 
to refund all disputed transactions unless they can prove fraud by the 
customer. In Britain, the regulators and courts have not yet been so 
demanding, and despite a parliamentary commission of enquiry which 
found tha t the PIN system was insecure, bankers simply deny that their 
systems are ever at fault. Customers who complain about debits on 
their accounts for which they were not responsible - so-called 'phantom 
withdrawals' - are told that they are lying, or mistaken, or that they 
must have been defrauded by their fiends or relatives (Anderson 1994, 
p.33).
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Here, then, it is argued that the results of the survey carried out by the group 
pointed to a potential problem with the UK's legal framework. By researching 
cryptology as a part of larger systems, the group were able to produce expertise 
that could map directly onto policy debates.
Throughout the 1990s, it is clear that the research into the reliability of security 
systems carried out by the laboratory led to the realization that the level of security 
provided depended on more than just the strength of a particular technology. It 
also depended on the way in which that technology was positioned within systems 
that also included human beings. Needham expressed this view most clearly when 
he delivered the Clifford Paterson Lecture at the Royal Society in 2002. Needham 
argued that:
Despite all the theoretical progress that has been made, and the very 
ingenious papers that have been published, systems remain rather in­
secure. This is not primarily because of bad algorithms or protocols.
It is to a substantial extent because of ignoring the human element.
An example is non-repudiation, where the purpose of a protocol is to 
furnish evidence that will convince an arbitrator that a party attem pt­
ing to repudiate a transaction did in fact commit to it. The arbitrator 
is, and has to be, human (Needham 2003, p. 1550-1551).
He added that security systems are often complex, and "to compound the effects 
of complexity, humans involved in managing security are fallible, lazy, and un­
comprehending", and ended the lecture with a plea for "computing researchers 
[to] climb down from their ivory towers to look at the real-world contexts in which 
their systems will be deployed" (Needham 2003, p. 1554-1555).
6.4 C onclusion
The Cambridge Computer Laboratory was established in the 1930s to develop com­
puting techniques and to deliver a computing service to the rest of the University. 
As such, from the outset, a significant proportion of the work of the laboratory 
has relied on practices that were geared towards the development, maintenance, 
and operation of computer systems. These practices allowed those working in the
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laboratory to become sensitive to some of the more practical issues associated with 
systems. As a consequence, those working at the laboratory were among the hrst 
to develop technologies - such as the Needham-Schroeder protocol - that dealt with 
specihc security issues. When Roger Needham was appointed head of the labo­
ratory in 1980, thanks to a climate of generous funding, he was able to increase 
the number of research themes pursued. Research into computer security was one 
theme that the laboratory developed. As a result, the laboratory was able to build 
expertise in cryptology. In addition to the expertise required to build individual 
cryptology technologies, the laboratory also produced a body of expertise on how 
security systems behave when they are put into use. During the early 1990s, re­
search practices even came to include the use of surveys in order to develop ideas 
about how cryptosystems fail. This allowed the group to appreciate the role of 
human beings in cryptosystems, and in the process, allowed ideas from psychology, 
economics and criminology to begin to inhuence their cryptology expertise.
Chapter 7 
Cryptology Research at the  
Government Com m unications 
Headquarters
7.1 In trod u ction
In this chapter I will consider the cryptology research of the Government Com­
munications Headquarters (GCHQ). I will briefly describe the cryptology research 
carried out there from 1919 to 1970, before describing in more detail what's known 
about their modern cryptology research. I will pay particular attention to the 
research carried out by CESG^ - the body within GCHQ that is now officially 
responsible for providing information security expertise and cryptology solutions 
to public bodies in the UK. I will discuss in detail the development of 'non-secret 
encryption' - a series of theoretical ideas developed within CESG that appear to 
both mirror and pre-date the independent development of public-key cryptogra­
phy in the US. Like much of the work of GCHQ, when this research was carried 
out during the 1970s, it was a closely guarded secret. I will describe how - starting 
in the late 1980s - in line with broader political trends and changing attitudes 
towards the role of intelligence organizations, CESG took on a more public role, 
and attempts were made to fashion a culture of openness around it. Despite this.
^Prior to 2002, the group was referred to as the 'Communications-Electronics Security Group', 
and was also abbreviated to 'CESG'. Following a name change in 2002, the group's full name 
became 'CESG', given that it was felt that 'Communications-Electronics Security' no longer fully 
described their work (Communications-Electronics Security Group 2012).
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I will argue that, though thanks to the declassification of certain materials we 
now have a fragmentary knowledge of some of the theoretical cryptology research 
carried out within CESC, and also an understanding of some of the public duties 
they took on during 1990s, it would still be more accurate to characterize their 
cryptology expertise as secret given the nature of the practices that were used to 
produce it.
7.2 T he U K ’s In te lligen ce O rganizations
The UK has three main intelligence organizations: MI5; the Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS) (commonly referred to as MI6); and the Covernment Communica­
tions Headquarters (CCHQ). Whilst it is often difficult to clearly delineate their 
respective remits, MI5 is broadly responsible for delivering national intelligence 
and security, SIS is responsible for delivering foreign intelligence, and CCHQ is 
responsible for delivering signals intelligence and communications security (Her­
man 1996). All three now operate under the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 
which is responsible for providing the UK Cabinet with the intelligence required 
for governmental decisions.^
MI5 and SIS were founded as the same organization in 1909. CCHQ was founded 
ten years later in 1919. Throughout their history - particularly in the case of 
CCHQ - most of their activities, and even their knowledge of their existence, have 
been kept secret from the public. This is, of course, unsurprising, given that an 
intimate knowledge of their activities would undermine their objectives. This is 
even less surprising in light of the culture of secrecy that is seen to pervade the 
work of the UK's civil service more generally (Rogers 1997, Vincent 1997, Moran 
2013). This secrecy, though perhaps rooted in culture, has been continuously 
upheld through legislation and institutional practices. The most influential of 
these hag been the Official Secrets Act. The Official Secrets Acts 1911 to 1989 
have prevented - and still prevent - members of intelligence organizations from 
publicly disclosing information relating to their work. Christopher Moran, in 
surveying the changing ways in which secrecy has been maintained by the civil 
service, described the broad scope of the original act:
'Intelligence' refers here to information that is of military or political value.
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Section 1, commonly known as the 'spying clause', made it a criminal 
oEence for anyone, 'for a purpose that could be prejudicial to the safety 
or the interests of the state', to collect, communicate or publish any 
plan, drawing or other item of official information to an enemy. The 
accused had no 'right to silence' and a trial could be held in camera. 
Section 2, which was targeted at civil servants, politicians and jour­
nalists, made a felony of both the unauthorised communication and 
the receipt of official information. It was widely drafted, embracing all 
types of information without any discrimination (Moran 2013, p.23).
When an individual is employed by an intelligence organization, they are required 
to sign the Official Secrets Act. However, given that it is a law, individuals are 
bound by it whether they sign or not. The Official Secrets Act therefore crim­
inalizes the unauthorized dissemination of classified information. This includes 
information relating to scientific research carried out at GCHQ and much infor­
mation related to working practices more generally.
The Official Secrets Act has also informed a number of practices common to 
many UK government bodies. For example, the 'Government Protective Mark­
ing Scheme' was designed to label documents according to the sensitivity of the 
material they contained. Under the scheme, documents produced by the state 
were labeled either: Top Secret; Secret; Confidential; Restricted; Protect; or Un­
classified. This system was used in conjunction with a vetting procedure that 
assigned government employees a clearance level commensurate with one of these 
labels. The clearance assigned to an employee would then be used to determine 
what documents, and ultimately what information, they would have access to. 
Employees were prevented from viewing documents labeled at a level above their 
clearance. As a result, even employees within governmental organizations are sub­
ject to practices designed to uphold secrecy. In the case of intelligence agencies, 
throughout their history, almost all of the records they have produced have been 
classified, usually at the level of Top Secret or Secret, meaning that individuals 
must be vetted and assigned a clearance before they can view them.^
^It was announced in October 2013 that the Government Protective Marking Scheme would 
be replaced with the similar yet simpler Government Security Classifications Policy. The changes 
came into effect in April 2014 (Cabinet Office 2013).
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The thrust of the Official Secrets Act also influenced the way in which records 
have, or have not, been made public. In most cases, documents produced by pub­
lic bodies are sent to the National Archives (formerly known as the Public Record 
Office) when they cease to be of use. Once at the National Archives - located in 
Kew, South West London - records can be viewed by any member of the public. 
The Public Record Ohice was established through the Public Record Office Act 
1838. Though initially established for the preservation of legal documents, records 
from government departments were accepted from the 1840s onwards. However, 
government departments were under no obligation to submit documents to the 
Public Record Office, giving them the option of retaining certain records at their 
discretion (National Archives 2012). Under the Public Records Acts 1958 and 
1967, government departments were subject to a thirty-year rule. Under this rule, 
all records created by public bodies would be transferred to the Public Records 
Office thirty years after their original date of creation. However, their creators 
could retain records that were over thirty years old if they were granted an excep­
tion by the Lord Chancellor under Section 3(4) of the acts. Additionally, it was 
decided tha t all records created by, or referring to, intelligence organizations would 
always be retained and would never be released. In 1967, the Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Cardiner, approved this blanket retention policy for another 25 years, thus 
carrying it through to 1992.
As will be described in full later, almost all of what follows in this chapter is a 
result of more recent attempts to reform the UK's intelligence organizations, with 
a view to making them more 'open' and more publicly accountable. Almost this 
entire chapter is based upon information that would not have been available to 
researchers or the general public before 1970. Such was the secrecy surrounding 
CCHQ in particular that, prior to 1970, it is likely that the majority of the general 
public would have been scarcely aware of its existence. Therefore, it should be 
remembered that almost all of what's described in this chapter would not have 
been public knowledge at the time.
7.3 H istorica l O verview  o f G C H Q
This section will review what is now known about the history of CCHQ. CCHQ 
was founded as the Covernment Code and Cypher School (CC&CS) in 1919, ten 
years after the founding of MI5 and MI6. The negative attitude towards spying
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and espionage held by Victorian society had meant that by 1904, the UK had 
been without a code-breaking centre for over hfty years (Porter 2009, p.20). The 
priorities of the First World War meant that the British army began an effort to 
break encrypted Cerman radio communications. By 1919 it was decided by for­
eign secretary Lord Curzon that a unified peacetime code breaking organization 
should be formed. The stated function of the CC&CS was the defence of the com­
munications used by government departments, but in reality, it began attempting 
to read the communications of others almost immediately. Prior to the Second 
World War, the activities of CC&CS were mainly based around the decrypting of 
Russian diplomatic communications, but also those of France, the US, and Japan 
(Aldrich 2010, p. 16).
By 1939, CC&CS had moved to Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire, where it 
set about breaking encrypted enemy communications as part of the war effort. 
By 1941, this effort came be known under the codename of Ultra - referring to 
'Ultra-Secret' - and consisted of attempts to break various German codes, most 
famously, those generated by the Enigma machine (Kahn 1991, Sebag-Montehore 
2001). There also existed a parallel project to break the Lorenz cipher, which 
resulted in the construction and use of Colossus - now recognised as one of the 
world's hrst electronic computers. These episodes are probably the most well 
known in GCHQ's history. As will be described later, though highly secret at the 
time, the wartime cryptology work carried out at Bletchley Park was eventually 
revealed in the 1970s. The motivation behind keeping this work secret is usually 
thought of in terms of allowing GCHQ to continue to use the same techniques to 
break the codes used by others during the Cold War. However, it has recently 
been argued that the primary purpose of hiding this work was simply to prevent 
knowledge of the existence of CCHQ (Moran 2013). In either case, since these ac­
tivities were revealed, cryptology has been understood as a core activity of CCHQ. 
Furthermore, following the ground breaking nature the work at Bletchley Park, 
the possibility that CCHQ might possess expertise that outstrips the expertise 
produced in other contexts has also found its way into the popular imagination.
After the Second World War, CC&CS was renamed the Covernment Commu­
nications Headquarters. In 1951, it began the process of moving from London 
to Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, where it remains to this day. During the war, 
CC&CS underwent a number of changes that set the trajectory for how CCHQ 
would operate during the Cold War and beyond. Whilst it may have entered the
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FIGURE 7.1: The Organization of GCHQ in 1946 (Aldrich 2010)
Second World War as a fairly disorganized collection of amateurs and eccentrics, 
in the years that followed, it emerged as a confident, professional and efficient, 
albeit smaller, organization (Aldrich 2010, p.69). Part of this process was the 
forming of intelligence alliances with other nations. The BRUSA (Britain-USA) 
agreement of 1946, followed by the UKUSA (United Kingdom-USA) agreement of 
1948, essentially meant that all of the major English-speaking nations - including 
the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand - would share intelligence 
(Rudner 2004). Despite some early disagreements over enciphering methods, the 
UKUSA agreement remains in place at the time of writing, although many of the 
details surrounding it remain classified.
The immediate priority for GCHQ, and indeed other UKUSA nations, following 
the war was monitoring the communications of the Soviet Union. Of particular 
interest were those related to the Soviet atomic bomb project. However, success 
in this endeavour was limited. High-level Soviet communications were encrypted 
using one-time pads - ciphers that were essentially unbreakable due to a lack of 
repeat use. The lack of success in this area prompted GCHQ, in the 1950s, to move 
away from attempting to derive intelligence through the use of cryptology, and 
towards the use of bugging equipment and electronic intelligence (ELINT). This
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usually took the form of attempting to read unencrypted radar signals (Aldrich 
2010, pp. 108-110). Starting in the late 1960s, the use of satellites and other wireless 
technologies to transmit telephone calls prompted GCHQ and others to begin 
changing their methods once more. GCHQ began to build large domed receivers 
tha t collected unencrypted communications from the ether. The building of large, 
highly visible listening stations, like GCHQ Bude in Cornwall, damaged GCHQ's 
anonymity. GCHQ had also become much larger. By 1966 it was the largest of the 
three intelligence services in terms of budget, and given that it employed around 
11,500 people, had more staff than MI5 and MI6 combined, and was larger than 
the entire British diplomatic service (including staff in overseas embassies). All of 
this contributed to the fact that GCHQ was reluctantly gaining public notoriety.
7.4  T he C om m u n ication s-E lectron ics S ecu rity  G roup
Prom the 1970s onwards, the branch of GCHQ that was most strongly associ­
ated with cryptology research was the Communications-Electronics Security Group 
(CESG). Before examining what is known about their work, it is important to dis­
tinguish more sharply between two key intelligence activities related to cryptology: 
signals intelligence (SIGINT); and communications security (COMSEC). SIGINT 
refers to activities geared towards the interception and interpretation of intelli­
gence from signals transmitted by others. COMSEC refers to the activities geared 
towards the protection of one's own signals from other parties that may be trying 
to carry out SIGINT on their communications. Cryptology expertise is required 
for both SIGINT and COMSEC. Though SIGINT and COMSEC are clearly in­
tertwined, throughout the period thus far described, they were somewhat separate 
organizationally.
7.4.1 Form ation
From the early 1950s until the late 1960s, SIGINT and COMSEC were essentially 
handled by two different organizations. GCHQ were responsible for SIGINT, and 
an organization called the London Communications Security Agency (LCSA) were 
responsible for COMSEC. It was not until 1969 that it was decided that GCHQ 
should be formally responsible for both.
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FIGURE 7.2: The Organization of GCHQ in 1970 (Aldrich 2010)
In the early 1950s, a review of the Cipher Policy Board's organisa­
tion and terms of reference led to the creation of a new agency, the 
London Communications Security Agency (LCSA). The LCSA had 
its own Director, but still remained administratively under GCHQ. 
In 1965, the LCSA became the Communications-Electronics Security 
Department (CESD), still based primarily in London, although parts 
were now co-located with GCHQ in Cheltenham, Gloucestershire. In 
1969 CESD formally merged organisationally with GCHQ and was re­
named the Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG). In 
1978 the last London elements of CESG moved to Cheltenham, where 
it has remained to the present day (Communications-Electronics Secu­
rity Group 2012).
The original decision to separate SIGINT and COMSEC was taken when GCHQ 
began the process of moving to Cheltenham in the early 1950s. It was decided 
by senior intelligence officials that it would be better to make a fresh start in 
both areas, so responsibility for COMSEC was given to LCSA. Though the LCSA 
remained in existence for over twenty years, almost nothing is known about it 
(Aldrich 2010, pp. 191-192). Richard Aldrich placed the 1969 integration of the 
CESG within the context of UK's relative economic decline - later highlighted
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by the withdrawal from 'East of Suez'. The integration of CESG was one conse­
quence of a series of changes to the UK's intelligence machinery that were designed 
to allow it to focus on obtaining economic and industrial intelligence, alongside 
military and diplomatic intelligence. It was also thought that a more tightly inte­
grated government communications organization would ensure a more harmonious 
relationship with other UKUSA allies at a time when the relationship was show­
ing signs of strain due to the emergence of American technical superiority (Aldrich 
2010, pp.241-242).
Today, CESG is referred to as the 'National Technical Authority' for advice and 
services to protect governmental voice and data networks. As such, it remains the 
department of GCHQ responsible for COMSEC work. However, prior to the mid- 
1980s, its role was far less public. Very little is known about its activities prior to 
this. Though it has been possible for historians to construct a partial history of 
GCHQ during this period, a parallel history of CESG has not yet been produced. 
Almost no academic material exists that specifically deals with CESG, and very 
few internal CESG documents have been released. In one sense, this is surprising, 
given that CESG now has a much more public role than many other departments 
within GCHQ. However, historically, the secrecy that has surrounded COMSEC 
has often been much higher than that which surrounds SIGINT, and information 
related to CESG's activity remains classified. Despite this, it is now known that 
it was within this department that 'non-secret encryption' was developed.
7.4.2 R esearch on N on-Secret Encryption
The only piece of cryptology research carried out by CESG that has been declas­
sified and revealed to the public was that on non-secret encryption. Non-secret 
encryption was the term used to refer to a series of theoretical advances made 
within CESG that very closely resemble research carried out independently in the 
US under the heading of public-key cryptography - particularly the Difhe-Hellman 
key exchange and the RSA algorithm (Difhe & Heilman 1976, Rivest et al. 1978). 
Though kept secret for some thirty years, work done under the heading of non­
secret encryption was revealed to the public in December 1997. The announcement 
was supported by the unusual release of five internal CESG documents (Ellis 1970,
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Cocks 1973, Williamson 1974, 1976, Ellis 1987). Electronic copies of these docu­
ments are still available online from various sources.'^ The physical documents - 
assuming they still exist - have not been made available. The work on non-secret 
encryption is the only major piece of post-Second World War cryptology research 
carried out within GCHQ that is now publicly known. How it came to be re­
vealed, and the reaction it caused in the cryptology research community, will be 
discussed in chapter 8. The description that follows summarises the content of the 
documents.
The work on non-secret encryption was initiated by James H. Ellis. Ellis was born 
in Australia in 1924, but grew up in London. He studied for a degree in physics 
at Imperial College London, before working at the Post Ohice Research Station at 
Dollis Hill. Ellis joined GCHQ in 1952, and transferred to CESG (or CESD, as it 
was then known) in 1965. In 1969, Ellis was one of about half a dozen researchers 
working within CESG on long-range, 'blue-sky' projects. Ellis was working on 
what is known in cryptology as the key distribution problem. The problem, as it 
was then understood, centred on the fact that, if parties wished to communicate 
with one another in secret, they must all share the details of the process used 
to encrypt the message, and the reverse, which can be used to decrypt it. This 
symmetrical system left the parties with the problem of securely communicating 
the key. As telecommunications became more widespread, the key distribution 
problem grew. However, a solution was rarely sought, given that the sharing of 
keys between sender and recipient was considered to be one of the fundamental 
tenets of cryptology. Writing later, Ellis recalled that:
It was obvious to everyone, including me, that no secure communica­
tion was possible without a secret key, some other secret knowledge, 
or at least some way in which the recipient was in a different position 
from an interceptor. After all, if they were in identical situations, how 
could one possibly be able to receive what the other could not? Thus 
there was no incentive to look for something so clearly impossible (Ellis 
1987).
Upon the discovery of a classified and unsigned paper produced by Bell Labora­
tories dating from the Second World War, Ellis began to change his view. The
'^Electronic copies of these documents, and many other previously classified documents pro­
duced by intelligence organizations, may be downloaded from http://www.cryptome.org.
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paper described how it might be possible for a sender to add analogue noise to a 
communication that could then be removed by the recipient if they knew exactly 
how it was generated. This demonstrated to Ellis that "secure communication 
was at least theoretically possible if the recipient took part in the encipherment" 
(Ellis 1987).
Ellis was subsequently able to conceive of a system whereby a communication 
can be secured by, hrst, the recipient generating a large number which is then 
transformed to a different number using a one-way mathematical function - a 
function that cannot easily be reversed. This new number is then sent to the 
sender, who uses it with a second function to scramble the message again before 
sending it back. The (original) recipient is then able to unscramble the message 
using the original number, which remains known only to them. Of course, such a 
system depends on there actually being a usable one-way mathematical function, 
and in 1969, it wasn't obvious to Ellis that such a function existed. Ellis produced 
an internal paper detailing his idea, and passed it on to Shawn Wylie, a chief 
mathematician at GCHQ. Although Wylie reported that the system appeared to 
be sound in principle, it was clear that it would need to be developed further to 
be of any use.
By 1971, the arrival of a new Chief Scientist at CESG had reignited interest in the 
system that Ellis had proposed. However, the search for usable functions remained 
unsuccessful, and was probably hampered by the fact that the system itself was still 
thought of as somewhat heretical, given that it violated one of the core assumptions 
of the discipline. In 1973, the problem found its way to new CESG employee 
Clifford Cocks. Before joining CESG, Cocks studied for an undergraduate degree 
in mathematics at the University of Cambridge, and a postgraduate degree at 
the University of Oxford. Upon arrival at CESG, Cocks was mentored by Nick 
Patterson. Patterson passed Ellis' idea onto Cocks. Although Patterson was aware 
that the problem had proved difficult in the past, he speculated that it might be 
useful to introduce it to someone who would approach it from outside of the context 
of key distribution. As Cocks would later suggest in a paper on the subject, the 
best way to produce a one-way function would be through the multiplication of 
prime numbers. Whilst it is straightforward to multiply large prime numbers, it is 
very difficult (although not impossible) to identify the prime numbers used if only 
their product is known (Cocks 1973). This method was almost identical to that
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used in Rivest, Shamir and Adleman's RSA algorithm - developed independently 
in the US some years later.
Cocks' method became known throughout CESG, and came to the attention of 
their other mathematicians. Malcolm Williamson examined the solution, and after 
failing to find any flaws, developed his own scheme for the sharing of keys that 
fitted the non-secret encryption model. This method, which was written up in 
1974, closely mirrors what would later be called the Difhe-Hellman key exchange, 
when it was also independently developed in the US (Williamson 1974).
In order to keep the work on non-secret encryption secret, and to comply with 
the Ofhcial Secrets Act, no material relating to it was disseminated outside of the 
intelligence community. This meant that the work did not appear in any form of 
publication, and was not presented at academic conferences. Furthermore, those 
involved in its development were prohibited from discussing it with colleagues 
outside of the UKUSA agreement. This was despite the fact that the work on 
non-secret encryption had the potential to completely subvert some of the classical 
tenets of cryptology. Indeed, it is perhaps a testament to how much secrecy 
informed research practices at CESG that they were able to keep this work secret 
until they chose to reveal it in the late 1990s.
Exactly what happened to the work on non-secret encryption immediately after it 
was developed remains unclear. It appears to have been left as an interesting idea, 
and was not put into practice by GCHQ or their UKUSA allies. Levy (2001, p.324) 
claimed that it shifted from being seen as impossible to impractical. Levy also 
claimed that GCHQ saw non-secret encryption as being something that could only 
potentially be used for transmitting messages, and as such, unlike those involved 
with work on public-key cryptography, did not anticipate that it could also be used 
for message authentication and data integrity. Aldrich (2001, p.491) claimed that 
non-secret encryption was later shared with Washington via Sean Wyllie, but that 
they were equally uninterested in developing it further.^ Again, because of the 
continued secrecy surrounding CESG and GCHQ, it is very difficult to place the 
work on non-secret encryption in any kind of context. However, it is unlikely that 
the documents relating to non-secret encryption are in any way 'representative'.
^Aldrich and Levy disagree on how to spell this individual's hrst name and surname. This 
highlights the fact that, due to the secrecy surrounding CESG, even the most basic information 
relating to employees is both hard to source and hard to verify.
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in the sense used by Scott (1990), of the totality of available documents related to 
CESG cryptolog}' research.
7.4.3 Increased Public A wareness
During the 1970s, at around the same time as work on non-secret encryption was 
being carried out, the public were becoming increasingly aware of the existence of 
GCHQ, and the work of UK intelligence organizations more generally. Moran has 
argued that:
By the 1960s the state had concluded that maintaining absolute se­
crecy with respect to some of its work was not only impossible but 
also counterproductive . . .  With this, the state moved into the realm 
of 'offensive' information management, putting 'secrets' into the pub­
lic domain on its own terms. The traditional 'defensive' approach of 
saying and releasing nothing was seen as too rigid. W hat was needed 
was flexibility (Moran 2013, p.5).
As a result, a certain tolerance of public information about GCHQ began to 
emerge. This tolerance even extended to information about GCHQ's past cryp­
tology research. In 1974, F. W. Winterbotham - a former Royal Air Force (RAF) 
ofhcer - published TAe .S'ecreZ. This book provided the hrst public account 
of the code breaking efforts at Bletchley Park during the Second World War. Up 
to that point, this work had actively been kept secret, and was even effaced from 
authorized histories of the Second World War, such as those written by Winston 
Churchill. In 1976, Duncan Campbell and Mark Hosenball published an article in 
OwZ magazine entitled 'The Eavesdroppers'. This article was one of the hrst 
to publicly allude to GCHQ's current activities. However, details were sparse, and 
the article contains little more than speculative asides. Despite these haws, both 
accounts undoubtedly contributed to an increased public awareness of GCHQ, and 
cemented its association with cryptology.
GCHQ returned to the public's attention again in 1984, when Margaret Thatcher's 
Conservative government successfully banned its employees from becoming union 
members in the interests of 'national security'. The New Labour government 
eventually overturned this decision in 1997. GCHQ also featured in Peter Wright's
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notorious 1987 memoir 6^^mtcAer. Wright, amongst other things, claimed that 
the intelligence services (particularly MI5) were secretly plotting against former 
Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson when his government were in power in the 
1960s and 70s. Many of Wright's claims have subsequently been discredited, but 
at the time, they again contributed to public awareness of GCHQ.
Following the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the UK's intelligence 
organizations and wider society began to change. This change can be seen as the 
result of processes like the Waldegrave Initiative - a process of legislative reform 
that was initiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Whereas, in the past, a 
position of absolute secrecy was adopted, the Waldegrave Initiative deliberately 
fashioned a culture of greater openness around intelligence organizations. The 
Conservative government's 1993 white paper on Open Government - resulting 
from an initiative launched by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, William 
Waldegrave, and the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd - led to a wide range of 
processes related to the re^reviewing of previously retained historical material. 
The public have since been granted access to a number of previously retained 
ofhcial documents related to, or created by, the UK's intelligence organizations. 
Furthermore, the policies that had underpinned some of the more extreme security 
measures were questioned. Under the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, GCHQ and 
SIS were placed on a statutory basis for the hrst time. This meant that the 
intelligence services and their directors could be legally referred to by name, and 
that records held by other departments that did so would no longer be eligible for 
retention on these grounds (Bennett 2002).
Whilst the Waldegrave Initiative has allowed greater access to recent records re­
lated to some public bodies and government departments, requests to release 
records related to GCHQ are either exempt or can be refused. In practice, this has 
meant that few records relating to GCHQ produced after the end of the Second 
World War have been released (Bennett 2002). Therefore, in contrast to many 
other topics, when examining the history of GCHQ, the closer one gets to the 
present the less is known. This is due to the fact that the information about their 
activities up to and including the Second World War are considered less secret 
than information that may pertain in some way to the present.
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7.4.4 Public R ole
These reforms occurred at the roughly same time as CESG started to take on 
more public duties. Whereas the work on non-secret encryption indicates that 
CESG had in the past been concerned with mathematical and theoretical re­
search, their research in the 1990s included work geared towards the fulfilment 
of their role as the UK's National Technical Authority. In general, this resulted 
in the provision of cryptographic algorithms, but also included "generic crypto­
graphic research", the "design and development of general-purpose or bespoke 
cryptographic products" and the "development of cryptographic algorithms and 
integrated circuits". CESG also used the expertise produced by this research to 
provide "evaluation and certification of products", "setting up production con­
tracts for licensed cryptographic products", "updates and Post Design Services 
for CESG-designed cryptographic products, and technical support to users", "[ad­
vice to] industry on commercial risk development of cryptographic products and 
systems for the UK official market", and "independent advice on the suitabil­
ity, application and integration of commercial off-the-shelf cryptographic products 
in public sector projects" (Communications-Electronics Security Group 1998n). 
However, it is important to re-iter ate that these services were only available to 
public bodies, and knowledge of them still required security clearance.
Aside from these activities, CESG also played a role in the UK's official licensing 
schemes for computer security products. In 1985, CESG established facilities for 
evaluating the security of government computer systems. Then, in 1987, the DTI 
established the CESG-managed Commercial Computer Security Centre (CCSC). 
The CCSC was responsible for formally evaluating commercially available IT prod­
ucts. This resulted in the publication of a set of evaluation criteria known as the 
'Green Books'. In 1989, it was announced that a new nationwide scheme would 
be developed. This came to be known as the UK ITSEC scheme, and became 
fully operational in 1991. ITSEC, which was eventually harmonised across many 
European countries, was eventually incorporated into the Common Criteria. Al­
though the development of the UK ITSEC Scheme is only partially dependent on 
cryptology, it does demonstrate how CESG acquired a more public role during 
this period.
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7.4.5 Continued Secrecy
Despite the fact that CESG took on more public duties during the 1990s, given 
tha t it was a part of GCHQ both organizationally and physically, much of its 
activity remained secret. Those working there remained bound by the Official 
Secrets Act, and therefore carried out research in line with the practices that were 
designed to uphold it. Although those working at CESG would very occasionally 
publish the results of cryptology research carried out during this period (e.g. Cocks 
1997, 2001), the vast majority remained classified. Furthermore, even though the 
research carried out there underpinned the cryptology services they provided to 
public bodies, information about the processes used and the motivations behind 
their cryptology research were not revealed as a part of this service. Although 
individuals who had worked for CESG during this period could not be interviewed, 
others who had come into contact with the practices used there in the 1990s 
were able to describe them to me. Practices related to security and secrecy were 
mentioned frequently when the topic of CESG or GCHQ was raised. In talking 
about the security of the CESG site, one interviewee explained:
Respondent: CESG is mZ/zm GCHQ. You know the GCHQ site, and 
you know how secure that is, well CESG is fenced off within that. 
You're not allowed to take mobile phones, laptops, or anything into it.
It is quite secure.
CESG also implemented practices to prevent individual names being associated 
with them, and vice versa:
R espondent: They were very strange. I went down to a meeting once 
at CESG, and it was for the whole security community, and you'd have 
the guest list there, and it would have your name and where you worked 
. . .  And then you'd have these people who were just names, and blank 
. . .  And if you sent them anything, because occasionally they would say 
"Oh, we want one of your reports", you had to double-envelope. You'd 
put it in an envelope, put their name and address on the outside, then 
you'd put it in another envelope and send it to this holding address, 
and then it would get sent internally.
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CESG practices, in particular those associated with vetting and document mark­
ing, were also known to produce somewhat absurd situations:
R esp o n d en t: There were different levels of vetting. We were all vet­
ted up to 'Secret'. Most of our work, particularly work funded by the 
MOD, was classed as 'Secret'. [Employee name], one of his reports, 
that he wrote, he wasn't allowed to see it, because they classified it as 
'Top Secret', and he wasn't vetted up to 'Top Secret' . . .  It was strange 
like that . . .  He also wasn't allowed to speak about it. Not entirely sure 
why. But you expect it if you work in that held.
This demonstrates that, although the stated role of CESG changed following the 
end of the Cold War, many of the practices that sustained it between 1990 and 2000 
did not. When the political phase of the crypto wars began, CESG and GCHQ 
were still highly secretive organizations, and this characteristic was imprinted upon 
the expertise tha t they produced.
7.5 C onclusion
In this chapter, I have described the cryptology research that has been carried out 
at GCHQ. Unlike the research sites described in the preceding three chapters, the 
history of cryptology research of GCHQ extends back beyond 1970. Indeed, the 
most well known cryptology research carried out there came during the Second 
World War, with Alan Turing's work on breaking ciphers generated by the Ger­
man Enigma machine, and the construction of the Colossus computer to break the 
Lorenz cipher. Following the Second World War, as the use of one-time pads be­
came more common, and later, as intelligence came to be increasingly derived from 
the analysis of unencrypted electronic communications, research into cryptology 
appears to have become less of a priority. Somewhat paradoxically, it was also dur­
ing this period that mathematicians working within CESG carried out theoretical 
work on non-secret encryption. This work mirrored the work on public-key cryp­
tography that was completed in the US nearly a decade later. During the 1990s, 
CESG took on a more public role, and carried out cryptology research commen­
surate with its role as the UK's National Technical Authority for the official use 
of cryptology.
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On the basis of what is known about the history of cryptology research at GCHQ, 
it could be characterized in a number of ways. However, it is important to note 
tha t compared to the data available on cryptology research at other sites in the 
UK, the available data on cryptology research carried out by GCHQ is very small. 
Although fragments of CESG's work have been revealed, it should be remembered 
tha t CESG is not the only department within GCHQ to carry out research related 
to cryptology. As can be seen in Figure 7.2, a 'Cryptanalysis' division existed out­
side of CESG, and it is very likely that this division both produced and possessed 
cryptology expertise. However, as this division lies outside of CESG, the work 
tha t it has carried out remains secret, and no information relating to it has been 
released. Despite processes like the Waldegrave Initiative, the secrecy surrounding 
GCHQ and CESG makes an explicit analysis of their cryptology research difficult. 
Although some records related to intelligence have been released, the majority 
remain withheld. The process of review is slow and resource-intensive, and ulti­
mately, not a high priority for the intelligence agencies themselves (Bennett 2002). 
Furthermore, due to the fact that the information held within some records re­
mains sensitive long after their immediate use (information pertaining to living 
individuals and their relatives, for example), as a general rule, GCHQ will not 
release records tha t were created after the end of the Second World War (Ben­
nett 2002). Although some personal accounts have been published related to the 
inner-workings of intelligence agencies, individuals remain bound by the Official 
Secrets Act after they stop working for them. This makes conducting interviews 
with those who have worked for intelligence agencies very difficult from a practical, 
legal and ethical point of view - especially given that the government have in the 
past attempted to prosecute individuals for revealing sensitive information (Easter
2 0 0 8 , p .6 8 2 ) .
These issues could be seen as methodological difficulties, and nothing more. Given 
the relative lack of data on cryptology research carried out within GCHQ, it may 
therefore be tempting to abandon a characterization of their cryptology research 
practices. However, this conclusion is rather unsatisfactory, as it fails to capture 
how the lack of public knowledge about the work of GCHQ impacted upon others 
working in the field, and does not reflect the curious pose that CESG struck be­
tween upholding secrecy and performing a clearly defined public role. Arriving at 
this conclusion also requires a certain betrayal of the approaches to documentary 
analysis that were discussed in chapter 3. In particular, the documentary realities
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argument has discouraged researchers from seeing documents as sources of descrip­
tions of reality, but rather as a part of the practices used to construct it (Atkinson 
& Coffey 2011). On this understanding, the inaccessibility and unavailability of 
documentary data can be seen as a result of practices that have been designed 
to uphold secrecy. For example, not publishing scientific work is not the absence 
or failure of practices used to publish in other institutional contexts. Rather, it 
is the presence and success of practices designed to minimize the extent to which 
tha t work is known. Therefore, on this understanding, it may be concluded that 
the practices employed by CESG were designed to produce secret contributory 
expertise in cryptology.
Chapter 8 
The Political Phase of the Crypto 
Wars
8 .1  In trod u ction
In the preceding four chapters, I have a provided an overview of the nature of cryp­
tology research practices at four different research sites. The research described 
can be thought of as constituting the technical phase of the crypto wars. I have 
also hinted at the nature of the expertise that these practices enacted. Up to this 
point, I have not described any of the developments that can be thought of as 
constituting the political phase of the crypto wars. That is the purpose of this 
chapter.
In this chapter, I will break the political phase of the crypto wars down into two 
debates over issues related to cryptology: a debate over Trusted Third Parties; and 
a debate over export controls. In contrast to previous descriptions, as outlined in 
chapter 1, I will place an emphasis on describing how the expertise produced 
during the technical phase was used during the political phase. By the end of this 
chapter, it will start to become clear that the expertise enacted at each cryptology 
research site was used during the crypto wars in different ways and for different 
purposes.
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F i g u r e  8.1: The Passage of a Bill in the UK Parliament (UK Parliament 2013)
8.1.1 A N ote on O rganization
In terms of both data collection and presentation, I have used the procedure used 
to pass a bill in the UK parliament as a general organizing principle (see Figure 
8.1).^ This has allowed me to identify separate debates by looking at the activity 
that surrounded the passage of different bills, and then to break that activity down 
into different phases based on government statements and publications. Though 
not part of the formal legislative process, I have also paid particular attention to 
the consultation periods that preceded the drafting of each bill.
If this process is used as an organising principle, two political debates featuring 
cryptology expertise can be identified. As 1 will describe later in this chapter, these 
debates are linked. Together, they can be thought of as constituting the political 
phase of the crypto wars in the UK. In broad terms, the first debate concerned 
proposals to implement Trusted Third Parties, and the second debate concerned 
changing the rules governing cryptography export. W hat follows is a chronological 
description of each debate. Within this structure, 1 will pay particular attention 
to the role of the cryptology research sites that were described in the previous 
four chapters. Thus, in contrast to other descriptions of the political phase of the 
crypto wars in the UK, 1 will describe political developments in relation to the 
cryptology expertise that was produced during the technical phase.
^For a brief overview of the processes used to pass a bill in the UK parliament, see (UK 
Parliament 2013).
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8.2 T h e D eb a te  over T rusted  T hird  P arties
The debate over Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) was framed by the government 
through questions over the best way to balance the potential economic benefits of 
widespread access to cryptology against the negative impact this might have on law 
enforcement capabilities. On the one hand, it was clear that cryptology could be 
used to promote electronic commerce. In the mid-1990s, there were concerns over 
a general lack of public trust in the security of the Internet for the transmission of 
financial information. Cryptography technologies could be used to encrypt this in­
formation, making it very difficult for potential fraudsters to obtain, thus removing 
one of the barriers to the adoption of electronic commerce. However, widespread 
access to cryptography technologies might also allow criminals to encrypt their 
communications and stored data, thus making it very difficult for law enforcement 
bodies to prevent crime or gather evidence. The government proposed a solution 
to this dilemma in the form of a system of Trusted Third Parties - organizations 
acting as state-licensed intermediaries that would provide cryptography services 
to the public, but would also be obliged to give law enforcement bodies the means 
to decrypt communications if requested. These proposals brought a number of 
propositional questions to the fore, such as: is the proposed nationwide TTP sys­
tem, and the technologies and assumptions it's based on, secure? As will become 
clear, some with contributory cryptology expertise believed that it was, whereas 
others did not. However, this is only one dimension of the debate. The manner in 
which the proposals were formulated and then debated is also significant. As will 
become clear, those from the Security Group at the University of Cambridge in 
particular felt that the TTP proposals were being formulated without drawing on 
the expertise of the entire cryptology research community, including the expertise 
that they themselves had enacted. Although the debate over TTPs can be seen 
in terms of conflicting answers to propositional questions, when looked at through 
the lens of elective modernism, it can also be understood in terms of how expertise 
from the technical phase was used (or not) during the political phase.
8.2.1 Background
Before describing the debate over TTPs, it will be useful to provide some details 
about the wider national and international context. At the international level, 
by the time the political phase of the crypto wars in the UK was underway in
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the early to mid 1990s, the European Commission (EC) - the executive body of 
the European Union (EU) - had already begun to address some of the issues that 
widespread access to cryptography technologies raised. In 1992, the Senior Offi­
cials Group - Information Systems Security (SOG-IS) was established to advise 
the EC on appropriate legislative steps. SOG-IS conducted pilot projects to in­
vestigate the challenges that cryptography posed. However, lengthy debates over 
the surrounding issues meant that by the time the crypto wars were underway, a 
clear Europe-wide, policy framework had not been agreed upon.
By the time the crypto wars were underway, SOG-IS had overseen the development 
and harmonisation of the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 
(ITSEC). As was described in previous chapters, ITSEC was a set of criteria that 
were implemented in several European countries - including France, Germany, 
the Netherlands and the UK - for the purposes of evaluating computer security 
products. The UK Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification 
Scheme, which organized the testing of security products and technologies against 
ITSEC, was managed by CESG and accredited by NPL. The scheme had been 
running for around five years by the time the debate on TTPs started.
There also existed international bodies that provided guidance to nation states 
that planned to legislate on matters related to the use of cryptography. Typi­
cally, these bodies did not have the power to legislate directly, but could produce 
guidelines for nations to use as a framework for their laws. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was founded in 1961 to stim­
ulate economic progress and world trade. Unsurprisingly, the advent of electronic 
commerce was a key issue for the OECD in the 1990s. In 1995, the OECD held 
a conference for representatives from industry and government to discuss the im­
pact of cryptography. This led to the formation of an Expert Group that met four 
times in 1996. The group produced a paper on 'OECD Guidelines for Cryptogra­
phy Policy' (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1997). It 
laid out eight principles for national legislation. They were, that:
1. Cryptographic methods should be trustworthy in order to generate confi­
dence in the use of information and communications systems;
2. Users should have a right to choose any cryptographic method, subject to 
applicable law;
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3. Cryptographic methods should be developed in response to the needs, de­
mands and responsibilities of individuals, businesses and governments;
4. Technical standards, criteria and protocols for cryptographic methods should 
be developed and promulgated at the national and international level;
5. The fundamental rights of individuals to privacy, including secrecy of com­
munications and protection of personal data, should be respected in national 
cryptography policies and in the implementation and use of cryptographic 
methods;
6. National cryptography policies may allow lawful access to plaintext, or cryp­
tographic keys, of encrypted data. These policies must respect the other 
principles contained in the guidelines to the greatest extent possible;
7. Whether established by contract or legislation, the liability of individuals 
and entities that oEer cryptographic services or hold or access cryptographic 
keys should be clearly stated;
8. Governments should co-operate to co-ordinate cryptography policies. As 
part of this effort, governments should remove, or avoid creating in the 
name of cryptography policy, unjustified obstacles to trade (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 1997).
Whilst open to interpretation, the wording of principle number six appeared to 
suggest that, though government access to encryption keys could be lawful, this 
concern should not be prioritised over the other principles.
At the national level, in terms of law enforcement and communications, the most 
important piece of legislation prior to the start of the debate over TTPs was the 
Interception of Communications Act 1985. This piece of legislation made it an of  ^
fence to unlawfully intercept communications sent by post or by a public telecom­
munications system. It also established a procedure for law enforcement bodies to 
obtain a warrant from the Secretary of State to lawfully intercept communications 
in certain circumstances. Section 2(2) of the act stated that the Secretary of State 
will not issue a warrant under this section unless he considers that the warrant is 
necessary:
1. In the interests of national security;
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2. For the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; or
3. For the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United King­
dom (Interception of Communications Act 1985, p.2).
In summary, prior to the debate on TTPs, there already existed powers that al­
lowed the legal interception of electronic communications for certain law enforce­
ment and economic purposes. There also existed guidance for European nations 
on cryptography policy, as well as frameworks for assessing the conformance of 
security technologies to European standards. The cryptology expertises of those 
working at CESG and NPL were put to use in the day-to-day running of the 
latter. Finally, it is worth making clear that, in contrast to the situation in the 
US, there's no evidence that law enforcement or intelligence agencies attempted to 
subvert the course of cryptology research in universities or in industry.^ However, 
the Clipper Chip proposals - which were discussed in chapter 1 - were known to 
many of those involved in the technical and political phases of the crypto wars in 
the UK, and this may have altered the way they viewed debates over cryptology 
regulation.^
8.2.2 The A nnouncem ent o f the T T P  Proposals
In this subsection, I will describe the way in which the government's TTP pro­
posals were announced. As will become clear, the TTP proposals were announced 
suddenly, and were immediately controversial because of the nature of what they 
proposed. Amongst some cryptology experts, they were also controversial because 
of the lack of technical detail they contained, their finalised tone, and the narrow­
ness of the expertise they appeared to be based upon.
By 1994, the crypto wars in the US were prompting concerns over whether the 
UK government had similar intentions. These concerns filtered through to a small 
group of MPs. This prompted David Shaw MP on 21st April 1994 to formally 
ask the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) whether they were planning on
^One interviewee from the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway told me that no-one 
from CESG or GCHQ had ever tried to stop them carrying out cryptology research.
^There is some evidence to suggest that those broadly opposed to the TTP proposals saw 
them in terms of attempts to introduce the Clipper Chip in the US. For example, in an early 
discussion of the proposals, they were referred to informally aa "HMS Clipper" (Gladman 1996u).
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introducing any legislation related to cryptolog}'. The DTI replied that they had 
"no current plans to introduce legislation relating to data encryption" (HC 1994).
This position was ofhcially reversed just over two years later with a statement 
from the DTI on June 10th 1996 (Department of Trade and Industry 19966). The 
statement was fronted by Ian Taylor MP - a Conservative minister for Science 
and Technology. In short, the 'Paper On Regulatory Intent Concerning Use Of 
Encryption On Public Networks' described how the government would attem pt to 
juggle the desire to engender trust in electronic commerce whilst maintaining the 
possibility of effective law enforcement. The paper stated that the government 
intended to introduce legislation to:
Facilitate the development of electronic commerce by the introduction 
of measures which recognise the growing demand for encryption ser­
vices to safeguard the integrity and confidentiality of electronic infor­
mation transmitted on public telecommunications networks (Depart­
ment of Trade and Industry 19966).
However, the government also stated an aim to:
Preserve the ability of the intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
to hght serious crime and terrorism by establishing procedures for dis­
closure to them of encryption keys, under safeguards similar to those 
which already exist for warranted interception under the Interception 
of Communications Act (1985) (Department of Trade and Industry 
19966).
The government proposed to do this through the use of TTPs. TTPs would be 
commercial or non-profit organizations that would act as intermediaries between 
two parties - say, an online vendor and a customer - that wished to communicate 
securely using cryptography. In terms of who the government saw as appropriate 
potential TTPs, they stated that they "would expect organizations with existing 
customers, such as banks, network operators and associations (trade or otherwise) 
to be prime candidates" (Department of Trade and Industry 19966).
Trust was identified as the key issue for TTPs. The government believed that 
TTPs would be trusted in their role, because they would each be required to 
obtain a license from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry:
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By their nature, TTPs, whatever services they may provide, will have 
to be trusted by their clients. Indeed in a global trading environment 
there will have to be trust of, and between, the various bodies fulfilling 
this function. To engender such trust, TTPs providing information 
security services to the general public will be licensed. The licensing 
regime would seek to ensure that organisations and bodies desiring to 
be TTPs will be fit for the purpose. The criteria could include fiduciary 
requirements (eg appropriate liability cover), competence of employees 
and adherence to quality management standards (Department of Trade 
and Industry 19966).
Crucially, the government stated that encryption keys - the vital information re­
quired to encrypt and decrypt communications - would be held by TTPs in escrow. 
As encrypted communications were seen by the government as having potential 
law enforcement implications, "TTPs would also be required to release to the 
authorities the encryption keys of their clients under similar safeguards to those 
which already exist" (Department of Trade and Industry 19966). Once the TTP 
had handed over an individual's encryption keys, law enforcement bodies would 
be able to use them to decrypt intercepted communications or stored information. 
This, unsurprisingly, turned out to be particularly controversial.
The initial statement from the government announcing their proposals for TTPs, 
and many of the documents that followed, were short on technical details. They 
typically did not provide specihc details about the technologies that would be used. 
However, the TTP system would clearly need to be built on top of an appropriate 
technological infrastructure, comprised of specific protocols and algorithms, and 
decisions about what technologies to use would be important. Some of those fol­
lowing the developments believed that the so-called 'Royal Holloway' protocol - 
developed by the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway - would form the 
basis of the proposed TTP system.'^ Though this was not clearly stated by the 
government, the belief stemmed Rom details about two public-sector information 
security schemes that were already underway. The first of these proposed the use 
of the Royal Holloway protocol to secure emails sent between government depart­
ments (Communications-Electronics Security Group 1996). The second scheme
^The Royal Holloway protocol was also referred to as 'CASM' or the 'GCHQ' protocol at 
various points during the crypto wars. This is because it was modified slightly at various points 
to suit the context in which it would be applied.
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proposed the use of the Royal Holloway protocol - in conjunction with a classi­
fied CESC-developed algorithm called Red Pike - to secure the How of clinical 
data around a proposed National Health Service (NHS) network (Zergo 1996). 
Ross Anderson and Michael Roe (1997) from the Security Croup at the University 
of Cambridge believed that the technologies earmarked for use on these projects 
would also be used for the TTP scheme to ensure compatibility when they became 
part of the same government network.
The Royal Holloway protocol was developed by Nigel Jefferies, Chris Mitchell, and 
Michael Walker (1995).^ It was first presented at the Cryptography Policy and 
Algorithms Conference in Queensland, Australia, in July 1995. The title of the 
paper was 'A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third Party Services'. The paper 
was also presented at subsequent conferences in America and Switzerland in the 
following year. The protocol emerged out of the aforementioned UK DTI/EPSRC 
research project entitled 'Security Studies for Third Generation Telecommunica­
tions Systems' (CR/J17173/01), carried out by the Information Security Croup 
in conjunction with Vodafone, CEC Plessey Telecommunications (CPT), and the 
DTI.
The paper proposed "a novel mechanism that will enable TTPs to perform the 
dual role of providing users with key management services and providing law 
enforcement agencies with warranted access to a particular user's communications" 
(Jefferies et al. 1995). As such, it matched the requirements that would later be 
outlined in the government's TTP proposals. The paper also described how it 
would be possible for two parties - using two different TTPs - to communicate in 
secret. Furthermore:
Should there be a warrant for legal interception of this communication, 
an intercepting authority can retrieve the private key of one of the users 
from the associated trusted third party within its jurisdiction and use 
this with the public key of the other user (which is transmitted along 
with the encrypted message) to find the session key for the encryption.
There is no requirement for the intercepting authority to retrieve the 
private keys of both users (Jefferies et al. 1995).
^At the time, only Mitchell held a position within the Information Security Group. However, 
all three had previously worked at Racal and maintained strong links with the group. On the 
original paper, the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway was listed as the institutional 
affiliation of all three authors.
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A unique feature of the protocol was that it allowed law enforcement bodies to 
decrypt both incoming and outgoing traffic. In the set of assumptions about the 
requirements of TTPs, the paper stated that "access must be provided to the 
subject's incoming and outgoing communication, where a warrant is held" and 
that "this is clearly achieved for the proposed scheme, as the subject's TTP can 
provide the appropriate send and receive private keys" (Jefferies et al. 1995). This 
was in contrast to most other protocols, where decryption was permitted, but only 
in a single direction. However, this feature also matched with what would later 
be outlined in the government's TTP proposals.
The first public indication that the government intended to make use of the Royal 
Holloway protocol came when CESC published a report on another proposed sys­
tem to secure government emails (Communications-Electronics Security Croup
1996). The system, known as the 'CESC Architecture for Secure Messaging' 
(CASM), was designed to:
Facilitate pan-government secure inter-operability of electronic mail, 
by simpli^ing the implementation of secure electronic mail within gov­
ernment, ensuring secure electronic mail between departments is pos­
sible, attempting to facilitate future inter-operability with commercial 
users, maximising the use of commercial technology in a controlled 
manner, whilst allowing access to keys for data recovery or law en­
forcement purposes if required (Communications-Electronics Security 
Croup 1996).
The report clearly stated that CASM was "based upon a proposal by the Royal 
Holloway College [RHC] for trusted third party services" (Communications-Electronics 
Security Croup 1996).
This was followed by the release of a report on proposals to use cryptography to 
secure the flow of clinical data around NHS networks. Prior to the publication of 
this report, it had long been believed that the networking of electronic clinical data 
within the NHS could offer benefits, and that concerns over privacy formed one 
of the main obstacles. Some, including the British Medical Association (BMA), 
were particularly concerned over the security of the planned NHS network. Specif­
ically, they were worried that non-medical personnel working for the NHS might 
be able to use the system to access patient data. Cryptography appeared to offer
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a solution. The Information Management Group (IMG) of the NHS Executive 
commissioned a report to examine "the ramifications of using encryption and re­
lated services across the NHS-Wide Network (NWN)". The report waa produced 
by Zergo Ltd. Zergo - as was described in chapter 5 - was a cryptography solu­
tions firm founded by Henry Beker in 1988. As such, Zergo had links with the 
Information Security Group at Royal Holloway and Racal. The Zergo report rec­
ommended that "the NHS will need to develop a key management infrastructure 
to sit across the many different systems that will become encryption-enabled. This 
infrastructure will require one or more Trusted Third Parties (TTP) management 
centres" and that "the NHS's needs should be addressed by a family of related 
encryption products built on the Red Pike encryption algorithm. This algorithm 
has recently been made available to the NHS by CESG, the National Technical 
Security Authority within HMG" (Zergo 1996). This could be read so as to suggest 
that plans were already being put in place for a system that would be compatible 
with a future national TTP infrastructure.
Because of the stated intention to use it for the NHS network, it was believed 
that the proposed nationwide TTP system would also make use of the Red Pike 
algorithm. Little is known about Red Pike. It was developed in secret at CESG, 
and information relating to it remains classified. In 1996, CESG commissioned 
an analysis of Red Pike by Codes and Ciphers Ltd - a cryptography consultancy 
company set up by Fred Piper which also drew on the expertise of individuals 
from the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway (Mitchell et al. 1996).
As was mentioned earlier, the BMA were critical of the security of the proposed 
NHS network. To aid their challenge, they asked Ross Anderson to act as a 
security consultant, so that they could propose their own security policy. Anderson 
was particularly critical of the decision to use a modified version of the Royal 
Holloway protocol (which Anderson preferred to refer to as the GCHQ protocol 
following their small modifications to it) in a system to secure government emails 
and in a system to secure clinical data, given a mismatch between their respective 
requirements:
The heart of the m atter is that the IMG cryptography strategy appears 
to encourage the NHS to adopt protection mechanisms very similar to 
those designed by CESG (a department of GCHQ) to protect gov­
ernment electronic mail . . .  However, the GCHQ protocol mechanisms
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have diEerent goals from those of the clinical professions. They attempt 
to keep a message between two officials secret from third parties, but 
available to both their superiors (and to the police and intelligence 
services) by ensuring that each official's departmental security officer 
has a spare copy of the key used to encrypt it . . .  Clinical professionals, 
on the other hand, require safety and privacy. The origin and con­
tent of messages should be indisputable, whether for the purposes of 
immediate clinical decision making or for litigation many years later 
(Anderson 1997a, p.3).
Anderson (1997a) was also critical of Red Pike, and in particular, its proposed 
use for the NHS network. Along with a general criticism of the NHS strategy, 
Anderson questioned the choice of a classified algorithm - rather than algorithms 
such as SAFER, WAKE, and Blowfish - all of which had been strengthened by 
academic scrutiny.
The proposals were also criticised form a technical point of view. The most promi­
nent critique of the technical aspects of Royal Holloway protocol, and GCHQ's 
modifications to it, came from a paper written by members of the Cambridge 
group. The paper, written by Ross Anderson and Michael Roe, used the HMG 
email and NHS reports to make a case for why the technical details of the protocol 
mattered:
If an unsound protocol were to be adopted across Europe, then this 
could adversely aEect not just the secrecy of national classified data, 
the safety and privacy of medical systems, and the confidentiality of 
tax returns and government grant applications. It could also affect a 
wide range of commercial systems too, and make Europe significantly 
more vulnerable to information warfare. If the protocols were sound 
but inefficient, then they might not be widely adopted; or if they were, 
the costs imposed on the economy could place European products and 
services at a competitive disadvantage (Anderson &: Roe 1997).
Here, Anderson and Roe argued that the adoption of the Royal Holloway pro­
tocol might prompt other nations within Europe to adopt it for standardization 
purposes. W hat followed was a detailed technical analysis, with the conclusions 
summarized in four key points:
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1. The key management scheme gives ns all the disadvantages of public key 
crypto (high computational complexity, long key management messages, dif  ^
hcult to implement on cheap devices such as smartcards), and all the disad­
vantages of secret key crypto (single point of failure, little forward security, 
little evidential force, difficulty of 'plug and play' with shrink-wrapped soft­
ware). It does not provide any of the advantages that one could get from 
either of these technologies; and its complexity is likely to lead to the subtle 
and unexpected implementation bugs which are the cause of most real world 
security failures.
2. It is designed for tightly hierarchical organisations, and cannot economically 
cope with the more complex trust structures in modern commerce, industry 
and professional practice. Its main effect in government may to perpetu­
ate rigid hierarchies and frustrate the efficiency improvements that modern 
management techniques might make possible.
3. It goes about establishing trust in the wrong way. To plan to bootstrap 
signature keys from a 'national public key infrastructure' of escrowed confi­
dentiality keys shows a cavalier disregard of the realities of evidence and of 
safety-critical systems.
4. There are a number of serious technical problems with the modifications 
that have been made to the US Message Security Protocol, which underlies 
the UK government's offering. Quite independently of the key management 
scheme and trust hierarchy that are eventually adopted, these modifications 
are unsound and should not be used (Anderson & Roe 1997).
The paper argued strongly that the protocol was "very poorly engineered" (An­
derson &: Roe 1997).
The reports detailing the TTP proposals, the NHS network, and the system to 
secure government emails, taken together, suggested to some that the government 
were rushing to implement a number of secure systems using the same technologies. 
Unusually, CESG director Andrew Saunders released a statement that openly 
addressed this issue. Saunders (1997) stated that elements of the HMG email and 
NHS proposals were mistakenly conflated:
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Some commentators have confused the relationship between the rec­
ommendations and a National Health Service project for a secure net­
work. The two are similar but distinct. In early 1996 Zergo Limited 
produced a study on the use of encryption services for an NHS-wide 
network. It recommended that the NHS should adopt X.509 Authen­
tication Framework, Certification Authorities, X.509 version 3 certifi­
cates, Trusted Third Parties, Diffie-Hellman, Red Pike, DSA etc, but 
did not refer to CESC's recommendations, only to CESC. It has been 
incorrectly assumed that the recommendations are the same as the so­
lution proposed for the NHS. However, CESC's programme is aimed 
only at HMC and has no connection with the Zergo proposal (Saunders 
1997).
Furthermore, Saunders accused critics of the proposals of inferring too much from 
the information given in the two documents, in particular, the desire to promote 
the CESC-designed Red Pike algorithm:
Another common misconception is that the CESC Red Pike algorithm 
is being recommended for use in the public arena. No confidentiality 
algorithm is mandated in the recommendations: for HMC use, how­
ever, approved algorithms will be required; Red Pike was designed for 
a broad range of HMC applications (Saunders 1997).
These denials did little to allay the concerns that some had over CESC's input 
into the scheme, and what appeared to be the proposed use of classified technology 
(e.g. Cladman 1997, Shepherd 1997). Importantly, Saunders' response ignored the 
more technical criticisms levelled by Anderson and Roe.
The technical problems that some saw in the Royal Holloway protocol, and in other 
technologies supposedly earmarked for the TTP proposals, were exacerbated by 
the fact that it appeared to them that the government had already 'made up its 
mind' without consulting the wider cryptology community. As Brian Cladman, 
former scientist and computer security specialist at the Royal Radar Establishment 
in Malvern and the Ministry of Defence, wrote in response to the tone of the 
original DTI announcement:^
^Further details about how Gladman acquired his cryptology expertise are provided on his 
personal website: http://www.gladman.me.uk
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Note here that the policy HAS BEEN decided - that's it folks - we 
know what is best for you - you know that you can trust us and we 
certainly don't want you to think for yourselves - heavens above, that 
how revolutions start! W hat did you say, it's all about democracy, gov­
ernments serving their citizens, achieving open government, freedom 
of information and all that? You mean that we should actually seek 
views BEFORE we set our policy? No, no, we can't possibly do that 
- if we did that people might disagree with us and we may then hnd 
it dilhcult to have the policy we want - OOPS, I mean the policy that 
we have decided is best for you (Cladman 1996a).
As this quote highlights, views were not publicly sought on the TTP policy before 
it was announced. Furthermore, given that the protocol had been partly paid for 
by the DTI, and would possibly be used in conjunction with classified technol­
ogy provided by CESC, some felt there had not been adequate opportunity to 
scrutinize the technology. It therefore appeared that the government had decided 
that the answer to the question "can a nationwide TTP system be secure?" was 
"yes". It was therefore felt by some, particularly the Cambridge group, that the 
government had not made proper use of the available cryptology expertise, and 
that if it had consulted more widely, it would have been compelled to consider 
an alternative view. To compound this, there was also a distinct lack of clar­
ity about the technologies tha t the government were proposing to use. Though, 
by piecing together information from different documents, some were apparently 
convinced that the Royal Holloway protocol and the Red Pike algorithm would 
be used, this had not been made absolutely clear. Some, including members of 
the Cambridge group, clearly felt that the lack of clarity over the TTP proposals, 
and the lack of consultation, was due to the fact tha t the impetus for them was 
coming from CCHQ, and that the secrecy surrounding them prevented the policy, 
and associated technologies, from being properly scrutinized (Anderson 1997a).
To sum up how cryptology expertise had been used up to this point in the political 
phase, we can see expertise from different sites being put to use in different ways. 
Expertise from Royal Holloway was used to produce a protocol for use in the pro­
posed TTP system. Expertise from Cambridge was not drawn upon during the 
formulation of the initial proposals. However, given that their work in the tech­
nical phase was at odds with the reasoning behind the proposals, it was used to 
critique the protocol and the broader assumptions it was based upon. The BMA
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also used this expertise to challenge the principles upon which the NHS proposals 
were based, and to develop their own security policy arguments. Expertise from 
CESC appears to have fed into the political phase through their input on related 
schemes, and the proposed use of Red Pike algorithm. However, the lack of clarity 
surrounding CESC's activity also started to fuel speculation over their motives. 
CESC also appeared to draw on the expertise of cryptography consultancy with 
links to Royal Holloway in order to legitimise their proposals and diffuse specu­
lation about their intentions. Expertise from NPL does not appear to have been 
visibly drawn upon by the government or used to influence the political phase in 
any other way.
8.2.3 The First Stage of C onsultation
The announcement of the TTP proposals was marked by a lack of clarity over 
how cryptology expertise had been used to inform them. In common with many 
policy announcements, it was later followed by a government consultation exercise. 
This ostensibly offered an opportunity for those who had not been involved in the 
initial formulation of the proposals - or who had otherwise disagreed with them - 
to offer up their expertise. Prior to the start of the consultation process, several 
interested individuals decided to establish a mailing list dedicated to discussion 
of this issue. This list became known as the UK Cryptography Policy Discussion 
Croup - but was informally referred to as the 'ukcrypto' mailing list. The mailing 
list became a hub of activity related to the political phase of the crypto wars, and 
was particularly popular with those who had specialist cryptology expertise. The 
list was established by Brian Cladman in July 1996. It had an initial membership 
of around 25 subscribers. Members came from a variety of backgrounds, including 
industry, the public sector, and academia. Though it is difficult to be sure, owing 
to the technical nature of much of the discussion it would appear that most of the 
members had some experience of cryptology research, or experience of research in 
an adjacent held. As such, membership of the list appears to have been made up 
of people who either had contributory or interactional cryptology expertise.
From reading through the mailing list's archives, it is clear that the majority of 
members were opposed to the government's proposals. However, the mailing list 
also featured occasional contributions from members who were somewhat support­
ive, so constructive debates were not ruled out. Nonetheless, particularly judging
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from the early messages, it is clear tha t most saw the list as a platform from which 
to organise their opposition to the proposals and to communicate this opposition 
to policymakers. In establishing the mailing list, Gladman wrote:
My own view here is that we need to avoid any hidden agendas which 
will lay ns open to accusations from both crypto fascists and anar­
chists that we are conspiring to undermine their undoubtedly correct 
positions. Hence I believe that it is important that we are open and 
honest about the group, its intentions and its membership. I do not 
think we can expect to be listened to if we are not prepared to be 
completely open about what we are doing. My own experience (and 
I have plenty!) is that the best defence against the extremists in this 
dirty political arena is one of being completely open and honest about 
positions and intentions - conspiracies and closed 'behind the scenes' 
activities are what the extremists get up to (Gladman 19966).
Issues related to the technology to be used in the TTP proposals continued to be 
discussed on the ukcrypto mailing list some years after the publication the two 
aforementioned CESG and NHS reports. In particular, it continued to be debated 
whether the wording of the report indicated that Zergo had indeed advised the 
NHS to adopt a key escrow scheme. The broadly oppositional stance taken by the 
members of the Cambridge group tended to be mirrored by other list members. 
In addition to repeated criticisms of the decision to base systems on the use of 
the Royal Holloway protocol and Red Pike, there persisted a general feeling that 
much of what had happened had been 'orchestrated' by CESG, and that it was all 
a pretence to force the adoption of some form key escrow scheme for the benefit 
of CCHQ (e.g. Back 1998). However, a lack of concrete evidence on both sides 
meant that debates often had a rather circular quality.
The TTP policy officially surfaced again in March 1997, when the DTI published a 
consultation document on the 'Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision 
of Encryption Services' (Department of Trade and Industry 1997a). In the UK, 
the purpose of consultation documents (sometimes called Green/White Papers) is 
to canvass the opinions of industry, academics and the wider public on a policy 
before attempts are made to draft a bill. Although not a formal part of the UK's 
legislative process, the consultation process is covered by the Cabinet Office Code 
of Practice. Though consultation should be viewed as a positive feature of the
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legislative process, it is still open to criticism. Common criticisms include the fact 
that: political pressure often means that there is little time to consult properly; 
the process may be overly influenced by larger organizations; consultation often 
focuses on broad issues at the expense of detail; and governments can ultimately 
ignore the opinions of others and proceed regardless of contrary opinion (Rogers & 
Walters 2006, p. 194). Despite these limitations, the publication of this document 
still marked the start of a consultation process, during which those opposed to the 
TTP proposals were able to offer up their expertise.
The timing of this consultation document is perhaps noteworthy, given its close 
proximity to the 1997 general election. This election resulted in a majority vic­
tory for the Labour party, ending an 18 year period in opposition. The Labour 
victory was significant because their election manifesto had explicitly stated that, 
if elected, their government would not follow the same path as the US when it 
came to cryptography regulation:
It is important that privacy is rigorously protected over the new net­
works, for both personal and commercial reasons. We do not accept 
the "clipper chip" argument developed in the United States for the 
authorities to be able to swoop down on any encrypted message at 
will and unscramble it . . .  The only power we would wish to give to 
the authorities, in order to pursue a defined legitimate anti-criminal 
purpose, would be to enable decryption to be demanded under judicial 
warrant (in the same way that a warrant is required in order to search 
someone's home) . . .  Attempts to control the use of encryption tech­
nology are wrong in principle, unworkable in practice, and damaging 
to the long-term economic value of the information networks. There is 
no fundamental difference between an encrypted file and a locked safe.
A safe may be effectively impregnable in that the effort taken to open 
it would destroy the contents. An encryption algorithm, similarly, may 
be effectively unbreakable (Labour Party 1997).
This appeared to suggest that a Labour government would not pursue the Con­
servative TTP policy. However, it also indicated that they believed that access to 
keys for law enforcement purposes would still be desirable.
Returning to the government's consultation paper, which was published before the 
1997 general election, the central aim was still to facilitate electronic commerce
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without undermining law enforcement. The document reiterated that anyone wish­
ing to provide 'encryption services' would be legally required to become a TTP, 
and would thus require a license from the government. This license would only 
be granted if the would-be TTP stored a copy of their client's decryption keys. 
The public were not required to actually use TTPs, but if they did choose to do 
so, the government would have access to their decryption keys. The consulta­
tion document also stated that there was a possibility that, for ease of access, a 
central repository would be established that would interface between law enforce­
ment bodies and TTPs. It was argued that, if established, "it is envisaged that 
it should take no more than an hour for a TTP, once presented with a validated 
warrant request, to deposit the appropriate client encryption key(s) with a central 
repository" (Department of Trade and Industry 1997a).
The government reiterated that the TTP proposals, although controversial, merely 
aimed to update the existing laws regarding the interception of communications 
to incorporate encryption technologies, in line with the Interception of Communi­
cations Act 1985:
A critical issue presented by cryptography is the possible conflict be­
tween privacy and law enforcement. While the use of cryptography 
is important for the protection of privacy, it can also be put to im­
proper use such as hiding the illegal activities of criminals and ter­
rorists. Consequently, there is a requirement to establish appropriate 
mechanisms for lawful access to encrypted information. In the UK, se­
curity, intelligence and law enforcement agencies can lawfully intercept 
communications under certain conditions in accordance with the Inter­
ception of Communications Act 1985 (lOCA). Unfortunately, the use 
of cryptography has the potential to seriously hamper this important 
law enforcement tool, by making legally intercepted messages unread­
able, to the detriment of all law abiding citizens (Department of Trade 
and Industry 1997a).
It was stated that although the UK was in a sense "taking the lead" with these pro­
posals, they believed they were nonetheless in line with EU and OECD guidelines 
(Department of Trade and Industry 1997a).
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As it often the case, the consultation document specified topics on which feedback 
would be most welcome. The consultation document requested responses to the 
following thirteen issues/questions:
1. Whether the suggested scope of an exclusion from licensing for intra-company 
TTPs is appropriate?
2. Whether, in the short term, it would be sufficient for business to rely on 
agreements under contract regarding the integrity of documents and identi­
fication of signatures; or whether it would be helpful for legislation to intro­
duce some form of rebuttable presumption for recognition of signed electronic 
documents?
3. The appropriateness of the proposed arrangements for licensing and regula­
tion.
4. Views on the proposed [licensing] conditions.
5. W hat if any, specific exemptions for particular organisations offering encryp­
tion services would be appropriate depending on the nature of the services 
offered?
6. Whether it is thought desirable to licence the provision of encryption services 
to businesses and citizens wholly outside the UK?
7. Should electronic methods for the delivery of electronic warrants by the 
central repository and the subsequent delivery of keys by the TTP be intro­
duced?
8. Does the legislation specifically need to refer to other forms of legal access 
including a civil court order for access to cryptographic keys used to protect 
information relating to civil matters such as bankruptcy?
9. Should deliberate (and perhaps wilfully negligent) disclosure of a client s 
private encryption key be a specific criminal offence, or would existing civil 
and criminal sanctions suffice?
10. Whether the principle of strict liability is appropriate in these circumstances?
11. Whether, in principle, an independent appeals body (such as a Tribunal) 
should be created?
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12. Whether the proposed duties of an independent Tribunal are appropriate?
13. Would mandatory ITSEC formal evaluation be appropriate? (DTI 1997b)
These issues were undoubtedly important. But, it is notable that they have little 
to do with the technical or cryptological side of the proposals, and were instead 
primarily focussed on legal issues. It may be inferred from this that the DTI 
remained uninterested in soliciting the views of cryptology experts on technical 
matters, and instead sought expertise on matters related to law, policy, and elec­
tronic commerce. Despite this, the start of the consultation processes signalled 
the wider involvement of cryptology experts in the political phase. Although some 
had reacted to previous announcements informally using various methods of on­
line communication, and others had responded by writing technical reports, it had 
largely been a one-way process. The start of the consultation process offered an 
opportunity for those who felt their expertise had been marginalised to formally 
introduce it to the political phase.
At the start of the consultation process, the ukcrypto mailing list was a key plat­
form for organizing the activity of those with technical expertise. Charles Lindsey 
- a computer scientist at the University of Manchester and a key figure in the de­
velopment of the ALGOL 68 programming language - offered the following advice 
in a message to the group following the publication of the first TTP consultation 
document:
I would suggest that for large numbers of people immediately to write 
off to the DTI at the address given is NOT the right way. We have to 
learn to do it their way, using their language. And most notably, they 
are always more impressed by submissions coming from well known 
individuals, or from bodies that have (or appear to have) some stand­
ing and support from within the community. Language must be clear 
and polite. Sarcasm is out (the driest of dry irony is possibly in). I 
therefore suggest three phases:
1. Study the document, and establish exactly what it means.
2. Decide which issues are the essential ones to raise.
3. Prepare specific commentaries and counter proposals (Lindsey
1997).
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Whether stemming from this message or not, this is quite a good summary of the 
approach used by individuals to transfer their expertise. The hrst TTP consulta­
tion resulted in 102 responses from organizations - including Intel, Hewlett-Packard 
and British Telecom - and 158 responses from individuals. This reflected the fact 
that many felt that the initial policy did not adequately reflect the available exper­
tise. The DTI published a summary of these responses in February 1998. The full 
responses themselves remain confidential, and were only made available to mem­
bers of parliament. However, at the time, Hosein (1997) solicited for full responses 
using mailing lists and Internet searches, and produced a summary report of the 
25 responses he received.
I s su e  D e s c r ip t io n
Legal recognition  of A lm ost universal consensus th a t th e  legal recognition  of d ig ita l
d ig ita l signatures signatures for th e  purposes o f e-com m erce was a p ositive  developm ent
D istingu ish ing  betw een G eneral consensus th a t e-com m erce and law enforcem ent are
e-com m erce and  ^ . . .
surveillance separate issues th a t require separate policies
Frequently expressed concern over m andatory licensing of T T P s. 
M andatory licensing  Som e felt th a t licensing should be voluntary, w h ilst others felt th at
licensing should be m andatory, but under different term s.
Frequently expressed concern over th e  com m ercial im pact th at  
International consistency  would result from th e  UK having a p o licy  th a t differed from their
trading partners.
q , Concern over th e  security  risks associated  w ith  placing keys in a
ecuri y n s  s centralised  system  outsid e  of their owner's control.
Concern over general lack o f technical deta il about the proposed  
Technical specifics schem e, and concern over tech n ica l com petence where deta il
was provided.
Crim inal circum vention Concern over the p o ten tia l for crim inals to  be able to  bypass the  system  and underm ine th e  law enforcem ent aspects.
TABLE 8.1: Summary of Responses to the First TTP Consultation (Hosein
1997)
From Table 8.1 it is clear that the legal status of digital signatures and the need to 
separate e-commerce and law enforcement policies were of primary concern to those 
who had submitted responses. However, despite not being solicited, comments 
were also received relating to the technical side of the proposals. Anderson used 
the consultation exercise to reiterate his view that the use of the Royal Holloway 
protocol was unacceptable, and to question the way in which the DTI had sourced 
technical expertise:
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The GCHQ protocol is extremely poorly engineered and should not be 
used. The detailed reasons for this are contained in the paper "The 
GCHQ Protocol and its problems" which is appended and is hereby 
included . . .  Quite apart from the specific problems with the GCHQ 
protocol, I would suggest that the DTI acquire some source of technical 
advice on cryptography that is of substantially higher grade than has 
clearly been made available to date (Anderson 19976).
Anderson combined these specific technical criticisms, and criticisms of how the 
DTI had sourced its expertise, with a broader critique of the policy:
The previous government's proposals for introducing key escrow via 
a scheme of compulsory licensing of so-called 'Trusted Third Parties' 
are founded on mistaken assumptions. They are probably illegal under 
European law; they will place a significant cost burden on British busi­
ness; they will decrease public confidence in information systems; and 
they attem pt to centralise the trust structures in our society in a way 
that will have many unpleasant consequences -  only some of which we 
can now predict. No case has been made for any law enforcement gain 
to offset these financial and social costs (Anderson 19976).
Responses from industry tended to be similarly negative, but were usually less 
damning in their criticism, thus striking a more conciliatory tone. For example, 
the submission from the computer hardware manufacturer Intel stated:
We doubt that:
1. The proposals represent the surest and least burdensome way of 
building public trust in the supply of encryption services.
2. There is a strong likelihood of their adoption, in principle at least, 
across the European Community and in other OECD countries.
3. The proposals would stimulate the growth of electronic commerce 
in the UK.
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4. There is no other viable option for enforcement agencies to have 
access to encrypted data in readable form and suggest that a fresh 
look is taken of the issues, with further consultation of interested 
parties (Intel 1997).
In summing up the responses that he had received, Hosein observed that:
While there is no clear consensus on the outcome of any policy that is 
to be introduced, what must be acknowledged is that within the UK 
we have a wealth of knowledge, a wealth of experience, and a wealth 
of opportunity. Any future development in the held of cryptography 
policy needs to capitalise on this, embrace the participation and invite 
the knowledge. We must release the obscurity, stop the scrambling, 
and introduce the sunlight (Hosein 1997).
This again rehected the view held by many that cryptology expertise had not been 
adequately drawn upon in the formulation of the policy.
Then, during the hrst part of the consultation process, there was a rather unex­
pected development. As was described in chapter 7, there exists strong evidence 
that the ideas that underpin public-key cryptography were hrst discovered by re­
searchers working within CESG in the 1970s. These ideas were explored under 
the heading of work on non-secret encryption. However, all information about 
this discovery was kept secret from the public. In December 1997, in-between the 
publication of the hrst consultation document and the publication of the summary 
of responses, CESG took the decision to declassi^ and release information relating 
to this work.
As was described earlier, hve documents were released in total (Communications- 
Electronics Security Group 19986). The hrst of these was an historical rehection 
on the discovery written by James H. Ellis, the individual now credited with 
the initial idea (Ellis 1987). The release of Ellis' historical account was later 
followed by the uploading to the CESG website of four further documents related 
to non-secret encryption: a report outlining Ellis' original idea (Ellis 1970); and 
three reports outlining Clifford Cocks' and Malcolm Williamson's mathematical 
implementations (Cocks 1973, Williamson 1974, 1976).
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Despite the implications that this might have had on how CESC was perceived 
during the crypto wars, a full explanation for the release of the documents relating 
to non-secret encryption was not given. This is perhaps strange given that the 
release of internal documents by CESC is rare, and questions about CESC's tech­
nical competence had already been raised by members of the Cambridge group. 
Although this revelation may appear to only be tangentially connected to the 
crypto wars, at the very least it evidenced that CESC had conducted important 
work on cryptology in secret, and that they believed there would be some value 
in informing people about this work. It should also be remembered that this 
revelation occurred during a period of 'oEensive' information management by in­
telligence organizations - based on putting secrets in the public domain on their 
own terms (Moran 2013). Despite this, when the revealing of non-secret encryp­
tion was discussed on the ukcrypto mailing list, the timing of the release was not 
linked to the wider context created by the TTP proposals.
To sum up, returning to the TTP debate, following the initial announcement, 
because some felt that their expertise was being ignored, they decided to organize 
themselves in order to be better able to contribute during the political phase. 
When the hrst consultation document was published, an opportunity arose to 
formally feed their expertise into the political phase. During this part of the 
consultation process, it became clear that the initial TTP policy did not rehect 
expert opinion. Despite earlier denials from CESC, it was still believed that the 
Royal Holloway Protocol and the Red Pike algorithm would be used. The DTI 
neither ofhcially conhrmed nor denied whether this was the case. The expertise 
of the Cambridge group remained partially marginalized, and does not appear 
to be rehected in the TTP policy. None of the technical criticisms levelled by 
the Cambridge Croup elicited a response. Additionally, the lack of clarity that 
plagued the earlier stage of the TTP debate remained.
8.2.4 The Second Stage of C onsultation
The consultation process then progressed into a second stage. The publication 
of the summary of responses to the hrst consultation was followed by a Secure 
Electronic Commerce Statement from the new Labour Parliamentary Under Sec­
retary of State at the DTI, Barbara Roche MP (Department of Trade and Industry
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1998a). Significantly, the statement explained that the mandatory approach to li­
censing favoured by the previous government would be replaced with a voluntary 
scheme:
The measures the Covernment plan to introduce take account of these 
differing aspects of cryptography and also the responses to the consul­
tation process on the licensing of Trusted Third Parties initiated by the 
previous Administration. In respect of the latter, the Covernment has 
responded to business concerns and criticisms of the previous "manda­
tory" approach to licensing. Thus, as will be explained below, the new 
proposals will neither oblige service providers to obtain licences nor to 
use any particular encryption products or technologies (Department of 
Trade and Industry 1998 a).
Though not entirely consistent with the claims made in Labour's election man­
ifesto, this statement represented a relaxing of the rules surrounding the TTP 
proposals. The statement also indicated that the Labour government saw digital 
signatures as separate from the debate, and stated that they would be dealt with 
using a separate policy (Department of Trade and Industry 1998a).
W ith the consultation process picking up speed, and faint signs that their exper­
tise was being listened to, those opposed to the government's proposals acted to 
mount an even stronger presence during the political phase. This resulted in the 
establishment of the Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) in May 
1998. FIPR was (and still is) a think-tank for technology policy, with a particular 
emphasis on policies related to information technology. Founded by Caspar Bow­
den, Ross Anderson, Roger Needham, and others, FIPR went on to become an 
important actor in the crypto wars, and clearly indicated that, rather than fading, 
the strength of the opposition to the TTP proposals was likely to grow. The FIPR 
launch press release stated that:
Too often, policy issues relating to information technology are sepa­
rately debated by two distinct groups: technology experts and those 
focused on social concerns. Policy makers face the challenge of recon­
ciling the separate debates in areas where technology is often evolving 
very quickly. [FIPR] aims to provide clear advice that spans this gap
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and is independent of vested interests (Foundation for Information Pol­
icy Research 1998 a).
W ith the founding of FIPR, it was clear that the problems associated with the 
way the government had in the past sourced their technical expertise had been 
recognised. FIPR, though made up of scientists and other experts, clearly aimed 
to have a foot in both the technical and political phases of the crypto wars, and 
aimed to bridge the gap between the two if the government was unwilling to draw 
on all of the available technical expertise. The press release also explained how 
FIPR would be funded:
Microsoft has contributed a six-hgure sum to cover the launch costs. 
Internet Service Providers Poptel and Demon are also providing sup­
port. The Foundation's independence will be guaranteed, however, by 
a board of trustees. In the medium term it will be supported by sub­
scriptions Rom a range of hrms in commerce and industry (Foundation 
for Information Policy Research 1998a).
This highlighted that, as well as failing to draw upon academic cryptology ex­
pertise, there was a belief that the government had also neglected to take full 
advantage of the expertise within industry. Following its inception, many of the 
public activities of those critical of the government's proposals were co-ordinated 
through FIPR. In a sense, it can be seen as the next organizational incarnation 
of the ukcrypto mailing list, in that it often represented the same viewpoint, but 
was able to do so in a more co-ordinated way. Once established, responses to 
consultation documents and independent surveys tended to be conducted through 
FIPR, rather than through individuals.
A second consultation document entitled 'Building Confidence in Electronic Com­
merce' followed in March 1999 (Department of Trade and Industry 1999a). In 
many ways, the second consultation document mirrored the first. Striking a bal­
ance between promoting trust in electronic commerce, and upholding law enforce­
ment capabilities was still seen as the central issue, and the way in which the 
government planned to legislate for this remained broadly the same. However, the 
document also reflected the changes outlined in the Secure Electronic Commerce 
statement. Firstly, it was now proposed that obtaining a TTP license would be
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voluntary. The stated reason for this change was that fact that "electronic sig­
natures and encryption will also be provided in 'closed' environments where trust 
already exists between the counterparties and 'trust' in the provider may be less 
important" (Department of Trade and Industry 1999a). Secondly, it was proposed 
that digital signatures would be treated separately from other cryptographic ser­
vices. In response to the feedback from the hrst consultation, it was recognised 
that digital signatures had a different commercial application than other encryp­
tion services. So-called Certihcation Authorities (CAs) would be responsible for 
electronic signatures, rather than TTPs, and as such, would be prohibited from 
escrowing keys and then disclosing them for law enforcement purposes. In sep­
arating electronic signatures - typically used for authenticity, from encryption - 
typically used for conhdentiality, the government was beginning to separate elec­
tronic commerce from law enforcement.^
The government's proposals then came under the scrutiny of the Trade and In­
dustry Select Committee. The summary of responses to the second consultation 
document was published just before the publication of the Select Committee's 
report (Select Committee 1999). In the UK, there are two main types of Select 
Committee: Commons Select Committees; and Lords Select Committees. Com­
mons Select Committees are responsible for overseeing and scrutinising the work 
of government departments. They are made up of government-appointed members 
of parliament. When a committee meets, they gather written and oral evidence re­
lating to a particular piece of government business, and produce a report of their 
findings. The government then typically has sixty days to provide a response. 
From January 26th to March 17th, the Trade and Industry Select Committee met 
six times to discuss the government's proposals for 'Building Confidence in Elec­
tronic Commerce'. They examined oral and written evidence from a number of 
parties from both sides of the debate, many of which submitted evidence during 
the consultation exercises.
The committee examined written and oral evidence from a wide range of sources, 
including scientists, lawyers, the Post Ofhce, companies associated with cryptology 
such as Baltimore (who had merged with Zergo in January 1999), and companies 
perhaps not traditionally associated with technology, such as Tesco. As with the
^As a side issue, although not fully discussed in the hrst consultation, the second consultation 
document stated that ITSEC approval would be required for technologies used for TTPs and 
CAs in order for them to receive a license from the government.
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previous consultation exercises, most expressed concerns about the TTP propos­
als, particularly over what were seen as attempts to promote a system based on 
key escrow. In his submission to the committee, Ross Anderson drew upon a paper 
he had recently co-authored with a group of high-profile US cryptology scientists, 
entitled 'The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party En­
cryption' (Abelson et al. 1997). The paper directly challenged the key escrow 
proposals and the TTP system more broadly. It was argued that:
The deployment of a global key-recovery-based encryption infrastruc­
ture to meet law enforcement's stated specifications will result in sub­
stantial sacrifices in security and greatly increased costs to the end- 
user. Building the secure infrastructure of the breath-taking scale and 
complexity demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experi­
ence and current competency of the field. Even if such an infrastruc­
ture could be built, the risks and costs of such a system may ultimately 
prove unacceptable (Abelson et al. 1997, p.250).
This paper, which clearly had an international focus, and envisioned the integra­
tion of national encryption systems within a global network, became the most 
widely cited on the issue of key escrow, and was also presented as evidence to the 
Senate during the crypto wars in the US. In their memorandum submitted to the 
committee, Baltimore saw a role for TTPs in electronic commerce:
There is a clear role for the trusted third party (TTP) within the global 
electronic market place. Indeed, some global trusted third party agree­
ments are already in place in order to meet existing market demands. 
Examples include the VISA and MasterCard organisations that set 
technical standards for bank and credit card systems. They also ar­
range clearing and settlement between retailers' banks and credit card 
issuing banks that would otherwise have no commercial agreement be­
tween them. There are many other examples of such "trusted third 
parties" in the world of automotive component purchasing, shipping 
and so on. "Trust" is a small but important part of a wider range of 
services tha t ensure that such organisations add value to an electronic 
commerce transaction and thus have a viable business role (Select Com­
mittee 1999).
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However, they were concerned about some of the potential economic consequences 
of key escrow, and an overall weakening of security:
A variety of key recovery, key escrow and trusted third party encryption 
requirements have been proposed, primarily by the police and military 
services of various countries seeking the ability to monitor and conduct 
surveillance on illegal transactions which may take place via electronic 
means. Whilst recognising the needs of law enforcements agencies, 
we are concerned that the deployment of key-recovery based encryp­
tion infrastructures will lead to an increase in costs for the user and 
/  or a weakening of the overall levels of information security (Select 
Committee 1999).
After hearing the evidence, the report produced by the Select Committee urged 
that "the Government's proposals to facilitate trust in electronic commerce must 
not interfere with existing, and often long-standing, electronic commerce relation­
ships". Furthermore, that:
The Government's proposals are tied, perhaps unduly, to the creation 
of a regulatory regime based on one particular technology - public- 
key cryptography - and a specific market model, which, although they 
could be considered attractive at present, may not be optimal bases for 
electronic commerce carried out over the internet in the future (Select 
Committee 1999).
Finally, the Select Committee suggested that:
. . .  the Government think twice about the content of its forthcoming 
Electronic Commerce Bill and only include in the Bill measures which 
will promote electronic commerce, rather than measures discarded from 
the previous key escrow policy which are concerned with controlling, 
not facilitating, electronic commerce (Select Committee 1999).
It was clear from the tone of the Select Committee report that the government's 
policy would need to be refined, and in all likelihood, the core assumptions of the
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TTP proposals would need to be rethought. By the end of the Select Committee 
process, those who felt that their expertise had been initially excluded from the 
political phase had successfully managed to transfer their expertise, and have it 
feed into formal political processes. However, it was also clear that being successful 
in this had required substantial effort, and without this effort, their expertise was 
unlikely to have been heard by the government. Furthermore, the changes to the 
proposals that this resulted in were modest. Most of the arguments that were 
made during the consultation process were ignored. In terms of how expertise 
from the four sites was used, the expertise of the group at Royal Holloway is hardly 
visible at this stage, either in the form of new technologies that could underpin 
the TTP system, or in the debates during the formal consultation exercises, select 
committee meetings, or on the ukcrypto mailing list. In contrast, the expertise of 
the Cambridge group is highly visible during the consultation process, on ukcrypto, 
and during the Select Committee process. The arguments made by Ross Anderson 
in particular appear to define the more general opposition to the government's 
proposals. In contrast to the earlier stages of the debate, CESC is far less visible. 
Whilst they did not involve themselves in either the informal or the political 
debates, their presence was clearly noticeable in their decision to reveal details of 
their work on non-secret encryption. Again, expertise from NPL does not appear 
to have been drawn upon. At this point, the conformance of any TTP technologies 
to ITSEC was a minor concern, as the debate had largely moved away from a 
technical discussion.
8 . 2 . 5  T h e  E n d  o f  t h e  T T P  D e b a t e
Shortly after the Select Committee report was published, the Prime Minister's new 
Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) published a report entitled 'Encryption 
and Law Enforcement' (Performance and Innovation Unit 1999). The PIU - as 
part of the Cabinet Ofhce - was essentially a high-prohle government think tank. 
Their involvement signalled that the TTP debate was now an important issue 
for the government. The PIU put together a 'task force' to examine it. Once 
again, the perceived conhict between electronic commerce and law enforcement 
was central. However, the report also signalled that the government was losing 
faith in the TTP concept:
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The task force welcomes the intention to include in the Electronic Com­
merce Bill provisions to allow lawful access to decryption keys and/or 
plain text under proper authority. The task force also recommended 
that further attention should be given in the Bill to placing the onus 
on the recipient of a disclosure notice to prove to the authorities that 
the requested keys or plain text are not in his possession, and to state 
to the best of his knowledge and belief where they are (Performance 
and Innovation Unit 1999).
W ith hindsight, this report can therefore be seen as marking a transition from the 
TTP model to a policy that sought direct and lawful access to encryption keys 
without the use of intermediaries (Hosein 2003).
In July 1999 the DTI published their draft Electronic Commerce Bill (Department 
of Trade and Industry 19996). The draft bill built upon the commitment made 
in 'Encryption and Law Enforcement' in that it proposed powers to allow for the 
lawful access of decryption keys under warrant. This meant that, if passed, law 
enforcement bodies would have the power to 'force' an individual to hand over 
their decryption keys through the threat of further legal action. As such, the 
law enforcement aspect of the original TTP proposals had been approached in 
a different way, and was no longer in direct conflict with the desire to promote 
electronic commerce. W ith a balance between law enforcement and electronic 
commerce priorities no longer required, TTPs lost their raison d'être.
Although still largely unpopular with those that opposed the TTP proposals, 
the wider consensus over the change to the law enforcement aspects of the bill, 
particularly the removal of key escrow, was powerful. The DTI agreed to transfer 
the law enforcement issues to the Home Office, who were in the process of making 
amendments to the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and drafting a bill 
on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers. In the Queen's Speech of November 
1999 - the point at which the government announces the laws they intend to 
bring forward - the Electronic Communications Bill contained only a sunset clause 
referring to the establishment of TTPs, which was set to expire if no action was 
taken before May 2005. This essentially marked the end of the debate over TTPs. 
FIPR issued a press release claiming that "the 'crypto wars' are finally over - and 
we've won" (Foundation for Information Policy Research 2005). This, in a sense, 
was misleading, as cryptography continued to be thought of by the government
Chapter 8. T/ze f  o(z(zm/ f/za se  0/  (/ze C?i/p(o Wars 205
as a threat to law enforcement during the intervening period. When the law 
enforcement issues were effectively passed to the Home Office, they proceeded with 
the controversial Regulation of Investigatory Powers bill, which eventually became 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). RIPA gave powers to 
law enforcement bodies to intercept and lawfully decrypt communications under 
warrant, and although it has been modified slightly since it received royal ascent, 
the powers it estabhshed are largely in effect at present.^
8.3 T he D eb a te  over E xp ort C ontrols
Running parallel to the debate over TTPs was another debate that featured cryp­
tology expertise - a debate over export controls. The debate over export controls 
concerned the best way, given the developments in electronic communications, to 
manage the intangible transfer of technology by electronic means, without dam­
aging international trade or academic freedom in the process. By the 1990s, the 
Internet could effectively be used to export software that could be used for mil­
itary purposes, and it was argued that new powers were needed to regulate it. 
However, if new powers were too drawn widely, they had the potential to impact 
negatively upon international trade and academic freedom. During this debate, 
cryptology was not seen as a potential solution to this problem, but one of the 
technologies and research helds that might be adversely affected by new laws. As 
such, cryptology had a different relationship to the debate over export controls 
than to the debate over TTPs. However, it is worth examining, because it again 
highlights how those with expertise in cryptology - in particular the Cambridge 
group - worked to have their expertise heard during the political phase. Given 
that, as will become clear, the TTP and export control debates were running in 
parallel, and the debates featured many of the same actors and processes, the ex­
port control debate will not be described in as much detail. The main purpose of 
describing the export control debate, aside Rom it being an important aspect of 
the crypto wars, is to further highlight how cryptology experts worked to transfer 
their expertise to the political phase.
^The debate surrounding RIPA was large, detailed and complex, and as a result, would require 
a separate study to analyze fully.
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8.3.1 The Background
As in many other countries, controls exist in the UK to regulate the export of cer­
tain goods. Export law is very complex, and what follows is only a brief overview. 
As a general rule, in most countries, goods designed specifically for military pur­
poses - such as weapons - are usually subject to export controls. Therefore, those 
wishing to export them require a license from the government. However, goods 
that are designed for non-military purposes, but could potentially be used for mil­
itary ends, can be classified as 'dual-use'. Those wishing to export goods that 
are classified as dual-use also require a license from the government. Additionally, 
some nations are subject to international sanctions that forbid other nations from 
exporting weapons or dual-use goods to them.
At the international level, the primary agreement concerned with export was (and 
still is) the Wassenaar Arrangement (see Evans 2009). The Wassenaar Arrange­
ment - named after the Dutch town in which it was agreed - effectively replaced the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) - a Cold War 
agreement not to export weapons to the Eastern Bloc and other socialist states. 
Like CoCom, Wassenaar is an export control regime agreed upon by nation states. 
Wassenaar is not legally binding, but instead provides guidelines for the member 
states to align their legislation with. According to the Wassenaar website:
The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to con­
tribute to regional and international security and stability, by promot­
ing transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional 
arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilis­
ing accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national 
policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to 
the development or enhancement of military capabilities which under­
mine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities 
. . .  The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole 
responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect 
to the Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation 
and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion 
(Wassenaar Arrangement 2013).
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Thirty-one countries signed the original Wassenaar Arrangement in 1996. The sig­
natories included most of the world's developed countries. Like CoCom before it, 
the arrangement classified cryptography as dual-use, and as such, countries that 
had signed the arrangement, including the UK, licensed the export of cryptogra­
phy. This meant that UK manufacturers and developers, prior to the start of the 
crypto wars, required a license to export goods that used cryptography. However, 
the Wassenaar Arrangement also contained a note on 'General Software'. This 
note exempted mass-market or public domain cryptography software from export 
controls. There also existed a personal-use exemption that permitted the effec­
tive export of products that accompanied the user (on a laptop, for example) as 
they crossed borders. However, the arrangement did not address the export of 
intangible goods, including the export of software using the Internet.
The EU also passed laws about the export of goods. These laws tended to mirror 
the Wassenaar Arrangement. Amended versions of EU Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 3381/94 and EU Council Decision No. 94/942/CFSP - both of which came 
into force in 1995 - regulated the export of dual-use goods (including cryptography) 
outside of the EU. As with the Wassenaar Arrangement, these rules did not apply 
to mass-market or public-domain cryptography, and no attem pt was made to 
address the issue of intangible export.
In common with most other countries, the UK aligned its export laws with the 
Wassenaar Arrangement.^ This meant that the export of many cryptography 
products required a license. Prior to the start of the crypto wars, the Export 
Control Organization of the DTI was responsible for issuing licenses to those who 
wished to export cryptography. However, an assessment of the application for an 
export license was made by CESG. In general, the DTI would follow the advice of 
CESG when it came to issuing licenses (Parviainen 2000, p.88).
The primary piece of legislation relating to the export of goods from the UK was 
the Import, Export and Customs (Powers) Defence Act (1939). This act, passed at 
the outbreak of the Second World War, allowed the Board of Trade to regulate the 
passage of goods in and out of the country in light of the present emergency. Given 
the age of the act, and the circumstances under which it was passed, by the 1990s it 
was seen as out-dated. The emergence of computers and the Internet, allowing as 
they did the transfer of goods by intangible means, brought this into even sharper
^As was alluded to in Chapter 1, the US was the only signatory to deviate from this arrange­
ment.
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focus. However, this, according to the government, was not the main impetus 
for changing the UK's export laws. This came from the so-called Arms-to-Iraq 
aRair, and the resultant 'Scott Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence 
Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions' (Scott 1996). 
The Arms-to-Iraq affair concerned the alleged sale of machine tools by the British 
firm Matrix-Churchill to Saddam Hussein's Iraqi government. The subsequent trial 
collapsed after it was revealed that Matrix-Churchill had received advice from the 
government on exporting to Iraq - a country that was then subject to blanket 
sanctions. As a result. Conservative Prime Minister John Major commissioned 
an enquiry headed by Lord Justice of Appeal Sir Richard Scott. Scott's 1,800- 
page report, published in 1996, was heavily critical of the export regime then 
in place, and recommended a complete reform of government powers to control 
exports. Scott also criticized the level of government transparency on the issue, 
and recommended a more open and accountable export regime.
8.3.2 The A nnouncem ent of the Export Control Proposals
Following on Rom this in July 1996, the government published a Green Paper on 
Strategic Export Controls (Department of Trade and Industry 1996(z). Responding 
to the Scott Report, the Green Paper proposed tighter regulation of the export of 
so-called weapons of mass destruction, the passage of scientific knowledge related 
to weapons of mass destruction, and the trafhcking and brokering of arms deals. 
Additionally, the Green Paper briefly addressed the new issue of the intangible 
transfer of technology by electronic means, noting that "there are currently no 
comprehensive controls on such activities" (Department of Trade and Industry 
1996a). This concern was not raised in the Scott Report, and had not yet been 
addressed by any of the relevant international bodies. As such, it was the first 
public indication that the UK government had identified it as an issue.
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, a new Labour government replaced the 
Conservative government after the General Election of May 1997. Shortly aRer- 
wards. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook MP issued a statement about the changes 
to the UK's export regime that the government were proposing. The statement 
claimed that Labour planned to build on their manifesto commitment to "not 
permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or 
international aggression". Furthermore, that:
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The Scott Report on the supply of arms equipment to Iraq revealed 
the dangers of such decisions being taken in secret. In order that par­
liament and public can observe that the new policy is being enforced,
I am today committing the Government to an annual report on the 
application of arms exports. An informed public debate is the best 
guarantee of responsible regulation of the arms trade (Department of 
Trade and Industry 19976).
Although the announcement did not specifically mention cryptography, it signalled 
that the new government were planning significant changes to export control leg­
islation.
In the months after this announcement, changes were also made to some of the 
aforementioned international frameworks. The transfer of technology by intangible 
means was slowly emerging as a concern. In October 1997 the EC published 
'Towards A European Framework for Digital Signatures And Encryption'. This 
document recommended that, when the time comes for the EU to review its dual- 
use regulation, it could be improved by:
1. Progressively dismantling intra-Community controls on commercial encryp­
tion products (i.e. not necessarily for very advanced encryption).
2. Launching a discussion on the scope and interpretation of certain provisions, 
such as the so-called "General Software Note" (stipulating that public do­
main software is not subject to controls).
3. Dealing with problems like intangible means of transmission (e.g. transmis­
sion of technology by fax or e-mail) (European Commission 1997).
It therefore became clear that the export of intangible goods was something that 
the EU might address in the future. In December 1998, the Wassenaar Arrange­
ment was amended. Goods employing relatively weak cryptography became free 
from export regulation, as did cryptography, such as that on DVDs, used to protect 
intellectual property. However, once again, no mention was made of the export of 
goods through intangible means.
To sum up, unlike the government's TTP policy, the government's policy on export 
controls did not have cryptography technologies or expertise at its heart. However,
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the classification of cryptography as dual-use had long been seen as a m atter of 
concern by those with cryptology expertise. This was particularly true in the 
period following the release of PGP, and the subsequent attempts to prosecute 
Phil Zimmerman for exporting it from the US without a license. IPs therefore 
unsurprising that broader changes to export controls were a m atter of concern for 
cryptology experts, and an issue on which they might want their expertise to play 
a part.
8.3.3 The C onsultation Process
In July 1998 the DTI published a White Paper on 'Strategic Export Controls' 
(Department of Trade and Industry 19986). This marked the start of the consul­
tation process. In the UK, White Papers are more detailed follow-ups to Green 
Papers, and are produced by the government to gather feedback before drafting a 
bill. The White Paper on Strategic Export Gontrols included a foreword from the 
then president of the Board of Trade, Margaret Beckett MP. In this foreword, the 
changes to export controls were framed against the backdrop of the Scott Report, 
and also, the recent technological advances related to electronic communications:
The Government believes that there is also a need to ensure that its 
strategic export control powers are brought up to date to enable it to 
deal with modern means of trading, such as transferring information 
via the Internet, and brokering deals involving the transfer of goods be­
tween two other countries (Department of Trade and Industry 19986).
The White Paper then expanded upon how it would deal with the issues of trans­
parency and accountability identified by the Scott Report. It also indicated that 
the government intended to legislate for what it called the transfer of technology 
by intangible means. The government believed that the existing Import, Export 
and Gustoms Powers (Defence) Act 1939 was outdated because it was worded in 
such a way that it could only deal with tangible transfer. The government pro­
posed that, as was the case with tangible transfer, the export of goods through 
intangible means should require a license from the DTI. The government therefore 
aimed to address the issue of export using email and fax:
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Given the ever increasing ease with which information can be trans­
ferred across national boundaries by electronic means, i.e. by fax or e- 
mail, the Government proposes to provide that documents transferred 
abroad containing controlled technology should be subject to export 
licensing requirements, whether exported physically or in electronic 
form (Department of Trade and Industry 19986).
The government also reserved additional proposals for the dissemination of goods 
and materials related to weapons of mass destruction. Here, the proposals also 
considered information uploaded to the World Wide Web:
The Government has also given consideration to possible controls on 
the publication of controlled technology on electronic networks such 
as the World Wide Web (WWW). Even the comprehensive controls 
on electronic transfers proposed above would not cover a situation in 
which sensitive information (which, if exported, would require a li­
cence) was posted on the electronic networks (at which point it would 
move into the public domain) where it would become accessible to 
potential proliferators. A possible solution to this would be to add a 
provision to the weapons of mass destruction-related offences proposed 
in section 3.1 above, making publication of controlled technology rel­
evant to the development of weapons of mass destruction an offence.
This would apply whatever the medium of publication (Department of 
Trade and Industry 19986).
But most drastically, the proposals also considered the regulation of information 
related to weapons of mass destruction that was 'exported' through oral commu­
nication:
Information can also be passed on in non-documentary form (e.g. 
orally or through personal demonstration). The proposal to make it 
an offence to do something which it was known or suspected could as­
sist a weapons of mass destruction or long range missile programme, 
described in paragraph 3.1.4, would catch transfers of information in 
non-documentary form. This offence would be implemented under the 
power to control the transfer of technology by any means. While this
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power would enable the Government, if need arose, to introduce the 
same controls on other types of technology, we propose for the time 
being, to limit this wider offence to technology related to weapons of 
mass destruction and long-range missiles. The Government consid­
ers that it is right that controls on the transfer of information orally 
or through personal demonstration should be limited to the areas of 
greatest concern, in view of the difficulties of licensing such transfers, 
both for applicants and for the licensing authority, and given also that 
there are sensitivities in relation to free speech and academic freedom 
(Department of Trade and Industry 19986).
Clearly, then, the government saw a wide remit for their new export control regime, 
and it was this broad scope that became the most controversial element of their 
proposals.
The DTI published two further consultation documents requesting feedback on 
their export control proposals. The first received 38 responses. The second re­
ceived 54 responses. Just over half of these responses were from industry and the 
rest were from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). However, the govern­
ment did not publish a summary of these responses, and only those voluntarily 
published by the author are available to view.
Although the White Paper did not specihcally mention cryptography or encryp­
tion, some of the responses identihed this as an issue, given the belief tha t it would 
be affected by the proposals. FIPR submitted a response entitled 'Strategic Ex­
port Gontrols: The Impact on Cryptography' (Foundation for Information Policy 
Research 19986). Here, they argued that commercial uses of cryptography should 
be separated from military uses:
Military cryptography tends to be custom built and expensive. It could 
be distinguished in law from the new growing area of commercial civil 
cryptography. But the rules make no such distinction. The controls 
apply, contrary to the spirit of Wassenaar, to what is emerging as a vital 
area for civil commerce (Foundation for Information Policy Research 
19986).
FIPR also speculated on how the proposed legislation would affect research into 
cryptography, as well as other scientific fields:
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The new proposals would effectively cover all cross-border research into 
cryptography As proposed, they would make an export licence nec­
essary for every fax and email on the subject (and those granting the 
licence would hardly be likely to understand the messages in question).
It might control the education of non-UK residents including, for ex­
ample, three quarters of Cambridge science and technology research 
students. UK participants would need a licence before submitting a 
contribution about cryptography to Internet mailing lists and news 
groups (Foundation for Information Policy Research 19986).
Here, then, FIPR were using cryptography as an example to illustrate wider neg­
ative implications for the education of, and research contribution of, foreign stu­
dents.
As had occurred with the TTP proposals, on November 10th 1998 the White Paper 
on Strategic Export Controls was scrutinized by the Commons Trade and Industry 
Select Committee (Select Committee 1998). Given the primary goals of the White 
Paper, most of the written and oral evidence that the committee heard came 
from defence manufacturers and anti-war/weapons NGOs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
defence manufacturers - such as the Society for British Aerospace Companies - 
tended argue that the proposals, particularly in relation to intangibles, went too 
far, and anti-war NGOs - such as the Campaign Against Arms Trade - while 
generally supportive, tended to think that the proposals didn't go far enough.
A written memorandum was submitted by Ross Anderson in the form of a letter 
to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Peter Mandelson MP. Anderson 
reiterated the arguments made in the earlier FIPR consultation response. Ander­
son argued that the proposed licensing scheme for intangible export would have a 
negative impact upon the science and technology departments of UK universities:
The majority of our research students, being foreign nationals, would 
appear to require personal export licenses in order to get access to 
high-tech equipment they use routinely in their work. The proposed 
requirements are likely to result in a considerable waste of time and of 
public money, and will give enormous scope for acrimony. They will 
also impose significant costs on our high-tech industries and harm our 
collaboration with them (including collaborations funded by the DTI).
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Their eEect will be to undermine the DTl's relationship with the UK 
science and technology community (Anderson 1998).
However, in this instance, cryptography technologies were only referred to briefly. 
They were listed as just one of many examples of science and technology research 
fields that would be affected.
The report published by the Select Committee, whilst acknowledging that there 
was no reason for intangible transfer to be completely exempted, expressed serious 
doubts about the viability of seeking to license in this way:
There is an irrefutable logic in the proposal which nearly all involved 
accept; there is no argument in favour of the principle of explicitly 
exempting such transfers from the licensing regime. Grave doubts have 
however been expressed as to the practicality of the proposals and 
fears raised as to their consequences if implemented (Select Committee 
1998).
Their report concluded that there could be no question of licensing export through 
intangible means until a consensus was reached. The report also dealt with some 
of the concerns raised in the responses to the W hite Paper that were specific to 
cryptography, and linked them to attempts during the crypto wars in the US to 
seek to limit its public use:
It was also implied by some respondents to the White Paper that the 
proposed extension of controls was a somewhat sneaky attem pt to con­
trol the transfer of "strong" cryptography. The USA has apparently 
tried and failed to prevent such transfers. It has also been implied that 
the new controls sought will be unenforceable unless the Government's 
agency has access to the necessary decryption, and that this will be 
used as a justification to obtain sweeping decryption powers: an im­
plication firmly rejected by the Minister (Select Committee 1998).
It's clear from this that the export control debates and the TTP debates are were 
linked in the minds of those involved. It was also clear that, as in the TTP debate, 
the Select Committee had serious concerns about the regulation of cryptology.
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As well as contributing to the consultation processes formally, those broadly op­
posed to the government's proposals also aimed to be heard through other chan­
nels. In 1998 and 1999, Ross Anderson co-authored a book called The Global 
Trust Register (Anderson et al. 1999). This book was ostensibly a directory of 
important public keys that could be used to encrypt communications. At the 
time, the export regulations surrounding cryptography prohibited the book from 
being legally published electronically, so instead, the rather cumbersome keys were 
distributed in print. Although the stated purpose of the book was "to cut through 
the current chaos of public key certification by printing the important keys in a 
widely distributed paper book and thus providing a kind of phone book or trade 
directory for security on the net" , it could also be used to impart a clear political 
message. As the preface to the 1999 edition stated, "the 1998 edition of this book 
already played a role in history: the British Government decided to tone down 
the previous government's proposed legislation on cryptography after we visited 
the minister responsible for culture, gave him a copy and complained that the new 
law would result in it being banned" (Anderson et al. 1999, pp.viii-ix).
In summary, during the consultation process, the expertise of the Cambridge 
group, particularly Ross Anderson, was clearly visible. This expertise was again 
used to form an opposition to the government's proposals. Although it would be 
difficult to argue that this expertise was ignored in the same way as it was during 
the TTP debate, the processes used to transfer it to the political phase were the 
same, and it is unlikely to have been heard if these processes were not utilized. 
Expertise from GESG, though absent Rom the visible consultation process, was 
used during the process of granting licenses for export under the previous export 
regime, and nothing in the proposals suggested that this would change. Expertise 
from Royal Holloway and NPL does not appear to have played any part in the 
debate over export controls, though when the m atter was discussed during inter­
views, a general view was expressed that the export of cryptography should not 
be licensed.
8.3.4 The Export Control Bill
On March 29th 2001, the government published its draft Export Control and 
Non-Proliferation Bill (Department of Trade and Industry 2001). The bill was 
eventually renamed to the Export Control Bill, and was introduced to the House
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of Commons on June 26th, 2001. Despite the concerns that were raised during 
the consultation process, the bill contained clauses to license the export of goods 
by intangible means. Section 2(6) of the Export Control Bill stated that:
In this Act -
"transfer", in relation to any technology, means a transfer by any 
means (or combination of means), including oral communication and 
transfer of goods on which the technology is recorded or from which it 
can be derived, other than the exportation of such goods;
"technology" means information (including information comprised in 
software) tha t is capable of use in connection with -
1. The development, production or use of any goods or software;
2. The development of, or the carrying out of, an industrial or com­
mercial activity or an activity of any other kind whatsoever (De­
partment of Trade and Industry 2001).
In response, through FIPR, Anderson and others campaigned for an amendment 
relating to academic freedom when the bill reached the House of Lords (Founda­
tion for Information Policy Research 2003). The Lords placed this section under 
scrutiny, and eventually proposed that a clause be added to the bill that exempted 
the transfer of any information that was in the public domain, and the transfer of 
information "in writing or electronically in the ordinary course of academic teach­
ing or research". This amendment was approved, and the bill was sent back to 
the House of Commons. The Export Control Bill - complete with this amendment 
- became the Export Control Act 2002 in the July of tha t year. As a result, the 
campaigning of FIPR and the Cambridge group succeeded in narrowing the scope 
of the government's export controls, and succeed in limiting their impact upon 
academic freedom. At present, the export of cryptography is still regulated in 
accordance with EU regulations, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Dual-Use 
Items (Export Control) Regulations 2000. These regulations cover both the tangi­
ble and intangible export of goods. To be clear, the amendment approved by the 
House of Lords, only exempted cryptography if bound up with academic freedom.
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8.4  C onclusion
My description of the political phase of the crypto wars in the UK described two 
debates over cryptology: a debate over TTPs; and a debate over export controls. 
Although distinct in terms of the legislative process, and their relationship to 
cryptology expertise, they overlapped in terms of some of the issues discussed and 
the actors involved.
The debate over TTPs was framed by the government as a debate over the best 
way to promote electronic commerce by using cryptography to make electronic 
transactions safer, whilst at the same time retaining the ability of law enforce­
ment bodies to monitor communications for the purposes of preventing crime. 
Eventually, the government abandoned these proposals in favour of a system that 
permitted lawful government access to keys under the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000. Expertise enacted by the Information Security Group at Royal 
Holloway was used to develop technologies that could be used in the proposed 
TTP system, and which were also to be used in a system to secure government 
emails, and patient data within an NHS network. Expertise enacted by the Se­
curity Group at the University of Cambridge was used to construct arguments to 
oppose the government's proposals. These arguments were deployed informally on 
the ukcrypto mailing list, and formally during consultation processes and Select 
Committee Meetings. Expertise enacted at GESG was used to inform the govern­
ments TTP proposals, and to assist with the development of the government email 
and NHS systems. Furthermore, GESG expertise was used to develop technologies 
that could be used in these systems. Expertise enacted within the Data Security 
Group at the NPL does not appear to have been drawn on.
The debate over TTPs can also be understood in terms of disagreements over how 
the government had arrived at their proposals, and thus the motivations behind 
them. It was felt by some - particularly those working within the Cambridge 
group - that their cryptology expertise had been ignored during the formation of 
the proposals. There also existed a view that the expertise that had been used - 
particularly that of GESG - was not up to the standard required to address the 
complexities of the TTP issue. Furthermore, the lack of detail in the proposals, 
particularly the lack of clear information about the nature of the involvement of 
GESG (and thus, possibly GCHQ), fuelled speculation about whether the propos­
als were a way of introducing a key escrow-based system that intelligence agencies
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had ultimate control over. Given tha t their expertise was being ignored, those 
opposed to the proposals organized themselves in order to mount a stronger oppo­
sition. Despite the fact that many of their arguments continued to go unanswered 
and largely unrealised in the proposals, those opposed to them consistently at­
tempted to engage with the formal processes within the political phase, in order 
to get their expertise heard. When the TTP proposals were eventually dropped 
in 2005, FIPR clearly believed that they had been instrumental in achieving this, 
given that they claimed to have "won the crypto wars" (Foundation for Informa­
tion Policy Research 2005).
The debate over TTPs unfolded in parallel with a debate over export controls. 
The debate over export controls was framed by the government as a debate over 
the best way, given the developments in electronic communications, to manage the 
export of technologies through intangible means - like cryptographic software - that 
could be used to threaten national security, without damaging trade or academic 
freedom in the process. Although the expertise enacted by Royal Holloway and 
NPL was absent from this debate, expertise enacted by the Cambridge group 
was again used to construct an opposition to the government's proposals. This 
expertise was later used to underpin arguments about the wider issues of academic 
freedom and the state of scientific research in the UK. Expertise enacted by GESG 
was used by the DTI in the process of granting licenses under the existing export 
control regime - a process tha t continued following the Export Control Bill.
As in the debate over TTPs, the cryptology expertise of those opposed to the 
proposals was initially ignored. However, in contrast to the debate over TTPs, 
the debate over export controls did not revolve around technical questions related 
to cryptology. As such, the way in which the DTI sourced its cryptology expertise 
was not as important. However, generally speaking, those opposed to the TTP 
proposals were also those opposed to the export control proposals, and the way in 
which they made their expertise known to policymakers during the political phase 
was much the same. Efforts were organized through ukcrypto and FIPR, and 
arguments were made during consultation processes, and through engagement with 
the press. These efforts could be described as successful in that they succeeded 
in preserving a particular strand of academic freedom. Therefore, aside from 
their relationship to cryptology, the debate over TTPs and the debate over export 
controls have in common the fact that their initial proposals were not based on 
the best available expertise, and if it were not for a considerable effort on the part
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of a determined group of individuals, it is likely that the UK law would now be 
different.
Chapter 9
M ultiplicity and its Consequences
9.1 In trod u ction
This chapter will be split into two halves. In the hrst half, I will describe how 
the third wave concept of sociological discrimination can be used to demonstrate 
that multiple historical and institutional research practices enacted multiple cryp­
tology expertises during the technical phase of the crypto wars. The process of 
sociological discrimination described will be based on Philippe Laredo and Philippe 
Mustar's criteria for assembling laboratory activity profiles. Moving from the spe­
cific descriptions of expertises described in chapters 4 through 7, I will categorise 
the activity of each research group in terms of the more general categories of: 
the production of certified knowledge, education and training activities, public re­
search and the innovation process, the participation in public or collective goods 
and finalities, and public debates about science and technology. In the second half 
of this chapter, I will describe the consequences that the multiplicity of contribu­
tory expertises had for the political phase of the crypto wars. I will describe how 
expertises were used for different and often distinct purposes during the political 
phase, and that these uses can be linked to the nature of the practices tha t enacted 
them during the technical phase. I will also begin to describe in more detail how 
the political phase came to know about the expertise that was enacted during the 
technical phase. I will bring all of this information together to highlight some 
of the contradictions and problems that acknowledging multiplicity brings to the 
fore, and suggest some ways in which these might be addressed. In particular, I
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will describe what I have called the 'Minimum Transfer Requirement'. This re­
quirement aims to specify the minimum conditions under which it can be claimed 
that the political phase has considered the available expertise enacted during the 
technical phase. I will also identify what I have called the 'problem of expert 
discrimination'. The problem of expert discrimination acknowledges that it will 
not always be possible for domain-specific discrimination to be adequately carried 
out or to be public demonstrated, and therefore suggests that in order to preserve 
a clear separation between the technical and political phases, there are circum­
stances under which expertise from the technical phase should not be transferred 
to the political phase.
9.2 C ontrib u tory  E x p ertise  D urin g  th e  T echni­
cal P h ase
As was described in chapter 2, the periodic table of expertise, elective modernism, 
and the third wave more generally, does not account for the different types of 
contributory expertise that can exist within a discipline. However, chapters 4 to 7 
have pointed towards some of the ways in which contributory expertise can vary 
according to the multiple institutional and historical research practices used to 
enact it.
To recap briefly, in chapter 4, it was described how the Data Security Group at 
NPL enacted their cryptology expertise during the technical phase of the crypto 
wars. Due to the increasing influence of New Public Management, the activities 
of the Data Security Group were initially focussed on the production of standards 
rather than original, open-ended research exemplified by Donald Davies' pioneer­
ing projects. By the 1990s, increased financial pressures were forcing management 
at NPL to place even greater emphasis on sourcing work using the customer- 
contractor model. Between 1992 and 1994, the budget for standards research was 
drastically cut, and almost all IT standards-based work was terminated. Within 
the D ata Security Group, this was replaced with work on the accreditation of 
testing centres for the UK ITSEC scheme. NPL became 'Government Owned, 
Contractor Operated' in 1995, resulting in fewer members of staff and a reduced 
work programme. The D ata Security Group initially survived this change, but
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with an increased emphasis on formal methods, strict conformance testing, and 
accreditation.
In chapter 5, it was described how the expertise of the Information Security Group 
at Royal Holloway was enacted during the technical phase through collaborative 
projects with industry and government. In particular, the group maintained a 
long and fruitful relationship with Racal-Gomsec. We saw how key members of 
the group became involved in cryptology through consulting for Racal-Comsec, 
and how - when the research group at Royal Holloway was established - a clear 
emphasis was placed on acquiring funding through industrial collaboration. The 
other distinctive feature of the expertise enacted by the group was its mathematical 
nature. Many of those working within the group had backgrounds in mathematics, 
and much of the academic output of the group tended towards the pure or the 
theoretical. Finally, it should also be remembered that the group also ran an MSc 
course in Information Security that aimed to train students for employment as 
industrial data security managers.
In chapter 6, it was described how the cryptology expertise of the Security Group 
at the University of Cambridge was enacted through practices based on interdisci­
plinary methods designed to probe the real-world use of cryptology systems. Re­
search into computer security began with Roger Needham's work on the Needham- 
Schroeder protocol and BAN logic, and flourished as the laboratory expanded 
through the 1980s. The key actor during the 1990s was Ross Anderson. By the 
time the UK crypto wars were underway in 1996, Anderson had already published 
work asking why crypto systems fail - based on studies of how systems behaved 
in the real-world, and the consequences that this might have for systems design. 
It should also be remembered that, again, this was only one strand of the work 
of the group. They also ran a doctoral programme for the training and education 
of PhD students, developed technologies, collaborated with industry, and carried 
out a number of other activities one would typically associate with a university 
department.
In chapter 7, a description was provided of the cryptology expertise enacted by 
GESG. GESG enacted their expertise through pioneering research into cryptology 
in the 1970s under the heading of non-secret encryption, and later, through the 
development of cryptographic algorithms such as Red Pike. GESG also advised 
governments on the use of cryptography for their communications systems, and
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managed schemes such as ITSEC that approved security products and technolo­
gies developed by others. However, these specific details also fail, in important 
ways, to paint a complete picture of CESG's expertise during the technical phase. 
This is because they capture little of the style in which GESG went about their 
activity. GESG, as a branch of GCHQ, was very secretive. Because of the links 
between GESG and the intelligence world, details about much of what they did 
- including basic details such as the names of their employees and the results of 
their research - were not made public. This created methodological difficulties for 
my research. Analysable documents were very hard to come by, and interviewees 
were either impossible to locate or unwilling or unable to participate. However, 
the methodological difficulties encountered should be seen as being caused by the 
very same practices that enacted their expertise. On this understanding, it can be 
argued that GESG enacted a secret cryptology expertise.
9.2.1 Identifying M ultip licity  U sing Sociological D iscrim ­
ination
Though the third wave does not distinguish between different types of contributory 
expertise, it may be possible to use a form of sociological discrimination to arrive 
at an appreciation of it. In discussing sociological discrimination, Weinel argued:
The application of STS methodologies and theories to instances of sci­
ence under Wave 2 has resulted in a particular understanding of the 
nature of science. It is argued here that it is this particular under­
standing of the nature of science that constitutes a specific type of 
transmuted meta-expertise, when it is used to inform science-related 
judgements such as judgements of the authenticity of scientific contro­
versies or, which is also possible, of the credibility of particular scientific 
claims (Weinel 2010, p. 198).
Weinel claimed that, because STS had developed an understanding of the nature 
of scientific controversies, this constituted a form of meta-expertise that could be 
used to arrive at a judgement of their authenticity. I argue that the same reasoning 
can be applied to other aspects of the nature of science that STS has developed an 
understanding of. Work within STS is undoubtedly sensitive to difference within
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science. Therefore, it should be possible to use existing concepts within STS to 
underpin sociological discrimination. This subsection will therefore consider some 
of the available options.
Other strands of STS have attempted to deal with difference and variation within 
scientific disciplines. Tony Becher and Paul R. Trowler (2001), in their broad-based 
study of the nature of academic disciplines, have drawn attention to the myriad 
specialities that can exist within them. In particular, they noted that "there is 
no single method of enquiry, no standard verification procedure, no definitive set 
of concepts that uniquely characterizes each particular discipline" and that it is 
"in some contexts more meaningful to speak about the identifiable and coherent 
properties of subsidiary areas within one disciplinary domain or another" (Becher 
&: Trowler 2001, p.65). Though the study of disciplines and specialization within 
science was an important area of enquiry for STS scholars in the 1960s and 1970s, 
studies were mainly concerned with developing a sociological understanding of how 
specialisms were formed, and did not aim to develop logical categories or types 
(Wray 2005). However, some studies have still touched on these ideas. For ex­
ample, Karin Knorr Cetina (1999) would later examine "machines of knowledge 
construction" in high-energy physics and molecular biology to argue that the dif­
ferences in the way they produce scientific knowledge revealed disunity amongst 
the sciences, and the possibility for disunity within scientific disciplines.
Given that it is rooted in practices, an alternative way of approaching an under­
standing of different types of contributory expertise may be derived from a con­
sideration of different laboratory 'types'. As Arjan van Rooij (2011) has observed, 
past descriptions of laboratory activity, particularly those of a historical nature, 
are predominantly based on contrasting laboratories situated within a university 
with those situated within an R&D environment:
Taking a broad view of the historical literature makes clear that sev­
eral types of laboratory have existed side by side. Yet the literature is 
fragmented. Typically, one type of laboratory is central to a particular 
strand of the literature. Crucially, academic and research and devel­
opment (R&D) laboratories have attracted much more attention than 
other laboratories in business and government or laboratories run as
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stand-alone businesses. Only very few studies have pursued a compar­
ative perspective, but these studies typically focus on only a few coun­
tries and only a few types. Because of the fragmentation, it seems that 
one type of laboratory has replaced, or has dominated, other types, 
and that one particular type embodies a superior mode of knowledge 
production. Particularly the history of R&D laboratories has been 
written from the perspective that such labs are inevitable for (big) 
business (van Rooij 2011, pp.427-428).
This can create problems for studying the multiplicity of contributory expertise 
produced in laboratories, because in the absence of an integrated account of dif­
ferent types, the understanding of university laboratories has dominated:
The university laboratory often appears as the basic type from which 
other labs are derived. In this perspective, research is equated with 
university science, but the context of business or government changes 
it. A strong current in the literature views R&D labs as halfway be­
tween the university laboratory and the world of business, as academic 
research with another goal (van Rooij 2011, p.428).
This also serves to reinforce a naive binary distinction between academic labora­
tories that are concerned with knowledge, and commercial laboratories that are 
concerned with profit. As a way of beginning to address this problem, van Rooij at­
tempted to differentiate between eight different types of laboratory (see Table 9.1).
L a b o r a to r y  T y p e O r ig in F e a tu r e s
U n iv ers ity 1800s Linked to  sc ien ce ed u cation
W orks 1800s Linked to  prod uction  p lants
C om pany Late 1800s M ix o f te st in g  and con su lting
Internal G overnm ent Late 1800s Service fun ction  for governm ent departm ents
R egu lative G overnm ent Late 1800s Support o f enforcem ent o f standards
R&D Late 1880s Im provem ent of firm 's p osition
N orm ative G overnm ent A fter 1900 Support of p o licy  goals
R esearch A ssocia tion 1910s O rganized  co-op eration
TABLE 9.1: Eight Types of Scientihc Laboratory (van Rooij 2011)
Van Rooij (2011) classified laboratories, in the first instance, based on the type of 
knowledge produced, their orientation, and their ownership. In terms of knowledge
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production, van Rooij claimed that laboratories can be concerned with research 
('why' questions), development ('how' questions), or testing ('what' questions). 
Though these classifications perhaps lack nuance in that they fail to account for 
the blurring of different activities, they do provide an interesting starting point for 
thinking about laboratories and the enacting of multiple contributory expertises, 
given that, at the very least, they acknowledge that different types of laboratory 
can produce different types of knowledge. Furthermore, van Rooij (2011) linked 
his types of knowledge production to historical and institutional practices, thus 
acknowledging the possible causal relationship between the two.
In a similar vein, Philippe Laredo and Philippe Mustar (2000) have attempted to 
assemble 'activity profiles' for scientific laboratories. Their starting point was the 
'research compass card model' - co-developed with Michel Gallon (Laredo et al. 
1992). This model identified five categories of activity that scientific laboratories 
typically engage in. They were:
1. The production of certified knowledge: the production of open scientific 
knowledge that is reviewed by colleagues and resistant to controversies;
2. Education, training activities and embodied knowledge: equipping scientists 
with the tacit knowledge required to undertake laboratory work;
3. Public research and the innovation process: the creation of competitive ad­
vantages and products through innovation.
4. The participation in public or collective goods and finalities: the production 
of standards and research that can be used by the public sector (defence, 
health, etc.);
5. Research and public debate about science and technology: contributing to 
controversies or public debates about the role of science and scientific re­
search (Laredo &: Mustar 2000, pp.517-521).
Laredo and Mustar (2000) used the research compass card to construct activity 
profiles for laboratories based on a quantitative analysis of the extent to which 
they carried out each activity. They based their assessment of whether laborato­
ries engaged in the production of certified knowledge through an assessment of: the 
average amount of academic articles produced by each researcher; indirect forms
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of individual recognition (such as conference organization, conference initiations, 
prizes, and membership of journal editorial boards); indirect forms of laboratory 
recognition (such as participation in national and international programmes); and 
official national forms of recognition. They based their assessment of education 
and training on: the number of postgraduate students in the laboratory; and the 
number of staff qualified to supervise postgraduate students. They based their as­
sessment of public research and innovation on: the level of industrial funding; and 
the nature of activities the laboratory entered into. They based their assessment 
of the production of public or collective goods on: official participation in national 
and international programmes; and the importance of national priorities to indi­
viduals at the laboratory. Finally, they based their assessment of involvement in 
public debate on: the involvement of the laboratory in controversies over technical 
decisions; and the involvement in controversies over research policy.
As Laredo and Mustar (2000) acknowledged, it is clear that any approach that 
attempts to use metrics to arrive at an assessment of the degree to which a labora­
tory engages in, say, the innovation process compared to the production of certified 
knowledge, will contain flaws. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that, in principle, the 
research compass card model can be used as a useful way of operationalizing so­
ciological discrimination to identi^  how practices at laboratories can vary. With 
this in mind, I have decided to use the research compass card as a starting point 
for developing a qualitative understanding of the work of the four laboratories 
described in the previous chapters, and thus, the expertise they enacted.
I will now attem pt to use this to characterize the activity of the research groups 
described in previous chapters. I will do this through the aid of a thematic concep­
tual matrix. More specifically, I will use the approach to the thematic conceptual 
matrix described by Stuart Henderson and Eden Segal (2013). Under this ap­
proach, the first column of the matrix states the principle, the second column 
defines that principle, the third column states the individual elements that make 
up the principle, the fourth column states whether each element was confirmed or 
refuted by the data, and the fifth column uses the data from the fourth column to 
arrive at an overall judgement of whether the principle itself was evident (see Ta­
bles 9.2-9.5). Based on the descriptions that I have developed in earlier chapters, I 
will assign a category of either: confirming evidence; partial confirming evidence;
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refuting evidence; or unknown, to each principled The advantage of this approach 
is tha t it is descriptive enough to show the disparities sometimes evident in the 
data, whilst also eschewing inappropriate or unsuitable attempts at quantification.
During the technical phase of the crypto wars, the Data Security Group at NPL 
was most closely aligned with the van Rooij's 'regulative government' classifica­
tion. However, as van Rooij (2011, 2013) specifically pointed out, more broadly 
the laboratory can probably be seen as a lying somewhere between the 'regulative 
government' and 'normative government' laboratory types. In terms of their activ­
ity during the technical phase, the group were probably most closely aligned with 
'public research and innovation' and 'participation towards public or collective 
goods and finalities' on the research compass card, but were also partially engaged 
in the 'production of certified knowledge' and 'education and training activities' 
(see Table 9.2).
The Information Security Group at Royal Holloway is clearly most closely aligned 
with van Rooij's 'university' laboratory classification. However, this alone tells us 
little about the nature of the work that the group undertook. In terms of activity 
during the technical phase of the crypto wars and the research compass card, the 
group were engaged in work characteristic of the 'production of certified knowl­
edge', 'education, training activities and embodied knowledge', 'public research 
and the innovation process', and 'the participation to public or collective goods 
and finalities' (see Table 9.3).
The Security Group at the University of Cambridge is also clearly aligned with van 
Rooij's 'university' classification. In this case, the 'university' classification pro­
vides a good starting point for thinking about the research practices that the group 
developed during the technical phase of the crypto wars. In terms of the research 
compass card, the group were engaged in work characteristic of the 'production 
of certified knowledge', 'education, training activities and embodied knowledge', 
'research and public debate about science and technology', and partially charac­
teristic of 'public research and the innovation process' (see Table 9.4).
GESG appears to be closely aligned with van Rooij's 'internal government' clas­
sification. However, GESG had an unusual role, and does not fit easily into this
 ^ In be absolutely clear, the category of 'partial confirming evidence' is applied to situations 
where there exists confirming evidence of partial involvement in an activity, rather than partial 
evidence.
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classification scheme. The group could equally be slotted into van Rooij's 'regula­
tive government' and 'normative government' classifications. In terms of activity 
during the technical phase of the crypto wars and the research compass card, there 
is evidence that the group carried out some work related to the 'participation to 
public or collective goods and finalities', but this makes for an awkward fit. This 
perhaps reflects the fact that the scientific work of intelligence organizations is 
rarely discussed. However, what is most noticeable about the attempt to charac­
terize the work of CESG is the amount of information that is unknown (see Table 
9.5).
This information can be summarised in a final table (see Table 9.6). This method 
of operationalizing sociological discrimination is neither flawless, nor the only way 
of going about the task. Whilst it does not capture the intricacies of the descrip­
tions provided in chapters 4 through 7, or identify a clear descriptive label for the 
expertise enacted in each case, it makes up for this by associating the expertise 
with general categories that may be present in other fields of scientific research. 
Furthermore, the way in which research practices (and thus contributory exper­
tise) has been characterized clearly demonstrates divergence, and thus multiplicity. 
In addition to what it reveals about conformance to the activities listed on the 
research compass card, it is also able to show instances where information about 
certain practices is absent.
This suggests additional ways in which sociological discrimination could be used 
in real-time during the political phase of a controversy over technological decision­
making. For example, assuming that the data is readily available, it could be used 
during the political phase to make decisions about where contributory expertise 
should be sought. Given that a controversy can hinge upon a wide range of issues, 
there may be a disparate range of propositional questions that require answers. 
Though a laboratory tha t specializes in education and training activities may be 
said to possess contributory expertise in a held, it is unlikely to be the best source 
of contributory expertise during a controversy that hinges on questions about the 
appropriateness of a particular technology. Thus, recognising that the contribu­
tory expertise produced within a discipline is multiple, and that this multiplicity 
can be identihed and characterized through sociological discrimination, may allow 
those active during the political phase to make better use of the expertise avail­
able from the technical, given tha t it offers an alternative to basing decisions on
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ubiquitous discrimination.
Cerlified Education research C ollective or D ebates and science
Knowledge and innovation public goods or science policy
Data Security Group ^  /  /  X
Information Security Group /  /  /  /  X
Security Group /  /  ^  X /
CESG ^  ? /  7
/ -  Conhrming Evidence 
^  Partial Confirming Evidence 
X - Refuting Evidence 
? - Unknown
TABLE 9.6: Summary of Multiple Research Practices
9.3 C ontrib u tory  E xp ertise  D urin g  th e  P o litica l 
P h ase
In the previous section, it was pointed out that the third wave does not distinguish 
between different types of contributory expertise. However, an examination of the 
technical phase of the crypto wars, as described in chapters 4 to 7, showed that 
historical and institutional practices varied across research sites. A method of 
sociological discrimination that can be used to demonstrate this multiplicity was 
therefore described. The third wave also makes few rules about the ways in which 
contributory expertise ought be used during the political phase of a controversy. 
As was described in chapter 2, under elective modernism, the technical phase can 
have a constraining effect on the justifications used during the political if the Min­
imum Default Position is applied, and more generally, it is stipulated that the 
political phase should make no attem pt to subvert the findings of the technical 
(Weinel 2010). But, in order to avoid technocracy, any kind of argument is permit­
ted during the political phase, except for the advancing of quasi-religious/populist 
arguments by those with specialist expertise. In order to develop further guiding 
principles, elective modernism should incorporate an appreciation of how contrib­
utory expertise can be used during the political phase. This is because, it is 
conceivable that, if contributory expertise is misused during the political phase, 
or if it is absent, then the technical phase could have a minimal or negative influ­
ence on the political. This is clearly to be avoided, given that it would undermine 
the crucial relationship between the technical and political phases that underpins
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elective modernism. With that in mind, I will now use the description provided in 
chapter 8 to characterize the ways in which the contributory expertise produced 
at each site was used during the political phase.
The most important thing to say about the expertise of the Data Security Group 
during the political phase of the crypto wars is that there is almost no evidence 
of its presence. Neither the D ata Security Group nor NPL were involved as in­
stitutions, and individuals working within the group did not involve themselves 
as private citizens. None of the documents analysed that originated from NPL 
discussed the debates over TTPs or export controls. Similarly, none of the doc­
uments produced by the government or other actors during the political phase 
mentioned NPL or the Data Security Group at any point. This is despite the fact 
that, historically, the laboratory had built up a considerable body of contributory 
expertise related to cryptology. Furthermore, despite changes to the way NPL 
was funded, its stated role was still to support industrial and commercial activity 
through scientific research, and questions about the best way to aid electronic 
commerce were at the heart of the TTP debate. The only partial link that can 
be made between the Data Security Group and the crypto wars relates to early 
TTP consultation documents tha t asked whether it would be appropriate for the 
technologies used in TTP systems to receive ITSEC approval. However, due to 
the way in which the debate unfolded, the proposals did not progress far enough 
for this to be a pressing concern.^
Those working within the D ata Security Group did not involve themselves in 
the political phase of the crypto wars as private citizens. This was particularly 
noticeable when I interviewed former members of the group. Most were only 
vaguely aware of the crypto wars, and of those that were, most demonstrated 
little interest in them:
Interviewer: Did you have a take on [the crypto wars]?
Respondent: No [laughs] . . .  to put it bluntly.
Interviewer: Was it something that you followed at all?
^Even if the TTP proposals had progressed further, and ITSEC approval was eventually seen 
as a requirement, the Data Security Group would not have been the ones actually carrying out 
the testing. This would have been carried out by one of the CLEFs, who would have in turn been 
accredited by the Data Security Group. As it turned out, the CASM system that waa proposed 
for use in securing emails between government departments, did receive ITSEC approval in 1998 
(Communications-Electronics Security Group 1998c). However, this ceased to be of relevance to 
the crypto wars when the TTP proposals were dropped.
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R esp o n d en t: No, I don't think I did, really.
In te rv iew er: Ok.
R esp o n d en t: To be honest, the reason I moved across to software was 
because I didn't really like security, actually. I quite liked the maths, 
all the algorithms and stuff, but I didn't really like the whole security 
area.
Others did not involve themselves directly in the crypto wars, but were interested 
in related issues, such as liability for banking fraud:
In te rv iew er: The impression that is given sometimes is that people 
were crusading for something. Is that something that was thought 
about?
R esp o n d en t: I think the only sense I got of crusading was against the 
banks - to make the banks responsible. There were people out there 
who really did want to make the banks responsible for their security - 
and rightly so.
This refers to the fact that, in the UK in the early 1990s, if a bank fraud case 
went to court, it was up to the bank's customer to demonstrate that they were 
not in some way responsible for the fraud having taken place, as opposed to the 
bank having to demonstrate that their system was as secure as they claimed. 
Although an important concern, questions about banking fraud and liability were 
only tangentially connected to the debates over TTPs and export controls.
On this basis, it can be concluded that the contributory expertise of the Data 
Security Group was absent from the crypto wars. This alone is significant, but it 
also begs the question of whether it is possible to further understand this absence. 
At present, a comprehensive sociology of the 'absent' does not exist. On the one 
hand, this is unsurprising, given that it is clearly difficult to place a consideration 
of the absent on a solid empirical footing. Furthermore, given that, as the well- 
known aphorism goes, "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence", those 
considering the absent can quickly find themselves on shaky logical ground. One 
way in which to think about absences has been provided by Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos. He has argued that:
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The sociology of absences consists of an inquiry that aims to explain 
that what does not exist is, in fact, actively produced as non-existent, 
that is, as a non-credible alternative to what exists. The objective of 
the sociology of absences is to transform impossible into possible ob­
jects, absent into present objects. The logics and processes through 
which hegemonic criteria of rationality and efhciency produce non­
existence are various. Nonexistence is produced whenever a certain en­
tity is disqualified and rendered invisible, unintelligible, or irreversibly 
discardable. W hat unites the different logics of production of non­
existence is that they are all manifestations of the same rational mono­
culture (Santos 2004).
On this understanding, an explanation of the absence of the contributory expertise 
of the Data Security Group during the crypto wars can be found rooted in the 
institutional and historical practices used to produce it. Given that, by the time 
the crypto wars started, the practices of the group were largely shaped by the 
deliberate imposition of the customer-contractor principle, the DTI (as the group's 
main customer) was able specify a focus on accreditation and ITSEC. As the 
contributory expertise required to carry out this role had little bearing on the 
issues being discussed in both the debate over TTPs and the debate over export 
controls, there was no obvious route for the Data Security Group into the political 
phase. Furthermore, in order to carry out a program of research that would 
have allowed the group to enact a body of contributory expertise relevant to the 
political phase of crypto wars, they would have had to secure a particular type of 
external contract. On this basis, I argue that by thinking about the absence of 
the contributory expertise of the Data Security Group in this way, absences can 
be thought of as being enacted in the same was as the presences of contributory 
expertises from other sources.
During the political phase of the crypto wars, the contributory expertise of the 
Information Security Group at Royal Holloway was present in the proposed use 
of a protocol that could be used to underpin the TTP system. As was described 
in chapter 5, the protocol was produced as part of a UK DTI/EPSRC research 
project entitled 'Security Studies for Third Generation Telecommunications Sys­
tems' (GR/J17173/01). The T160,000 project was carried out in conjunction 
with Vodafone (which had recently emerged from the Racal group) and GPT. The 
Royal Holloway protocol matched the government's stated requirements for the
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TTP network, and was linked to proposed systems to secure government emails 
and NHS data. In addition to the provision of technical solutions, members of 
the group were also commissioned to provide an independent assessment of the 
CESG-developed Red Pike algorithm. On this basis, it can be argued that the 
expertise of the group was also used to underpin technological solutions and to 
approve the solutions developed by others.
Despite using their expertise to produce the technologies at the heart of the TTP 
proposals, the group do not appear to have been involved in any other respect. 
For example, there exists no evidence of them being involved in the public de­
bates, either informally at the level of ukcrpyto mailing list exchanges, or formally 
during public consultations or Select Committee meetings. When interviewed, 
the members of the group appeared comfortable in making a distinction between 
their technical work and its wider policy implications. Some, when asked, did not 
appear to connect the two:
Interviewer: W hat was your position during the 90s encryption pol­
icy debates, export regulations et cetera, if indeed you took one? 
Respondent: My involvement in cryptology has been concerned with 
technical matters, and I have not been involved in such policy issues. 
Interviewer: Did you make any contribution towards policy or legis­
lation?
R esp o n d en t: No.
Interviewer: Did you contribute in other ways, such as sitting on 
government committees?
R esp o n d en t: No.
Others recognised that their technical work and policy views might conflict, but 
were still able to separate them. Here, the key escrow aspect of the Royal Holloway 
protocol is discussed:
Respondent: Key escrow was a proposal based on, crudely, and I 
mean very crudely, on the assumption we, we being governments, were 
happy for our companies to be secure against anyone but us, but we 
need to control encryption somehow so that's  where encryption came 
in. We did not, as an emotional concept, support key escrow, but we
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did design a key escrow system that could work. We saw no contradic­
tion in terms in that. Basically, we designed a key escrow management 
system. The trust model was clear, and people didn't like the trust 
model, which is hue. I'm not sure we liked the trust model either, but 
that wasn't the point. The key escrow model could work. Under key 
escrow you were secure against you enemies, provided your enemies 
didn't infiltrate the key escrow agent. But, technically it was quite an 
interesting problem.
Despite not supporting the politics of the key escrow concept, the group were 
able to design a system that they believed could work. Furthermore, by using 
their expertise to provide the technology that was to be used in the controversial 
proposals, there is a sense in which this precluded the group from using that same 
expertise to express any dissatisfaction with the principles upon which the policy 
was based. This may explain why those from the group did not involve themselves 
in the crypto wars in other ways, and why they were absent hrom formal and 
informal debates. At the very least, it demonstrates that contributory expertise 
enacted during the technical phase may not be present during the political phase in 
the form of symbolic arguments - it may also be found embedded in technologies.
Again, there appears to be a link between the practices used to enact exper­
tise within the Information Security Group, and what this expertise was used to 
accomplish during the crypto wars. The group enacted their expertise through 
collaborating with government and industry to create technologies, and they were 
able to use this expertise to produce a technology to be used in the proposed TTP 
system. That a research group within a university should design their research 
practices in this way is no longer unusual or surprising. A number of theoreti­
cal frameworks have been developed to describe such trends in scientific research 
practices, including: 'Mode 2' (Gibbons et al. 1994); 'Triple Helix' (Etzkowitz &: 
Leydesdorff 2000); and 'Academic Capitalism' (Slaughter &: Leslie 1997). Of these, 
the theory of academic capitalism appears to the most relevant to this particular 
case. The theory of academic capitalism:
.. .  sees groups of actors - faculty, students, administrators, and aca­
demic professionals - as using a variety of state resources to create new 
circuits of knowledge that link higher education institutions to the
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new economy. These actors also nse state resources to enable intersti­
tial organizations to emerge that bring the corporate sector inside the 
university, to develop new networks that intermediate between private 
and public sector, and to expand managerial capacity to supervise new 
hows of external resources, investment in research infrastructure for the 
new economy, and investment in infrastructure to market institutions, 
products, and services to students. Expanded managerial capacity is 
also directed toward restructuring faculty work to lower instructional 
costs (although not costs generally) (Slaughter & Rhoades 2004, p.l).
The broad consequence of this trend, assuming it is accurate, is a shift from univer­
sities that enact expertise exclusively for the 'public good', and towards universities 
that enact expertise that can also be used as a commercial resource (or a 'private 
good'). This, of course, does not imply that there is no overlap between the two, 
and that they cannot in some sense be co-produced. However, studies of academic 
capitalism have also highlighted the failure of some academic institutions to meet 
the expectations of society in terms of economic growth, employment, and student 
training. Simon Marginson (2011), drawing on Jiirgen Habermas' ideas about the 
development of the 'public sphere', has argued that universities, as recognized pro­
ducers of public goods, play an important role in criticizing policy, and that status 
competition and marketization can undermine this enterprise. But, as the Royal 
Holloway example shows, expertise can be embedded in technologies that support 
public goods, as well as in advice offered to policy makers in the form of arguments 
(Calhoun 2006). Therefore, the consequences that a trend towards academic cap­
italism might have in terms of how the expertise it produces effects controversies 
have not been fully developed. However, if research practices increasingly result in 
the enacting of expertise that produces technologies in collaboration with commer­
cial or governmental partners, then role of the contributory expertise tha t emerges 
from certain university laboratories needs to be reconceptualized accordingly.
During the political phase of the crypto wars, the contributory expertise enacted 
by the Security Group at the University of Cambridge was absent from the ini­
tial export control and TTP proposals. This resulted in the construction of an 
opposition to them. The form that this opposition took changed as the crypto 
wars progressed. At the beginning of the debate over TTPs, Ross Anderson and 
Michael Roe used their contributory expertise to level explicit technical criticisms 
at the Royal Holloway protocol. These criticisms demonstrated that the TTP
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proposals were potentially insecure. Anderson also used his expertise to develop 
criticisms of how the protocol was to be put to use by government departments 
and the NHS. These criticisms were expressed at meetings to discuss the propos­
als, and informally on the ukcrypto mailing list - with the thrust of the arguments 
being largely accepted by those using the latter. When the TTP consultation pro­
cess began, the opportunity to register a formal opposition arose, and was taken 
by members of the Cambridge group, and others persuaded by their arguments. 
Anderson in particular contributed during every stage of the consultation process, 
and gave evidence in person at Select Committee meetings. The Cambridge group 
also played a key role in creating the FIPR think-tank, which would mount a 
more coordinated opposition later on in the debates. This led to those opposed to 
the government's proposals becoming more involved in the political phase of the 
crypto wars. In addition to rising to the ever more formal requirements that effec­
tive opposition demanded, Anderson and other FIPR contributors were able to use 
their cryptology expertise to contribute to the wider export control debate, during 
which cryptology was only one of many fields that might have been affected. This 
culminated when they successfully used their cryptology expertise to push for the 
amending of the Export Control Bill to exclude the export of academic ideas, in 
an arena that was partly made up of groups pushing for tighter regulation. By 
the end of the crypto wars, it was clear that the Cambridge group and others had 
transferred their expertise from the technical phase to the political phase.
It has been acknowledged within STS for some time that scientific expertise is 
often enlisted by others in order to add weight to political claims during contro­
versies (see Nelkin 1995). However, the use of scientific expertise by scientists to 
underpin their own participation during a political phase appears to be a different 
exercise, and one that is less commonly referred to. An extreme form of this activ­
ity has been referred to as 'scientist activism'. Scott Frickel (2004) has described 
how the field of genetic toxicology emerged from the political activism of scientists 
concerned about the dangers of chemical mutagens. Although this differs slightly 
from how the expertise of the Cambridge group was used to underpin their own 
participation in the political phase, it is perhaps something that elective mod­
ernism should account for, given it prescribes that society should "always aspire 
to keep the technical and the political phase separate even where they are com­
bined in institutions or individuals" (Collins et al. 2010). However, interventions 
such as this, though arguably a positive development during crypto wars, may be 
undesirable in other cases if a clear separation between phases is to be maintained.
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Again, there appears to be a link between the research practices the Cambridge 
group used to enact their expertise, and what this expertise was used to accomplish 
during the crypto wars. The group designed research practices to understand how 
security systems behaved in the real world. To do this they used interdisciplinary 
methods then unorthodox in security and cryptology research. The conclusions 
from this research - based as they were on appraisals of threat models used by 
systems designers - enacted a body of expertise that could be translated into policy 
arguments. Furthermore, those that possessed the expertise were also sensitive to 
some of the issues associated with secure system design that they felt others may 
not have been aware of. When the government proposed their TTP system, the 
arguments that the group had developed could be used to critique the proposals, 
and formed the basis for an opposition. By contributing to the formal consultation 
processes during the TTP debates, it could be argued tha t Anderson and other 
members of FIPR also enacted a body expertise related to contributing towards 
scientific controversies. This expertise was put to use during the export control 
debates, where cryptography was a relatively minor issue.
During the political phase of the crypto wars, the contributory expertise enacted 
by CESG was partially evident in their proposals for government security schemes. 
However, the secret nature of CESG's involvement in the crypto wars was one of 
the most important aspects of their contribution. To understand the impact of 
their secret expertise on the political phase of the crypto wars, the first step is to 
consider their historical association with cryptography. CESG (and GCHQ) have 
long been associated with cryptology expertise. Up until the 1970s, cryptology 
expertise had been seen as something that was the preserve of militaries and 
intelligence organizations. This is exemplified by the fact that Alan Turing's now 
famous code breaking efforts at Bletchley Park during the Second World War were 
undertaken whilst working for the GC&CS - which morphed into GCHQ after the 
end of the war. Therefore, it became natural to assume that they would continue to 
have expertise in this area. For example, when Donald Davies hrst started serious 
cryptology research at NPL in the 1970s, he thought that this might conflict with 
work being done at GCHQ. Davies recalled that he "had been in touch with 
GCHQ about data security and realized that it would be very difficult for NPL to 
get involved in this area, because of the way they regarded any government work 
in this field to be very much their province" (Campbell-Kelly 1986). This was 
further compounded by the fact that, by the time the crypto wars in the UK were
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underway in the mid-1990s, the involvement of the NSA (usually thought of as 
GCHQ's American counterpart) in the crypto wars in the US was widely known.
Despite this reputation, by the time the crypto wars in the UK were underway, 
the secrecy that surrounded CESG meant that very little was known about their 
expertise in the held. This made an accurate assessment of their expertise prob­
lematic. The combination of CESG's historical reputation, and the lack of infor­
mation about their expertise, appears to have resulted in a tension. This tension 
primarily manifested itself as anxieties about CESG's lack of expertise and the 
motivations behind their involvement. In terms of their motivations, over time, 
the view that CESG and GCHQ were 'pulling the strings' for the TTP and export 
control proposals gained wider currency. This view was initially made evident in 
discussions on the ukcrypto mailing list. When the documents relating to the NHS 
network and the Cloud Cover system were discussed, contributors speculated on 
behind-the-scenes involvement and motivations of CESG and GCHQ. There was 
a repeatedly expressed belief that the NHS were being persuaded to adopt the 
GESG-developed Red Pike algorithm to improve the chances of the wider adop­
tion of a key escrow-based system over which CESG and GCHQ had control, 
thus allowing them to continue to use telecommunications networks as a source of 
intelligence.
There also emerged a view that, despite being at the forefront historically, CESG 
had fallen behind with developments in cryptology. Again, this view appears to 
have emerged from discussions on the ukcrypto mailing list. One contributor based 
at a UK university stated that:
I have spoken with people from CESG (and GCHQ) on various oc­
casions here at the University and elsewhere concerning research pro­
grams etc. My impression is that they had a "golden age" which started 
with the stunning successes at Bletchley and lasted up to about 10- 
15 years ago but that they have now really "lost it" in all respects.
They were often unaware of key papers in many areas and were very 
grateful for a photocopy to take away with them!! Far and away the 
best cryptographers are in the academic world and CESG is becoming 
more and more sidelined in the main stream of events. This was very 
evident at the CompuSec exhibition last year from the way they pre­
sented themselves on their stand. If they want to be taken seriously as
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a consultancy to whom the general populace will come for IT security 
advice then they really need to get their act together in a VERY big 
way hrst.
Although initially expressed informally, views such as these came to be used for­
mally during the political phase, as the debates heightened. This is best demon­
strated by quoting an oral response given by Ross Anderson to a question from 
Helen Southworth MR during a Select Committee meeting held on March 2nd, 
1999:
H elen  S o u th w o rth  M P : You are suggesting that the intelligence 
agencies are pushing key escrow and that they are being left behind 
with developments in cryptography. Can you ju s ti^  those two points 
of view?
R oss A nderson : That the intelligence agencies are pushing the es­
crow agenda is I think evident from the [Zergo NHS report] written 
by Henry Beker and Chris Amery, who have been long-term suppliers 
to CCHQ, have the clearances and so on. The kinds of problems that 
one is having with CCHQ's falling behind the curve with commercial 
cryptography can be seen, for example, in Cloud Cover which is a key 
management system that has been promoted within the Civil Service 
and which CESC has tried to get the NHS to adopt. I have ended 
up on the opposite side to that because I advised the BMA on safety 
and privacy of clinical systems and we found quite a number of things 
wrong with Cloud Cover (Select Committee 1999).
It could be argued that these are examples of those with contributory expertise 
carrying out domain-specific discrimination, given tha t they were forming judge­
ments about others who have contributory expertise on the surface, but can be 
distinguished from 'true' experts by virtue of internal technical and social criteria 
(Weinel 2010, Collins et al. 2010). It may be that their assessments were correct. 
However, given the secrecy surrounding CESC, it is clear that these assessments 
are unlike other attempts at domain-specihc discrimination. For instance, they 
are based on incomplete information about the expertise being judged, and, as 
was acknowledged by those making the judgements, they are attempting to judge
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individuals and institutions whose motivations they are unsure of. More specih- 
cally, given that CESC rarely published details of their work, it would have been 
difficult to assess - and even harder to prove - how favourably their work com­
pared to that of other contributory experts in terms of criteria like the journals 
they published in, and their overall readership. Indeed, it could be argued that 
the lack of information relating to CESC's cryptology expertise, in part, allowed 
such arguments to be made and gave them greater currency, given that, in order 
to maintain secrecy, they could not be readily falsified or refuted.
Uncertainty about CESC's expertise and motivations also allowed for arguments to 
be made about the broader relationship between surveillance and the state during 
the political phase. Caspar Bowden - at the time the director of FIPR - and Ya- 
man Akdeniz - founder and director of Cyber Rights &: Cyber Liberties - discussed 
this in a paper on 'Cryptography and Democracy'. Here, it was argued that the 
implementation of the government's proposals would result in a "slippery slope" 
towards a surveillance state, reminiscent of Ceorge Orwell's Ymefeen 
(Bowden &: Akdeniz 1999). At one point, it is claimed that representatives from 
CCHQ attempted to persuade the OECD to adopt the CASM system as an in­
ternational standard. However, the source for this claim was "private information 
from those present at OECD meetings" (Bowden &: Akdeniz 1999, p. 110). Whilst 
there is nothing to suggest that this claim is untrue, it is typical of the way in 
which claims about CCHQ and CESC were often made in the crypto wars, and 
indicates how secrecy can both distort attempts at assessing expertise, and distort 
attempts to publicly demonstrate claims.
On this basis, I argue that the secret nature of the expertise of CESC produced 
uncertainty during political phase of the crypto wars. As such, it can be linked 
with an emerging STS literature on secret science. As was described in chapter 
2, although little has been written about secret science Rom an STS angle, an 
emerging view urges that secret science be thought of as something more than 
just open science done behind closed doors. Much scientific work involves an 
element of secrecy. It is not uncommon, for example, for scientific work to be 
kept secret in order to properly establish priority claims or to gain a commercial 
advantage. However, the level of secrecy employed by institutions like GCHQ 
clearly exceeds this (counter-)norm, given that the upholding and maintaining 
of secrecy dictates most of their activity. Balmer has argued that secret science 
can have consequences for those whom information is kept from. For example.
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secrecy can actively construct uncertainty, gossip and rumour that can be used 
both positively and negatively by actors on all sides of the secrecy divide (Balmer 
2012, pp.76-77). On this understanding, the effects of secrecy are linked to the 
practices used to enact secret expertise.
This is important to bear in mind when considering what was enacted by CESG's 
expertise during the crypto wars. Whilst CESG's expertise undoubtedly produced 
technological artefacts in the form of Red Pike, technical assistance and advice in 
the form of the Cloud Cover system, and 'collective goods' in the form of their 
management of ITSEC, the secret nature of their research practices produced 
uncertainty during the crypto wars that effected the nature of many of the other 
contributions. This uncertainty made assessments of expertise problematic - even 
during attempts at domain-specific discrimination - and encouraged speculation 
about underlying motives. This was perhaps expressed best by one interviewee 
who, when asked about CESG's role during the crypto wars, simply said that 
"they were either everywhere or nowhere".
To sum up, the descriptions provided in this section indicate how varied the uses of 
contributory expertise during a political phase can be. It also shows tha t the links 
between the practices used to enact the contributory expertise during the technical 
phase, and its use during the political phase, are intelligible.^ This can be used 
to suggest tha t some of the assumptions built into elective modernism may need 
refining. For example, elective modernism assumes that "political decisions should 
not be made without considering as much as possible of the technical knowledge 
which bears upon the decision" (Collins et al. 2010). Yet, the use of the contribu­
tory expertise enacted by CESG during the political phase appeared to have had a 
negative influence on the debate, given that it introduced expertise that was prob­
lematic for other experts to accurately assess. Although the operationalization of 
domain-specific discrimination has not been precisely laid out, it is clear that no 
matter how it is done, if it is based on incomplete information then it becomes 
difficult (or even impossible) to know whether the conclusions are flawed. It is 
also likely that this lack of information on which to base domain-specific discrim­
ination went some way towards licensing speculation about the motives of CESG 
and GCHQ, and had the potential to legitimize the use of quasi-religious/populist 
arguments by those with contributory expertise. Although private citizens are
^It should be noted that these links were made intelligible with hindsight. It is not yet clear 
whether it is possible to use sociological discrimination to predict exactly how a particular type 
of contributory expertise will be used, or the effect it might have, in real-time.
Chapter 9. and Cangeqzzenceg 247
permitted to make these arguments during the political phase, those with spe­
cialist expertise are not. However, they may be the best placed to make them, 
given that it would be difficult to argue that their attempts at domain-specific 
discrimination - though compromised - were inferior to those based on ubiquitous 
or local discrimination. During the crypto wars, this served to undermine the 
separation between the formative intentions of the technical phase and the politi­
cal phase, because technical questions became entangled with political questions. 
This is further evident in the fact that, over the course of the political phase, the 
Cambridge group's involvement in the political phase blurred with their technical 
work. This can be seen in their particular form of 'scientist activism', such as dur­
ing the formation of FIPR, and some of their more overtly political publications, 
such as the Global Trust Register. This isn't a criticism of how the Cambridge 
group, and other activists, involved themselves in the crypto wars. However, it 
made the aspiration "to keep the technical and the political phase separate even 
where they are combined in institutions or individuals" (Collins et al. 2010) unre­
alistic and potentially undesirable. These contradictions suggest tha t additional 
elective modernist principles may be required in order to chart a path through 
controversies of this nature.
9.4  T he Transfer o f C ontrib u tory  E xp ertise
Before moving on to making some suggestions for what those principles might 
be, it is worth considering another dimension of the relationship between the 
technical and political phases, and multiple contributory expertises - namely, how 
contributory expertise is 'transferred' from the technical phase to the political 
phase. As was described in the literature review, Evans and Plows (2007) have 
argued that the relationship between the phases is circular, with the outputs from 
one informing the other. Weinel (2010) has argued that the conclusions of the 
technical phase should have a constraining effect on the justifications used during 
the political. However, these arguments - though useful - are not based on a 
prior distinction between different types of contributory expertise. Making this 
distinction may be helpful in understanding the transfer of contributory expertise 
between phases, and its impact upon the decisions made during the political phase.
Evans and Plows (2007) described the relationship between the technical and po­
litical phases as a whole. I will focus on one particular 'transfer' within that broad
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relationship - namely, how the political phase comes to know about the output of 
the technical phase. Given that the relationship between the phases is reciprocal, 
this is only one dimension of the transfer process. However, it is an important one 
for elective modernism to address, given that the quality of the debate during the 
political phase is dependent on it.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to devote some time to discussing what 'transfer' 
means in this context, and following on from this, how a transfer might be identified 
and characterized. In simple terms, a transfer can be said to have occurred when 
the expertise enacted during the technical phase is used during the political phase. 
However, expertise 'use' can potentially mean a number of different things. In 
order to flesh out this idea, it is useful to draw on insights from fields such as 
'Knowledge Transfer', 'Research Utilization', and 'Knowledge Mobilization', that 
have focused on how research is used to inform policy.'* In a survey of research 
use, Julius Court and John Young (2003) found that it could be used for a wide 
variety of ends, including pushing issues onto the policy agenda, influencing key 
policy decisions, enhancing knowledge, supporting the development of networks, 
and changing ways of working. It is therefore important to acknowledge that 
research use during a political phase can be either 'instrumental' - when it has 
a direct impact upon policy decisions, or 'conceptual' - when it has an indirect 
impact upon knowledge, attitudes, and practices (Caplan 1979, Webber 1986). On 
this understanding, when aiming to identi^  a transfer of expertise, it is important 
to remain aware that its use may take many different forms.
Whilst it is important to acknowledge that expertise can be used during the po­
litical phase in a number of different ways, some have nonetheless attempted to 
identify stages of research use. Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky (1980) conceived 
of research use as occurring in seven linear stages:^
1. Reception: The research is received (the research is considered 'used' even if 
it is never actually read);
2. Cognition: The research is read and understood;
course, expertise, knowledge, and research are not precisely the same thing. However, the 
study of the relationship between knowledge, research, and policymakers offers a useful starting 
point for considering the transfer of expertise, given that the terms undoubtedly overlap.
number of models also aim to describe the process of research use in this way. In some 
cases, the first stage is similar to Knott and Wildavsky's 'Reception', in that they describe the 
'Transmission' of research findings, or practitioners becoming 'Aware' of them (Landry et al. 
2001, Glasziou & Haines 2005).
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3. Reference: The research changes ways of thinking;
4. Effort: The research has shaped actions;
5. Adoption: The research has a direct influence on policy;
6. Implementation: The policy containing the research has been implemented;
7. Impact: The implemented policy is successful.
Though Knott and Wildavsky's model was designed to understand how research 
is used, it can also be used to underpin ideas about the transfer of expertise. It 
enables us to say tha t expertise has been transferred from the technical phase to the 
political phase if there exists evidence of any of the above stages having occurred. 
For example, 'Reception' can be said to have occurred if a document produced 
during the course of the enacting of expertise during the technical phase - such 
as a research paper - appears on the list of documents submitted as evidence to a 
Select Committee, and 'Adoption' can be said to have occurred if that document 
is cited by a government policy report. In both cases, it is clear that the expertise 
has been transferred from the technical phase to the political phase.
Once a transfer of expertise has been identified in this way, it becomes possible to 
characterize the nature of that transfer. Once again, ideas about research use can 
be used to illuminate the nature of the expertise transfer process. As Sandra M. 
Nutley, Isabel Walter, and Huw T. O. Davies (2007) pointed out, policymakers 
can encounter research in a number of different ways, and are able to access it 
from a variety of different sources. It may be encountered through direct commu­
nication with those that produced it, or, the transfer process may be mediated 
through knowledge brokers such as research centres and government organiza­
tions. Furthermore, as Ake Bergmark and Tommy Lundstrom (2002) highlighted, 
it is possible to distinguish between research that is encountered actively - if the 
policymaker seeks out research to help support their work, and research that is 
encountered passively - if the policymaker is presented with research. Finally, it 
is also possible to consider the form in which research is transferred. Research 
findings may be embodied in a number of different ways. For example, they may 
be embodied in technologies, objects, actions, practices, and symbolic arguments.
W ith this in mind, I will now return to the descriptions of the technical phase 
of the crypto wars from chapters 4 through 7, as well as the description of the
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political phase in chapter 8, to identify and characterize the transfer processes 
used. The contributory expertise enacted during the technical phase in the Data 
Security Croup at the NPL was absent from the political phase. Therefore, we can 
say that no transfer of expertise occurred. There may be interesting and important 
reasons for why this was the case, but for the time being, it is sufhcient to note 
that no transfer took place. Civen this, there is nothing that can be said about 
how the political phase came to know about the conclusions of the technical, or 
about the embodiment of the expertise.
In contrast, the contributory expertise enacted during the technical phase by the 
Information Security Croup at Royal Holloway was transferred to the political. 
This expertise was embodied in a technology that underpinned the controversial 
TTP proposals. Therefore, we can say that the expertise was transferred in the 
form of a technology, rather than through the use of symbolic arguments. The 
'Royal Holloway' protocol was produced in conjunction with the DTI as part of a 
SERC-funded project. Therefore, the expertise of the Information Security Croup 
was actively 'commissioned' from those working in the technical phase.
The contributory expertise enacted during the technical phase in the Security 
Croup at the University of Cambridge was initially ignored, but was then used 
to construct an opposition to the controversial proposals. Therefore, we can say 
that the expertise was embodied in technical and political symbolic arguments. 
It was transferred from the technical phase to the political phase through active 
engagement with the consultation procedures, engagement with the press, and 
other political activity. Therefore, in contrast to the contributory expertise of 
the Information Security Croup, from the point of view of the policymakers in 
the political phase, the expertise of the Security Croup was 'delivered' by those 
working in the technical phase.^
The contributory expertise enacted during the technical phase within CESC at 
CCHQ was embodied in technologies that underpinned the controversial propos­
als. Furthermore, it was believed that CESC's expertise was used to provide 
symbolic arguments that underpinned how the systems should function, and what
^It is important to remember that, whilst the expertise of the Cambridge group was delivered 
by the technical phase to the political, this was facilitated through formal consultation proce­
dures, one of the purposes of which is to provide an opportunity for experts to make their views 
known. However, participation in the consultation procedures is optional. Therefore, although 
the expertise of the Cambridge group was in a sense 'solicited' by the political phase, it was still 
up to the Cambridge group to actually take steps to 'deliver' it.
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their relationship with other policies should be. However, the conditions under 
which this expertise was enacted were secret. Furthermore, and as a partial con­
sequence, the way in which the expertise was transferred from the technical phase 
to the political phase was not made clear. Unlike in the case of the expertise en­
acted by the Information Security Croup and the Security Croup, it was unclear 
whether the expertise was commissioned by, or delivered to, the political phase. 
Therefore, the transfer of expertise can be described as 'invisible'.
R esearch Site Transferred? E m bodim ent D irection T ransfer T ype
Data Security Group No N/A N/A N/A
luformatiuu Security Group Yes Technology Technical <- Political Commissioned
Security Group Yes Symbolic argument Technical ->Political Dehvered
CESG Yes Technology; Symbolic argmnent Teclmical ?? Political Invisible
T A B L E  9.7: The Transfer of Contributory Expertise
As with the other descriptions in this chapter, these descriptions of contributory 
expertise transfer can be summarized in a table (see Table 9.7). This information 
shows that we can use sociological discrimination to distinguish between the em­
bodiment of the expertise, and the direction of the transfer from the technical to 
the political phase. The consequences tha t making these distinctions might have 
for elective modernism will be suggested in the next section.
9.5 C onsequences for E lective  M odern ism
In this short hnal section, I will use the information Rom the previous three to 
briefly consider some of the consequences that acknowledging a multiplicity of 
contributory expertise might have for how elective modernism should function 
during controversies over technological decision-making. I will outline a number 
of problems that emerge from the descriptions of what happened during the crypto 
wars. I will then suggest what I have called the 'Minimum Transfer Requirement', 
and identify what I have called the 'problem of expert discrimination'. These are 
by no means the only insights that can stem Rom an acknowledgement of multiple 
contributory expertises, and nor are they fully-developed enough to be considered 
hnal or comprehensive. However, they will provide an indication of both why it 
is important to take multiplicity seriously, and how elective modernism might be 
rehned in order to confront the issues that it raises.
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9.5.1 M inim um  Transfer R equirem ent
In the hrst section, it was shown that it is possible to characterize the diherent 
types of contributory expertise that can be enacted within a discipline during 
the technical phase of a controversy. In the second section, it was shown that 
the uses of contributory expertise during the political phase are also multiple. 
Furthermore, plausible links can be established between the practices used to enact 
the expertise during the technical phase, and how it is used during the political. 
Elective modernism requires that "political decisions should not be made without 
considering as much as possible of the technical knowledge which bears upon the 
decision" (Collins et al. 2010). However, this raises the question of whether it is 
possible to assess whether or not this has actually taken place. A way of beginning 
to address this problem is by understanding more about what I have called the 
'transfer' process. I use this term to refer exclusively to how the political phase 
comes to know about the conclusions from the technical. In the third section of 
this chapter, I have shown that it is possible to arrive at a distinction between 
expertise that is: not transferred; commissioned; delivered; or transferred invisibly. 
I suggest that these categories can be used to define a minimum requirement that 
those in the political phase must fulfil in order to be able to claim that they have 
attempted to draw upon an adequate level of expertise from the technical phase. 
I call this the Minimum Transfer Requirement.
The Minimum Transfer Requirement states that decisions made in the political 
phase cannot be made solely upon consideration of expertise that has been com­
missioned, or expertise that has been transferred invisibly. Decisions should not be 
made based solely upon consideration of expertise that is commissioned because 
this would allow decision makers to draw on expertise that they either know to 
be already aligned with preconceived policy objectives, or expertise that they had 
an active role in enacting. Decisions should not be made based solely on expertise 
that has been transferred invisibly as it would, in extreme cases, be impossible 
for those observing the political phase (including those working in the technical 
phase) to use sociological discrimination (or other forms of meta-expertise) to 
determine whether it had been commissioned or delivered. It therefore also fol­
lows that decisions made in the political phase cannot be made after considering 
only a combination of invisible and commissioned expertise. Of course, as elective 
modernism stipulates, there is no requirement for the political phase to act upon
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expertise that has been transferred in a particular way. It may be that the politi­
cal phase chooses to act upon expertise that has been commissioned, rather than 
expertise that has been delivered, assuming they are in contradiction. However, 
in order for the political phase to be able to claim that it has considered as much 
as possible of the technical knowledge which bears upon the decision, at the very 
least it must fulhl the Minimum Transfer Requirement.
9.5.2 Problem  of Expert D iscrim ination
In the first section, although it was shown that it is possible to use sociological 
discrimination to characterize the different types of contributory expertise that can 
be produced within a discipline during the technical phase of a controversy, in some 
cases, the adoption of practices designed to uphold secrecy can actively prevent 
the acquisition of the information required to make such a characterization. In this 
case, the expertise itself can be characterized as secret. In the second section, it was 
shown that the uses of contributory expertise during the political phase are also 
multiple. Furthermore, plausible links can be estabhshed between the practices 
used to create the expertise during the technical phase and how it is used during 
the political. In the case of the secret expertise, this created uncertainty during 
the political phase because the secrecy surrounding it made an assessment of its 
quality problematic. Even domain-specific discrimination could not be carried 
out in a satisfactory way because it was based on incomplete information, and the 
construction of secrecy around it may have meant it was also based on deliberately 
misleading information. W hat would have been domain-specific discrimination in 
other circumstances, was potentially reduced to a form of transmuted expertise. 
The lack of information upon which to base an assessment of this expertise was 
itself used by experts to criticise it during the political phase, and as a platform 
for broader arguments about the circumstances which were used to produce it. 
This ultimately had the potential to undermine the crucial separation between 
the technical phase and the political phase.
The suggests that, in some cases, there may be a 'problem of expert discrimina­
tion'. The tension at the heart of this problem is that elective modernism states 
that political decisions should not be made without considering as much as pos­
sible of the technical knowledge which bears upon the decision. However, the use 
of some contributory expertise to inform decisions can be controversial because
Chapter 9. and Conseqzzenceg 254
it cannot be adequately assessed by others - even other experts. The problem of 
expert discrimination carries consequences. If this expertise is not drawn upon, 
then political decisions may not be taken on the basis of the best technical ex­
pertise. If it is used, it may not be trusted by either experts or the public. It 
may undermine the separation between the technical and political phases, as it 
blurs the concerns of both. Furthermore, it may lead to decisions that are viewed 
as 'undemocratic'. Given that the separation between the technical and political 
phases lies at the heart of elective modernism, it follows that principles should 
be designed to uphold it. There may be numerous ways of addressing this prob­
lem. For example, answers to propositional questions that cannot be publicly 
assessed using domain-specihc discrimination, and by implication other forms of 
non-transmuted expertise, should not be permitted to transfer from the technical 
phase to the political. This would strike a balance between aiming to draw upon 
as much expert advice as possible, whilst also preserving the crucial distinction 
between the technical and political phases. An alternative way of addressing the 
problem of expert discrimination may be to conclude tha t contributory expertise 
that cannot in principle be assessed using domain-specihc discrimination should 
not be considered contributory expertise at all. If this view is taken, then not 
permitting this 'expertise' to transfer from the technical phase to the political 
phase could also be justihed. However, taking this view may require an additional 
reconceptualization of the technical phase, given that it may still be possible to 
enact expertise that cannot be assessed using domain-specihc discrimination using 
practices that are aligned with the formative intentions of science.
9.6 C onclusion
In this chapter, I have shown how historical and institutional research practices 
enacted a multiplicity of contributory expertises during the technical phase of 
the crypto wars. To demonstrate this, I have used Laredo and Mustar's criteria 
for assembling laboratory activity prohles to underpin a process of sociological 
discrimination. This has been used to show how, to varying degrees, the Data 
Security Group at NPL, the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, the 
Security Group at the University of Cambridge, and CESG at GCHQ, engaged 
in the production of certihed knowledge, education and training, public research 
and innovation, the production of collective goods, and debates over policy. I have
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further shown that these multiple enactments of expertise were used for specific 
purposes during the political phase of the crypto wars. On this basis, I argue that 
it is possible to differentiate between sources of contributory expertise based on 
the specific characteristics of practices, rather than at a disciplinary level.
I have also made a case for why it is important to take the multiplicity of contrib­
utory expertise seriously. In a broad sense, I have described a method that could 
be used to inform the processes used during the political phase in order to make 
the best use of the expertise available. Given that a controversy over technologi­
cal decision-making can hinge on a disparate range of propositional questions, an 
appreciation of the multiplicity of contributory expertises that can exist within a 
discipline can offer guidance to decision-makers about how to go about sourcing 
informed answers. Acknowledging this multiplicity also highlights the problems 
and contradictions associated with some of the existing principles of elective mod­
ernism. During the process of characterizing the various enactments of expertise, 
it became clear that the secrecy surrounding some of the practices used at CESG 
meant that there was neither the presence of confirming or refuting evidence for 
particular indicators of research activity. The contributory expertise produced by 
CESG during the technical phase was therefore characterized as secret. When this 
expertise came to be used during the political phase, it introduced further uncer­
tainty. Other experts came to question the motivations behind the contributions 
made by CESG, and speculated about the quality of their expertise. This arose 
out of the fact that the secrecy surrounding CESG's research during the technical 
phase could not be properly assessed using domain-specihc discrimination. The 
assessments of other experts were necessarily based on incomplete information, 
and it was acknowledged that CESG might be engaged in practices that were de­
liberately designed to deceive. This, in part, prompted some experts to become 
active during the political phase, and to act in such a way that the boundaries 
between the technical and political phases became blurred. Given that political 
decisions should not be made without considering as much as possible of the tech­
nical knowledge which bears upon the decision, this raises questions about whether 
it is desirable for the political phase to draw upon types of contributory expertise 
that have the potential to undermine the other principles of elective modernism.
In order to develop answers to these questions, I characterized elements of the 
relationship between the technical and political phases during the crypto wars. I 
focussed on one particular process in this relationship - namely, how the political
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phase came to know the conclusions from the technical phase. This allowed for 
a simple distinction to be made between expertise that was not transferred, ex­
pertise that was commissioned, expertise that was delivered, and expertise that 
was transferred in a way that was not visible to those not directly involved in 
the transfer process. This information can be used to think more carefully about 
how much information from the technical phase should be available to the politi­
cal phase. Given that elective modernism states that as much from the technical 
phase as possible should be considered by the political phase, it appears useful 
to think more carefully about what can be classed as an appropriate basis for 
decision-making. Therefore, I suggest the use of the 'Minimum Transfer Require­
ment' principle. The principle states that, for it to be claimed that the political 
phase has made its decisions in light of the conclusions from the technical, it must 
at least be able to demonstrate that it has not made decisions solely on the basis 
of expertise that was commissioned or transferred invisibly. Secondly, the problem 
of expert discrimination recognises that, although decisions in the political phase 
should be made in light of as much expert advice as possible, this is complicated by 
the fact that it is not always possible for experts to adequately assess the expertise 
of other experts, thus throwing doubt on the expert status of some contributions.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
10.1 In trod u ction
In this concluding chapter, I will re-state the research questions that formed the 
backbone of this thesis, followed by my answers to them. I will then reflect on 
the limitations of the arguments made in this thesis and suggest some ideas for 
future work. W hat emerges from these reflections is a need for more empirical 
case studies viewed through the lens of the third wave.
1 0 .2  R esearch  Q u estion s and A nsw ers
In chapters 1 and 2, I used the current literature on the crypto wars, controversies 
over technological decision-making, the third wave, and the ontological framework, 
to pose three research questions:
1. How was contributory cryptology expertise produced during the technical 
phase of the crypto wars in the United Kingdom?
2. Can the ontological framework and the third wave be used in conjunction to 
develop a reconceptualization of the production of this contributory expertise 
as 'multiple'?
3. W hat were the consequences of this multiplicity of contributory expertise 
during the political phase of the crypto wars?
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My answer to the hrst research question was provided in chapters 4 through 7, and 
was summed up in chapter 9. My answer was given in the form of four individual 
descriptions of the practices used to enact contributory cryptology expertise at 
four different research sites: the Data Security Group at the National Physical 
Laboratory; the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of 
London; the Security Group at the University of Cambridge; and CESG at the 
Government Communications Headquarters.
In the case of the Data Security Group at NPL, practices were designed in accor­
dance with New Public Management priorities. Although the Computing Divi­
sion had been associated with pioneering computing research following the Second 
World War, by the time the Data Security Group was founded in the late 1970s, 
the move towards New Public Management had increasingly commercialized the 
work of the division. In response to the requirements of commercialization, the 
Data Security Group initially enacted expertise in cryptology standards, but later, 
their focus turned to enacting expertise on cryptology accreditation and testing.
In the case of Royal Holloway, following a series of reforms to the University of 
London that culminated in the 1980s, practices across science departments were 
altered to foster industrial collaboration. The Information Security Group was 
founded because cryptology was seen as a useful niche for Royal Holloway to 
occupy. Given that the key founder members of group had mathematical back­
grounds, the Information Security Group was able to provide the mathematics 
required to underpin commercial products and government technologies. As a 
result of their strong industrial partnerships with companies like Racal-Comsec, 
those working within the Information Security Group enacted expertise that met 
with the requirements of external partners.
In the case of the Security Group at the University of Cambridge, following an 
earlier emphasis on providing a usable computing service to the university, and sev­
eral large projects to build early computers, the computing laboratory diversified 
its research programme during the 1980s - in part thanks to a period of generous 
funding. Computer security was one of the new areas of enquiry that emerged 
from a traditional focus on computer systems. Although the group carried out 
work on the development of technologies, other work attempted to understand 
cryptology as a component in larger security systems. This strand of research was 
characterized by the use of interdisciplinary methods, and engagement with fields
Chapter 10. Conc/aszoM 259
such as psychology and economics. The group therefore used practices to enact 
expertise that pertained to the real-world behaviour of cryptology systems.
Finally, in the case of CESG at GCHQ, research into cryptology had a much longer 
history. From its founding in 1919, cryptology research practices were designed 
in accordance with intelligence priorities. The nature of the research carried out 
at GC&CS in this early period is exemplified by the work of Alan Turing during 
the Second World War. As a result of intelligence priorities, the nature of the 
cryptology research carried out by CESG has typically been a closely guarded 
secret. W ith the exception of the research on non-secret encryption - carried 
out in the 1970s and revealed in the late 1990s - little of their modern cryptology 
research has been made public. Although there have been attempts to reform some 
aspects of the UK's intelligence organizations since the late 1980s, and although 
CESG has a more public role than most bodies within GCHQ, practices designed 
to uphold the Official Secrets Act continued to dominate. Therefore, during the 
technical phase of the crypto wars, CESG enacted a secret cryptology expertise.
Some of the research practices employed at each of these research sites undoubt­
edly overlapped with one another. However, they also clearly exhibited divergence. 
The second research question essentially asks whether this divergence can be un­
derstood through the use of the ontological framework, and whether contributory 
expertise can be usefully thought of as multiple. My answer to this question is 
a qualified 'yes'. Although usually kept separate in the ST8 literature, the third 
wave understanding of contributory expertise shares key tenets with the ontologi­
cal framework. They are both rooted in practices, and they both consider what is 
enacted by those practices to be real. W ithin the STS literature, one of the most 
popular strands of the ontological framework has come to think of the enactments 
that result from practices as multiple. In particular, prominent sociologists such 
as Annemarie Mol and John Law have argued that divergent practices will result 
in multiple 'realities'. Though the consequences of insisting on the enacting of 
multiple realities renders the adoption of a full philosophical ontology problem­
atic, Michael Lynch's ontography can still be used as a useful way of adjusting the 
analytical focus.
It is possible to discern multiplicity in the descriptions of the practices used dur­
ing the technical phase of the crypto wars, offered as part of the answer to the 
first research question. But, additional steps can also be taken to identify mul­
tiplicity more clearly. Again, in order to do this, ideas Rom the third wave and
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the ontological framework can be used in conjunction. In particular, a process 
of sociological discrimination can employed. Martin Weinel has argued that the 
knowledge that STS analysts have acquired about the nature of science constitutes 
a particular type of non-transmuted meta-expertise. Weinel argued that given 
that those working within STS have built a considerable knowledge of controver­
sies over technological decision-making, sociological discrimination can be used to 
demarcate authentic and inauthentic controversies. I have argued that, given that 
STS has also built knowledge of how scientific work can differ within a discipline, 
sociological discrimination can also be used to delineate multiple enactments of 
contributory expertise.
I decided that the most appropriate of the available options for delineating differ­
ent enactments of contributory expertise during the technical phase of the crypto 
wars was Philippe Laredo and Philippe Mustar's criteria for assembling labora­
tory activity profiles. Laredo and Mustar argued that activity profiles could be 
assembled based on a quantitative assessment of the extent to which laboratories 
engaged in: the production of certified knowledge; education, training activities 
and embodied knowledge; public research and the innovation process; the partici­
pation in public or collective goods and finalities; and research and public debate 
about science and technology. I argued that a qualitative assessment of whether 
there is evidence of engagement with each of these activities could be used to 
underpin the delineation of enactments of contributory expertise. When applied 
to the expertise enacted during the technical phase of the crypto wars, it was 
clear that, though the practices of some research sites overlapped, there were clear 
areas of divergence. Furthermore, when analysed using a thematic conceptual ma­
trix (constructed on the basis of whether there exists: evidence; partial evidence; 
refuting evidence; or no evidence of particular practices) it was possible to charac­
terize contributory expertise in other ways. In particular, by making a distinction 
between refuting evidence obtainable through interviews and absence of evidence 
noticeable in documents, absences could also be used to indicate the enacting of 
secret expertise given tha t it was symptomatic of practices designed to limit access 
to information.
Though it was possible to use sociological discrimination to identi^  the existence 
of multiple enactments of contributory expertise during the technical phase of the 
crypto wars, it may not be immediately clear why it was worth going to the trouble 
of doing so. The response to this forms the answer to the third research question.
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In short, in the case of the crypto wars, considering the multiplicity of contribu­
tory expertise from the technical phase was worthwhile because it could bo used 
as a platform for an analysis of the political phase. In contrast to the one previous 
description of the political phase of the crypto wars in the UK, I described events 
with respect to the expertise that was enacted during the technical phase. This 
revealed how each enactment was used during the political phase. My description 
of the political phase of the crypto wars was structured around two sets of gov­
ernment policy proposals related to cryptography. The hrst was a set of proposals 
for a nationwide network of TTPs. In light of developments within the held of 
cryptology, and the increasing use of large-scale electronic communications net­
works, the TTP proposals were framed as a way to balance the desire to promote 
electronic commerce, whilst preserving the capabilities of law enforcement bodies. 
Under the proposals, cryptography would be both regulated, and used as a means 
of regulation. The second policy proposed reforms to the UK's export control 
regime. Again, in light of the increasing use of large-scale electronic communica­
tions networks, the changes to export controls were framed as a way of addressing 
export through intangible means. Unlike the TTP proposals, cryptography was 
not instrumental to the proposed regime, but would be one of the many scientihc 
helds affected.
The multiple cryptology expertises produced during the technical phase were used 
in a variety of different ways during the formal and informal processes tha t char­
acterized the activity of the political phase of the crypto wars. The expertise 
enacted within the Data Security Group was absent from the political phase. This 
absence can be seen as being actively constructed, given that research practices 
within the Data Security Group were designed to enact expertise on matters that 
did not feature prominently in the controversy. Furthermore, practices were suffi­
ciently constraining so as to prohibit the enacting of expertise outside of testing 
and accreditation. Expertise enacted within the Information Security Group was 
used to produce a technology to underpin the TTP proposals. During the techni­
cal phase, the group had used practices to enact contributory expertise that was 
sensitive to the requirements of industry and government, and were able to align 
their research with the goals of external partners. Expertise enacted within the 
Security Group was initially ignored during the formation of the TTP proposals, 
but was later used to criticise them and the underlying technologies. The group 
had previously enacted expertise that related to the real-world use of security sys­
tems, and were able to translate this research into arguments suited to a policy
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debate. Members of the group were also successful in influencing the export con­
trol debate by using their cryptology expertise to construct arguments about the 
preservation of academic freedom. Expertise enacted within CESG was used to 
both produce technologies that could be used in the TTP proposals, and to advise 
the government on the formation of their policies. However, the expertise enacted 
within CESG also caused uncertainty during the crypto wars. The level of secrecy 
surrounding their cryptology research during the technical phase meant that other 
experts and the public were prevented from knowing details about the quality of 
their expertise, and the motivations behind its enactment.
In all four cases, it was possible to form plausible links between the enactments of 
expertise during the technical phase, and the way it was used during the political 
phase. This lends extra credence to the idea tha t expertise is enacted, given that 
Mol (2002) used the term to denote the performing or carrying out of practices, as 
well as to denote what results from them. Linking expertise and its uses therefore 
allows for the enactment of expertise to be thought of as extending across both 
the technical and the political phases. On this understanding, recognizing the 
multiplicity of contributory expertises that can exist during the technical phase 
would, in principle, allow sociological discrimination to be used to inform decisions 
during the political phase about where to seek expertise on a particular issue. This 
is especially important during controversies over technological decision-making, as 
the broad hraming of an issue - as required by elective modernism (Collins et al. 
2010) - may make a number of propositional questions relevant.
This is a positive potential outcome of recognizing the multiplicity of contributory 
expertise that can exist during a technical phase. Recognizing this multiplicity also 
allows for an analytical appreciation of cases where decisions about where to source 
expertise can have negative consequences. A closer examination of the political 
phase of the crypto wars showed that some actors felt that their expertise was being 
excluded, and that drawing on the secret expertise of CESG was inappropriate. 
It was argued that the expertise enacted by CESG was of dubious quality, and 
that they were attempting to force the adoption of technologies that would serve 
their own particular ends. In response, individuals from the Cambridge group 
(and others) engaged in a form of scientist activism. They mounted a successful 
opposition to the government's proposals through active engagement with the 
formal and informal processes of the political phase.
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The events of the political phase of the crypto wars can therefore be used to high­
light some of the contradictions in the current formulation of elective modernism. 
In particular, it was shown how decisions about where to source expertise threat­
ened to collapse the distinction between the technical and political phase, and gave 
reason to question the notion that the political phase should consider as much of 
the available expertise from the technical phase as possible. As a way of creat­
ing an extra analytical foothold on these issues, I argued that, in the case of the 
crypto wars, it is possible to characterize a particular element of the relationship 
between the technical and political phases - namely, how the political phase came 
to know about the expertise enacted during the technical. I argued that it was 
possible to distinguish between expertise that was: not transferred; commissioned; 
delivered; and transferred invisibly. Under this scheme, as it was absent from the 
political phase, the expertise enacted within the Data Security Group was not 
transferred. As the expertise within the Information Security Group was, in part, 
enacted through a DTI-funded project, it was commissioned. As the expertise 
enacted within the Security Group was initially ignored, but was eventually in­
tegrated into the proposals during the consultation procedures, it was delivered. 
Finally, as the way in which the expertise of CESG was transferred was not made 
clear, it was transferred invisibly.
I have argued that it is possible to use this extra layer of data about the transfer 
process - together with the ideas expressed in the answers to the other research 
questions - to suggest two additional elective modernist ideas: the Minimum Trans­
fer Requirement; and the problem of expert discrimination. The Minimum Trans­
fer Requirement is an attem pt to provide a means of determining whether it can 
be claimed by decision-makers that they have sufficiently considered the expertise 
enacted during the technical phase of a controversy. It states that, in light of 
the problems that resulted from the ignoring of particular enactments of expertise 
during the crypto wars, for it to be claimed that the available expertise has been 
sufficiently considered, decisions cannot be made solely on the basis of either com­
missioned expertise, or expertise that was transferred invisibly. The problem of 
expert discrimination recognizes that, in some cases - as with the secret expertise 
enacted by CESG - it may not be possible to use non-transmuted meta-expertise 
to assess its quality. In extreme cases, even the processes typically associated with 
domain-specific discrimination may not be available. In such cases, I have sug­
gested, in order to preserve the distinction between the formative intentions of the
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technical and political phases, the case can be made for prohibiting the transfer 
of this expertise from the technical to the political phase.
10.3 R eflection s, L im ita tion s, and Further W ork
There are, of course, some limitations to the arguments that I have made and the 
methods I have used to arrive at them. In this hnal section, I will reflect on these 
limitations, and in some cases, use them to suggest ideas for further work. In 
many cases, it is clear that more case studies using the third wave are needed to 
probe both the ideas expressed in this thesis, and the ideas that underpin elective 
modernism more generally.
I will begin by reflecting on my methodological approach. Although, as was dis­
cussed in the chapter 3, some concerns over the generalizability of findings that 
result from case studies are perhaps exaggerated (Flyvbjerg 2006), they cannot 
be entirely dismissed. It is by no means clear that each of my claims would be 
equally visible in case studies based on, say, different fields of scientific research, 
or different controversies over technological decision-making. This thesis does not, 
and cannot, show that multiple research practices always produce multiple con­
tributory expertises, or that multiple contributory expertises are always used in 
different ways and for different purposes during controversies over technological- 
decision making. Nor does it claim that the types of contributory expertise that 
emerge from the descriptions are comprehensive. The purpose of this thesis was 
to work towards the development of new third wave ideas grounded in empirical 
data, rather than to confirm a pre-existing theory or relationship.
The main barrier to the generalizability of this case study could be seen as the 
emphasis on secrecy. The enacting of secret expertise was at the heart of what 
made the crypto wars distinctive, and the problem of expert discrimination aims 
to identify the problems associated with its use during controversies. However, it 
is possible to question the extent to which the enacting of expertise in secret is 
a pressing concern, especially given that Merton (1973) identified 'communalism' 
as one of the norms that guides science. Though Merton was right to stress 
the importance of communalism, this does not mean that secrecy is incompatible 
with science. In id en ti^n g  the existence of a set of counter-norms, Mirtoff (1974) 
argued that secrecy is important to academic science because it allows scientists to
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carry out a programme of research without having to worry about those working on 
something similar. This is also broadly true of commercial science - where keeping 
research secret can be used to protect a potential source of revenue - and of defence 
science - where keeping research secret can protect military power. A strand of 
literature within STS is emerging tha t aims to better understand these aspects 
of the relationship between secrecy and science. Civen that secrecy guides much 
scientihc activity, I believe that it is appropriate for the third wave to address the 
consequences of the use of secret expertise during controversies over technological 
decision-making.
Remaining concerns over generalizability and the importance of secrecy can be 
addressed by conducting more case studies. If this is done, there does not seem to 
be any good reason to limit case studies of the nature of contributory expertise to 
any particular scientihc, technological, or medical held. Future case studies that 
probe multiple contributory expertises may even be able produce robust categories 
that could be incorporated into the periodic table of expertise. The more general 
categories tha t make up the research compass card could provide a useful basis for 
this. In terms of testing the existence of these categories of contributory expertise, 
it may be possible to use experimental methods similar to those used to test for 
interactional expertise (Collins et al. 2006).
Turning now to the specihc methods used during this case study, in chapter 3 I 
outlined the way in which the heldwork and analysis stages would be structured 
(see Table 3.2). Although this basic structure was broadly adhered to, there were 
some deviations. For example, the line between the hrst and second stage was 
blurred by the fact that some interviewees were involved in both the technical 
and political phases. As both were covered in the same interview, in some cases, 
data relating to the second stage was gathered before the hrst stage was com­
pleted. Also, within the hrst and second stages, a process similar to snowballing 
occurred whereby information gathered during the interview process pointed to­
wards documents that had not yet been examined. This blurred the separation 
of the documentary analysis and semi-structured interview sections of each stage. 
This kind of pattern can be potentially problematic, because it is easy to see how 
such a snowballing process might serve to reinforce certain themes and conceal 
others. However, although it is difhcult to be certain, it would appear that to 
not explore new avenues of investigation after they have been revealed would have
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prevented me from claiming that a saturation point had been reached in terms of 
gathering more data.
Attempting to examine the relationship between a technical phase and a political 
phase of a controversy, to a certain extent requires the use of historical methods. 
It would be difhcult to justify studying a technical phase in real time, without 
knowing whether a political phase would emerge later. One consequence of us­
ing historical methods is that they produce data that emphasises macro-social, 
institutional and historical research practices, rather than micro-social research 
practices associated with experimentation. Though I have argued that institu­
tional and historical research practices exert a powerful influence on how expertise 
is enacted, not being able to observe research practices from the technical phase 
undoubtedly resulted in a lack of highly detailed descriptions of particular pro­
cesses. On a similar note, there were also issues related to asking interviewees 
direct questions about vague and slightly abstract concepts such as 'expertise' 
and 'research practices'. One interviewee, when asked to describe their research 
practices, responded by stating that "they were just normal, really". Therefore, 
questions about expertise and research practices often had to be approached from 
a different angle. Furthermore, though I was aware from the methodological hter- 
ature that interviewees often struggle to remember events from the past, with the 
benefit of hindsight, I do not think I was quite prepared for the extent to which 
this would be the case. Some themes, about which I would have liked to know 
more, simply could not be developed further due to a lack of specific details.
Turning now the substantive claims made in this thesis, I have described the 
research practices used to enact contributory cryptology expertise at four research 
sites during the technical phase of the crypto wars. However, the historical and 
sociological information contained in this thesis cannot be considered a complete 
historical or sociological study of modern cryptology research. There is evidence 
to suggest that cryptology research was undertaken at a number of other sites 
from 1970 to 2000. For example, the industrial cryptology research carried out 
by Zergo (and later Baltimore) would have been a good addition. Furthermore, 
it is known that early UK government-funded computer security research was 
carried out at the Royal Radar Establishment in Malvern in the 1980s, and that 
this may have included research into cryptology. However, in both cases, there was 
insufficient available data to be able to investigate this research in detail. Similarly, 
though this thesis necessarily focussed on collective research practices, the work
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of lone scientists carrying out research into cryptology may be of relevance to 
future understandings of the crypto wars. Also, due to the fact that the third 
wave dehnes the technical phase in line with the formative intentions of science, 
the contributory expertise of lawyers and policymakers, and their relationship to 
the crypto wars, was not discussed. In the case of the crypto wars, this was a 
significant omission, as much of the activity from groups such as FIPR, that was 
used to construct an opposition to the government's proposals, was informed by 
non-scientific expertise. Future work on the third wave will surely have to address 
this shortcoming, as these types of expertise (and others) are likely to be pivotal 
during many controversies over technological decision-making.
Returning to the study of cryptology research, more can also be said about other 
social and historical facets. To take just one example, this study has not addressed 
the users of these technologies. Of particular interest may be the way in which 
the designers and developers of these technologies 'configured' their users' ideas 
about security (Woolgar 1991). Ideas about how cryptology use is configured may 
also be able to shed light on why some chose not to use these technologies, given 
that it has been acknowledged that non-users can also shape their development 
(Wyatt 2003).
In terms of data collection for the political phase, there were some barriers that, 
in general, did not exist during the data collection for the technical. Documents 
pertaining to the technical phase were usually publicly accessible in archives, and 
scientists and other interviewees were mostly happy to give up their time to talk to 
me. For the political phase, documents were often stored in archives tha t were not 
publicly accessible. Fol requests to see these documents were occasionally refused, 
and those that were successful often returned documents that had been heav­
ily redacted. Potential interviewees, including politicians, were either too busy or 
otherwise unavailable to talk. Therefore, the description of the political phase pro­
vided was based on publicly accessible information. Consequently, for the political 
phase, it was not possible to carry out and define a full process of sociological dis­
crimination that mirrored that which was carried out for the technical phase, given 
the lack of symmetry in the data. Though it was possible to provide a detailed 
description of the public face of the political phase, a lack of information about 
internal processes meant that an attem pt to describe the evidence that existed for 
certain 'principles' in a thematic conceptual matrix would have been comprised 
by the possibility that evidence of this principle had not been made public. One
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suspected reason for this difhcnlty is that, despite reaching a legislative conclusion 
around 2000, the political phase of the crypto wars, has, in a sense, continued. 
The tensions at the heart of the crypto wars did not disappear after 2000, and 
in many ways, they are still with us today. Debates over the appropriate use of 
cryptology technologies continue. The recent publication of classified intelligence 
documents leaked by Edward Snowden, detailing as they did the post-2000 at­
tempts by GCHQ and the NSA to covertly undermine cryptographic technologies, 
demonstrates this clearly. Some cryptography advocates see the controversy that 
I have described as the hrst of many crypto wars that are sure to take place in 
the future (e.g. Assange 2012). As a result, information pertaining to the political 
phase of the controversy retains both sensitivity and contemporary relevance. On 
this point, in carrying out this study, I have learnt a lot about the impact that 
symmetry and availability of data can have on the conclusions that one is able 
to reach. It is now much clearer to me why some aspects of society are better 
understood than others. When designing future studies, I will be sure to place 
more emphasis on initial investigations that aim to reveal the likely availability of 
relevant data.
The answer I gave to the second research question was a qualified 'yes'. The 
reason for this qualification is that it should be acknowledged that some aspects 
of the ontological framework discussed in chapter 2 do not align well with third 
wave ideas about expertise. For instance, in describing how multiple enactments 
of atherosclerosis interacted with one other. Mol (2002) described a process of 
co-ordination during which a 'superior' enactment came to determine a course of 
treatment. There appears to be a superficial resemblance between this process and 
the closing of a controversy. However, Mol's description of co-ordination appears 
to hinge on there actually being an identifiable and indisputable enactment that 
is superior, and does not describe how such an identification may be achieved. Of 
the enactments that were produced during the technical phase of the crypto wars, 
it would be very difhcult to pick one out as being superior to the others. Indeed, 
in identifying multiplicity, fundamental differences were described that implied a 
certain degree of incommensurability between enactments. Similarly, the 'different 
worlds' argument (Law &: Mol 2011) did not align well with the descriptions of 
the work of the technical phase of the crypto wars. Whilst it would have been 
possible to delineate enactments of contributory expertise along the lines of 'ma­
terials' and 'qualities', it did not seem possible to identi^  a convincing distinction 
between their 'spatial relations' and their 'staging of time'. As a result, these
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aspects of multiplicity and the ontological framework could not be satisfactorily 
integrated into this case study. It was for this reason, and others, that I chose to 
use what Michael Lynch (2013) has termed 'ontography'. Ontography refers to the 
adoption of the vocabulary of the ontological framework, rather than a complete 
acceptance of its heavily criticised philosophical consequences. However, in shed­
ding the philosophical aspects of the ontological framework, it could be argued 
that it loses its raison d'etre. After carrying out this study, I agree with Lynch 
that there is value in ontography due to the fact that it can be used to reorient 
descriptions. Though the crypto wars could have been studied using the episte- 
mological framework, it is difhcult to see how it could have been used to arrive 
at a similar appreciation of the fundamental ways in which contributory expertise 
differed, and the consequences that this had. I argue that it would have made 
little sense to claim that those researching cryptology were essentially carrying 
out investigations along the same lines, but each from a different point of view. 
That being said, it is also clear that more ontographical case studies need to be 
carried out before its legitimacy can be properly established.
Finally, the consequences of multiple contributory expertises during controversies 
over technological decision-making should be examined in more detail. Though 
the Minimum Transfer Requirement and the problem of expert discrimination were 
suggested as possible inclusions to elective modernism, they require further elab­
oration. In their current formulation, though I would argue that their application 
would be have been beneficial for the quality of debate during the crypto wars, 
it is likely that, it other scenarios, they would not have been. Similarly, though I 
have argued that recognising multiplicity could be used to guide decisions about 
where to source expertise during controversies, more work is needed to properly 
investigate and analyse the viability of this idea. Once again, these issues can be 
partially addressed through more case studies that attem pt to use the third wave 
to understand and improve controversies over technological decision-making.
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# NPL Annual Reports and Accounts 1991/1992 - ZK.9.b.5764
# NPL Annual Reports and Accounts 1992/1993 - ZK.9.b.5764
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# NPL Data Security
# NPL Data Security
# NPL Data Security
# NPL Data Security
# NPL Data Security
# NPL Data Security
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# Racal Review 1971
# Racal Review 1972
# Racal Review 1973
# Racal Review 1974
# Racal Review 1975
Group Bulletin 1991 
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Group Bulletin 1995 
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(P)PM580-E(13)
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Racal Review 1980 
Racal Review 1981 
Racal Review 1982
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6 issues 
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- P.523/183
- P.523/183
- P.523/183
- P.523/183
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Racal Electronics for Defence 1982 - P.625/463 
Racal Electronics for Defence 1983 - P.625/463 
Racal Electronics for Defence 1984 - P.625/463 
Racal Electronics for Defence 1985 - P.625/463 
Racal Electronics for Defence 1986 - P.625/463 
Racal Electronics for Defence 1987 - P.625/463 
Racal Electronics for Defence 1988 - P.625/463
Miscellaneous Racal Publications Not Catalogued Separately - ZA.9.d.252 
The Racal Handbook 1956-1975 - YK.1994.b.l3305
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NPL News 1975 
NPL News 1976 
NPL News 1977 
NPL News 1978 
NPL News 1979 
NPL News 1980 
NPL News 1981 
NPL News 1982 
NPL News 1983 
NPL News 1984 
NPL News 1985 
NPL News 1986 
NPL News 1987 
NPL News 1988 
NPL News 1989 
NPL News 1990
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
BS.38n/99
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# NPL News 1992 - BS.38n/99
B .2  C am bridge U n iversity  A rch ives
B.2.1 Collection: Archives of the M athem atical Labora­
tory and its successor, the C om puter Laboratory
# Report on the functions of the Mathematical Laboratory, circulated to Fac­
ulty Board of Mathematics, with covering note - COMP 1/1
# Report of Mathematical Laboratory Committee to the Faculty Board of 
Mathematics on present conditions, proposals for improvements and plan of 
development - COMP 1/2
# Minutes and papers of the Laboratory Coordination Committee - COMP 
1/5
# Minutes of Phoenix meetings - COMP 1/6
# Computing Service planning documents - COMP 1/7
# Minutes and papers of the Curriculum Committee - COMP 2/1/1-2
# Minutes and papers of the Teaching Committee - COMP 2/2
# University prospectus: Computer Science at Cambridge - COMP 2/6
# Papers relating to the Science Research Council grant for research staff and 
equipment - COMP 3/1/1
# Papers relating to the equipment grant from Xerox - COMP 3/1/2
# System evaluation documents - COMP 4/4
# Software Review meetings minutes - COMP 4/5
# Mainframe Division meetings minutes and papers - COMP 4/6
# Design Progress meetings minutes and papers - COMP 4/8/1-2
# Papers relating to EDSAC jubilee celebrations - COMP 7/1
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B.3.1 Collection: D onald D avies’ Papers
# Persona] - GB 98 B
# Notes of Miscellaneous Scientific Work - GB 98 B
# Data Security MS Notes - GB 98 B
# Public Key Ciphers - CB 98 B
B .4  N a tio n a l A rchives
B.4.1 Collection: Records o f the D epartm ent o f Scientific 
and Industrial Research, the N ational P hysical Lab­
oratory
# Minutes of the Review Committee 1973 - DSIR 10/470
# Minutes of the Review Committee 1974 - DSIR 10/471
# Minutes of the Review Committee 1975 - DSIR 10/472
# Minutes of the Review Committee 1976 - DSIR 10/473
# Minutes of the Review Committee 1977 - DSIR 10/474
# Minutes of the Review Committee 1978 - DSIR 10/475
# Minutes of the Review Committee 1980 - DSIR 10/476
# Green Paper: Industrial Research and Development in Government Labora­
tories - DSIR 10/486
# Green Paper: Industrial Research and Development in Government Labora­
tories - DSIR 10/487
e Green Paper: A Framework for Government Research and Development - 
DSIR 10/488
# Advisory Board: Minutes and Papers 1969-1971 - DSIR 72/5
# Supervisory Board: Setting up and operation of the Board including some
minutes and papers 1986-1988 - DSIR 72/13 - Fol
# Supervisory Board: Minutes and Papers 1987-1988 - DSIR 72/14 - Fol
# Supervisory Board: Minutes and Papers 1988-1990 - DSIR 72/15 - Fol
# Steering Board: Minutes and Papers 1990 - DSIR 72/16 - Fol
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Steering Board: Minutes and Papers 1991 - DSIR 72/17 - Fol
Steering Board: Minutes and Papers 1992 - DSIR 72/18 - Fol
Steering Board: Minutes and Papers 1993 - DSIR 72/19 - Fol
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes 1970-1977 - DSIR 72/25 
Superintendents Meetings: Papers 1970-1974 - DSIR 72/37 
Superintendents Meetings: Papers 1975-1976 - DSIR 72/38 
Superintendents Meetings: Papers 1977 - DSIR 72/39 
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1978 - DSIR 72/40
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1979 - DSIR 72/41
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1980 - DSIR 72/42
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1981 - DSIR 72/43
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1982 - DSIR 72/44
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1983 - DSIR 72/45 - Fol
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1984 - DSIR 72/46 - Fol
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1985 - DSIR 72/47 - Fol
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1986 - DSIR 72/48 - Fol
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1987 - DSIR 72/49 - Fol
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1988 - DSIR 72/50 - Fol
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1989 - DSIR 72/51 - Fol
Superintendents Meetings: Minutes and Papers 1990 - DSIR 72/52 - Fol
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1970 - DSIR 72/75 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1971 - DSIR 72/76 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1972 - DSIR 72/77 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1973 - DSIR 72/78 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1974 - DSIR 72/79 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1975 - DSIR 72/80 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1976 - DSIR 72/81 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1977 - DSIR 72/82 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1978 - DSIR 72/83 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1979 - DSIR 72/84 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1980 - DSIR 72/85 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1981 - DSIR 72/86 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1982 - DSIR 72/87 
Directorate Committee: Minutes 1983 - DSIR 72/88 - Fol
Appendix B. 6"owces 278
# Directorate Committee: Minutes 1984 - DSIR, 72/89 - Fol
# Directorate Committee: Minutes 1985 - DSIR 72/90 - Fol
# Standards Committee: Minutes and Papers 1976 - Foi
# Standards Committee: Minutes and Papers 1977-1979 - DSIR 72/135
# Standards Committee: Agendas, Minutes, Correspondence and Papers 1975- 
1976 - DSIR 72/143
B .4 .2 Collection: Records of the H om e Office, M inistry of
H om e Security, and R elated  Bodies
# National Computing Centre Seminar on the Protection of Data by Cryptog­
raphy - HO 261/198
B .5  P arliam en tary  A rchives
B .5.1 Collection: Records o f the H ouse of Com m ons
# Trade and Industry Committee: Seventh Report, 1998-1999: "Building Con­
fidence in Electronic Commerce": The Government's Proposals (HC 187) - 
H C /CL/C O /CZ/1/19 - Fpl
# Trade and Industry Committee: Tenth Report, 1998-1999: Electronic Com­
merce (HC 648) - H C /CL/CO /CZ/1/22 - Fbl
# Trade and Industry Committee: Fourteenth Report, 1998-1999: The Draft 
Electronic Communications Bill (HC 862) - H C /CL/C O /CZ/1/25 - Fpl
B .6  R oyal H ollow ay A rchives
B .6.1 Collection: Royal Holloway C ollege Papers
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1970 - RHC/AL/100/10
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1971 - RHC/AL/100/10
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1972 - RHC/AL/100/10
e Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1973 - RHC/AL/100/10
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Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1974 - RHC/AL/100/10 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1975 - RHC/AL/100/11 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1976 - RHC/AL/100/11 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1977 - RHC/AL/100/11 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1978 - RHC/AL/100/11 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1979 - RHC/AL/100/11 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1980 - RHC/AL/100/13 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1981 - RHC/AL/100/13 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1982 - RHC/AL/100/13 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1983 - RHC/AL/100/13 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1984 - RHC/AL/100/13 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1985 - RHC/AL/100/14 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1970 - R H C /18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1971 - RH C/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1972 - RHC/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1973 - RH C/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1974 - RH C/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1975 - RH C/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1976 - RH C/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1977 - RH C/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1978 - R H C/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1979 - RHC/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1980 - RH C/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1981 - RHC/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1982 - RHC/18/19/3/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1970 - RHC/AL/170/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1971 - RHC/AL/170/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1972 - RHC/AL/170/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1973 - RHC/AL/170/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1974 - RHC/AL/170/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1975 - RHC/AL/170/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1976 - RHC/AL/170/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1977 - RHC/AL/170/4 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1978 - RHC/AL/170/4
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# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1979 - RHC/AL/170/4
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1980 - RHC/AL/170/4
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1981 - RHC/AL/170/4
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1982 - RHC/AL/170/4
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1983 - RHC/AL/170/4
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1984 - RHC/AL/170/4
B .6 .2 Collection: Royal Holloway and Bedford N ew  Col- 
l e g e  P a p e r s
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1986 - H B /C P /2 /2 /1 /1
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1987 - H B /C P /2 /2 /1 /1
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1988 - H B /C P /2 /2 /1 /1
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1989 - H B /C P /2 /2 /1 /2
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1990 - H B /C P /2 /2 /1 /2
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Board 1991 - H B /C P /2 /2 /1 /2
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Academic Planning Committee 1983 - 
H B /C P /1 /1 /4
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Academic Planning Committee 1984 - 
H B /C P /1 /1 /4
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Academic Planning Committee 1985 - 
H B /C P /1 /1 /4
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1986 - Uncat­
alogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1987 - Uncat­
alogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1988 - Uncat­
alogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1989 - Uncat­
alogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1990 - Uncat­
alogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Academic Planning Committee 1991 - Uncat­
alogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1985 - Uncatalogued
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# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1986 - Uncatalogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1987 - Uncatalogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1988 - Uncatalogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1989 - Uncatalogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1990 - Uncatalogued
# Minutes of the Meeting of the Faculty of Science 1991 - Uncatalogued
B .7  W ay back M achine
# Website of the National Physical Laboratory 
www.npl.co.uk
# Website of the Cambridge Computer Laboratory 
www.cl.cam.ac.uk
# Website of the Communications-Electronics Security Croup 
www.cesg.gov.uk
# Archives of the UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Croup 1997 
W W W . chiark. greenend. org. uk /  mailman/listinfo /  ukcrypto
# Archives of the UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Croup 1998 
www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/ukcrypto
# Archives of the UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Croup 1999 
www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/ukcrypto
# Archives of the UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Croup 2000 
www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/ukcrypto
# Archives of the UK Cryptography Policy Discussion Croup 2001 
WWW. chi ark. greenend. org. uk/  mailman/listinfo/  ukcrypto
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